OU_1 58587
A HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Such is the unity of all history that anyone who
endeavours to tell a piece of it must feel that his
first sentence tears a seamless web.
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK
H.M. KING Ml'HAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH
A HISTORY
OF
AFGHANISTAN
By
BRIG.-GEN. SIR PERCY SYKES
K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.
GOLD MEDALLIST OK THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL AND
ROYAL EMPIRE SOCIETIES. AUTHOR OF ' A HISTORY OF
PERSIA ', ' A HISTORY OF EXPLORATION ', ETC.
VOL. II
LONDON
MACMILLAN & CO. LTD
1940
COPYRIGHT
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXIX
PAGE
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR: THE OCCUPATION OF KABUL . . i
CHAPTER XXX
THE SURRENDER OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD . . -13
CHAPTER XXXI
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL . . . . . .22
CHAPTER XXXII
"RETRIBUTION . . . . . . . .38
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE SECOND REIGN OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD . . .61
CHAPTER XXXIV
SHIR ALI ESTABLISHES HIMSELF AS AMIR . . . .69
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA ACROSS CENTRAL ASIA . . .83
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE FIRST SEISTAN MISSION, 1872 . . . . 91
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE GENESIS OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR . . 97
v
vi HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
CHAPTER XXXVIII
PAGE
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR . . . . . .no
CHAPTER XXXIX
ABDUR RAHMAN is PROCLAIMED AMIR OF KABUL . . .120
CHAPTER XL
THE BATTLES OF MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR. . . . 139
CHAPTER XLI
ABDUR RAHMAN is ACKNOWLEDGED AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS
DEPENDENCIES . . . . . . . 151
CHAPTER XLII
THE PANJDEH CRISIS AND THE RUSSO-AFGHAN BOUNDARY COM-
MISSION . . . . . . . . 1,58
CHAPTER XLHI *
THE DURAND MISSION TO KABUL . . . . .169
CHAPTER XLIV
THE PAMIR AND OTHER BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS . . .178
CHAPTER XLV
ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES HIS REBELLIOUS SUBJECTS . . .189
CHAPTER XLVI
THE McMAHON MISSIONS ...... 201
CHAPTER XLVII
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN NEGOTIATES A NEW TREATY . .215
CONTENTS vii
CHAPTER XLVIII
PAGE
His MAJESTY HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA . . .225
CHAPTER XLIX
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION . . . . .231
CHAPTER L
THE TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO THE AMIR DURING THE GREAT
WAR ......... 246
CHAPTER LI
THE ASSASSINATION OF KING HABIBULLA AND THE ACCESSION OF
AMANULLA KHAN ....... 264
CHAPTER LII
THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR ...... 270
CHAPTER LIII
AFGHANISTAN ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE AN INDEPENDENT STATE . 283
CHAPTER LIV
KING AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS . . . . 295
CHAPTER LV
KING AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE ..... 302
CHAPTER LVI
THE TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA . . . . .310
CHAPTER LVII
NADIR KHAN OVERTHROWS THE BRIGAND HABIBULLA AND is ELECTED
KING OF AFGHANISTAN . . . . . .318
viii HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
CHAPTER LVIII
PAGE
THE ASSASSINATION OF KING NADIR SHAH AND THE ACCESSION OF
KING ZAHIR SHAH, 1933 ..... 327
EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . -337
APPENDIX A: The Simla Manifesto . . . ^ -339
B: The Treaty of Capitulation .... 344
C: Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rah-
man Khan, G. C.S.I., and Sir Henry Mortimer
Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I ..... 352
D: Translation of the Treaty . . . - 355
E: Articles of the Anglo-Russian Agreement as affecting
Afghanistan. . . . . . 356
F: The Treaty of Peace of August 8, 1919 . . 358
G: Note on Proposals of the British and Afghan Govern-
ments for a Treaty of Friendship . .360
H: The Treaty ......
LIST OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . 371
INDEX ......... 377
ILLUSTRATIONS
H.M. Kin Muhammad Zahir Shah .... Frontispiece
FACING PAGE
The Kabul Gate of Ghazni 1 1
The City of Kabul from the Bala Hissar . . . 19
Sirdar Akbar Khan 3 1
Lord Mayo receives Amir Shir Ali Khan at Ambala, 1869 . .78
Maiwand : The Last Stand H3
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan . . . . . . 1 54
The Pul-i-Khisti . .163
The Zulfikar Pass, looking north-east . . . . .163
H.M. King Habibulla Khan 228
MAPS
Sketch Map No. i 273
Sketch Map No. 2 275
Sketch Map No. 12 277
In pocket : Iran and Afghanistan, 2nd ed. of 1938. By
special courtesy of the Geographical Section, General Staff.
CHAPTER XXIX
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR'. THE OCCUPATION OF KABUL
The inhabitants of Kabul manifested the most complete indifference to
their new sovereign, and expressed no sign of welcome or satisfaction at his
accession to the throne. Evidently their hearts and affections were with their
previous sovereign, now a wanderer beyond the Hindu Kush. SIR GEORGE
LAWRENCE.
Lord Auckland settles his Policy. During the siege of
Herat, McNeill had sent Major Todd on a mission to
induce Auckland to adopt vigorous measures against
Persia, since the fall of Herat, in his opinion, was
imminent. The Board of Control of the East India
Company, realizing the aggressive spirit of Russia, had
alsJb urged the Governor-General to take strong action in
defence of their eastern possessions. The siege of Herat
by Muhammad Shah and his claims to the sovereignty of
Kandahar undoubtedly constituted a serious menace to
the British in India, and it was clear that a barrier of some
sort against invasion from the west was essential. It would
have been thought that Dost Muhammad was the best man
to support and subsidize, but so influenced was Auckland
by Wade's views of the importance of decrepit Ranjit Singh,
and also by his own policy of restraining Sikh designs of
aggression on Sind, that, having abandoned all ideas of
utilizing the Amir, his thoughts turned to the Maharaja.
The Mission of Macnaghten to Ranjit Singh. In May
1838 Macnaghten was accordingly despatched to Lahore
on a Mission to discuss the question with the Sikh ruler.
Received with due pomp and ceremony, the British
envoy referred to the treaty which the Maharaja had made
with Shah Shuja, and suggested that the British Govern-
ment should become a party to it. " This ", replied
Ranjit, " would be adding sugar to milk." Upon the
VOL. II I B
2 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
receipt of this satisfactory answer, Macnaghten went on
to say that the Governor-General would supply Shah
Shuja with money and officers. It was finally decided
that the ex- Amir would march on Kandahar, while a
Sikh force, with Timur, the son of Shah Shuja, would
march on Kabul via Peshawar. The Maharaja, generally
speaking, was not disposed to help the scheme enthusi-
astically, since he realized that, if it were successful, the
power of the British would be increased to his own detri-
ment, as also would that of Shah Shuja. Moreover, he
was aware that the Khalsa feared the Khaibar Pass and
its warlike custodians. Finally, he realized that he was
to pull the chestnuts out of the fire or, to quote the
apposite Persian metaphor, " the beak of appetite was to
be tempted by the fruit of conquest and the berries of
revenge ". However, the Tripartite Treaty was duly
signed on July 16 by Shah Shuja and on July 23 by the
Maharaja. 1 It was in effect a treaty between Ranjit
Singh and Shah Shuja, which the British Government
guaranteed.
The Instructions of the Board of Control. In Mffj?
1838 Auckland had drawn up a minute in which he laid
down that the only solution of the Afghan problem was
the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne, and it is a
curious fact which deserves mention that, just before this
minute reached England, the Board of Control, on
October 24, recommended the very course which the
Governor-General had decided to adopt. At the same
time it was left to the discretion of Lord Auckland to
make another effort to gain over Dost Muhammad an&
his brothers. 2 Unfortunately, when this letter reached
India on January 16, 1839, a British army was on its
way to invade Afghanistan. It was too late.
The Decision to despatch a British Force to Kabul.
Macnaghten explained to the Governor-General that
1 This lengthy document is given in full by Kaye, op. cif. vol. i, pp. 332-335. By its
terms Shah Shuja relinquished all claims on the provinces in the possession of Ranjit
Singh. He also engaged to pay him annually 2 lakhs of rupees in return for his armed
support in case of need.
2 The text of this letter is given in John Russell Colvin, by Sir Auckland Colvin,
pp. 124-128.
xxix THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 3
Ranjit Singh refused to accept the full responsibility that
it had been desired to lay upon him, while it was very
difficult to believe that Shah Shuja could, within a
reasonable time, raise and discipline a force which would
ensure him success. Consequently, in July, Auckland
came to the conclusion that a British force must be sent
to Kabul to set Shah Shuja on the throne. It is only right,
at this pgint, to place on record a letter which Burnes
wrote to Macnaghten : l " It remains to be reconsidered
why we cannot act with Dost Muhammad. He is a man
of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high opinion of
the British nation ; and if half you must do for others
were done for him, and offers made which he could see
conduced to his interests, he would abandon Russia and
Persia tomorrow." Unfortunately Auckland and his
chief advisers lacked vision and insight, and the stage
was set for the First Afghan War.
The Simla Manifesto of October i, 1838. While a
British force was being assembled, the Governor-General
issued a Manifesto which denounced the attitude of
Dost Muhammad, whose defensive measures against Sikh
aggression at the mouth of the Khaibar appear in this
document as " a sudden and unprovoked attack upon the
troops of our ancient ally Ranjit Singh ". Indeed the
Manifesto, which is given in full in Appendix A, might
in some parts have been drafted by the Maharaja himself.
To quote Sir Henry Durand: " In order to repel the
shadow of Russian aggression, we had resolved to force
Shah Shuja, a weakened worthless exile, upon the Afghan
people, till then well disposed towards us; and this great
and unprovoked injustice, the cause of all our subsequent
troubles in Afghanistan, was to be effected by military
measures of which the rashness and folly seem at the
present day almost inconceivable ". 2 To quote Keene:
" The only parallel to Auckland's policy was Louis XIV
endeavouring to expel William of Orange, to make room
for James Stuart ". 3
1 Dated June 2, 1838.
2 Life of Sir Henry Durand, by Henry Mortimer Durand, vol. i, p. 40.
3 History of India, by H. G. Keene, vol. ii, p. 143.
4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Raising of the Siege of Herat. Before the pro-
clamation was issued, the Shah, as we have seen, had
retired baffled from Herat in September 1838. Surely,
on the disappearance of the Russo-Persian menace, it
would have been the obvious course to have cancelled the
military expedition and to have assisted Dost Muhammad
by subsidies to strengthen his position in Afghanistan.
The Tripartite Treaty had, of course, to be tjken into
consideration, but it did not pledge the British Govern-
ment to march troops into Afghanistan, and it seems clear
that the invasion of that country should, under the new
conditions, have been cancelled.
The Army of the Indus. The British army for the
invasion of Afghanistan was assembled at Ferozepur, 450
miles distant from Sukkur, the point at which the Indus
would be crossed. From Sukkur to Kandahar was 400
miles, and from that city to Kabul was 325 miles. The
original plan was that two Bengal divisions and one
Bombay division should be employed, in case it might be
necessary to attack the Persian army besieging Herat.
Owing to the retreat of that force, the expeditionary arnty
was reduced to one Bengal and one Bombay Division
under Sir John Keane, the Bombay Commander- in -
Chief.
The Organization of Transport and Supplies. Army
transport, as we know it today, did not exist. To quote
Macmunn: " The Indian Army supplied itself from a
huge moving city of shops, which followed it a-pack-a-
back. . . . The regimental merchants and agents fed the
men in staples; shoes and equipments were mended irt
the bazaars, and every requisite, legitimate or otherwise,
except fighting-stores and equipment could be bought
from the hucksters and sutlers who followed the army.
. . . The huge numbers of followers who maintained
these shops, pitched tents, and the like, made sanitation
beyond the power of man to establish, and when cholera
came it swept the camps." x
The Contingent of Shah Shuja. The force raised by
Shah Shuja consisted of six battalions of infantry, two
' Afghanistan^ by Lieut.-Gcneral Sir George Macmunn, pp. 117-118.
xxix THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 5
irregular cavalry regiments and one battery of horse
artillery. Recruiting was necessarily hurried, but, under
picked British officers, the Gurkhas, the Hindustani and
Punjabi Moslems soon improved and constituted a force
some 6000 strong.
The Appointments of Mr. W. H. Macnaghten and of
Sir Alexander Burnes. The very important post of
" Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of
India at *the Court of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk " was given
to Macnaghten. At the same time Burnes was to be
employed " under Mr. Macnaghten's directions, as envoy
to the chief of Kalat or other states ". Auckland ex-
plained to him that when the Kalat province had been
crossed he would regard him as " an independent political
officer to cooperate with Macnaghten ".
The Line of March. Owing to the objections of
Ranjit Singh to the British army traversing the Punjab,
it was decided that the line of march should run in a
south-westerly direction through Bahawalpur and Sind,
striking down to the Indus and crossing that river at
Sukkur, an island fortress opposite Sukkur. From the
Indus it would turn north-west to Shikarpur, would
travers^ the Bolan Pass to Quetta and thence across the
Khojak Pass to Kandahar. It was much the same route
as that followed by the ex-Amir in his last unsuccessful
attempt to regain the throne. It was also decided that
Shah Shuja should raise a large sum of money from the
Amirs of Sind, although they held two releases written
in Korans duly signed and sealed by him. In the event
these Chiefs were treated with injustice and harshness.
The March to Bukkur. The main British force,
marching in the cold season and supplied to some extent
with water transport, found the first section of the long
march easy, but the Amir of Khairpur, who owned the
ancient fortress of Bukkur, situated on the island in the
Indus where it had to be crossed, hesitated to allow the
British to occupy it. Indeed, after his acceptance of the
treaty by which it was to be ceded, powder-bags accom-
panied the detachment of the troops which was sent to
receive possession, by way of precaution, in case it should
6 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
be found necessary to blow in the gate. 1
The March of the Bombay Division. In December
1838 the Bombay division under Sir John Keane landed
at the mouth of the Indus, where Sir Henry Pottinger
informed him of the hostility of the Amirs of Haiderabad.
Keane thereupon called for the despatch of a reserve force,
which arrived at Karachi early in February 1839. Since
fire was opened by the Karachi fort, it was bombarded
and seized by the British. In the meanwhile tne Bengal
division which had reached Bukkur had started to march
down the Indus to support Keane, and the vacillating
Amirs now realized that they must submit. They
accordingly signed a treaty by the terms of which they
paid tribute to the British, and the Bombay division joined
the main force without further incident.
The March up the Bolan Pass. The Bengal division
now advanced to Shikarpur without experiencing diffi-
culty as to supplies, but the next section of the march
to Dadur, 146 miles in length, lay across an arid and more
or less waterless tract. At Dadur little in the way of
supplies had been collected, and Sir Willoughby Cottowj
who was in command, decided to draw on the month's
supply which accompanied his force, and thus* relying
entirely on this reserve, entered the difficult Bolan Pass.
Burnes had been successful in arranging for the repre-
sentative of the Khan of Kalat to accompany the column
but, even so, the sixty miles of rocks and sand constituting
the Pass, which wore to the quick the hoofs of the trans-
port, its scanty grazing and its water tainted by bodies
of camels which had fallen by the way, entailed much
sickness and a serious loss of artillery horses and camels.
Fortunately there was no concerted attack by the wild
Baluchi tribesmen.
On March 26, 1839, the tired Bengal column reached
the delightful upland of Shal, with Quetta (still known as
Shalkot in Persia), then a miserable mud fort, situated on
a mound. The force, which was most unwisely ordered
1 Mir Rustam of Khairpur told Burnes that the cession of his fortress would ruin his
good reputation unless Karachi or some other fort were seized from the Haiderabad Amirs.
He must therefore have been delighted to hear of the bombardment and capture of
Karachi.
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 7
by Keane to halt until his arrival, was now faced with
famine, in arid Baluchistan, and Cotton perforce reduced
the rations of the troops to one-half, while those of the
unfortunate followers were reduced to one-quarter. For
eleven days the force halted, idly consuming supplies
and losing efficiency from lack of proper rations, alike for
man and beast. No advantage was taken of this oppor-
tunity to send out reconnaissance parties to survey and
report on the Khojak Pass. There was apparently no
intelligence department in existence at that period.
The Mission of Burnes to the Khan of Kalat. Burnes
visited Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Kalat, who provided
a small quantity of grain there had been a blight in the
previous year and a considerable number of sheep.
He frankly told his guest that the British might restore
Shah Shuja to the throne, but that the Afghans were
opposed to him and that we should fail in the end. He
somewhat unwillingly sealed a treaty by the terms of
which, in return for an annual subsidy of ij lakhs of
rupees, he agreed to " use his best endeavours to procure
cupplies, carriage and guards " in the Kalat province.
Actually he had good reason to dislike Shah Shuja,
whom Hfe had succoured on his former campaign and now
charged with ingratitude; alleging illness, he refused to
visit him.
The Advance on Kandahar. In due course the main
body of the army and the Shah, with his contingent,
reached Quetta. Letters were received from the Kandahar
Barakzai brothers, who were anxious to negotiate for
terms and were, it was clear, most unlikely to resist.
Shah Shuja thereupon led the advance across the Khojak
Pass, and, upon approaching Kandahar, was met by some
of the leading Chiefs, who were rewarded with lavish
gifts of money.
The Entry of Shah Shuja into Kandahar. On April 25,
with pomp and circumstance, Shah Shuja re-entered
Kandahar. He was warmly welcomed by the towns-
people, according to the reports received by Macnaghten,
but it would appear that many of the influential Chiefs
waited to see how events would shape themselves before
8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
giving their allegiance to an Amir who was supported
by a British army and who was considered to be unlucky.
The Barakzai brothers, in the first instance, proceeded to
Girishk and then rode off to Seistan. They received offers
of a residence in India with allowances, but preferred to
retain their liberty, hoping, no doubt, that the British
troops would before long be withdrawn.
The Position at Kandahar. Keane had now accom-
plished one of the main objects of the expeflition and
decided to rest his force and reorganize his transport
train. The question of supplies was unsatisfactory,
those available at Kandahar being scanty, but the crops
were ripe and would soon be harvested.
The Mission to Herat. After the retreat of the Persian
army, Pottinger and Stoddart had remained at Herat to
help its unfortunate inhabitants, who were starving. Yar
Muhammad, the main source of whose income was slave-
dealing, was hostile to the activities of the British officers.
Later, Stoddart was instructed to proceed to Bukhara,
where he was imprisoned and murdered by its ruler,
while Pottinger was insulted and his house was attacked
by the retainers of Yar Muhammad in January 1839.
At the same time the infamous Vizier opened up'relations
with the Persian Court and the Kandahar brothers, with
a view to opposing the reinstatement of Shah Shuja.
Needless to say the Persian Court declined to take any
open part in this policy.
Upon the arrival of the British at Kandahar, Yar
Muhammad hastened to congratulate the British. Mac-
naghten thereupon decided to send a Mission to Herat
under Major Todd, who had been a member of the British
Military Mission in Persia, to replace Pottinger. With
him were James Abbot and Richmond Shakespear, both
of whom subsequently won fame in Central Asia. Their
Mission included the conciliation of the good-will of
Shah Kamran and of Yar Muhammad, the strengthening
of the fortifications at Herat and the determination as
far as was possible of the boundaries of the province.
They were supplied with guns and considerable sums of
money.
xxix THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 9
The Position of Dost Muhammad. The peaceful
occupation by the British of Kandahar hardly astonished
the Amir but nevertheless it constituted a blow to his
position, since news reached him that the neighbouring
Chiefs, won over by gold, were joining his enemy. He
had despatched Akbar Khan to hold the passes against
the Sikh army, which was assembling at Peshawar;
another son, Haider Khan, garrisoned Ghazni, and Afzal
Khan l with a body of cavalry was stationed in the vicinity
of the fortress. It had been reported that the British
would march on Herat and again that they would mask
Ghazni and march on Kabul. In any case the position of
Dost Muhammad was one of very great difficulty.
The Advance up the Khaibar Pass of the Sikh Force.
Before describing the advance of the British army on
Ghazni and Kabul, a brief notice of Prince Timur and his
Sikh supporters is called for. Accompanied by Wade, he
left Lahore in January 1839 and recruited troops at
Peshawar with some difficulty, as the Sikh Commander
thwarted his schemes by endeavouring to gain allies for
Ranjit Singh. That potentate died on June 29, before
the forcing of the Khaibar Pass by Wade's force, entirely
by meafhs of his own troops, helped to complete the suc-
cess of a campaign in which he wished the British to be
defeated.
The Advance on Ghazni^ June 27, 1839. Towards
the end of June it was decided to march on Kabul.
Optimistic Macnaghten guaranteed Keane that not a shot
would be fired, and proposed that the Bombay division
should be left at Kandahar. The British leader mis-
trusted Macnaghten 's predictions and insisted on thie
army being kept as a united force. He was, however,
persuaded by the officer commanding the artillery to
leave behind the four 1 8-pounders, his only siege guns.
Accordingly, two battalions of Indian troops, a body of
the Shah's cavalry and the siege guns were left to hold
Kandahar. Partly owing to the Ghilzai tribesmen being
engaged in harvesting operations, the column was not
1 Afzal Khan was the eldest son and the father of Abdur Rahman Khan, the great
Amir.
io HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
attacked on the march. Ghazni, however, with its parapet
rising to a height of 70 feet and surrounded by a wide
wet ditch, in the absence of siege guns, appeared to be as
impregnable as Afghans boasted that it was. Fortun-
ately, however, a traitor gave the priceless information
that, although most of the city gates had been built up,
the Kabul gate had been left open presumably to serve
as a bolt-hole. Supplies had fallen short, and^rejecting
the suggestion of the Chief Engineer to mask th'e fortress
and march on Kabul, Keane gave orders to carry Ghazni
by a coup de main.
Sir Henry Durand, at that time a lieutenant in the
Bengal Engineers, was ordered to lead the powder party,
and since the exploit was the crowning achievement of
the campaign, I am giving a full account of it:
The morning star was high in the heavens, and the first red
streak of approaching morning was on the horizon, when the
explosion party stepped forward to its duty. In perfect silence, led
by the engineer Durand, they advanced to within 150 yards of the
works, when a challenge from the walls, a shot, and a shout, told
that the party was discovered. Instantly the garrison were on the
alert; their musketry rang free and quick from the ramparts, and
blue lights suddenly glared on the top of the battlements, Brilliantly
illuminating the approach to the gate. A raking fire from the low
outer works, which swept the bridge at half pistol-shot, would have
annihilated the engineers and their men, but, strange to say, though
the ramparts flashed fire from every loophole, the bridge was passed
without a shot from the lower works, at the sally-port of which
the engineer Peat took post, prepared, with a small party of the
1 3th, to repel any sally of swordsmen. Without a blow from a
sword or a shot from the lower works, and without the loss of
a man from the heavy fire of the battlements, Durand reached
the gate, and having laid the first bag of powder containing
the end of the hose, man after man stepped up, deposited his
powder, and retired as they had advanced, in single file, edging
the foot of the wall, and under the eye and charge of the engineer
Macleod. 1
To continue the narrative: there was some delay
owing to the portfire not immediately igniting, but
finally " a column of flame and smoke rising above the
1 The First Afghan War^ by Major-General Sir Henry Durand, pp. 177-178.
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 1 1
gateway and followed by a dull heavy report, proved that
the charge was sprung ".
Then followed a delay. Peat's bugler had been killed
and, by mistake, a bugler with the main column sounded
the retreat. Fortunately the error was speedily rectified;
the storming column charged cheering through the gate-
way to be followed by the main column, and Ghazni
was captured by storm, with slight losses in killed and
wounded, on July 23, 1839.
At that time the Victoria Cross had not been instituted,
but, some forty years later, Durand's exploit was com-
memorated by the foundation of a " Durand Medal ",
which is still awarded to Indian officers of the Corps of
Sappers and Miners. The troops were honoured by a
special Ghazni medal, and the storming party of the 1 3th
Somerset Light Infantry gained a mural crown as a
distinction for the regiment.
The Flight of Dost Muhammad. The capture of
Ghazni struck terror among the Afghans and paralysed
the resistance of Dost Muhammad. He sent his brother,
the Nawab Jabbar Khan, to the British camp with the
proposal that the Amir should be prime minister to Shah
Shuja, But Macnaghten coldly refused it, offering in its
stead an " honourable asylum " in India. Jabbar Khan
declined and left the camp.
To his army encamped at Urghundeh Dost Muham-
mad made one final appeal with the Koran in his hand,
calling upon his adherents to remember that they were
Moslems and adjuring them to fight the invading British
6r to die. However, his supporters were thunderstruck
by the storming of Ghazni and not only was he deserted,
but his camp was looted by his personal servants. Realiz-
ing the situation, the Amir, encumbered with women and
children, fled, and although hotly pursued, escaped to
Balkh. His intention had been to take refuge in Persia,
but being offered an asylum by Nasrulla Khan of Bukhara
he proceeded to the Court of the Uzbeg Amir.
The Occupation of Kabul. Keane halted a week at
Ghazni, which was found to be well stocked with supplies,
and, leaving a garrison to hold it, marched on towards
12 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.XXIX
his goal. No opposition was offered, and on August 7
Shah Shuja, without a show of welcome by his subjects,
made his public entry into Kabul, thirty years after having
fled the country. Thanks to British gold and British
bayonets, he had been restored to the throne of his
ancestors.
CHAPTER XXX
THJf SURRENDER OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD
A mock King; a civil administration hated because under foreign dictation
and dissonant from the feelings of the Afghans; an envoy, the real King,
ruling by gleam of British bayonets, and thus enabled to impose his measures
however crude or unpalatable; a large army> raising by its consumption the
price of provisions, and preying on the resources of a very poor country; these
were the inevitable concomitants of having shrunk from at once, in good faith
and in good policy, withdrawing the British army, while the moral impression
made by its entire success was fresh and deep upon the Afghan mind. SIR
HENRY DURAND.
The Views of Lord Auckland. The objects of the
Army of the Indus, which were the expulsion of Dost
Muhammad, together with his brothers who ruled at
Kandahar, and the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne,
had been accomplished. Dost Muhammad and his two
sons, A*zal and Akbar, had fled to Bukhara and had
virtually been made prisoners by the Uzbeg ruler. The
tribes had submitted and, in Macnaghten's opinion,
although this was not the general view, had welcomed
Shuja. It now apparently only remained to redeem Auck-
land's promise that " when once he (Shah Shuja) shall be
secured in power, and the independence and integrity
of Afghanistan established, the British army will be with-
drawn ".'
There were many weighty objections to the continued
occupation of Afghanistan by British troops. It was,
however, the considered opinion of Auckland that were
British troops entirely withdrawn, Shah Shuja would
not be able to maintain himself, and that, to withdraw
them and then to be followed down the Khaibar Pass by
a refugee Amir, would constitute a disgrace which the
1 In this chapter I have consulted Forty-three Tears in India> by Lieut.-General Sir
George Lawrence, a work, based on his letters, which, owing to his position as Military
Secretary to Macnaghten, is of the greatest value.
13
i 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Government was not prepared to face. The Governor-
General accordingly laid down that a brigade of all arms
should be sufficient to keep Shuja on the throne and that
the rest of the army should be withdrawn. It is to be
noted that the war was already constituting a very serious
drain on Indian finances.
The Withdrawal of British Troops. Keane, whose
views coincided with those of the Governor-Gqieral, led
a column of troops, which included horse artillery and
cavalry, down the Khaibar Pass to India in October,
The turbulent Afridis had been promised their customary
allowances by Shah Shuja but, since his promise was not
implemented, they attacked Ak Masjid and harassed
detachments until Macnaghten decided to pay the recog-
nized sums.
The Storming of Kalat. The Bombay division was
ordered to march back to India through the Bolan Pass,
It turned aside to storm Kalat, where the behaviour of
Mehrab Khan was considered to have been unsatisfactory.
The Indian troops, who had not taken part in the storming
of Ghazni, covered themselves with glory, since the fort
was very strong and the resistance offered was desperate.
It would appear that Mehrab Khan, who was kiTled, did
not deserve his fate, but was betrayed by his own retainers.
As a result of this successful operation, Shal, Mastung
and Cutch were added to the domains of Shah Shuja,
The Arrival at Kabul of Colonel Wade and Prince Timur.
To return to Wade, his task at Peshawar was a difficult
one. Ranjit Singh was dead; his representatives were
bent on increasing the influence of Lahore and the SikhS
feared the Khaibar Pass. Finally, Timur proved to be a
nonentity. Nothing daunted, however, Wade enlisted a
motley force which was disciplined by capable British
officers, and as mentioned above, forcing the Khaibar Pass,
the column attacked Ak Masjid. The artillery bombard-
ment disheartened the garrison, which was not supported
by Akbar Khan, he having been recalled to the capital by
Dost Muhammad. The stronghold was consequently
evacuated and no further opposition was encountered.
On September 3, Wade, to whom much credit is due
xxx SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD 15
on this occasion, reached Kabul with a body of troops
which constituted a reinforcement. While at Peshawar
he had also corresponded with various important Chiefs
at Kabul and had done much to undermine the position
of Dost Muhammad.
The Distribution of Troops in Afghanistan. By a
general order dated October 9, under the command of
Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, the I3th Light
Infantry, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery and
the 35th Native Infantry were to remain at Kabul and
to be accommodated in the Bala Hissar. The 48th Native
Infantry, the 4th Brigade and 2nd Cavalry were to be
cantoned at Jalalabad. Ghazni was to be garrisoned by
the 1 6th Native Infantry, by a squadron of Skinner's
Horse and by detachments of the Shah's contingeat.
Finally, under Major -General Nott, Kandahar was to
be held by the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, with
the 4th Co. 2nd Battalion Artillery, two squadrons of
Skinner's Horse and some of the Shah's contingent.
The Despatch of Troops to Bamian. The danger to
the restored monarchy in Afghanistan lay principally in
the possibility of Dost Muhammad returning to Afghan
Turkistan and raising a force in that area. Accordingly a
detachment of Shah Shuja's army with some field artillery
was despatched to garrison Bamian during the winter
a dangerous dispersal of troops. Dr. Lord, the political
officer, created local hostility by attacking a Hazara
fort whose inhabitants had refused to sell their scanty
supplies of forage, on which their own cattle depended
ift the winter. The assailants fired the forage and the
unfortunate Hazaras were burned alive or shot. He also
pushed forward troops to Bajgah and occupied Saighan,
situated on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush.
Although these forward movements resulted in Jabbar
Khan placing himself and the family of Dost Muhammad
under British protection, the political effect was unsatis-
factory and attacks were made on these outlying detach-
ments, which were ultimately withdrawn.
The King and Macnaghten proceed to Jalalabad. In
the autumn the King and Macnaghten, in accordance
1 6 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
with the usual custom of the Afghan rulers, left for
Jalalabad, and Burnes, whose advice had apparently not
been sought by Macnaghten, was left in temporary
political charge. The economic position at Kabul was
unsatisfactory, since the cost of living had been raised
by the purchase of large quantities of supplies at high
prices for the use of troops. The grain and forage that
were grown in the neighbourhood did not suffix for the
supply of the large demands made by the British.
The Russian Expedition against Khiva. Upon receiv-
ing information of Perovski's expedition, which is
described in Chapter XXXV, Macnaghten, who feared
that the occupation of Khiva would have been followed
by that of Bukhara, seriously thought of despatching a
British force against the latter state in order to forestall
Russia, thus proving his unsuitability for the very im-
portant post he was occupying. At this period he also pro-
posed sending Burnes on a mission to the Russian camp.
To this suggestion Burnes replied that he would willingly
go if ordered, and not deeming this comment sufficiently
enthusiastic, Macnaghten abandoned the plan. The com-
plete failure of the Russian expedition transformed the
situation and was a great relief to him.
The Sikh Question. Another important question was
the attitude of the Sikhs since the death of Ranjit Singh.
They had, as we have seen, rendered no effectual help to
Wade and Timur; they were not maintaining a contingent
force in return for the subsidy granted by the Tripartite
Treaty, and they were encouraging Ghilzai refugees to
foment disturbances against Shah Shuja from the shekel
of their frontier forts. Macnaghten realized very clearly
that, without the right of way across the Punjab, which
the Khalsa strongly objected to grant, the British position
in Afghanistan would rapidly deteriorate.
The Position at Herat. Yar Muhammad had quickly
shown his true character to Major D'Arcy Todd. The
treaty, by which Shah Kamran bound himself not to
negotiate with other states without the consent of the
British Resident, had only been signed a few weeks when
proof was forthcoming that the treacherous Vizier was
SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD 17
seeking the protection of the Persian Government and
was proposing a treaty for the expulsion from Afghanistan
of the infidel British!
As was to be supposed, Yar Muhammad hated Todd,
who was anxious to abolish the slave trade in Central Asia,
just as he had hated Pottinger. To meet the situation,
Macnaghten strongly recommended that a British force
should be t despatched against Herat, which city, upon its
capture, should be annexed to Shah Shuja's dominions.
But Auckland decided to send money and still more
money and Yar Muhammad continued to intrigue
with the Persian Government. Our policy was founded
on bayonets or gold. Finally, realizing the folly of his
money-bag policy the advances to the people and
Governor of Herat amounted to 200,000 Auckland
was disposed to resort to bayonets, but the Commander-
in-Chief pointed out that any advance upon Herat or
Bukhara was out of the question.
Before long, Yar Muhammad was proved guilty of
inciting the Durranis of Zamindavar to rise. Moreover,
in February 1841, he demanded still more money, and
when Todd replied that he would require some guarantee
that such concessions would not be thrown away, the
Vizier demanded the money or the departure of the
Mission. To quote Kaye: " Never before, perhaps, had
the British Government been so insulted and so outraged
in the person of its representatives. . . . There is little
doubt that, if the Mission had remained longer at Herat,
the members of it would have been subjected to indignities
oT the worst kind." l
Auckland, instead of showing sympathy for Todd,
removed him from political employment. He further
lowered British prestige by writing conciliatory letters to
Yar Muhammad, expressing regret at occurrences which
had interrupted mutual good relations,
The Position of Shah Shuja. Shah Shuja was a monarch
supported by foreign troops. Apart from the British
garrisons, there was the Shah's army, to which were
added local corps, all officered by the British and paid by
1 Op. cit. vol. ii, p. 1 10.
1 8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
them. With these troops occupying forts in commanding
positions, taxes were levied and the turbulent Afghans,
to some extent, were controlled. It is to be noted,
however, that Macnaghten retained in his own hands the
right to send out expeditions against revolting tribes. He
settled the strength of each force and gave detailed in-
structions to their commanders as to the objectives and
the method to be followed for their attainment. The
British thus incurred unpopularity for these expeditions,
many of which were necessitated by the tyranny and
greed of the Shah and his favourites. They were un-
desirable from the military point of view, while the
system was not only bound to be unpopular to the
independent, fanatical Afghans but also to the Amir, who
resented his lack of power. We have seen how Ahmad
Shah instituted a feudal system under which each tribe
was liable to military service. The new system, however,
was far beyond the capacity of poverty-stricken Afghani-
stan to support and was thoroughly unsound.
From his own point of view, Shah Shuja realized that
he was only a King in name and proofs were not lacking
that he and his Ministers were secretly fomenting dis-
turbances in Zamindawar and elsewhere. Indeed, it was
only reasonable to expect that, chafing under the system
imposed upon him, he would constantly throw grit into
the creaking machinery of dual government. Had he
been allowed to rule his subjects by Afghan methods
with the support of a subsidy, he might possibly have
succeeded, although the fact that Dost Muhammad, who
was virtually held a prisoner by the Amir of Bukhara,
was still liable to reappear on the scene certainly con-
stituted a serious element in a difficult problem.
The Position in Afghanistan, 1 840. In the spring, the
Ghilzais, who had given trouble in the previous autumn
and had been punished by Captain Outram, again re-
belled and cut the communications between Kandahar
and Kabul. A composite force under Captain Anderson
marched out and attacked a body some 2000 strong.
With the valour for which the tribe is noted, the Ghilzais
charged twice but were beaten off with heavy loss. After
3-.': '. 1;,
t
w
DC
H
xxx SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD 19
some negotiations, Macnaghten decided to pay the Chiefs
the equivalent of 3000 per annum, in return for guaran-
teeing the safety of the road.
In the Kalat area the youthful son of Mehrab Khan,
crying for vengeance, attacked Kalat, and Newaz Khan,
to whom it had been given, abdicated in favour of the
rightful heir. The political officer, Lieutenant Loveday,
was madea prisoner and was subsequently murdered.
The Adventures of Dost Muhammad. At this period the
refugee Amir escaped from Bukhara. His horse fell,
tired out, but, dyeing his beard with ink, he thereby
baffled the vigilance of the Amir's officials and crossed the
Oxus. There he was welcomed by the Vali of Khulm and
was able to raise a strong force among the Uzbegs of the
province, so that, early in September, he advanced on
Bamian at the head of 6000 men. The British had
evacuated both Bajgah and Saighan, but an Afghan regi-
ment, which had garrisoned these posts, deserted with its
arms and ammunition to their late ruler.
The reappearance of Dost Muhammad on the scene
had created a ferment not only in Kabul, but also in the
Kuhistar^ to the north of the capital, and indeed all over
the country. There was also proof that Nao Nehal Singh,
the ruling Sikh Prince, was in communication with him,
while Sikh emissaries were busy in Afghanistan with anti-
British propaganda.
The Defeat of Dost Muhammad, September 1840.
Brigadier Dennie had been despatched to Bamian with
reinforcements consisting of an Indian regiment, and had
taken command of the troops. He met the enemy, who
had occupied several forts north of the defile leading into
the Bamian Valley. His artillery wrought havoc on the
dense bodies of Uzbeg horsemen, who finally broke and
were pursued for miles along the narrow defile. Dost
Muhammad escaped by the speed of his horse. This
opportune victory resulted in the Vali of Khulm tendering
his submission and promising not to aid Dost Muhammad
or his sons. In Northern Afghanistan the reaction was
temporarily most favourable to the British.
The Reappearance of Dost Muhammad in the Kuhistan.
20 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The dauntless ex- Amir had said : " I resemble a wooden
spoon : you may throw me hither and thither, but I shall
not be hurt ". He reappeared in the Kuhistan, where the
lawless chiefs, who strongly objected to paying taxes,
joined him. To meet this rebellion, Sale marched out
and attempted to storm a strong fort, but failed. The
rebels subsequently evacuated the position, but the failure
of the storming party affected British prestige.* The in-
cessant activities of Dost Muhammad caused alarm at
Kabul, and Macnaghten, fearing a siege, called for re-
inforcements from India. On November 2, at Pur-
wandarra, Dost Muhammad engaged the Indian cavalry,
which fled, while its British officers, charging the enemy
unsupported, were killed or wounded. Among the killed
was Dr. Lord. The Afghan horsemen then attacked the
British infantry position, which remained firm, and the
enemy were finally driven from the field. After this
action Burnes, who was unduly depressed by it, advised
Macnaghten that the force should fall back on Kabul, on
which centre all British troops should be concentrated.
The Surrender of Dost Muhammad. The virile
Afghans hold high ideals as to valour, and the ^ex-Amir
realized that, while he had scattered the Indian cavalry,
he could not defeat the British. Considering then that
he could surrender with honour, after his successful
charge, he rode towards Kabul and, meeting Macnaghten,
who was riding outside the city with George Lawrence,
dramatically seized the envoy's hand, " which he put to
his forehead and his lips as a sign of submission ".
Lawrence adds to his account: " The appearance of the
Dost was rather disappointing, quite different from what
I had imagined. He was a robust, powerful man, with a
sharp aquiline nose, highly arched eyebrows, and a grey
beard and moustache, which evidently had not been
trimmed for a long time."
In accordance with the best British traditions, the
gallant Afghan was treated with honour, not only by the
envoy but also by British officers, who paid him marked
attention. Macnaghten, indeed, in a letter claiming
liberal treatment for our enemy, wrote: " Shah Shuja
xxx SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD 21
had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him
of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never
offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the
victim." l For this generous candour we can forgive
much to Macnaghten.
On November 12, 1840, Dost Muhammad left
Kabul under escort for India, where he was received with
courtesy and generous hospitality. Granted an annual
allowance of 2 lakhs of rupees, he settled down at Calcutta
and watched events.
The surrender and deportation of Dost Muhammad,
which created a period of unprecedented tranquillity,
would seem to have left no excuse for the British force
remaining in Afghanistan. The only formidable rival of
Shah Shuja had disappeared off the scene and the British
army should have followed him to India, more especially
as Shah Shuja considered that he could now maintain
himself on the throne without our support.
To quote Durand: " No more striking event could
be conceived for an honourable termination to the armed
occupation of Afghanistan, and for the triumphant return
of the Anglo-Indian army to its own frontier. By furnish-
ing so ifnhoped for an occasion, Providence removed all
reasonable ground of excuse or hesitation, and afforded
the Indian Government the very occasion which it pre-
ferred to await." Incredible as it seems to the historian,
Macnaghten decided that British troops must remain in
Afghanistan. He thus became responsible for the tragedy
which was so soon to follow his unwise decision.
1 Sir W. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson, Jan. 12, 1841.
CHAPTER XXXI
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL
Their plain duty was to have attacked the rebels in the cu.y uic moment
they realized what was going on, and those who refused or neglected to give
orders to that effect, involved the many brave men who served under them, and
who asked for nothing better than to die sword in hand, in undeserved blame.
WELLINGTON.
In the pages of a heathen writer, over such a story as this would be cast the
shadow of a tremendous Nemesis. KAYE.
The Position in the Kandahar Province. Upon hearing
of the departure of the British Mission from Herat,
Macnaghten wished to organize an expedition against
that city. This proposal was not countenanced by Auck-
land or the Commander-in-Chief in India, but the
aggressive designs of Yar Muhammad on Girishk and
the hostility of the Durranis, which he had excited,
rendered military operations necessary. The p&sition at
Kandahar was unsatisfactory. Prince Timur had been
appointed Governor with some of the Ludhiana exiles as
his staff. These individuals, as might have been expected,
were mainly anxious to fill their empty pockets and
alienated alike the haughty, but greedy, Durrani Chiefs
and the common people. Fortunately Nott was well
supported by Captain (later Sir Henry) Rawlinson, whfb
was destined to become the leading authority on Central
Asia, and their difficult task was dealt with firmly and
successfully.
The Expedition against the Ghilzais and the Durranis^
1841. In the spring of 1841, the first outbreak to be
dealt with was that of the Western Ghilzais, who attacked
a British column under Colonel Wymer near Kalat-i-
Ghilzai. The tribesmen bravely charged again and
again, but were defeated by the steady musketry fire of
the Sepoys, supported by grape from the guns, and left
22
CHAP, xxxi THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 23
many dead on the battlefield.
The proceedings of Aktur Khan, a son of Dost
Muhammad, who was preparing a force to attack
Kandahar, had next to be dealt with. A British column
was despatched in July and found the Durranis encamped
on the right bank of the Helmand. The enemy crossed
the river and attacked, but were defeated with heavy
loss by the combined efforts of the artillery and infantry.
Realizing that the situation was serious and having no
confidence in his mounted troops, Captain Woodburn
was content with his success against superior numbers
and did not attempt a pursuit. Later, Captain Griffin,
at the head of a powerful column, attacked the Durranis,
who held a strong position in walled gardens and small
forts. They opened a heavy fire on the advancing troops
but were defeated and finally broken up by a cavalry
charge. Nott was invariably successful in his operations
and should have been appointed to succeed Cotton, as
the Commander-in-Chief wished.
The Views of the Secret Committee. It is of consider-
able importance at this juncture to note that, at the end
ot 1 840, the Secret Committee had written to Auckland
that thuy could see nothing in the continued support of
Shah Shuja, who, it was clear, had not secured the good-
will of his subjects, to compensate for the alarming drain
on the financial resources of India. To quote from this
despatch: " We pronounce our decided opinion that
for many years to come the restored monarchy will have
need of a British force, in order to maintain peace in its
own territory, and prevent aggression from without.
We must add that to attempt to accomplish this by a
small force, or by the mere influence of British Residents,
will, in our opinion, be most unwise and frivolous, and
that we should prefer the entire abandonment of the
country and a frank confession of complete failure, to any
such policy."
The Rising of the Eastern Ghilzais. During the spring
and summer of 1841, apart from the risings above men-
tioned, Macnaghten was satisfied that all was well.
Indeed, in a letter dated August 20, he wrote with un-
24 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
justifiable complacency: " The country is perfectly quiet
from Dan to Beersheba 'V
Macnaghten had been appointed Governor of Bombay
and was about to make over charge to Burnes in October,
when news was received that the Eastern Ghilzai tribes
had risen en masse and had severed communications with
India via Jalalabad. Instead of evacuating the country, as
the Secret Committee had recommended, Auckland, with
supreme lack of insight, had decided on the fatal policy
of half measures and stopped payment of allowances on
which the vital communications of the Kabul force
depended. Many other allowances were also discontinued
which, naturally, created feelings of intense resentment
among the Chiefs and even in the Shah himself.
The March of Sale to Jalalabad. Sale's brigade,
which was under orders to return to India, was instructed
to reopen the route closed by the Ghilzais. 2 Starting on
1 Letter to Mr. Robertson quoted by Kaye, op. cit. vol. ii, p. 130.
2 In view of its importance, I am reproducing an interesting " Route from Cabool
to Peshawer " from The March and Operations of the Army of the Indus in the Expedition
to Afghanistan^ by Major Hough. In my chapter on " The Third Afghan War " I give
a sketch map of the Khyber as it was then termed which might also be consulted
in connexion with this and the following chapters :
ROUTE FROM CABOOL TO PESHAWER
Stages M. F. Remark
Boot Khak, 6,247 ^ eet
8 7
Cross the Laghar and Khoord Cabool rivers.
Khoord Cabool,
9
Through a pass 6 miles long. Cross the stream
7,466 feet,
23 times.
Tezecn, the Pass, 8,173;
12 7
The road crosses over 7 Kotils (Passes). Camp
Valley, 6,488 feet,
in the valley. Water from the river.
Ararent, or the
8 6
Road over a valley of stones. Water not good.
Giants' tomb,
Rood-i-Kutta Sung,
4 6
Ascents and descents, road over stones. Cros*
the Bareek-ab 5,313 feet.
Jugduluk, $375 feet, 7 4 A contracted Pass for 3^ miles, crossing the
stream often.
Soork-ab, 4,373 feet, 13 o Ascents and descents. Last part very difficult
road. Camp near the heights.
Sufed Sung (Gundumuk, 9 6 Ascents and descents. Enter valley of Gundu-
4,616 ft.), muk (usual halting place.) Last 3 miles bad
road.
Futeha bad, 3,098 feet, n 7 Valley of Neemla to the right. Ascents and
descents. Cross the river Neemla. Ascents
and descents (defiles).
Sultanpoor, 2,286 feet, 7 4 Road over a low flat and stony desert.
JELLALABAD, 1,964 feet, 8 7 Road over a sandy tract. The Cabool river
J mile to S. of the town.
[Footnote continued on opposite page.
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 25
October 20, he halted at Tezin for some days, where
Captain MacGregor, the political officer, who considered
that the rising was due to " the harsh and unjust " action
of the British, agreed to the restoration of the coveted
allowances to the tribesmen. Sale, influenced by Mac-
Gregor, neglected to carry out the orders given him to
seize the Tezin fort. He equally violated the vital
principle that, in Asia, no concession should be made to
an unbeaten enemy.
Although accompanied by the Ghilzai Chiefs, the
tribesmen, who were entirely out of control, attacked the
column beyond Jagdalak. From the heights and all
salient points a heavy fire was poured on the British. The
light troops, however, gradually drove the tribesmen
from their points of vantage and the advance guard
found the main outlet clear. However, the Ghilzais,
thirsting for loot, made a concentrated attack on the
rear-guard, which suffered very heavy losses.
Sale reached Gandamak on October 29, where he
found a force known as Burne's jezailchis. He halted at
this village until November n, and then marched
through a hostile country to Jalalabad, which he occupied
on November 13.
The retreat from Gandamak to Jalalabad speedily
caused the local situation to deteriorate. Burne, who had
Alec Boghan, 6 6 First part sandy. Last 3 miles over stony road.
1,91 1 feet, A jungle of rushes 3 miles from camp.
Chard eh, (Bareek-ab, 14 i First part an ascent, thence enter a wide valley,
1,822 feet), where the simoom prevails in the hot season.
At 9 miles village of Bareek-ab. Cross the
Rood-i-Butter Kot.
Huzarnow, (Bassool, 1 1 6 There are 2 roads which join at Bassool. The
1,509 feet), nearest in an E. direction, the other S.E.
Dakka, (Lalpoora, 9 At 6 miles the small Khyber Pass, Dakka on right.
1,404 feet), Lalpoora on the left bank of Cabool river.
KHYBER PASS, Lundee 87 At i mile from Dakka, enter the Pass.
Khana, 2,488 feet,
Summit of Pass 3,373 feet,
Ali Musjid, W. 13 6 In the Pass, 12 miles, we encamped ij beyond it.
2,433 feet >
Kuddum, out of the Pass, 10 i Road through and out of the Pass.
(Jumrood, 1,670 feet),
Koulsir, 7 o Pass on the left the fort of Futehgurh. The
road sandy and stony.
PESHAWAR, 1,068 feet, 8 5
from Cabool, 193 4
26 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
been instructed by Sale to hold the Gandamak fort, was
almost immediately attacked by the Afridis under his
command and, perforce leaving his baggage and two
guns in the hands of the mutineers, he followed Sale
to Jalalabad.
The Refusal of Sale to return to Kabul. While halting
at Gandamak, Sale had been ordered to march back to
Kabul. Instead of acting on his instructions he called a
Council of War, the members of which pronounced
against compliance. As Durand points out, even had he
halted at Gandamak, his brigade would have threatened
the passes and would have " necessarily paralysed a
portion of the Ghilzai strength . . . whilst at the same
time ensuring to Elphinstone the comparative safe and
easy withdrawal of the force from Kabul, . . . When the
issue of the rebellion was as yet uncertain, and energy
might have quelled it, he withdrew from the struggle and
remained shut up within distant walls, there to court and
abide investment, at the leisure of an unembarrassed and
triumphant enemy/* There is little doubt that Durand
was justified in his scathing remarks. His opinion is
supported by Keene who wrote: " It is the opinion of the
best military critics that if he [Sale] had returned to
Kabul, or if he had only remained encamped at Gandamak,
he might have averted the impending disaster ", x
The British Cantonment at Kabul. Before describing
the tragic events that were about to occur, some account
must be given of the British cantonment. Measuring
1000 by 600 yards, it was situated on a low-lying piece
of ground near the Kuhistan road, surrounded and com-
manded on every side by forts which were neither
occupied nor demolished, and by hills; its weak breast-
work could be ridden over. To add to its defects, the
whole of the supplies were stored in a small fort situated
at some distance from its perimeter, with an intervening
fort and a walled garden, which were not under British
control. Finally, it was separated from the Bala Hissar
by the Kabul river.
Who was to blame for this disgraceful state of affairs?
1 History of India, by H. G. Kfcene, vol. ii, p. 1 54.
xxxi THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 27
Durand had urged the necessity for constructing barracks
in the Bala Hissar and, to some extent, these were con-
structed, and were occupied by British troops during the
first winter. But Macnaghten had, later, with no proper
regard for the safety of the British garrison, handed over
the barracks to Shah Shuja for the accommodation of
his harem. Sturt, who had succeeded Durand, and
Roberts, Jfather of the great soldier bearing that name,
had insisted on the supreme importance of occupying
the Bala Hissar, but had been met with Macnaghten's
definite refusal.
General W. K. Elphinstone. Sir Willoughby Cotton,
who was responsible for selecting the site of the canton-
ment, left Kabul in the winter of 1840 and handed over
charge at Jalalabad to General Elphinstone with the
unfortunate observation: " You will have nothing to do
here. All is peace." Indeed, so far did this belief prevail
that Macnaghten permitted officers to arrange for their
wives and families to proceed to Afghanistan.
In April 1841 Elphinstone travelled with the Envoy
to Kabul. He is described by George Lawrence, who was
a member of the party, as being " altogether without
Indian experience. He was evidently in very weak health,
suffering acutely from chronic rheumatic gout, so much
so that it was understood he had for a long time declined,
on account of his infirmities, to accept the command in
Afghanistan, and only consented when it was so urgently
pressed upon him by the Governor-General, that as a
soldier he could no longer refuse." x Actually Elphin-
stone, whose health became worse, had decided to return
to India with Macnaghten, and Nott had been appointed
to succeed him temporarily, but, most unfortunately, was
unable to take up the appointment.
The Murder of Burnes. The weakening of the British
force at Kabul, the successful rising of the Ghilzais and
the spreading disaffection in the Kuhistan, led to a con-
spiracy being formed by Abdulla Khan Achakzai, who
hated Burnes and spread the rumour that several of the
Chiefs would be arrested and sent to London a dire
i Op. cit. pp. 55-56.
28 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
threat! He also produced a forged order from Shuja to
kill all infidels. Neither Burnes, who occupied a house
in the city, nor Macnaghten was aware of the existence
of any serious plot at this period.
Suddenly, on November 2, the storm broke, and Sir
Alexander Burnes, his brother Captain Burnes and Captain
William Broadfoot were killed and cut to pieces, as were
the men of his escort. 1 The mob then sacked the treasury,
containing i 7,000, which, with the prevailing ineptitude,
was kept in a neighbouring house.
Shah Shuja, hearing of the disturbance, despatched
a regiment of his Hindustani troops under Campbell (who
had re-entered his service), but, entangled in the narrow
streets, it was beaten back. Meanwhile Brigadier Shelton
at the head of a British force of infantry, with guns,
reached the Bala Hissar and covered Campbell's retreat.
Apart from this he failed to take the decided action that
the situation demanded.
The news of the murders and of the rich loot that
had been secured spread far and wide, and thousands
of armed Afghans hastened in from every direction.
A weak British force was sent out to attack Kabul,
but fortunately failed to enter the city, where* it would
have been cut up. Throughout indecision prevailed and
recommendations by the envoy and competent officers
were ignored. The curtain had fallen on the first act of
the tragedy.
The Capture of the Commissariat Stores. The envoy
had moved from the Residency to the adjacent canton-
ment, but no effort was made by the military authorities
to secure the safety of the supply fort. As was only to
be expected, the intervening fort and garden were occu-
pied by Afghans. Since no determined action was taken
to expel them nor to reinforce the detachment in the fort,
its weak garrison, after a gallant defence, escaped by
means of an underground passage and the supplies
were lost to the British. Elsewhere a large quantity of
flour was defended by another British officer and again
1 For a vivid account of the tragedy vide Life of Dost Muhammed Khan, by Mohan
Lai, vol. ii, ch. xviii.
xxxi THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 29
he was deserted by Elphinstone and was compelled to
evacuate the fort. This completed the second act of the
tragedy.
The Fatal Indecision of Elphinstone and Shelton. The
position was now considered to be so serious that a retreat
to India was seriously discussed by the military leaders.
It seems incredible that Shelton, the only senior
officer who was in a position to influence Elphinstone,
should have been strongly in favour of this fatal step.
Indeed Pottinger, in a letter written to MacGregor,
wrote that " we were prevented from going into the
Bala Hissar entirely by the obstinacy of Brigadier
Shelton ".'
The Disasters at Charikar and Shekabad. Among the
outlying posts was one at Charikar garrisoned by a
Gurkha regiment with Eldred Pottinger as political
officer. The treacherous chiefs under the leadership of
the Nijrao Chief, known as Mir Masjidi, at a meeting
cut down Pottinger's assistant Rattray, and the Charikar
post, which had no water-supply under its control, was
invested. Finally, after desparate fighting, the post was
evacuate^ by the garrison, which was overcome by lack of
water, and only Pottinger and Haughton, both badly
wounded, reached the cantonment on November 15,
Another post near Ghazni was similarly attacked and
the garrison massacred. These disasters increased the
atmosphere of gloom which surrounded the General and
his advisers, while they naturally encouraged the enemies
of the British.
The Despatch of a Brigade to Kabul by Nott. The
Envoy and Elphinstone sent Nott orders, which reached
him on November 14, to send a brigade to reinforce
Kabul. Although this reduction of force weakened his
position considerably, Nott, loyally, but against his
better judgment, despatched Maclaren's brigade on
November 19. However, owing to a heavy snowfall and
the bitter weather in these elevated uplands Ghazni
itself is situated at some 7000 feet above sea level
Maclaren was obliged to return to Kandahar before
1 Dated Budeabad, January 30, 1842.
30 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
reaching Ghazni, and Macnaghten heard, on December
10, that the hoped-for reinforcement would not reach
Kabul.
Movements of the Kabul Force. Shelton, on Novem-
ber 9, was instructed to leave the Bala Hissar and return
to the cantonment, which order he carried out without
encountering any opposition. Macnaghten had directed
Sale to return to Kabul from Gandamak, but that officer,
as we have seen, had marched on to Jalalabad. Mean-
while the Afghans, noting the inactivity of the British,
began to fire into the cantonment from surrounding
positions. Shelton was ordered to capture a fort but the
attack was countermanded. Finally it was made and the
fort was taken, but not without heavy losses.
Again, an Afghan force, which was shelling the
cantonment from the Bemaru hills, was attacked. But
Afghan cavalry charged through the British, who fell
back on their reserve. Finally, the British again charged
and captured the position.
Macnaghten s Negotiations with the Chiefs. If the
Envoy had been entirely misled as to the feelings of the
Afghans and had preached peace where there was no
peace, at this crisis he proved himself a man of mettle,
Elphinstone and Shelton, as we have seen, were strongly
in favour of making terms with the Afghans for the evacua-
tion of the country, while Macnaghten, who was attempt-
ing to buy off some of the leading Chiefs, advised the
occupation of the Bala Hissar. Finally, the military
authorities definitely decided against this obvious step
and insisted on a retreat to India. The Envoy thereupon
drew up a draft treaty by the terms of which, in return for
supplies and safeguard, the British would evacuate the
whole of Afghanistan. 1
Akbar Khan had reached Kabul on November 22
and his arrival had strengthened the body of Afghan
conspirators. On December 1 1 Macnaghten met him
and other Chiefs and made an agreement on these terms,
binding the troops to quit the cantonments in three days'
time,
1 Appendix B.
SIRDAR AKBAR KHAN
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 31
The Murder of Macnaghten. Macnaghten was delay-
ing the execution of the treaty, hoping to save the situa-
tion by creating dissension among the avaricious Chiefs.
In pursuance of this scheme, on December 23, he, with
members of his staff, 1 met Akbar Khan and other Chiefs,
without adequate precautions for their safety being taken.
Their capture had been decided upon by the Afghans,
and Macnaghten, Mackenzie, 2 Trevor and Lawrence
were all suddenly seized. The Envoy, while struggling,
was shot by Akbar and was then cut to pieces by the
fanatical Afghans. Lawrence and Mackenzie were each
forced to mount behind a Chief and escaped with their
lives, while Trevor, who was also mounted behind a
Chief, was hacked to pieces when the horse he was riding
stumbled. The curtain thus fell on the third act of the
tragedy.
The Attitude of Akbar Khan. Akbar Khan was un-
doubtedly the leader of the Afghan Chiefs at this period.
It must be remembered that he considered that the Envoy
had attempted to deceive him, an opinion which was also
held by Pottinger, although not accepted by Lawrence,
and he was intensely suspicious of the British. He also,
as was but natural, feared that if the column reached
Jalalabad intact, the combined forces would be strong
enough to defeat his aims. He wished, on this account,
to halt the column at Tezin until he had heard that
Jalalabad was evacuated. He accordingly, more than
once, delayed the march of the column and he entirely
failed to supply food, forage or fuel. Indeed, it was
probably out of his power to provide for such a multitude,
and this he must have known.
On the other hand Eyre, describing the disaster in
the Khurd Kabul Pass, writes: " It ought, however, to
be mentioned, that several of Akbar's chief adherents,
who had preceded the advance, exerted themselves
strenuously to keep down the fire; but nothing could
1 From a letter written by Lady Sale to Lawrence, which I have read, it is clear that
Elphinstone had ordered a strong escort and had later cancelled the order.
2 In Kaye's op. cit. vol. ii, p. 422, Captain Mackenzie gives a detailed account of
Macnaghten's attempt to enter into negotiations with Akbar, as distinct from the body
of confederate chiefs.
32 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
restrain the Ghilzais ".* Akbar also displayed other good
qualities. He obviously liked the British officers, with
whom he was brought into contact, admiring the courage
with which, when sent to Jalalabad on missions, they
loyally returned to captivity, sometimes with messages
calculated to enrage him. He saved the lives of all
the women and children and of British officers to a
number exceeding forty. He presumably considered
them to be valuable hostages but, even so, he was hospit-
able when in a position to be so, and never allowed his
prisoners to be ill-treated. Again, when defeated and
wounded at the sally of the Jalalabad garrison, he did not,
as he was urged to do by the more fanatical chiefs, even
contemplate the massacre of his hostages and prisoners.
He used the pertinent argument that, if the hostages were
killed, vengeance would be taken by the British Govern-
ment on Dost Muhammad and his family. 2 Finally, it
should be remembered that killing men in Afghanistan
at that period was not considered a serious matter. Even,
in 1899, when I founded the Seistan Consulate, recent
killings among the rulers were excused with the remark:
" Oh! killing a man in Seistan has no more importance
than drinking a glass of water! "
Further Demands by the Chiefs. On December 24
the Chiefs sent in further demands, which included the
surrender of all married officers (including Sale) and
their wives, who should be held as hostages until the
arrival of Dost Muhammad and other Afghan prisoners,
that all guns except six should be handed over and all the
money in the treasury. On December 26, encouraging
letters from MacGregor at Jalalabad and news from
Peshawar that reinforcements were on the way were
received. Pottinger, who acted as political officer, warned
Shelton and other officers that the Afghans were
treacherous and that a great effort should be made to
occupy the Bala Hissar or else to fight their way to
Jalalabad, but Shelton declared that neither course was
1 The Kabul Insurrection of I #4142, by Major-Gcneral Sir Vincent Eyre, 1879.
a For the behaviour of Akbar Khan 'vide also Captain Johnson's Journal quoted in
Appendix in vol. ii of Kaye.
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 33
practicable. On January i, 1842, the humiliating treaty
was sent in, sealed by eighteen Afghan Chiefs. 1
The Retreat. On January 6, 1842, after two months
of humiliating indecision unexampled in British military
history, the force, consisting of 4500 fighting men with
12,000 followers, marched off from Kabul (which is
situated at an elevation of nearly 6000 feet) for Jalalabad,
distant 130 miles. The men were dispirited and were
becoming demoralized; rations, transport and forage
were lacking, while there was snow on the ground. The
followers were panic-stricken. During the first march
only five miles were covered and the rear-guard, which
had been attacked, did not reach the camping ground
until 2 A.M.
On the second day another short march was made.
Shelton urged that the dangerous Khurd Kabul Pass
should be traversed immediately before the Ghilzais had
assembled in full force, but Elphinstone, in view of
promises of supplies of food and firewood and the exhaus-
tion of the force, decided to halt, intending to march
through the pass at night. This plan he was, later,
persuaded to abandon.
For the tragedy that followed I quote Vincent Eyre's
vivid account: " The rapid effects of two nights'
exposure to the frost in disorganizing the force can hardly
be conceived. It had so nipped the hands and feet of
even the strongest men, as to completely prostrate their
powers and incapacitate them for service. ... In fact only
a few hundred serviceable fighting-men remained." 2
. To continue his account: " This truly formidable
defile is about five miles from end to end, and is shut in
on either hand by a line of lofty hills, between whose
precipitous sides the sun at this season could dart but a
momentary ray. Down the centre dashed a mountain
torrent . . . with thick layers of ice on its edges over
which the snow lay consolidated in slippery masses. . . .
This stream we had to cross and recross about eight-and-
twenty times. ... A hot fire was opened on the advance,
* These treaties are given in full in Appendix B.
2 Qp. cit. by Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, pp. 265-266 and 268.
VOL. II D
34 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
with whom were several ladies . . . who galloped forward
at the head of all running the gauntlet of the enemy's
bullets. . . . Lady Sale received a slight wound in the
arm. . . . Onward moved the crowd into the thickest of
the fire, and fearful was the slaughter that prevailed. An
universal panic speedily prevailed, and thousands, seeking
refuge in flight, hurried forward to the front, abandoning
baggage, arms, ammunition, women and children, regard-
less for the moment of everything but their own lives. "
Heroic acts were performed, but the disaster cost the
lives of three thousand men. The survivors, who had
ascended to a still colder climate, died in hundreds during
the night, while, to intensify their misery, snow fell for
several hours.
To push on was the only hope left, but gullible
Elphinstone gave the order to halt in view of a message
from Akbar Khan that he would provide supplies and
escort. During this halt, at the suggestion of Akbar, the
women and children, together with the wounded officers,
were handed over to his charge. The state of the women,
some of whom were pregnant, was deplorable, and the
offer was accepted, although doubts were expressed as to
the wisdom of the action. 1
On the morning of January 10 this foolish halt had
further incapacitated the force, the European troops alone
remaining efficient. The advance was held up, to quote
Eyre once again, " in a narrow gorge between the
precipitous spurs of two hills. . . . The Afghans securely
perched on their point of vantage, commenced the attack,
pouring a destructive fire upon the crowded column, as
it slowly drew nigh to the fatal spot. . . . The last small
remnant of the Native Infantry regiments were here
scattered and destroyed, and the public treasure, with all
the remaining baggage, fell into the hands of the enemy/'
The survivors who reached Khak-i-Jabar, five miles
beyond the gorge and twenty-nine miles from Kabul,
numbered some 200 Europeans; there was also a con-
siderable body of camp-followers.
Akbar Khan again appeared on the scene and, through
1 Among these wounded officers was Lieutenant Eyre.
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 35
Captain Skinner, who had arranged for the women to be
handed over to the Sirdar, he expressed his regret at the
attacks made on the column, due, he stated, to his inability
to restrain the Ghilzais. He then offered to save the
Europeans on condition that they abandoned the natives.
To his credit Elphinstone refused and in the passage down
the defile to the Tezin Valley further losses were sustained,
but the British remnant fought on heroically.
From Tezin to Jagdalak was a distance of twenty-two
miles and by a night march it was hoped to reach that last
obstacle before it was occupied by the tribesmen. But
ill-fortune dogged the footsteps of the force. At Seh
Baba only seven miles distant attacks began, the
mob of panic-stricken camp-followers almost paralysing
the efforts of the few remaining soldiers. At Kattar-Sang
twelve miles from Tezin constant attacks were
made, but Shelton, with his handful of brave men of the
44th regiment, protected the rear. At 3 P.M. Jagdalak
was reached where a position was taken up in some ruins.
Here, apparently hoping to make terms for the survivors,
Elphinstone, Shelton and Johnson visited Akbar and
were detained as hostages for the evacuation of Jalalabad.
On January 1 2 the brave remnant marched on to the
Jagdalak Pass, which rises to an elevation of 6420 feet.
To quote once again from Vincent Eyre: " This formid-
able defile is about two miles long, exceedingly narrow,
and closed in by precipitous heights. The road has a
considerable slope upwards and, on nearing the summit,
further progress was found to be obstructed by two
strong barriers formed of branches of the prickly holly-
oak stretching completely across the defile/' Here again
the losses were very heavy but there still remained a
handful, which included twenty officers and forty-five
British soldiers, struggling on towards Gandamak.
To save themselves from an attack in the open, this
small body quitted the road and took up a position on a
height to the left, where they determined to sell their
lives dearly. At this last stand, they could only raise
twenty muskets with two rounds of ammunition per
musket. Some Afghan horsemen coming from the direc-
36 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
tion of Gandamak were beckoned to and, at the invitation
of their chiefs, Major Charles Griffiths, who had dis-
tinguished himself throughout the retreat, descended the
hill to parley. It was agreed that the party should receive
terms, but, before this information reached the men on
the hill, an Afghan attempted to snatch a musket from a
soldier, who shot him. The Afghans thereupon killed
the British, who fought to the death.
During the Second Afghan War, Major Waller, 1 a
grandson of Griffiths, collecting the bones and relics,
built a cairn over them, on what is known as " Forty-
fourth Hill ".
Another small party had pushed on ahead, six of
whom arrived at Fatehabad, sixteen miles from Jalalabad,
but Dr. Brydon alone of this pitiful remnant struggled
into Jalalabad to announce the disaster. 2 Thus fell the
curtain on the fourth act of the tragedy.
Summary. Looking back on the First Afghan War,
a century later, it would appear that too serious a view of
the disastrous retreat from Kabul was taken, not only in
India but also in Great Britain. It was a disaster that
was discreditable not only to Auckland and to the military
and political authorities at Kabul, but in a lessftr degree
to Sale, who, in the first place, failed to capture Tezin and
who, in the second place, quitting Gandamak with his
powerful force, made no attempt to attack the hostile
tribesmen, while the Kabul column was being over-
whelmed in the neighbouring pass.
It is, however, reasonable to hold the opinion that,
had the column marched off in November, it would have
fought its way through the passes, perhaps with heavy
casualties and with the loss of part of its baggage, but
without complete disaster. It was the paralysing results
of the intense cold in mid-winter which clearly destroyed
the fighting value of the troops. It is also fair to quote
Rawlinson, who writes: " If we except, indeed, the fatal
winter of 1841-42, when by the strangest concatenation
1 He was a brother of Frances Tezeena Waller, whose birth is recorded in the next
chapter.
2 Two other Europeans and a number of natives straggled in during the month.
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL 37
of accidents, our forces at Kabul had become completely
demoralized, there never was an occasion on which the
Afghans could stand for an hour against British soldiers
or Indian Sepoys f V Yet again, Afghanistan was not
evacuated. Resolute Nott firmly maintained his position
in the Kandahar area by hard fighting, while Sale at
Jalalabad, as we shall see, entirely defeated Akbar Khan's
utmost efforts.
1 England and Russia in the East, pp. 184-185.
CHAPTER XXXII
RETRIBUTION
Follow after we are waiting, by the trails that we lost,
For the sounds of many footsteps, for the tread of a host.
Follow after follow after for the harvest is sown:
By the bones about the wayside, ye shall come to your own.
KIPLING.
Lord Auckland's Indecision. The news of the disaster,
which proved to Auckland that he had been entirely
misled, was a terrible blow and, at first, he gave way to
despair, 1 as is shown by his message to the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls: " I am coming fast to the
opinion that our furthest point of support in advance
must be Ferozepore, and that we must bear the disgrace
and disadvantage of retiring to this frontier with as little
of loss as may now be assured ". 2 His state of mind was
such that he merely wished to despatch an insufficient
force in the shape of a single brigade, with orders to march
to Jalalabad, entirely ignoring the necessity for the vindica-
tion of our military power in Afghanistan. However,
independent action was taken by the Agent at Peshawar
and by George Clerk, the Lieutenant-Governor of the
North- West Provinces, and, on January 4, 1842, a
second brigade crossed the Sutlej on its march to Pesha-
war. Nicolls, it should be stated, was opposed to these
forward movements, an opposition which certainly did
not redound to his credit.
The Failure of Brigadier Wild. During this period
Wild had reached Peshawar with four Indian regiments,
but was totally unprovided with artillery. General Avita-
1 In addition to previous authorities, I have consulted the Cambridge History of India
vol. v, ch. xxviii.
2 Kaye gives a clear account of Auckland's unheroic attitude and in his appendix
quotes from his various letters. Op. cit. vol. Hi, pp. 405-406. Fide also Durand's
scathing criticism, op. cit. ch. xxviii.
38
CHAP, xxxn RETRIBUTION 39
bile, the Italian Governor of the Peshawar district, pro-
vided four rickety guns, manned by Sikh artillerymen,
and promised that his Sikhs, who regarded the warlike
guardians of the rugged Khaibar with deep apprehension,
would proceed as far as Ak Masjid.
On January 15 half the brigade marched on Ak
Masjid without encountering opposition, but, by a most
unfortunate error, their supply column never arrived.
Wild attempted to follow on January 20, but the Sikhs
mutinied and he was defeated and wounded. As a result,
Ak Masjid was perforce evacuated and the brigade fell
back on Jamrud.
The Arrival of General George Pollock at Peshawar.
General Pollock, who had been commissioned to relieve
Jalalabad, reached Peshawar in February. There he
found a disheartened force prostrate with malaria and
realized that until the arrival of the British troops, for
which he pressed, it was out of the question to advance,
in spite of the appeals he received from Sale. He con-
sequently remained at Peshawar, raising the moral of the
Indian troops by constant visits to their hospital, and
making carefully thought-out plans for his advance.
Lord* Ellenborough appointed Governor -General. In
October 1841, upon the fall of the Whig Ministry and
the assumption by Sir Robert Peel of the premiership,
Lord Ellenborough, who had served as President of the
Board of Control for several years, was appointed to
supersede Auckland. He reached Calcutta on February
28, 1842, and in his despatch to Nicolls, of March 15,
ISid down that: " Faced by the universal hostility of the
Afghan people, which had assumed a religious as well
as a national character, it was clear that to recover
Afghanistan, if it were possible, would constitute a source
of weakness rather than of strength in case of an invasion
from the west, and that the ground upon which the
present policy rested had ceased to exist ". He further
observed that " whatever course was to be taken, rested
entirely on military considerations. In the first instance
regard to the safety of the various garrisons . . . and
finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation
40 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon
the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, to our
own subjects and to our allies, that we have the power
of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities
and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately
from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to
maintain our position but because we are satisfied that
the King we have set up has not, as we were erroneously
led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he
has been placed. "
The Siege of Jalalabad. When Brydon announced
the disaster in person on January 13, George Broadfoot, 1
the engineer officer, pointed out to Sale that, unless he
was prepared to hold Jalalabad to the last, he should
evacuate the city immediately and fight his way through
the Khaibar to Peshawar.
Sale decided to remain at Jalalabad and Broadfoot
set to work to restore the ruined defences, while foraging
parties were sent out to secure supplies of wood and
grass. Caravans from Peshawar had opportunely brought
three months' supply of wheat. To lessen the hostile
population, all the Afghans in the city, including 200
men of a Jezailchi regiment, were expelled. *
Early in January a letter from Akbar to a neighbour-
ing Chief, which called upon the Faithful, in the name of
the Prophet, to fight the infidels, was intercepted. In
this despatch Akbar boasted of having killed Macnaghten
with his own hands.
The failure of Wild's brigade to penetrate the
Khaibar on January 20 appalled Sale. With the assisf-
ance of MacGregor, he drew up a scheme for the evacua-
tion of Jalalabad, and on January 26 summoned a Council
of War to approve of his proposals. This document
purported to be a reply to Shuja, who had written to
MacGregor: " Your people have concluded a treaty
with us. You are still at Jalalabad. What are your
intentions? Tell us quickly." Shuja had also stated
that if supplied with money he could hold the country
for the British Government.
1 Vide The Career of Major George Broadfoot^ by Major W. Broadfoot, 1888.
xxxn RETRIBUTION 41
MacGregor declared that in his opinion and also in
that of Sale the British Government could not relieve
the Jalalabad garrison. He went on to say that Shuja
desired their departure from Afghanistan and that it was
their duty to treat with him for the evacuation of the
country. The terms proposed were that the British were
to give four hostages in proof of their sincerity; and that
Shuja should send a force to escort them to Peshawar with
their arms, guns, etc., intact. Other provisions included
the supply of transport and foodstuffs, the withdrawal
of Akbar from the scene, and finally, that Afghan hostages
should be handed over to the British.
So far from this precious document being nominally
a reply to Shuja, it was virtually an attempt to treat with
Akbar, and Broadfoot, on reading it, flung it from him in
disgust. A scene of intense excitement followed. The
majority were in favour of the proposal and Broadfoot
could only secure an adjournment of the Council. On the
following day the subject was again hotly debated and
the terms of the proposed capitulation were carried
with the exception that it was decided that no hostages
should be given.
The clocument was despatched to the Shah and, in
due course, the answer came that to prove their sincerity
the senior officers should seal it. Broadfoot now claimed
that the doubt that had been expressed of their sincerity
liberated them from their obligations and proposed that
the whole question should be reconsidered. Finally, it
was decided to end the negotiations and to hold Jalalabad.
'* And thus ", to quote Durand, " the firmness of one
man, and he nearly the junior in the Council of War,
preserved his country's arms from suffering another deep
and disgraceful blow."
On February 19 an earthquake destroyed the newly
erected fortifications of Jalalabad, and the risk of an
attack by Akbar, who had collected a considerable force
and was investing the city, was considerable. Afghans,
however, dislike attacking forts they possessed but
little artillery and through the energy of the garrison,
which was cheered by the publication of the Government
42 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
manifesto of January 31,' the defences were speedily
rebuilt.
On April 6, urged on by Captain Henry Havelock,
Sale somewhat unwillingly attacked the Afghans at
daybreak. The artillery directed a heavy fire on their
centre, while the infantry broke through it. The Afghans
fired from a battery screened by a garden wall, but the
British would not be denied; the guns which had been
lost by the Kabul force were recaptured; the camp was
burned; and the defeat of Akbar, who was wounded,
was complete.
The Position at Kandahar. To turn to the position
in the south, Nott held his own during the winter. Money
was very scarce and reinforcements with fresh supplies
under General England were eagerly awaited. On
February 21 a letter from Elphinstone and Pottinger,
which had been written some two months previously,
was received, ordering the evacuation of Kandahar and
Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Nott and Rawlinson did not consider
this letter in any way binding, but the astute Durrani
Chiefs, fully aware of the situation, demanded the evacua-
tion of the British force, on the ground that Shah Shuja
no longer required their services. Failing thfeir with-
drawal, they threatened the British with the fate of the
Kabul column. To add to the difficulties of the situation
at this juncture, Prince Timur received a letter from Shuja
which ran: " You must understand that the disturbances
which you have, no doubt, heard of at Kabul, have been
a contest between the followers of Islam and the un-
believers. Now that the affair is decided, all the Afgharts
have tendered their allegiance to me and recognized me
as King. . . ." Rawlinson pronounced this letter to be
genuine.
Nott replied to the Chiefs that there was every reason
to believe that Shuja's letter was written under com-
pulsion, that he was awaiting instructions from his
Government and that a British army was on its way to
avenge the murder of the envoy. All doubts as to British
policy were temporarily set at rest by the receipt of a
Vide Kayc, op. cit. vol. iii, pp. ^J and 407.
RETRIBUTION 43
copy of an official letter, dated January 28, in which the
continued occupation of Kandahar was enjoined. On
March 3 Rawlinson took the step of expelling the Afghan
inhabitants, to the number of 5000, from the city.
The Durranis nearly capture Kandahar. On March 7
Nott attacked the Durranis, who retreated and then
doubled back on Kandahar. They attacked with fanatical
fury and, when the Herat Gate was burned, their success
seemed probable. However, a solid rampart of sacks of
grain was formed and held, in spite of repeated charges
by GhaztSy careless of life. Finally, the attack was
repelled with the loss of some 600 Ghazis. Nott, later
in the month, again attacked and defeated the Durranis.
The Fall of Ghazni. The Durrani Chiefs, who were
much dejected by these defeats, recovered their courage
upon hearing of the capture of Ghazni. The townspeople
had admitted the attacking force and the garrison, 400
strong, was shut up in the citadel. With half rations
and with practically no forage or water, Colonel Palmer
made a treaty with the enemy by which the British were
to be conducted in safety to Peshawar. Treachery was,
however, intended, as indeed might have been expected,
and the force was surrounded and, after surrender, was
massacred. The fall of Ghazni on March 6 was con-
sidered to constitute a discreditable disaster, as, had
Palmer expelled the population, he would have secured
supplies and, in any case, he should have maintained
control of the water-supply.
The Movements of General England. Fortunately
Kalat-i-Ghilzai defeated all attacks, and the advance of
England in March with his convoy of treasure, ammuni-
tion and medicines was reported. Nott was pressed by
Rawlinson to despatch a force to co-operate with him at
the Khojak Pass but refused to do so. England with his
advance body was met with a heavy fire from the defenders
of a position at Hykulzai near the entrance to the Khojak
Pass, and was repulsed. His officers begged him to
renew the attack but, grossly overestimating the enemy
force, he retreated to Quetta.
A month later England again attacked the position
44 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
at Hykulzai, this time with complete success. Entering
the Khojak Pass, its heights were crowned by the
Kandahar troops and the united brigades on May 10
entered Kandahar. There news of the relief of Jalalabad
by General Pollock was celebrated by firing a royal
salute.
Ellenborough's statesmanlike declaration of March
15, sad to say, was followed by a complete volte-face,
owing to the check received by England and, on April 1 9,
Nott was instructed to withdraw the garrison of Kalat-i-
Ghilzai and to evacuate Kandahar. He was then to take
up a position at Quetta " until the season may enable you
to retire upon Sukkur ". Much against his own judg-
ment, Nott decided to carry out the first part of his
instructions, but he was unable to march back to India
without collecting a considerable amount of fresh trans-
port a matter of months for so large a force.
The Defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. On May 19 a
brigade was despatched to evacuate the garrison of Kalat-
i-Ghilzai. Information as to this movement, which
naturally encouraged them, had reached the Ghilzais,
who determined to storm the fort before the arrival of
the relieving column. At the false dawn, on*May 21,
4000 men provided with scaling ladders made a desperate
assault. Three times they reached the crest of the works
only to be repulsed with very heavy losses by the defenders,
not one of whom was killed. Upon the arrival of the
relieving brigade the fort was destroyed and the garrison
was withdrawn to Kandahar.
The Battle outside Kandahar. On May 29 the Dift--
ranis under Aktur Khan, who attempted to deceive
Rawlinson by constant overtures for peace, made a
general attack on Kandahar, but were defeated with
heavy loss. They had intended, as in the Second Afghan
War, to hold the Baba Wali Pass which they had blocked,
but the rapid action of the British upset their plans.
Information as to the orders received by the British to
evacuate Kandahar had reached them and was mainly
responsible for these continued hostilities.
The Last Days of Shah Shuja. Some days after the
RETRIBUTION 45
murder of Burnes, the rebel leaders invited Shuja to con-
tinue to rule, stipulating, however, that he should give
his daughters in marriage to the leaders. This condition
Shuja at first agreed to, but later refused to carry out.
The influence of Akbar Khan was enormously in-
creased by the destruction of the British force, albeit the
older Chiefs were jealous of him. Although Shuja wrote
to Sale demanding the evacuation of Jalalabad, his posi-
tion was really a very weak one. Accordingly he osten-
sibly accepted the proposal of Nawab Zaman Khan
Muhammadzai (who had been appointed King by the
conspirators, after Shuja's refusal to give his daughters to
the Chiefs) to become his Vizier.
At this period Zaman Khan was guarding the British
prisoners, whom he refused to hand over to the Shah.
Meanwhile Akbar was pressing Shuja to prove his sin-
cerity by joining him before Jalalabad with his troops and
artillery, and this, after much hesitation, Shuja decided
to do. On April 5 he left the Bala Hissar with a small
escort in order to join his army, which was encamped
close by. On the way he was murdered by Shuja-ud-Dola,
son of Zaman Khan.
Thus' J fell Shah Shuja. There is much divergence of
opinion as to his fidelity to the British. There is no doubt
that many of his courtiers were hostile to us, and perhaps
it would be safe to say that he was an opportunist who
trimmed his sails to suit the prevailing wind, but always
realized that we had the power of the purse.
Ferrier, who was in close touch with Afghans some
years later, sums up as follows: " If he always failed, it
was because he never would permit the smallest entrench-
ment upon his absolute rights. . . . His conduct during
his second reign is a proof of that independence of char-
acter which was ever his misfortune : indignant under the
yoke imposed upon him by the English, all the vices of
his Afghan nature broke forth; he betrayed his bene-
factors, resisted his liberators, and died by the hands of
assassins for an Afghan he could have no more
glorious close to such a career." l
1 History of the Afghani , p. 363.
46 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Difficulties of General Pollock. Among the chief
difficulties of Pollock was the doubtful attitude of the
Sikhs. They had, as we have seen, mutinied under Wild,
but the arrival of large reinforcements of British troops
with artillery, the tact of the general himself and the
influence of Captain Mackeson had restored their moral,
as had appeals to their honour to wipe out the disgrace
which the Khalsa had suffered from the mutiny. The
Afridis, in return for money payments, had agreed to hold
the Khaibar, but upon the appearance of Akbar with 800
men at Ak Masjid, they pleaded their inability to perform
their agreement. 1
The Forcing of the Khaibar Pass. Pollock was a great
organizer and left nothing to chance. Before dawn on
April 5, the army marched into the pass and the troops
immediately scaled its precipitous heights. The Afridis,
who were surprised by the movement, offered little
opposition at first and, thanks to skilled leadership and
their own gallantry, the British were able to drive the
enemy before them.
When this difficult feat had been achieved, the centre
column advanced to the barrier that had been erected in
the pass, which was destroyed, its defenders being
scattered by shrapnel, and the huge convoy, 2 which in-
cluded supplies and munitions for Jalalabad, marched
safely up the pass. Suffering alike from heat and from
thirst, the slow-moving column finally reached Ak
Masjid, distant some seven miles from the mouth of the
pass; the fort had been evacuated by Akbar early in the
day. *
Pollock had forced the Khaibar. Avitabile, it is to be
noted, considered that he was going to certain destruction,
and this opinion was perhaps held by the Sikhs, who had
followed another and more circuitous route. They were
attacked by the tribesmen and suffered some casualties,
but undoubtedly lessened the resistance offered to the
British column which they finally rejoined at Ak Masjid.
1 In addition to previous authorities, I have consulted The Life of Sir George Pollock^
by C. R. Low.
2 Pollock had insisted on all ranks discarding heavy baggage, and only had one small
tent for himself and a staff officer.
RETRIBUTION 47
Pollock wrote to a friend: " There were many deser-
tions among the Indian troops before we advanced. Now
they are in the highest spirits, and have a thorough con-
tempt for the enemy. . . . The Sikhs are encamped near
us and are much more respectful and civil since our opera-
tions of yesterday." l The British casualties were slight,
while those of the tribesmen were very heavy.
The Relief of Jalalabad. Pollock's repulse of the
Afridi tribesmen, coming after the signal defeat of Akbar,
swept away all serious opposition. He halted on April 6
and, by April 8, he had marched to Lundi Kotal, some
ten miles farther on, and then proceeded to Dakka,
twelve miles from the pass. On April 1 8 Jalalabad was
reached, where the garrison warmly welcomed the re-
lieving force. 2
The Instructions of Ellenborough. In spite of the
success of Sale and of Pollock, Ellenborough's mercurial
spirit was daunted by the surrender of Palmer at Ghazni
and the check suffered by England. He accordingly
abandoned his declared policy and gave orders in direct
opposition to it. He seems to have forgotten the prisoners
whom he was in honour bound to release. He also now
doubted :he expediency of undertaking operations merely
for the re-establishment of our military reputation.
Nicolls, who appears to little advantage, acting on the
Governor - General's pusillanimous wishes, instructed
Pollock, on April 29, to withdraw every British soldier
to Peshawar. " The only circumstances ", he added,
44 which can authorise delay in obeying this order are:
i fit. That you have brought a negotiation for the release
of the prisoners lately confined at Badiabad to such a
point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by
withdrawing. 2ndly. That you may have attached a
lightly equipped force to rescue them. 3rdly. That the
enemy at Kabul may be moving to attack you. In this
improbable case, should any respectable number of
troops have descended into the plain below Jagdalak
with that intent, it would be most advisable to inflict
1 Low, op. cit. p. 262.
2 In Low's o/. at. pp. 270-277, a spirited account of the march is given.
48 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
such a blow upon them as to make them long remember
your parting effort."
The Reply of General Pollock. On May 13 Pollock
gave an admirable reply to these unworthy instructions.
To quote from it: " With regard to our withdrawal at
the present moment, I fear that it would have the very
worst effect it would be construed into a defeat, and
our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost
in this part of the world ".
Later on he writes: " But the advance on Kabul
would require that General Nott should act in concert
and advance also. I therefore cannot help regretting that
he should be directed to retire, which, without some
demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty
in doing." x Pollock then declared that he could not
retire to Peshawar without additional transport, and this
delay, as we shall see, gave temperamental Ellen borough
time to change his mind once again.
It is of considerable importance to learn that Pollock,
on receiving these instructions, wrote to Nott requesting
him on no account to retire, as directed by his superiors,
until he should hear from him again. He realized that
he endangered his commission by this act, bftt he felt
that co-operation, combined with delay, would result in
success. 2 Stout-hearted Nott readily agreed to Pollock's
request.
The Mission of Captain Colin Mackenzie. On April 25
Mackenzie reached the British camp with proposals from
Akbar, who wished to arrange terms for himself and his
party. Pollock replied, offering payment for the release
of the prisoners, but would not entertain Akbar's
extravagant proposals.
Ellenborough* s fresh Orders to the Generals. Fortun-
ately, as it would appear, the inglorious orders of Ellen-
borough had leaked out and caused a storm of dis-
approval both in India and at home. They also reacted
unfavourably on the position in Afghanistan. The
Governor-General, influenced by public opinion, there-
upon issued fresh orders to both generals.
1 This letter is given in full by Kaye, vol. iit, pp. 198-200. 2 Low, op. cit. p. 297.
RETRIBUTION 49
During the summer months Pollock was not inactive,
In June he despatched a force to the Shinwari Valley,
where a captured gun, treasure and plunder had been
collected. By way of punishment for their guilt, of which
ample proofs were forthcoming, the villages in the valley
were burned and the crops were carried off.
On July 4 Ellenborough wrote direct to the two
generals, stating that his opinions had undergone no
change since his declaration that the withdrawal of the
British troops from Afghanistan was the main object of
Government. But he laid down that if Nott wished to
retire to India via Ghazni, Kabul and Jalalabad, he might
be assisted in this retirement by Pollock's advance to
Kabul. The letters are given by Low. 1 That to Nott
included the following: " If you should be enabled by
a coup de main to get possession of Ghazni and Kabul you
will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proof of the
power of the British army, without impeaching its
humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of
Mahmud of Ghazni his club which hangs over it, and you
will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates
of Somnath. These will be the just trophies of your
success.' *
Kaye's opinion of this document runs: " It is either
from first to last a masterpiece of Jesuitical cunning, or it
indicates a feebleness of will an infirmity of purpose
discreditable to the character of a statesman entrusted with
the welfare and honour of one of the greatest empires in
the world ". Studying the question a century later, I feel
bbund to concur in this condemnation of Ellenborough.
The Advance of Pollock to Gandamak. In the middle
of August Pollock heard from Nott that he was preparing
to march on Kabul. Consequently, on August 20, he
sent his advanced guard to Gandamak and, three days
later, it attacked two neighbouring villages, where a
hostile force had collected. Not without some loss the
villages were taken and the tribesmen dispersed. During
the halt at Gandamak, on September i, the unfortunate
Fath Jang, who had been elected puppet King of Kabul
1 Op. cit. vol. iii, pp. 328-329.
VOL. II E
50 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
by the Sirdars, rode in to claim British protection, only
too happy to have escaped with his life.
On September 8 the British force in two columns
(with General McCaskill l marching one day behind)
entered the Jagdalak Pass, which was very strongly held
by Ghilzai tribesmen. But the British, fired by the spirit
of retribution, attacked with a determination that nothing
could withstand. The victory was complete. The force
then marched on to Tezin, where, owing to the fatigued
condition of the transport, a day's halt was ordered.
Meanwhile Akbar, who realized the seriousness of
his position, attempted to delay the British advance by a
letter which never reached Pollock. He had, at first,
decided to hold the Khurd Kabul Pass, but, encouraged
by Pollock's halt which he attributed to fear, he moved
on to Tezin.
The Battle of Tezin. On September 1 3 Akbar made
his supreme effort. The valley was surrounded by high
hills, each of which was held in force. The action opened
by the Afghan cavalry being attacked and cut up by the
3rd Dragoons. The British infantry then climbed the
heights. Realizing that their muskets were outranged
by the jezails, they everywhere charged with "bayonets
fixed. Desperate were the efforts made by the Afghans
to hold the Haft Kotal, but thoughts of the massacre, of
which ghastly evidence was still visible on the march,
made Pollock's force, British and Indians alike, careless
of everything but vengeance. Finally the heights of the
Haft Kotal were secured and the Afghans dispersed and
fled to their homes, realizing that they were beaten dh
their own mountains. On September 15 the victorious
British reached Kabul without further opposition.
Nott marches North. To return to the situation at
Kandahar: during July Nott, who had received a large
supply of camels from Quetta, was preparing to retire to
India. Suddenly, on July 20, Ellenborough's letter of
July 4, which permitted him on his own responsibility to
" retreat " from Kandahar via Kabul, reached him. In
reply to it he wrote to the Governor-General that he had
1 His daughter married Sir Henry Durand.
xxxii RETRIBUTION 51
decided to retire a portion of the army 'via Ghazni and
Kabul.
On August 9 Nott commenced his march on Kabul
with a strong column which included two batteries of
artillery, and the 4Oth and 4ist foot, with five Bengal
battalions and some cavalry. England at the same time
retired to India with the Bombay regiments and the Shah's
army.
The Battle of Ghoaine^ August 30. During the first
marches the British were undisturbed, but information
was received that Shams-ud-Din Khan, the Governor of
Ghazni, with some 500 horsemen and 2 guns, was in the
neighbourhood. On August 28 the force had started to
advance from Mukur, when the rear-guard was attacked,
but the irregular cavalry cut up and dispersed the
assailants. Upon reaching the camping-ground a haze
prevented effectual reconnoitring and, upon receipt of a
false report that the grass-cutters had been attacked, some
cavalry galloped out and dispersed a body of footmen.
A force of Afghan horse appearing on a ridge was then
charged, but our horsemen fell into an ambush and were
received by a hot flanking fire causing' heavy losses.
They were then, in turn, charged and defeated by the
Afghan horse. Hearing of this repulse, Nott marched
out to fight the enemy, reported to be 7000 strong, but
only their vedettes were visible on the hill-tops.
Shams-ud-Din Khan attacks the British. On the follow-
ing day Shams-ud-Din had sent round the heads of the
three British officers who had been killed, and declared
tfiat one of them was Nott's. The Ghilzais, much en-
couraged by these proofs of success, resolved to fight.
Nott marched towards Ghoaine, while the Afghan
leader kept parallel to his right and finally took up his
position in the hills to the east of the camp. After rest-
ing his force, Nott determined to capture an adjacent fort
which was held by the enemy, but seeing the British
artillery make little impression on it, Shams-ud-Din ad-
vanced in full force, Nott thereupon drew off" from the
attack on the fort and charged the Afghans, who fled.
Their guns and camp were captured.
52 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Norfs Advance on Ghazni. On September 5 Nott's
army was before Ghazni. Shams-ud-Din was holding
the surrounding heights, which Nott proceeded to clear
and then camped. The famous Ghazni gun, the Zubbur
Jang, was, however, fired from the fortress and fourteen
balls fell in the camp, which was accordingly moved out
of range. Pollock ordered the construction of breaching
batteries, but they were not required, since Shams-ud-
Din fled to Kabul and the defenders of the fortress evacu-
ated it by night.
Nott enters Ghazni. In the morning the British flag
was hoisted from the tower of the citadel; a royal salute
was fired from the captured Afghan guns and the fortress
was destroyed in retribution for the treacherous massacre
of the British garrison. Finally, Pollock carried out
Ellenborough's instructions by loading up the gates of
the shrine of Mahmud of Ghazni and then continued his
march.
Nott reaches the Kabul Valley. On September 4, when
camping some twenty-five miles south of Kabul, Nott
received information of Pollock's victory at Tezin and of
his intention to reach the capital on September 15. The
Kandahar force was opposed by a strong body of Afghans
who, under Shams-ud-Din and Sultan Jan, had thrown up
earthworks in the Maidan Pass. The defence was stout
and the heights were carried although not held. The
action was indecisive, but that night news of the defeat
of Akbar at Tezin reached the Afghans, who decided to
retreat to a position at Urgundeh. In the morning the
Maidan Pass was found to have been abandoned, but the
tribesmen harassed the column with jezail fire. Nott,
however, crushed all opposition and, destroying the
villages as he advanced, camped some five miles from
Kabul. He had been beaten in the race by Pollock, but
his advance had attracted strong forces which otherwise
would have joined Akbar's army.
The Captives. Lady Sale 1 mentions that before
1 Lady Sales Journal, p. 227. I have also consulted Forty-three Tears in India, by
Sir George Lawrence, and have read letters of interest which were received from Lady
Sale and General Pollock. These were lent me by Major-General Sir William Beynon,
the grandson of Sir George Lawrence.
RETRIBUTION 53
starting on the tragic retreat, by chance she opened
Campbell's Poems at " Hohenlinden ", " one verse of
which ", she writes, " actually haunted me day and
night":
Few, few shall part where many meet,
The snow shall be their winding sheet;
And every turf beneath their feet
Shall be a soldier's sepulchre.
In the previous chapter the handing over of the
women and children is mentioned. With the exception
of Lady Macnaghten they had lost everything except the
clothes they wore, and, for the last four days, had tasted
nothing but some dry biscuits and some sherry or brandy.
Lawrence, however, writes: " During the whole of these
trying marches, I felt truly proud of my countrymen and
women; all bore up so nobly and heroically against
hunger, cold, fatigue, and other privations of no ordinary
kind, as to call forth the admiration even of our Afghan
guards ".
The March to the Panjshir Valley. The captives re-
mained for the night in the Khurd Kabul fort and on the
following day proceeded to Tezin. Lady Sale, who had
been twic^i wounded in the Khurd Kabul Pass, writes:
" The road was covered with awfully mangled bodies, all
naked: fifty-eight Europeans were counted . . . the
natives innumerable. . . . The sight was dreadful; the
smell of the blood sickening; and the corpses lay so
thick. . . ."
Lawrence, who had been claimed as a hostage, took
charge of the party, and describes in similar terms the
onward march through the Jagdalak Pass, beyond which
the captives turned north across a steep range to the village
of Tigri, situated in the Panjshir Valley. There, to a
congregation numbering 100 British men, women and
children, he read the appallingly appropriate psalm for
the day: " O God, the heathen are come into thine in-
heritance. . . . The dead bodies of Thy servants have
they given to be meat unto the fowls of the air,"
Tigri, being an undefended village, was not con-
sidered safe and, accordingly, the party moved on to the
54 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
fortified village of Budiabad, where reasonably comfort-
able quarters were provided. On February 1 1, the earth-
quake that had levelled the walls of Jalalabad wrought
havoc also at Budiabad, but fortunately no lives were lost.
On April 1 1 , after a false start and a return, the
captives finally left Budiabad, passing on the way Akbar
Khan, who carried his wounded hand in a sling. " He
spoke in a free and soldierly manner of Sale's victory and
his own defeat, praising the gallant bearing of our men,
with Sale conspicuous on his white charger at their head."
On April 1 9 the party reached the Tezin fort, which
had suffered badly from the earthquake, and here the
fourth child was born since leaving Kabul. 1 The captives
then moved to Goudah, some twelve miles from Tezin,
and at this camp, on April 23, General Elphinstone died.
Lady Sale's diary, under date of May 1 1, breathes her
indomitable spirit: " The citizens [of Kabul] are ruined
by the perfect stagnation of trade. . . . Now is the time
to strike the blow, but I much dread dilly-dallying just
because a handful of us are in Akbar's power. What are
our lives when compared with the honour of our country? "
From this camp, on May 23, the captives travelled to
the Haft Kotul; "and here ", Lady Sale wfites, " we
came upon a sad scene of decaying bodies ". They then
halted once again at the Khurd Kabul fort.
During this trying period, Pottinger who, as political
officer, had to deal with Akbar, made the best of a very
difficult situation and urged the Sirdar to give a proof of
his sincerity by sending the women and children to
Jalalabad. Akbar, had he been free to decide, might
have agreed, but the other Chiefs would have opposed
the step, considering the hostages to be a gold mine.
Hearing that the Chiefs or the Jabbar Khel, among
whom they were camped, intended to seize them, on
May 22 a hurried march was made to a fort at Shewaki
close to Kabul, the party covering forty miles of rough
country in two days. Here they were in comparative
luxury. Captain Connolly, who had joined the prisoners,
received a letter from Pollock at Jalalabad dated July 4, in
1 She was aptly named Frances Tezeena Waller.
XXXII
RETRIBUTION 55
which the General stated that he had a force of 20,000
men at Jalalabad and that Nott's division was 15,000
strong. He added that 25,000 men were assembling at
Ferozepore, and that 10,000 men were on their way from
England, He concluded : " All will make an overwhelm-
ing army and it will be a fearful day if such an army
advance for the release of our prisoners and the delivery
of our guns ". While the captives were at Shewaki,
Colonel Palmer and his officers, nine in all, arrived in a
pitiable condition from Ghazni and joined the rest of the
prisoners.
On August 25 Akbar decided to despatch the party
to Bamian under a strong escort, so determined was he to
prevent their rescue by the advancing armies. Reports
of Nott's march on Ghazni had alarmed him. Indeed,
before the arrival of the prisoners at Bamian, the fall of
that fortress was announced. The crossing of the high
passes was very trying, especially for the sick, but finally
the Bamian Valley was reached, when the prisoners,
forgetting their troubles, visited and sketched the wonder-
ful Buddhist remains.
On September 11, Saleh Muhammad, the officer in
command of the escort, received Akbar's orders, to move
the prisoners to still more distant Khulm. At this juncture
Saleh Muhammad's brother, accompanied by a Sayyid
Murtaza, arrived from Kabul. From a friend of the
British they bore proposals to which the wife of Saleh
Muhammad had already been won over, that that officer
should arrange for the liberation of the captives in
feturn for handsome sums of money. He was informed
that Akbar had fled, and that the Kizilbash had joined the
British. Consequently he was ready to accept the very
generous terms of 20,000 rupees in cash to be paid on
arrival at Kabul, and an annuity of 12,000 rupees for
life. Having decided to join the winning side, Saleh
Muhammad hoisted the standard of defiance on the walls
of the fort, and, before sunset, it was known that the
British had engaged his services.
Pottinger, to whom the greatest credit is due for
these successful negotiations, in which he was ably
56 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
seconded by Lawrence, immediately issued a pro-
clamation to the neighbouring Hazaras to tender their
allegiance, with the result that various Chiefs joined
the British. The representative of Akbar fled and a
known friend of the British took his place as Governor.
Meanwhile money, which was very scarce, was obtained
from a passing caravan.
The Happy Ending to the Captivity. On September 1 6
the party, fearing that they might be attacked at any
moment, started on their march back to Kabul. To some
extent the arrival of Sir Richmond Shakespear at the
head of a force of Kizilbash cavalry, allayed their anxiety.
But there were strong bodies of enemy in the Kuhistan,
and Shakespear urged the captives to make long marches,
until they were met by Sale, whose brigade was holding
the pass. To quote his heroic wife for the last time:
" When we arrived where the infantry were posted they
cheered all the captives as they passed them, and the
men of the I3th pressed forward to welcome us indi-
vidually. . . . On our arrival at the camp at Siah Sang we
were greeted with a salute of twenty-one guns."
The Reoccupation of Kabul, and its Punishment. On
September 16 Pollock marched in triumph *through
Kabul to the Bala Hissar, where he hoisted the British
flag. Path Jang was recognised as King, but it was
clearly pointed out to him that he could expect no assist-
ance from the British in men, money or arms. His posi-
tion was, needless to say, an impossible one.
Pollock had been instructed that a signal act of
retribution should fall on guilty Kabul. He realized
that if the Bala Hissar were destroyed, there would be
even less chance than at present existed for the restoration
of law and order in Afghanistan. He therefore decided
to blow up the main bazaar in which the mutilated corpse
of Macnaghten had been exhibited. But anxious to
keep the retribution within reasonable bounds, he sent
a strong detachment of British troops to protect the
inhabitants from plunder and outrage. However, upon
the sound of the explosions being heard, " the cry went
forth ", to quote Rawlinson, " that Kabul was given up
RETRIBUTION 57
to plunder. Both camps rushed into the city, and the
consequence has been the almost total destruction of the
town/ 1
These excesses are to be deplored, but when we con-
sider that the soldiers and the camp-followers had been
eye-witnesses of the massacres perpetrated alike on soldiers
and non-combatants, the fact that the guilty city lay at
their mercy and the rumour that it was to be plundered,
feelings of vengeance, which cannot be severely blamed,
would naturally be aroused.
The Last Expedition. In order to discourage an
attack on his troops in the Khurd Kabul Pass, Pollock,
who had heard that Amanulla Khan had collected a
strong force at Istalif in the Kuhistan district and that
Akbar Khan, after sending his family across the Hindu
Kush into Turkistan, was waiting on events in the same
neighbourhood, decided to take action. By his orders
McCaskill attacked this " maiden " fortress, with com-
plete success. Nothing could check the gallantry of the
troops, who stormed through village and vineyard with
such a rush that the defenders of Istalif were seized with
panic, and the hillside beyond was covered with men and
white-veifed women fleeing from the town. McCaskill,
with true British gallantry, allowed no pursuit, but two
guns and much booty fell to the victors.
On his return McCaskill destroyed Charikar, the
scene of the annihilation of the Gurkha regiment. He
then marched back in triumph to Kabul, having inflicted
a heavy blow on Afghan pride and moral by the capture
of Istalif, with such consummate ease.
The Victorious Armies march back to India. British
honour had been fully vindicated by the recovery of the
hostages and captives, by victories that crushed all
opposition in the field and by the punishment inflicted
on the guilty cities. Its task was accomplished. On
October 1 2 the army began its march homewards, taking
with it the blind Zaman Shah, the youthful Path Jang
and their families. It was also accompanied by the
Indian survivors of the retreat who had, in some cases,
been enslaved, and who were treated with every care and
58 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
consideration. Halting at Jalalabad, Pollock destroyed
its fortifications, as he also did at Ak Masjid. He then
marched down the Khaibar to Peshawar, where the army
was welcomed with princely hospitality by Avitabile.
Finally it marched across the Punjab to Ferozepore.
The Victory Celebrations. The victorious army was
greeted by Ellenborough, and crossing the Sutlej by a
temporary bridge, it marched between 250 caparisoned
elephants, and was welcomed with booming of guns,
military music and heartfelt rejoicings. Festivities
followed, which culminated in a grand military display.
Ellenborough dubbed Sale's brigade the " Illustrious
Garrison ". He might with at least equal justice have
termed Nott's command " The Ever-Victorious Army ".
Lord Ellenborough } s Treatment of the Hostages and
Prisoners. It is important, after dealing with the honours
bestowed on the victors, to refer to the decisions of the
Viceroy in the case of the hostages and prisoners. I will
give as an example the treatment meted out to Pottinger,
whose eminent services throughout the war were con-
spicuous. In January 1843, Pottinger appeared before a
court-martial at which the President declared: " I con-
sider that Major Pottinger omitted nothing so*far as lay
in his power, to maintain the honour of British arms and
to secure the safety of the army, that he ultimately signed
the treaty [with Akbar Khan] contrary to his own judg-
ment, through the unavoidable necessity of acting as
agent for the Council of War. The Court cannot con-
clude its proceedings without expressing a strong convic-
tion that, throughout the whole period of his painftil
position, Major Pottinger's conduct was marked by a
degree of energy and manly firmness that stamps his
character as one worthy of admiration."
In spite of this magnificent testimonial, Ellenborough
not only refused Pottinger's request for an interview,
while his written demand to receive his pay when serving
as a hostage fared no better than those of Lawrence and
other officers.
Nor were these the limits of his injustice, since
Ellenborough also refused to allow any medals won by
XXXII
RETRIBUTION 59
officers for services rendered by them prior to the disaster
to be given to them. Such behaviour dishonoured Ellen-
borough and is fortunately rare among British officials
holding high positions.
Lord EllenborougJi s Proclamation of October r. The
news of the complete success of the British arms induced
Ellenborough to issue a grandiloquent proclamation which
was dated October i, as was the unfortunate document of
Lord Auckland, in 1838. It was of no particular im-
portance, but I cannot refrain from reproducing an extract
from his proclamation of November 10, which Wellington
aptly termed a " Song of Triumph ". It runs : " Our vic-
torious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnath
in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of
Sultan Mahmud looks upon the ruins of Ghazni. The
insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged. The
gates of the temple of Somnath, so long the memorial of
your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your
national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over
the nations beyond the Indus. " No such proclamation
has ever been issued by a British Governor-General. It
was certainly an outrage to Moslems and little less to
Hindus, *while on the high authority of Rawlinson, the
gates brought back to India were not the gates of
Somnath!
Summary. In the last three chapters I have dealt
with a campaign which, costing the lives of tens of
thousands of British and Indian soldiers and thousands of
Afghans, had involved our armies in a crushing defeat.
Apart from the expenditure of some 15 millions sterling,
this massacre of a British force destroyed our reputation
for invincibility in India and Central Asia and undoubtedly
led to the Indian Mutiny,
Auckland's invasion of Afghanistan was not only a
terrible mistake but constituted an equally grave injustice
to Amir Dost Muhammad and the people of Afghanistan,
whose hatred was deep and enduring; Macnaghten, who
aimed at a protectorate, failed completely to establish
Shah Shuja on the throne; and Elphinstone and Shelton,
through a complete lack of military qualities, involved
60 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.
the British Raj in the greatest disaster its arms had
suffered in Asia. Yet in the final act of the drama, British
columns, crowned with the laurels of victory, converged
on Kabul and exacted due, but not vindictive, retribution.
There is a Persian proverb which runs: " History is the
mirror of the Past and the lesson of the Present ". The
bitter lesson of Kabul should never be forgotten.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE SECOND REIGN OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD
Is Dost Muhammad dead that there is no justice? An Afghan proverb.
The Return of Dost Muhammad to Afghanistan. One
result of the victorious campaign which is described in the
last chapter was the realization that the retention of Dost
Muhammad as a state prisoner was no longer justified
or expedient. Ellenborough accordingly issued a pro-
clamation setting forth that " When the British army
returning from Afghanistan shall have passed the Indus,
all the Afghans now in the power of the British Govern-
ment shall be permitted to return to their country ".
In due course Dost Muhammad accepted the offer.
He was escorted to Shikarpur and formally set at liberty.
In the fifst instance, however, he proceeded to Lahore,
where he was magnificently entertained by Shir Singh,
who was now Maharaja of the Punjab. There he learned
that, as soon as the British had crossed the Indus,
Akbar had reappeared at Kabul and had dethroned
Shapur Mirza, a younger son of Shah Shuja. He also
learned that the party of Zaman Khan had attacked
Akbar who had retired into the Bala Hissar where he
was besieged.
Dost Muhammad, realizing the situation, immedi-
ately sent four of his sons, Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad
Akram, Muhammad Azim and Gholam Haidar to Kabul
where they were able to relieve their beleaguered brother.
Dost Muhammad, following shortly afterwards, was
welcomed by the people as Amir of Kabul. He had
been in banishment three years. About the same
time Kohandil Khan returned to Kandahar from Persia
and, once again, became its independent ruler.
61
62 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Ambitions of Muhammad Akbar Khan. Dost
Muhammad had appointed Akbar to the post of Vizier,
but soon realized that his influence as the leader against
the detested English and his ambitions to re-establish
the Afghan Empire in the plenitude of its ancient
boundaries were likely to cause trouble. The Amir had
learned much during his residence in India, but his
wider views were unpopular among the fanatical and
conservative Afghans, while the conquest of Sind by the
British, in 1843, naturally accentuated the anti-British
feeling, since it destroyed all hopes of reconquering this
outlying province, which had formed part of the empire
of Ahmad Shah,
The Murder of Shah Kamran^ 1842. To return to
the position at Herat : after the departure of Todd from
that city in March 1841, Yar Muhammad, freed from all
restraint, confiscated, tortured and enslaved at will. He
also planned to seize and plunder his master.
Shah Kamran, suspecting these designs, suddenly
took possession of the citadel, hoping that the population
would rise in his favour. In this he was disappointed
and, after sustaining a siege of fifty days, he was forced
to surrender. The infamous Vizier managed to secure
the jewels which Shah Mahmud had taken from the
crown to Kabul, and also Kamran's treasure to the esti-
mated value of 240,000. But there remained a jewelled
vest, valued at 160,000 which Shah Kamran had en-
trusted to one of his wives, who, in turn, had made it
over to a faithful servant to carry away to Khurasan.
Yar Muhammad tortured the unfortunate woman, but
without eliciting the secret. He subsequently distributed
the younger women among his partisans and sold the
elder ones, including four of Kamran's daughters, into
slavery. Early in 1842, by his orders, Shah Kamran
was suffocated in his prison.
Akbar Khan, Kohandil Khan and Tar Muhammad
Khan. In 1846 Akbar Khan prepared, against the
wishes of the Amir, to invade Kandahar, on the pre-
tence that Kohandil Khan was fomenting disturbances
at Kabul. To strengthen his position, he married the
xxxm DOST MUHAMMAD 63
daughter of Yar Muhammad and arranged for Yar
Muhammad's son to marry one of his cousins.
Kohandil Khan was exasperated by this new alliance,
which placed him between two fires. He consequently
raided the Herat province. However, Akbar Khan
arrested this proceeding by rapidly advancing at the head
of 800 cavalry. But, before this civil war had developed,
he was suddenly recalled to Kabul by the Amir, whose
orders he bitterly resented.
The Intrigues of Kabul and Herat with Persia.
Towards the end of 1846 Akbar and Yar Muhammad
wrote a joint letter, carried by envoys, to Muhammad
Shah, pointing out that the English were conquering the
whole of the Indus Valley, and begging him to make an
alliance with them against the common foe. The envoys
were well received and the Shah sent jewelled swords and
decorations to Dost Muhammad and to Akbar,
The Death of Akbar Khan. The turbulent son of
Dost Muhammad was still determined to attack Kohandil
Khan, in alliance with Yar Muhammad. Dost
Muhammad, who opposed this civil war, was threatened
by Akbar and, quitting the Bala Hissar, took refuge with
the KizilBash troops. Akbar demanded that his father
should be handed over to him, and would probably have
proceeded to take extreme action when he was suddenly
poisoned by a Hindu doctor. His death permitted Dost
Muhammad to regain full power at Kabul.
The Campaigns of Tar Muhammad. Yar Muhammad,
upon seizing the supreme power at Herat, extended his
authority over the small Uzbeg Khanates in the north,
Maimana, Sir-i-Pul, Shibarghan, Andkhui and Akchah.
He also attacked the Hazaras and transplanted eight
thousand families to the depopulated lower valley of the
Hari Rud, He finally engaged in a campaign against the
Uzbegs of Balkh, but was forced to retire upon news of
risings at Farah and Bakwa, which were fomented by
Kohandil Khan.
The Ghilzai Revolts, 1847. Muhammad Akbar Khan
had sworn an oath of brotherhood on the Koran with
a Ghilzai Chief, Muhammad Shah Khan, who, upon his
64 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
decease, claimed not only his property but also possession
of his widows and the post of Vizier. Dost Muhammad
finally quelled the rising which ensued and appointed his
son Gholam Haidar to be his heir-apparent and Vizier.
A second rising of the Ghilzais was also crushed,
Dost Muhammad and the Sikhs, 1845-1849. In the
winter of 1845 Akbar had despatched 500 horsemen to
assist the Sikhs, but, on February 10, 1846, the British
won the battle of Sobraon and entered Lahore as
conquerors. 1
The Sikhs for many years had offered to restore
Peshawar to the Afghans if Dost Muhammad would aid
them against the British. In 1848, when they embarked
on the Second Sikh war, he was compelled to yield to
the popular demand. He took possession of the plain
of Peshawar and advanced to Attock, which was held by
Colonel Herbert, who was ultimately obliged to surrender.
The Amir, content with the recovery of Peshawar,
showed no disposition to continue to support the Sikhs,
but he was forced by his Chiefs to send a body of cavalry
some five thousand strong, which took part in the battle
of Gujarat fought on February 21, 1849. The Afghans
made a charge and were met by British cavairy, which
not only defeated them, but pursued them into the
passes. Dost Muhammad himself barely escaped by the
fleetness of his horse and returned to Kabul defeated and
humiliated. All hopes of recovering Peshawar were lost
for ever, since he realized that Gujarat was a final crushing
defeat for the Sikhs, and that the British would occupy
their kingdom.
The Reconquest of Afghan Turkistan. During the
years 1850-1855 Dost Muhammad gradually recon-
quered Balkh, Khulm, Kunduz and Badakhshan, and
appointed his eldest son, Sirdar Afzal, to govern these
provinces, which became an integral portion of his
dominions,
The Death ofKohandil Khan y 1 855. One of the most
serious difficulties of the Amir was the bitter hostility
shown by Kohandil Khan against Yar Muhammad of
1 Cunningham, in his op. cit. pp. 312-316, gives a homeric description of this battle.
xxxm DOST MUHAMMAD 65
Herat. In August 1855 this firebrand died and the
Amir, at the request of Rahmdil Khan, who had quarrelled
with the deceased man's son, marched in person to
Kandahar. In spite of much opposition by the people,
who were stirred up by the mullas to engage in Jihad
against the so-called ally of the British, he annexed Kanda-
har to his kingdom.
The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853. We must, once
again, deal with the position at Herat. Yar Muhammad
had died in 1851, and was succeeded by his half-witted
son Said Muhammad who, with a view to strengthening
his position, commenced negotiations with Persia. This
action displeased the British Government who negotiated
a treaty with Persia, by the terms of which that power
" engaged not to send troops on any account to the
territory of Herat, excepting when troops from without
attacked the place ".*
The Shah and his Vizier disliked this treaty which
they had been obliged to sign. The latter vented his
spite on the British Minister over a trifling matter and
owing to this offensive attitude of the Vizier, the Minister
broke off relations, and at the end of 1855 quitted
Tehran. *
The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855. The threatening
attitude of Persia towards Herat brought the Amir once
again into friendly relations with Great Britain, and, in
1854, he sent his son Gholam Haidar to negotiate a
treaty with Sir John (later Lord) Lawrence, at Peshawar.
By its articles, respect for the territories of the Amir and
of the East Indian Company was reciprocally agreed
upon; and the Amir engaged to be " the friends of its
(the East India Company's) friends, and the enemies of its
enemies ". By this engagement the twelve years of
hostility and suspicion, which the First Afghan War had
bequeathed as a legacy, were ended, 2
The Occupation of Herat by Persia^ 1856. The
Persian Vizier was at first apprehensive that the British
1 Aitckison's Treaties^ No. XVII, p. 72.
2 The treaty is given in full in Rawlinson'a England and Russia in the East,
Appendix II.
VOL. II F
66 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
would resent his unwarrantable action, but not having
received any communication from London for some
months after the rupture of relations, he somewhat
optimistically thought that no action would be taken.
Consequently, in the spring of 1856, he ordered a
Persian army to march on Herat, where it was welcomed
by Muhammad Yusuf, a Sadozai Sirdar who had put
Said Muhammad to death, to avenge the blood of
Kamran, and had taken his place. Later there was a
rising against the Persians, whose tyrannical behaviour
was resented, but, in October 1856, the Persian pos-
session of Herat was finally established.
The Second Treaty with Dost Muhammad. The British
took prompt action to meet this situation and, in January
1857, by the terms of a second treaty, granted Dost
Muhammad a subsidy of ; 10,000 per mensem during the
continuation of hostilities, on the understanding that the
money was to be spent on his army under the supervision
of British officers; large numbers of muskets and
quantities of ammunition were also supplied. 1 Actually,
however, hostilities were ended before the Amir was able
to take any action.
The Anglo-Persian War of 1857. The British who
were only anxious to bring just sufficient pressure on the
Shah to oblige him to withdraw from Herat, occupied the
island of Kharak and then the town of Bushire, A force
under Sir James Outram marched inland and met a
Persian army at Khushab near Borazjun and defeated it.
Later, it landed at Mohamera on the River Karun and
drove the enemy from the field. The Persian Govern-
ment had already sued for peace after the capture of
Bushire, and by the terms of the Treaty of Paris which was
negotiated, the Shah agreed to evacuate Afghanistan and
to recognize its independence. The Persians were amazed,
and with reason, at the magnanimity of the British, who
exacted no indemnity and did not even claim the dismissal
of the hostile Vizier. Article 6 of the treaty runs :
His Majesty the Shah of Persia agrees to relinquish all claims
to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the countries
1 The treaty is given in Rawlinson's op, cit. Appendix III.
DOST MUHAMMAD 67
of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the chiefs of Herat, or
of the countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience, such as
the issue of coinage or " khutba ", or tribute.
His Majesty further engages to abstain hereafter from all inter-
ference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His Majesty
promises to recognize the independence of Herat and of the whole
of Afghanistan, and never to attempt to interfere with the inde-
pendence of those States.
In case of differences arising between the Government of Persia
and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan the Persian Govern-
ment engages to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices
of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless those
friendly offices fail of effect.
The New Ruler of Herat. The Persian authorities,
upon receiving information about the treaty, handed over
Muhammad Yusuf to the relations of Said Muhammad,
who put him to death. He was replaced by a Barakzai
Sirdar, Sultan Ahmad Khan, a refugee son-in-law and
nephew of Dost Muhammad, who agreed that the khutba
should be read in the Shah's name. Consequently Persia
continued to rule Herat through this Sirdar, who visited
Tehran and received a robe of honour from the Shah. It
is difficult to understand why the British Government
did not iflsist that the provinces should be handed over to
their ally Dost Muhammad.
Dost Muhammad and the Indian Mutiny. In con-
nexion with the second treaty 'with the Amir, a Mission
consisting of three British officers reached Kandahar
early in 1857. Shortly afterwards the Indian Mutiny
broke out and the Governor of Kandahar, after reporting
this fact and adding the news that all the English in
India had been killed, inquired, " Had I not better cut
the throats of these three officers? " Dost Muhammad
replied: " It is useless. I know these English well. It
may be true that all those in India have been killed, but
they will come in thousands from beyond the sea and
reconquer the country. Better leave these three men
alone." The Amir had gained wisdom by his sojourn
in India 1
Dost Muhammad captures Herat and dies, 1 863. The
Amir had regained Kandahar, thanks to the death of his
68 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XXXIH
disloyal brother Kohandil Khan. But he was not content
to allow Ahmad Khan to recognize the suzerainty of
Persia. Accordingly he marched on Herat, carried the
city by storm and died nine days later. Thus passed off
the stage a truly great Amir, who must have died happy
in the knowledge that he had reunited all the provinces
of Afghanistan.
CHAPTER XXXIV
SHIR ALI ESTABLISHES HIMSELF AS AMIR
The Afghans youth have reddened their hands,
As a falcon dyes its talons in the blood of its quarry.
They have made their white swords red with blood,
As a bed of tulips blooming in summer.
From an Afghan poem.
The Result of the Annexation of the Punjab. A new
phase in Afghan history opened with the overthrow of
the Sikh armies by the British and the subsequent
annexation of the Punjab. Up to 1846 the policy of the
British Government had mainly been concerned with
the creation in Afghanistan, in Persia, and in Central
Asia to a lesser degree, of a favourable political situation
that would help to protect India from invasion by distant
foes. But, between 1846 and 1849, the British assumed
control of the provinces conquered by Ranjit Singh,
which marched with the loosely defined boundaries of
Afghanistan. The Indian Empire had thereby reached
its natural limits and, by this advance, the North- West
Frontier automatically became, and still remains, the
most important question with which British admini-
strators are faced. 1
On the other hand, the development of communica-
tions, and the assumption by the Crown of the Govern-
ment of India after the Indian Mutiny, gradually resulted
in the Secretary of State dictating the foreign policy of
India; and when the Red Sea cable was laid in 1870,
the liberty of controlling foreign policy by the Governor-
General soon became a thing of the past.
1 I have consulted Life of Lord Lawrence, by Bosworth Smith; Life of Robert,
Marquis of Salisbury, by Lady Gwendolen Cecil; the Cambridge History of India, vol. vi;
and From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts, by J. L. Morrison, Raleigh Lecture,
1936.
69
yo HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Sir Henry Lawrence as Warden of the Marches.
During the period 1846-1853 Henry Lawrence set a
notable example of the true lines for border administra-
tion. He recruited the famous Corps of Guides from
both sides of the frontier and constructed the road from
Peshawar to Kohat through what is still independent
tribal country. His views are aptly summarised in a letter
to Lord Stanley: " It is not to be expected that such a
frontier can ever be what is called quiet^ but it is quite in
our power to prevent it being dangerous. . . . With a
carte blanche I could guarantee, at a less expense than at
present, to pacify the frontier within three years, that is,
to make it as quiet as is consistent with the character of
such a people.'* J
General John Jacob, the Warden of the Sind Frontier.
Another great frontier officer was Jacob. He had, like
Henry Lawrence further north, gained a strong position
on the Sind frontier. He had also realized the supreme
strategical importance of Quetta. He wrote: " From
Quetta, we could operate on the flank and rear of an
army attempting to proceed towards the Kyber Pass;
so that, with a British force at Quetta, the other road
would be shut ". 2
The Close Border Policy of Lord Lawrence. In spite of
the striking success of these great frontier officers, John,
Lord Lawrence as Viceroy failed to realize that it was
unwise to cut off friendly intercourse with Afghanistan,
since it would inevitably drive its Amirs to seek for support
from Russia or Persia. He equally failed to realize that
peace on the North- West Frontier could never be secured
without a friendly Afghanistan. Lawrence had disagreed
with a proposal of Edwardes, in 1853, that an attempt
should be made to secure the goodwill of the Amir. He
disagreed for two reasons: "One, that you will never
get the Afghans to make a treaty; and two, if they make
it, they will not keep it". Yet the treaty of 1853,
strengthened by that of 1855, enabled Dost Muhammad
to restrain his warlike subjects from invading India
* H. M. Lawrence to Lord Stanley, March 31, 1853.
2 Piews and Opinions of General Jacob, p. 379.
SHIR ALI AS AMIR 71
during the Mutiny. As Dalhousie observed, the views of
Lawrence were based on the fallacy that the Afghans
were too foolish to recognize their own interests.
The Indian Mutiny. During the very anxious period
of the Indian Mutiny, Dost Muhammad, thanks to the
treaties given in the last chapter, and perhaps still more
to his knowledge of the vast resources at the disposal of
Great Britain, had remained our friend. So much so was
this the case that John Lawrence, who feared for the
position of the small besieging force at Delhi, instructed
Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, to consult
with Brigadier Sydney Cotton and John Nicholson, the
Deputy-Commissioner, as to the advisability of handing
over Peshawar to the Amir. The answer was worthy of
its writers: " We are unanimously of the opinion that,
with God's help, we can and will hold Peshawar, let the
worst come to the worst; and that it would be a fatal
policy to abandon it, and retire beyond the Indus ". x
The Sons of Dost Muhammad. To understand the
constant struggle for power between the numerous sur-
viving sons of Dost Muhammad, it is desirable to give a
list of the most important among them, with some details
as to the*posts they were holding at this juncture. The
brackets denote sons by the same mother.
1. Muhammad Afzal, aged 52, Governor of Afghan Turkistan
2. Muhammad Azim, aged 45, Governor of Kurram
3. SHIR ALI KHAN, aged 40, Heir designate
B-J 4. Muhammad Amin, aged 34, Governor of Kandahar
5. Muhammad Sharif, aged 30, Governor of Farah and Girishk
6. Vali Muhammad, aged 33, Commandant of Akcha under Afzal
7. Faiz Muhammad, aged 25, serving under Afzal
( 8. Muhammad Aslam, aged 27, serving under Afzal
D-j 9. Muhammad Hassan, aged 25
(10. Muhammad Husayn, aged 23
E |i i. Ahmad, aged 30 | b h ; d Af ,
\I2. Muhammad Zaman, aged 25; 6
Gholam Haidar, who had formerly been nominated
heir-apparent, and had negotiated the treaty with
Lawrence, died in 1858, and the Amir had then informed
1 Life of Lord Lawrence > by Bosworth Smith, vol. ii, pp. 137-141.
C
\
72 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the Viceroy that he had appointed Shir AH to be his
successor. His reasons for the selection of Shir Ali in
preference to his eldest son Afzal may well have been
that the mother of Afzal was not a member of the royal
tribe. Dost Muhammad, as stated above, had suffered
much from a similar disability and preferred to choose a
son with the highest claims by birth. In any case, as we
have seen, Afzal had not behaved well when commanding
a force outside Ghazni in 1839,
Shir All Khan announces his Accession to the Viceroy.
Shir Ali, immediately on his father's death, announced his
accession to Lord Elgin, who, hearing rumours that his
brothers might contest the throne with him, delayed his
formal acknowledgment of the new Amir. In view of
the friendly relations that had latterly existed with Dost
Muhammad, this delay, which constituted a definite
rebuff, was unfortunate. Lord Elgin died in the autumn
of 1863 and it was not until six months after the receipt
of Shir Ali's letter that Sir William Denison, who was
acting Governor-General, gave a cold official reply.
The Amir, upon receipt of the acknowledgment,
asked that his son Muhammad Ali might be officially
considered to be his heir. He also asked forta gift of
6000 muskets. These requests were received by Law-
rence, the new Viceroy, who agreed to recognize Muham-
mad Ali as heir-apparent, but declined to supply the
muskets. About this period an envoy from Persia reached
Shir Ali, and that ruler, realizing that there was little
hope of help from the British, received him with marked
distinction. "
The Rebellion of Afzal Khan and Azim Khan. Three
months later, in April 1864, Shir Ali, possibly, if not
probably, owing to the coldness of the Viceroy, was faced
with a serious rebellion of his two elder brothers. Crush-
ing Azim by a force under his general Muhammad
Rafik, he crossed the Hindu Kush and engaged Afzal's
army at Bajgah. After an indecisive engagement, Afzal
sued for peace and was restored to his government. But
before Shir Ali had quitted Afghan Turkistan, he heard
that Abdur Rahman, the son of Afzal, whom he had
SHIR ALI AS AMIR 73
summoned to his presence, had fled across the Oxus.
He thereupon imprisoned Afzal, and appointed Fatteh
Muhammad Khan, son of the deceased Akbar Khan, to
the governorship of the province. Having thus settled
matters in Afghan Turkistan, he returned victorious to
Kabul.
The Battle of Kujbaz, June 1865. In the spring of
1865, Shir Ali's own brothers, Muhammad Amin and
Muhammad Sharif rebelled. The two armies met in the
vicinity of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and the engagement resulted
in the defeat of the rebels. During the battle, Muham-
mad AH, the heir-apparent, engaged in single combat
with his uncle Muhammad Amin in which both were
wounded with sword cuts. The uncle then killed his
nephew with a pistol shot and was himself despatched by
Muhammad Ali's soldiers, both men falling within a few
paces of one another. Muhammad Amin's corpse was
brought before Shir Ali, who exclaimed: " Throw away
the body of this dog, and bid my son come and con-
gratulate me on the victory ". Shortly afterwards, his
attendants, not daring to tell him that his son had also
been killed, silently brought in the corpse. " Who is this
other dog? " exclaimed the Amir, but, when he learned
the truth, he rent his garments and cast dust upon his
head. In spite of the father's overwhelming grief at the
loss of his heir, Sharif Khan, who had sued for peace,
was pardoned, while Azim Khan fled to British territory,
where he continued to plot against the Amir.
The Rebellion of Abdur Rahman Khan, July 1865.
For months after the tragedy Shir Ali remained a
demented man, indifferent to all around him. En-
couraged by what appeared to be the end of the Amir's
reign, Abdur Rahman crossed the Oxus and, upon his
arrival in Afghan Turkistan, was joined by the troops
which had served under him. He was also aided by
troops and money from Bukhara, and advanced on Kabul
in the name of its Amir. This invasion aroused much
consternation, since Shir Ali refused to return to the
capital where the garrison was weak and the soldiers
remained unpaid.
74 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Abdur Rahman occupies Kabul on February 24, 1866.
The rebel Sirdar had won over more than one chief,
who had been estranged from Shir Ali. He had also been
joined by Azim Khan, who had recruited some soldiers.
Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, a younger son of Shir Ali,
had done his best to hold Kabul with an inadequate force
of unpaid troops, but, finally, he was forced to take
refuge in the Bala Hissar, and Abdur Rahman occupied
Kabul city without serious opposition. A few days later,
Muhammad Ibrahim, having received an assurance of
safety, handed over the Bala Hissar to Azim Khan.
The Battle of Sheikhabad, May 9, 1866. This very
serious news from Kabul finally aroused the Amir from
his stupor. Marching north with a force of 9000 infantry,
5000 cavalry and 25 guns, he found the enemy strongly
entrenched at Sheikhabad, some thirty miles south of
Kabul, and attacked with the utmost determination. At
the fourth assault he was apparently winning the battle
when, at this critical juncture, some Kandahar levies
deserted to the enemy. Shir Ali, thereupon, followed by
some 500 horsemen, fled from the field. The Governor
of Ghazni, deciding to side with the victors, shut the city
gates in the face of Shir Ali and released Aftal Khan.
The liberated Sirdar speedily joined Azim Khan's camp,
where, under a salute of 100 guns, he was proclaimed
Amir. He then, supported by Azim Khan and all the
Chiefs of the party, entered the Bala Hissar under a
second salute.
The Battle of Kalat-i-Ghilzai> January 1867. During
the period that elapsed since the battle of Sheikhabad,
the intrigues of various Sirdars are too numerous to
relate. However, the Kabul army marched south and
was met near Kalat-i-Ghilzai by Shir Ali. The Kandahar
contingent broke, as in the previous action, and, as a
result of the battle, the gates of Kandahar were shut
against the vanquished Amir, who retired to Herat.
The British Communication to Afzal Khan, February
!867. Afzal Khan wrote to inform the Viceroy of his
victory at Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The position of the British
authorities, faced with these kaleidoscopic changes, was
SHIR ALI AS AMIR 75
shown in a letter which stated that pity was felt for Shir
Ali Khan although, as the Viceroy was careful to point
out, he had not been aided with arms or money. Lawrence
then went on to state that he would acknowledge Afzal
as Amir of Kabul and Kandahar if he, in return, would
recognize as binding the two treaties made with Dost
Muhammad.
The Mission of Takub Khan to the Shah, July 1867.
This short-sighted policy of the Viceroy had the result
that Shir Ali, despairing of aid from the British, despatched
his son Yakub Khan to solicit help from the Shah. Pro-
ceeding to Meshed the envoy had an audience of Nasir-
ud-Din, but nothing followed except an exchange of
gifts. The Shah was naturally afraid of arousing British
susceptibilities.
Another Defeat of Shir Ali Khan, September 1867.
Shir Ali, realizing the treachery of his Kandahar subjects,
made his way to Turkistan where he raised an army
under Faiz Muhammad, Governor of the province.
He advanced on the capital from the north but was
defeated by the skilful tactics of Abdur Rahman at Kila
Alladad, situated to the north of Charikar.
The Death of Afzal Khan, October 7, 1867. Upon
his return to Kabul, Abdur Rahman found that his
father had died. He was at once involved in disputes
with Azim Khan, the new Amir, who refused to pay the
troops their long overdue arrears. Abdur Rahman, wishing
to take his own troops to Afghan Turkistan, claimed the
entire artillery force.
Anxious to be free from his uncle at all costs, and
hoping to deliver the coup de grace to Shir Ali, Abdur
Rahman marched off northwards. It was mid-winter and
his army suffered heavy losses from the cold, but he
finally crossed the passes only to find that Shir Ali had
evacuated the province. He then, much hampered by
lack of money, set to work to re-establish his position,
intending to pursue Shir Ali to Herat. He was, however,
repulsed in the siege of the insignificant fort of Maimana,
which was held by a loyal partisan of Shir Ali, and
although the Chief finally made terms with the invader,
76 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the losses of the latter had been so severe that Abdur
Rahman abandoned all ideas of attacking Herat.
Shir Alt returns to Herat and advances on Kandahar.
Shir Ali in defeat was at his best. He fell back on
Turkistan and, in January 1868, taking with him 6000
troops, 6 guns and a large sum of money provided by
the widow of Faiz Muhammad, he marched back to
Herat. He was obviously encouraged by the death of
Afzal Khan, more especially as he realized the unpopu-
larity of Azim Khan with' the Chiefs and inhabitants of
Kabul, and his strained relations with Abdur Rahman.
Indeed the hatred inspired by Azim, who was both cruel
and miserly, raised the country against him and, in the
absence of Abdur Rahman, the position at the capital
went from bad to worse.
Shir Ali, before hearing of the result of the siege of
Maimana, had despatched a force under his son Yakub
Khan, This force defeated Azim's sons, who shared the
unpopularity of their father, and Yakub Khan reoccupied
Kandahar.
The Fall of Azim Khan. Azim Khan sought assist-
ance from Abdur Rahman, but in vain; the Chiefs
deserted him; Ayub Khan and Abdulla Khan, the
younger sons of Shir Ali, were released by their father's
partisans and collected a force. Finally Ismail Khan,
who had been deprived of the governorship of Kandahar
by Azim Khan, left Abdur Rahman (with whom he had
quarrelled), marched on Kabul, and, being joined by
tribesmen from the hills, occupied the city and ultimately
captured the Bala Hissar. Upon hearing of the fall of the
citadel, Azim's army began to desert, and eventually,
without a battle, the Amir, realizing that all was lost,
fled at the end of August to Afghan Turkistan.
The Battle of Zurmat, January 1869. The final
victory of Shir Ali was won in the vicinity of Ghazni, the
gates of which were closed against Azim Khan, who had
reappeared on the scene. There were almost daily skir-
mishes for over a month, but the cause of Shir Ali was
materially strengthened by the arrival of 2 lakhs I of rupees
1 A lakh of rupees represented 10,000 at this period.
xxxiv SHIR ALI AS AMIR 77
and 3000 muskets from Lawrence with the promise of
further assistance.
Abdur Rahman's account of the engagement l shows
that, against his own judgment, he was forced by Azim
Khan to attack Zanakhan, " where there are six or seven
forts ", and thus attempt to prevent Shir Ali, who was
encamped in the neighbourhood, from obtaining supplies.
This movement necessitated dividing the force " and
marching all day and over snow towards night ". Actu-
ally, since the fort was not surrendered, the attacking
force spent the night sitting in the snow, and suffering
severely from the cold.
Realizing that Shir Ali would fight in the morning,
Abdur Rahman begged Azim Khan to send reinforce-
ments without delay, only to receive the reply that he
would start directly the weather became warmer. As
was anticipated, Shir Ali attacked at dawn, captured the
artillery and completely routed the rebels. Abdur
Rahman, unable to rally his men, fled towards Zurmat,
and joined Azim, who had deserted his troops. Abdur
Rahman concludes his account of the disaster: u A few
days before, I had possessed in my treasury 800,000
gold coirts of Bukhara, 20,000 English sovereigns,
20,000 drams of gold, eleven lakhs of rupees, Kabuli,
five lakhs of rupees, Kunduz. . . . Now we were defeated
and had no money/' Practically destitute, the ill-matched
couple, accompanied by a few faithful followers, started
on their travels, which are described in Chapter XLL
Shir Alfs Visit to India^ 1869. Shir Ali was grateful
fcfr the help he had received from the British and wished
to accept Lawrence's invitation to visit India, but deferred
it owing to anxiety as to the movements of Azim Khan
and Abdur Rahman. However, in March 1869, the
Amir met Lord Mayo, Lawrence's successor, at Ambala.
He was delighted with the friendliness of his reception,
and in the discussions which followed he brought forward
two proposals. In the first place, seriously alarmed by
the continued advance of Russia towards his kingdom,
he desired the British Government to guarantee him their
1 Life of Amir Abdur Rahman, pp. 101-105.
78 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
aid in case of external attack. His second wish was that
the British Government should not acknowledge " any
friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Amir and his
descendants ".
Mayo, however, was only permitted to write that
" considering that the bonds of friendship have lately
been more closely drawn than heretofore, it [the British
Government] will view with severe displeasure any
attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position
as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further
endeavour, from time to time, by such means as cir-
cumstances may require, to strengthen the Government
of Your Highness. . . ." l The gifts made to Shir Ali
on this occasion included 6 lakhs of rupees, 6500 muskets,
four i8-pounder siege guns, two 8-inch howitzers and a
mountain battery of six 3-pounder guns.
The Amir had received no guarantee against external
attack, but his reception had been friendly; he had also
been given money, arms and ammunition, with an under-
standing that he would receive further support from time
to time. It is interesting to note that the Afridi tribesmen
looted some of the Amir's stores, which were ransomed
by a payment of 3000 rupees. *
Internal Reforms. Upon his return from India, Shir
Ali, influenced by Mayo's advice, threw himself with
much zeal into reforms. Among them was the creation
of a Council composed of thirteen members, to advise
the Amir on all administrative questions. As, however,
Shir Ali soon realized that the Chiefs were merely looking
to their own interests, this scheme ultimately fell through.
The difficult question of finance was also attacked, and it
was decided to collect the land revenue, not as hitherto,
half in kind, half in cash, but wholly in cash. Shir Ali
was also opposed to farming out the collection of taxes to
the Governors. Finally, in order to secure the regular
payment of the troops, he gave orders that 39 lakhs
should be earmarked from the four principal provinces
for this purpose. The army was then reorganized, all
irregulars being converted into regulars and paid in cash,
ParL Papers, 1878-9, Ivi, 466.
Sayyid Nur Muhammad Shah
fcrv/il
Amir Shir AH Khan
H.E. The Earl of Mayo
Abdulla Jan
(Appointed Heir- Apparent, 1873)
LORD MAYO RECEIVES AMIR SHIR ALI KHAN AT AMBALA, 1869
(By favour of Sir Louis Dane)
xxxiv SHIR ALI AS AMIR 79
instead of by orders on villages. Efforts were also made
to keep the men with the colours, while manuals of in-
struction were prepared inpushtu for all arms. Uniforms,
too, were being gradually supplied.
The Viceroy gave assistance to the Amir's efforts by
the gift of 1 200 two-grooved Brunswick rifles, 1200
three-grooved carbines, and 1000 smooth-bore pistols.
Meanwhile Armstrong guns were being manufactured at
Kabul with some success. In March 1 8 7 1 , it was reported
that the regular troops had received eleven months' pay
for the past year, but were grumbling because one month's
pay had been deducted on account of the cost of their
uniforms ! Of less importance was the organization of a
postal service to Peshawar, for which stamps were struck,
the improvement of roads and the cleansing of the Kabul
bazaars.
A Persian Mission to Kabul, September 1869. In the
summer of 1869, a Persian envoy reached Herat whose
ostensible object was to congratulate the Amir on his
victories and to convey friendly assurances. Actually his
real object was to learn what had passed at Amballa and
to ascertain the Amir's views with respect to Persia and
more especially with regard to Seistan. The envoy,
during his stay at Kabul, presented a friendly letter from
the Prince-Governor of Khurasan to Yakub, together
with the gift of a double-barrelled gun. Shir Ali treated
the envoy with coolness. He gave him a small allowance
and dismissed him with a friendly but formal letter to the
Prince-Governor at Meshed.
The Reception of Mir Abdul Malik, son of Amir Muzajfar
of Bukhara, August 1869. In the same year, the Amir of
Bukhara, accompanied by Ishak Khan, son of Azim Khan,
had marched to the Oxus, at the head of a strong force,
in order to crush the rebellion of his son Abdul Malik.
This Prince, who had attempted to raise Jihad against the
Russians in opposition to his father's wishes, shortly
afterwards made his way to Taktapul, where, by Shir
Ali's instructions, he was escorted with honour to Kabul.
Upon his arrival in the vicinity of the capital with eighty
followers, the Amir held a durbar for the reception of the
80 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Prince, who is described as being eighteen years of age,
small and quiet. He had apparently made the remark that,
had he known of his host's good relations with the British
Government, he would not have sought his protection.
Shir AH was inclined to take advantage of the situation
and wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar that, in view
of the injuries suffered by Afghanistan, owing to the
encouragement given by the Amir of Bukhara to raids by
Afghan refugees, and in view of the certainty of Russia
advancing to Charjui and Kirki, he proposed to occupy
these places. The reply was that the British Govern-
ment, while deeming him fully entitled to resist foreign
aggression to the utmost, could not approve of the acts
of aggression which the Amir suggested. It was also
pointed out that the Amir of Bukhara was allied to Russia,
which Power was on friendly terms with Great Britain.
Prince Abdul Malik had strongly urged Shir Ali to
attack Bukhara, but upon meeting with a definite refusal,
he left Kabul and, on November i, recrossed the Oxus.
The Raid of Ishak Khan, July 1869. At this period
Ishak Khan, Azim Khan's son, who had recruited some
Turkoman, crossed the Oxus and attacked Akchah. The
local Jezailchis set fire to the magazine in <hat town
and then, together with the Turkistan cavalry, deserted
to the enemy. Ishak subsequently advanced on Balkh,
but was routed near that city by Mir Alum, Shir Ali's
Governor, and fled across the Oxus. At this period,
owing to the number of officers and men who had served
under Abdur Rahman, there was constant danger of a
mutiny in the Afghan army, more especially among the
artillery officers. On the other hand, information reached
Kabul in November that Amir Muzaffar was displeased
with Ishak, had stopped his allowance and had forbidden
him to attend the Court.
Abdur Rahman had reported his arrival to the Amir
of Bukhara, but, as mentioned in Chapter XXXIX, was
coldly received by him at Hissar. Muzaffar mentioned
the subject in a typical letter to Mir Alum: " Abdur
Rahman Khan has arrived at Bukhara to perform devo-
tion ; you know how these people come as travellers, one
SHIR ALI AS AMIR 81
goes and another comes. I consider the wants of all, and
treat them as guests for a few days, till their fortunes
improve; at least, such is my hope. My friendship is the
same for all of them."
The Rebellion of Takub Khan. Shir Ali was pressed,
time and again, by Yakub to be acknowledged as heir-
apparent. The Amir gave evasive replies, since his real
intention was that his youngest son Abdulla Jan should
be his successor. Yakub Khan was aware of this
indeed it was clear to everyone and, in September
1870, he suddenly left the capital and wrote to Shir Ali:
" My life being oppressed, I took to flight. For the
sake of God and the Prophet do not trouble me. I am
desperate ; if you come you will receive no profit from
me."
The Attempt on Kandahar. The rebel Prince then
collected his adherents and, taking his younger brother
Ayub Khan with him, rode off" to Kandahar. He found
the gates of Ghazni closed against him and also failed to
gain the support of the garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. At
Kandahar he occupied the adjacent Kandahar-i-Nadiri,
collected some troops and levied some revenue. How-
ever, he again failed to win over the garrison and con-
sequently fled westwards. He attacked the fort of
Girishk, only to be beaten off and next retired in the
direction of Seistan. Pursued by a body of troops, he
reached the district of Rudbar, close to the Seistan
hamun. He then entered Persian Seistan, where the
Governor, Mir Alum Khan, who is referred to in the last
ckapter, supplied him and his followers with food.
The Anxiety of the British. At this period the British
Minister at Tehran obtained assurances that the refugee
Prince would not be allowed to march on Herat through
Persian territory, but that if he did enter Persia, he would
be brought to Meshed and treated like other Afghan
refugees.
Takub Khan takes Herat, 1871. The rebel Prince
left Seistan in March 1871 with his following and, un-
hindered by the Persian authorities, marched on Ghurian,
the Afghan garrison of which frontier fortress went over
VOL. II G
82 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XXXIV
to him. He then advanced on Herat, being joined by
bodies of the local troops, and, on May 6, with the
connivance of its defenders, Herat was taken with,
trifling losses.
Takub Khan surrenders to Shir Alt , July 1871. Much
intriguing followed this undoubted success. But inter-
mediaries finally succeeded in inducing Yakub, whose
position was none too strong at Herat, to return to Kabul.
There, in order to test his loyalty, Shir Ali sent his son
the following message: " I have formed the wish to
retire, and have withdrawn myself from worldly affairs,
and am, by my own will and intention, entrusting the
reins of government to you ". Yakub replied: " As I
have become penitent for my faults, I have entirely
abandoned the idea of government, and have merely
waited on Your Highness to obtain forgiveness for my
past offences. Should Your Highness kill me or place
me in confinement, I shall consider it a glory in the world
to come."
Takub Khan reappointed Governor of Herat, September
1871. In September the Amir replied to the Viceroy's
letter, in which Mayo strongly urged reconciliation with
Yakub, that, in view of his deep humility and>penitence,
he had forgiven him. He then reappointed him Governor
of Herat, but did not give him full control.
Such then was the position in Afghanistan at the end
of 1871. Shir Ali, who was unpopular and unable to
raise sufficient revenue for the payment of his troops and
other expenses, had indeed regained the throne but, in
this constantly disturbed land, more than in other'
countries, " uneasy lies the head that wears a crown ".
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA ACROSS CENTRAL ASIA
It would be manifestly futile to base the safety of the North-West Frontier
of India upon any understanding, stipulation, convention or treaty with the
Imperial Government. I do not mean to imply that the Emperor and his
ministers would wilfully violate their engagements; but the authority of the
Russian executive is so slight, the control it exercises over its distant agents
and military chiefs is so unsteady, and its policy is so designedly tentative
while the forces which stimulate the aggressive instincts of the nation are so
constant, that little reliance could be ultimately placed upon mere verbal
guarantees. LORD DUFFERIN to Lord Salisbury, 1880.
The more powerful Russia becomes in Central Asia, the weaker England
becomes in India, and consequently the more amenable in Europe. SKOBELOFF.
From Merv, last home of the free-lance, the clansmen are scattering far,
And the Turkman horses are harnessed to the guns of the Russian Czar.
LYAL L.
The Position of Russia in Central Asia. The advance
of Russia across Central Asia may be considered to have
begun in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. 1
At this period her boundary in Asia ran from the mouth
of the Ural River to Orenburg and thence to Omsk and
Semipalatinsk. This line was defended by forts and
outposts which, generally speaking, skirted the great
Kirghiz steppe. At this same period British India was
bounded by the River Sutlej and the north-west desert.
Consequently a zone some fourteen hundred miles wide
separated the two empires.
The First Expedition against Khiva, 1839-1 840. The
Uzbeg Khan of Khiva had long been a most unsatis-
factory neighbour. He had encouraged raiding for
slaves, cattle and other loot, and the number of Russian
prisoners whom he held and ill-treated was considerable.
But, apart from these justifiable reasons for a punitive
expedition, the British occupation of Kabul probably
1 Among other works I have consulted England and Russia in the East, by Sir Henr
Rawlinsonj also Anglo-Russian Relations concerning Afghanistan, 1837-1907, by William
Hubberton, 1937.
83
84 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
provided an incentive to the Russian frontier officials,
if not to the Government, to undertake an important
advance towards India. Accordingly, in November
1839, the Governor, Count Perovski, in command of
3000 infantry, 2000 Cossacks, and a powerful artillery,
started from Orenburg on a march of 900 miles across
the desert. He carried supplies on an enormous column
of baggage camels. But the lack of forage and the cold,
which killed off his camels by hundreds, forced the
column to retreat before even reaching the Ust-Urt
plateau, situated midway between the Caspian and the
Aral Seas. The column, which suffered heavy losses,
returned to Orenburg in June 1840.
This expedition, although it ended in disaster,
alarmed Major Todd, Great Britain's representative at
Herat. Under his instructions Captain James Abbot,
followed later by Captain Richmond Shakespear, crossed
the desert 700 miles wide to Khiva where they explained
to the Khan the extreme danger of flouting Russia. Not
content with this, the latter officer induced him to
release all his Russian slaves, and personally conducted
them, numbering four hundred men, women and children,
to Orenburg, a truly remarkable feat. 1 '
It had been decided to despatch a second expedition
against Khiva, but the Uzbeg Chief tendered his sub-
mission and, in 1 842, he agreed to a treaty, by the terms of
which slave-dealing was abolished in Khiva, and raiding
prohibited.
In Chapter XXX the relief experienced by the British
envoy in Afghanistan at Perovski's failure is noted, while
the subsequent disastrous retreat of our army from Kabul
was triumphantly recorded by the Russians as the re-
tirement to the old frontier and the abandonment by the
British of the " tyrannous and exorbitant policy " of
founding in the heart of Asia a powerful state, of which
they should be the masters. 2
1 Vide " From Herat to Ourenbourgh ", by Capt. Sir R. Shakespear, Blacktvood's
Magazine, June 1842. It appears that Abbot exceeded his instructions and negotiated
an offensive and defensive alliance with the KAan, and that Shakespear was sent to
repair Abbot's mistake.
2 Vide Schiemann's Geschichte Russian ds unter Kaiser Nikolaus /, vol. iv, p. 28.
xxxv THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA 85
The Russians occupy the Sea of Aral^ 1844,. The
failure of the Khiva expedition made Russia realize the
importance of occupying the great Kirghiz desert which
spread from the Ural Mountains to the Sea of Aral. In
1844 her explorers reached this inland sea and, in 1847,
occupied the mouth of the Sir Daria by the erection
of a fort termed Aralsk. In due course a flotilla was
launched, which materially assisted her further advance.
The Decay of the Khanates. At this period the
Khanates, which Russia was about to annex, had fallen
from their former greatness. Arminius Vamb^ry, who
made his celebrated journey to Central Asia in 1863,
describes the Khan of Khiva as " being in appearance so
frightfully dissolute and as presenting in every feature
of his countenance the real picture of an enervated imbecile
and savage tyrant". 1 Of Bukhara he writes: " The
wretchedness of the streets and houses far exceeded that
of the meanest habitations in Persia, and gave but an
ignoble idea of Bukhara the Noble ". To misgovern-
ment, corruption, bigotry, constant wars and the in-
security of the caravan routes must be added the decrease
in the volume of the rivers on which the life of the crops
depended* Under these conditions the absorption of
the Khanates in the Russian Empire was effected with
remarkable ease.
The Advance up the Sir Daria. Russia was now
operating in Khokand territory and naturally excited the
hostility of that state by her occupation of the mouth of
the Sir Daria. In 1853 she attacked the fort of Ak
Masjid, situated 220 miles up the river. Owing to a
reconnaissance made in the previous year, the fort had
been much strengthened and was only assailable by
regular approaches. However, a breach was effected by
the explosion of a mine and Ak Masjid was stormed.
The Khokandis made repeated but ineffectual efforts to
recover Ak Masjid and, for the next eight years, Russia
was fully occupied in consolidating her position. Apart
1 Travels in Central Asia, passim. I spent a happy day at Budapest, listening to
Vambe'ry's adventures, shortly after my return from my first journey in Central Asia
some forty-eight Jears ago.
86 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
from the hostility of Khokand and the veiled hostility
of Khiva, the whole area between the Orenburg line
to the Sea of Aral was thrown into confusion by a Kirghiz
bandit who for five years defied the Russian efforts to
capture him. During this period the Crimean War also
stopped all progress.
Russian Advance Eastwards. The Russian advance
to the eastwards had been steady and had resulted in
bringing under control the Kirghiz of the Great Horde
around Lake Balkash. In 1 854 Fort Vernoe was founded
in this area and garrisoned by 5000 military colonists.
The Creation of the Province of Turkistan, 1867.
When the main advance was resumed, Tashkent was
stormed in 1865. In the following year, and again in
1868, the Amir of Bukhara was defeated, the spoils of
victory, including Samarkand, while Bukhara now became
a " subsidiary ally " of Russia.
These conquests constituted the province of Turkistan,
whose administration was purely military, all reports
being sent to the War Office at St. Petersburg. In 1876
Khokand was occupied and completed the annexation
of the Khanates.
The Russian Occupation of Krasnovodsk.-+\n 1869
Russia established herself at desolate Krasnovodsk, now
the starting-point of the Central Asian Railway 1 and,
shortly afterwards, occupied Chikishliar, situated near
the mouth of the River Atrek. Persia protested, but in
vain. The declared object of Russia was the opening up
of a trade-route to Central Asia, a policy which was partly
inspired by the desire to gain contact with the province
of Turkistan from the west. The routes to the interior
were surveyed and Russian influence over the Yamut
Turkoman was gradually established.
The Annexation of Khiva, 1873. The attitude of
the Khan of Khiva towards his northern neighbours had
been consistently foolish. He had declined to release the
captives whom he had enslaved, while he instigated raids
on the Russian possessions. Altogether he was a typically
barbarous ruler who, relying on the Russian failure of a
* It is generally termed the Transcaspian Railway by English writers.
xxxv THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA 87
generation ago, believed that he could defy that Power
with impunity. He was warned, time and again, but in
vain. Russia during this period had sent out powerful
reconnaissance forces from three sides towards Khiva
and finally, columns from Ak Masjid (renamed Fort
Perovski), Tashkent and Orenburg converged on Khiva. 1
On June 10 the capital was stormed and the Khan
perforce signed a treaty with General Kaufmann by the
terms of which " he renounced all direct and friendly
relations existing with neighbouring rulers ". Further-
more, the lands on the right bank of the Oxus passed
into the possession of Russia, a fort being constructed on
them. It was also stipulated that Russia possessed the
sole right of navigation on the Oxus and that Russian
merchandise was to pass free of customs. Finally, a
heavy war indemnity was imposed,
Anglo-Russian Relations. The relations of Great
Britain and Russia were, generally speaking, distinctly
friendly at this period. Assurances were given by Prince
Gortchakoff that there was no intention of annexing Khiva
and they were apparently genuine. Actually, the unwise
behaviour of the Khan of Khiva, together with the am-
bition of fche Russian frontier officers, forced the hand of
the Russian Government. In view of the Tsar's assurance,
given in January 1873, that there was no intention to
incorporate Khiva or to extend her possessions in Central
Asia, this almost immediate violation of assurances was
naturally viewed seriously by the British Government.
The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873. However,
the Russian Foreign Office, as distinct from their War
Office, was anxious to settle matters with Great Britain on
reasonable terms. Various proposals were made but,
finally, an important Agreement relating to the northern
frontier of Afghanistan, was signed. It was stated in
Lord Granville's despatch of October 17, 1872, as
follows: " Badakhshan with its dependent district of
Wakhan from Sir-i-Kul [Lake Victoria] on the east to
the junction of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Panja)
1 A fourth column, that was despatched from Krasnovodsk, was obliged, from lack
of water, to bury its guns and retreat.
88 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
forming the northern boundary of this Afghan Province
throughout its entire length ". The Oxus continued to
be the boundary as far as the ferry of Khwaja Salar l on
the road between Balkh and Bukhara, at which point that
river turned north-west towards the Sea of Aral. Further
west it was agreed that a line should be drawn from
Khwaja Salar towards the Persian frontier to include
Andkhui and Maimana in Afghanistan, but it was
stipulated by the Russian Government that " the old
city of Merv and adjacent Turkoman districts " should
be excluded from its possessions.
A despatch of Prince Gortchakoff of January 31,
1873, which was couched in most friendly terms, con-
cluded this Agreement. Its results were two-fold. Great
Britain gained for Afghanistan northern boundaries that
were definitely fixed in one section by the Oxus, whereas
west of the great bend of that river, the boundary was
approximately, but not definitely, laid down. Of further
great importance was the avowal by Russia, which was
repeated on more than one occasion, that Afghanistan
lay wholly outside her sphere of influence. 2
Persian Campaigns against the Turkoman, 18521861.
The Turkoman question was one of great importance
to Persia, whose province of Khurasan was incessantly
ravaged by these manstealing raiders. In 1857 the
Governor-General of that province invited eighty Turko-
man chiefs to a conference at Meshed, where they were
promptly imprisoned. Taking advantage of the favour-
able situation, he marched on Merv, which he occupied
after gaining a victory over the leaderless Turkoman.
Three years later, his successor occupied Merv once again
but was defeated in an attack he made on an entrenched
camp of the Tekke. The Persians fled utterly de-
moralized and were enslaved by hundreds, so much so
that slaves became a drug on the Bikhara market. After
this disaster, Persia limited her activities to raiding
expeditions from Sarakhs,
1 On the map prepared by Burnes the spelling is Khojusalu. Another spelling is
Khoja Saleh. The spelling in the text is that given by Holdich.
* Gortchakoff to Brunnow, Jan. 31, 1873, Parl. Papers, 1873, Ixxv (" Correspondence
with Russia respecting Central Asia "), pp. 15-16.
THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA 89
The Proclamation and Campaigns of General Lomakin.
In 1 874, General Lomakin, the newly appointed Governor
of Krasnovodsk, issued a proclamation to the Yamuts,
who occupied both banks of the Atrek, and to other
Turkoman tribes who inhabited the country as far as
Merv and the Oxus, inviting them to send delegates to
meet him. Three years later, after a series of recon-
naissances, he led an expedition against Kizil Arvat and
received the submission of the Khans.
The Russo-Turkish Campaign, 1877-1878. In April
1877 Russia had declared war on Turkey and in 1878,
when the Russian army had reached the walls of Con-
stantinople, the British Government had interposed with
her fleet, and had subsequently, at Berlin, insisted upon
the modifications adverse to Russian interests that were
contained in the Treaty of San Stephano.
Russia's Counterstroke in Asia. The answer of Russia, as
described in Chapter XXXVII, was the march of Russian
troops towards Afghanistan and the despatch of a Mission
to Kabul charged with the task of making an alliance
with Shir Ali, who was merely a pawn in the game and
was thrown aside without scruple when it was lost. It
is to be floted that Bismarck was working industriously
to avert a coalition of Russia, France and England by
stirring up dissensions between the three Powers. In the
event, the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin on July 13,
1878, stayed the advance of the Russian army, General
Stolietoff was withdrawn but, as we shall see, other
members of the Mission remained at Kabul for some
ntonths.
The Defeat of General Lomakin at Geok Teppe. In
1879 Lomakin renewed his advance into the interior
and attacked the walled camp of the Tekke Turkoman at
Geok Teppe, 1 His artillery inflicted serious losses on
its defenders, but his attempt at storming the fortress was
repulsed and he retreated suffering heavy losses in men,
material and prestige.
The Capture of Geok Teppe by General Skobeloff, 1881.
1 It was actually termed Denghil Teppe, but is known as Geok Teppe or " Blue
Hill " in Europe.
90 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH. xxxv
In the following year Skobeloff who had been appointed
to avenge this disaster, made a reconnaissance in force and
then retired to the Caspian where he completed his
preparations. In December he reappeared on the scene
with a force of 7000 men and 60 guns. The fortress con-
sisted of a quadrilateral enclosure with walls 35 feet thick
at the base and 25 feet thick at the top. On this wide
top were constructed an inner and outer parapet with
loopholes and a large number of traverses, designed to
protect the defenders. The Tekke made desperate sorties,
but the bombardment by heavy artillery and the ex-
plosions of mines, followed by a storming party captured
the stronghold. The pursuit of the fugitives became a
massacre. Personally, when I visited the fortress some
years later, I marvelled at the courage with which, in face
of terrible losses, this walled enclosure was held.
Thus fell the last great stronghold of Central Asia.
The survivors of the Tekke Turkoman were cowed and
their kinsmen of Merv were easily persuaded to submit
by Alikhanoff, a Moslem of Daghestan, whom I met
later at Tiflis, In 1884 Merv thus became a part of the
Russian Empire, as did the Sariks of Yulatan to the
south. This campaign made the Tsar the Master of
Central Asia.
The Effect on the British Position. In Great Britain
the capture of Geok Teppe, followed by the submission
and annexation of the Turkoman of Merv aroused strong
feeling. It was not apparently realized by our statesmen
that organized Russia, in the presence of tribes whose
warlike instincts found their chief outlet in raiding an'd
who believed themselves invincible, was irresistibly com-
pelled to advance until she reached a definite frontier,
such as the British were anxious to negotiate with her for
Afghanistan and, finally, did negotiate. From the military
point of view, the annexation of the Turkoman country
affected the strategical position most unfavourably for
India, since the armies of Trans-Caspia and Turkistan
were brought into direct touch, while railways completed
their power of rapid concentration on the Afghan frontier.
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE FIRST SEISTAN MISSION, 1 8 72
And thou hast trod the sands of Seistan,
And seen the River of Helmand, and the Lake of Zireh.
But I
Have never known my grandsire's furrowed face,
Nor seen his lofty house in Seistan,
Nor slaked my thirst at the clear Helmand stream.
MATTHEW ARNOLD, Sohrab and Rustutn.
A Geographical Outline. Before dealing with the
intricate problems relating to Seistan, a brief account of
this interesting area, which is divided between Afghanistan
and Persia, is, I think, desirable. 1
Seistan is a large basin some seven thousand square
miles in area, which receives all the drainage of a vast tract
of country. The Helmand is the principal river, but the
Khash Rud, Farah Rud and Harut Rud, together with
torrents from the western mountains, all drain into this
inland hamun, which at times forms a lagoon one hundred
miles in length by some ten miles in width. Every few
years, when its level reaches a certain height, the flood-
water flows by the Shelag Channel into the Gaud-i-
Zireh.
Today the Helmand with its branches forms the delta,
in which we find the cultivated area of modern Seistan.
Outside it there is no water and no cultivation.
McMahon discovered the existence of at least three
deltaic areas, which have in turn constituted populated
Seistan. Moreover he discovered that each of these
deltas has been used time and again as the wayward
1 This description is based on " Recent Survey and Exploration in Seistan ", by
Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Geographical Journal^ Sept. and Oct. 1906, and also on
my own observations.
91
92 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Helmand changed its course. The population has per-
force followed the river, on which its very existence
depended, and it would appear that the Zarangiana,
visited by Alexander the Great, covers the area now
marked by the remains of Ramrod in the Tarakun area,
where I noted ruins of important cities. It is also
definitely established that Zaranj, the capital destroyed
by Tamerlane, can be identified with the ruins of Zahidan
in the present delta. Other and older sites abound.
Chief among them are the ruins of Sarotar on the right
bank of the Helmand, which extend for some sixty miles
northwards in an unbroken line, proving the existence
of a Seistan which was infinitely more prosperous and
contained a much larger population than the 200,000
inhabitants of today.
In the Sarotar ruins Parthian and Sasanian coins are
found with those of the Caliphs, To the west of the
hamun rises the flat-topped Kuh-i-Khwaja, the only hill
of the delta. On its southern slopes are the massive ruins
of Kakhaha, a strongly fortified site, around which many
legends connected with Rustam centre. Stein visited this
ancient site in 1915, and discovered frescoes of the
Sasanian period of great importance; one ofr them, as
was befitting, represents Rustam holding his famous mace.
A Historical Note. The delta of the Helmand, the
classical Etymander, may be justly termed the birthplace
of the legendary history of Persia. It was the home of
Rustam, the champion of the ancient Keianian dynasty,
whose exploits form the main theme of the Shahnama of
Firdausi. To come to historical times, as we see in
Chapter V, it was traversed in 330 B.C. by Alexander the
Great, who termed it Zarangiana, after its inhabitants,
who are termed Sarangi by Herodotus.
Zaranj) the Capital. Continuing our brief survey:
as the result of tribal movements in Central Asia during
the middle of the second century B.C., described in
Chapter VII, the Sakae, or Scythians, occupied the
province until about A.D. 275, and in Sakastane, as they
named it, we have Seistan. The Arabs conquered the
province from the Sasanian dynasty in the middle of the
xxxvi THE FIRST SEISTAN MISSION 93
seventh century, and for some centuries after this change
of masters it remained prosperous and civilized. In the
tenth century Yakubi describes the capital Zaranj as
being four leagues in circumference. It was strongly
fortified with an inner and an outer wall. The latter had
thirteen gates opening across a great moat filled with
water. Reference is also made to the riches and learn-
ing of the inhabitants. In 1362 Timur, at that time a
fugitive, raided the province at the head of 1000 horse-
men, but was wounded in the foot and retreated, as
narrated in Chapter XVII.
Returning to Seistan in 1383, Tamerlane captured
Zaranj, which offered a desperate resistance. The in-
habitants were massacred or enslaved and Zahidan, as it
is now termed, was left desolate.
The present inhabitants of Seistan are mainly Baluchis,
although a few members of the ancient Keiani are left,
while the Saiads or fowlers who live along the edges of
the hamun claim to be the original inhabitants. Probably
by taking refuge in the reed-beds on their tutins or rafts
they escaped the fury of the invaders.
Nadir Shah invades Seistan. To resume our survey,
Nadir Sh#h is believed to have captured Kakhaha after a
siege of seven years. Upon the death of this, the last of
the great conquerors of Asia, Seistan, in A.D. 1 747, formed
part of the empire of Ahmad Khan. Afghan rule lasted
for over a century, but, as mentioned in Chapter XXXVII,
the allegiance of the outlying chiefs was more or less
nominal.
In the middle of the nineteenth century Ali Khan,
Chief of the Sarbandi tribe, gave in his adherence to
Persia and was rewarded by being granted a Persian
bride of the royal family.
The Shah's Appeal to the British Government. During
the years 1861-1863 the Shah repeatedly called on the
British Government to protect Seistan against alleged
Afghan aggression, but was informed that, since the
sovereignty of the Shah in that province was not recog-
nized, it could not interfere. In 1863 ^ e Foreign Office,
in reply to a final appeal, replied with some lack of
94 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
suavity that " Her Majesty's Government being informed
that the title to the territory of Seistan is disputed between
Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the
matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good
their possession by force of arms ".
The Persian Government continued steadily to pursue
its policy of increasing Persian authority and influence
until Shir Ali, who had finally succeeded in establishing
himself upon the throne at Kabul, threatened to declare
war. Upon this, the British Government, in 1870, pro-
posed arbitration under the Treaty of Paris which pro-
vided that the Shah should " refer for adjustment to the
friendly offices of England any differences that might
occur between Persia and Herat or Afghanistan ". This
proposal was duly accepted by the Persian Government.
The Appointment of the British Mission. Major-
General Sir Frederic Goldsmid had already constructed
the telegraph line along the coasts of British and Persian
Makran a great feat. Moreover, he had not only
delimited but had secured the ratification of the Makran
boundary. He was now appointed to arbitrate on Persian
and Afghan claims in Seistan. The British Mission,
which included Majors Beresford Lovett 'and Euan
Smith, landed at Bandar Abbas and was joined in Seistan
by General Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawar, who
represented Lord Mayo, and by the Afghan Commis-
sioner, to whose appointment the Shah had raised strong
objections. The Amir, on the other hand, had frankly
accepted the British proposal for a peaceful settlement
of the whole question by arbitration.
The Persian Commissioner. The Shah's representa-
tive was Masum Khan, who, acting in a similar position
on the Makran Mission, had given infinite trouble.
Upon arriving in Seistan, to quote Goldsmid: " Nothing
too severe can be said as to his conduct from the moment
in which he first came within the influence of the Amir of
Kain, whose power terrified him, and whose constant
bribes excited his intense cupidity ". x
1 Eastern Persia, vol. i, p. 260. This valuable work was written by members of the
British Commission.
THE FIRST SEISTAN MISSION 95
The Reception of the Mission in Seistan. The Mission
reached Nasratabad (then termed Nasirabad) in February
1872, and was met by an istikhbal or " Reception Party "
sent out by the Amir of Kain. It was headed by two
Sirdars whose men were " armed with every conceivable
species of musket, rifle, spear, sword, shield, and known
and unknown weapon of defence ". No one was sent by
Mir Alum Khan to make the usual " health inquiries ",
and other evidences of unfriendly feelings were not
lacking. No camping-ground was arranged for, and the
Mission was housed in some mud hovels, while the Com-
missioner was not permitted to hoist his flag, as he had
invariably done throughout the Makran Boundary Com-
mission and while on the march to Seistan. 1
The Tour of the Commissioners. In view of the delay
of the Afghan Commissioner to appear on the scene,
Goldsmid insisted on touring the province, and, leaving
the wretched quarters " which so closely resembled an
imprisonment ", he started oflf with the Persian Com-
missioner who, through the Amir of Kain's representa-
tive, was practically able to dictate the direction of the
daily marches. They visited the big dam at Kuhak and
then marahed up the Helmand to Bandar-i-Kamal Khan ;
they also visited Nad Ali. Generally speaking, in spite
of obstructiveness of every kind, information of the
utmost value was secured, while Beresford Lovett was
able to survey the districts that were visited.
The Arrival of General Pollock and the Afghan Com-
missioner. General Pollock and the Afghan Com-
missioner, Sayyid Nur Muhammad, reached Seistan early
in March and camped at Banjar, a few miles to the east
of Nasratabad. The Afghan Commissioner declined to
call first on the Persian Commissioner and the Amir of
Kain, partly owing to the gross incivility which he and
his followers had experienced. He also considered that his
position was much superior to that of the Persian officials.
1 When I founded the British Consulate in Seistan in 1899, and hoisted the British
flag, I received threats, which I ignored, from both the Governor and the Chief Mulla.
Sir Frederic Goldsmid was deeply interested to hear of my experiences that were so
similar to his own. But, fortunately, I was provided with a small escort of Indian
cavalry.
96 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH. xxxvi
The Final Breach with the Persian Commissioner.
Threatening letters referring to the suite of the Afghan
Commissioner completed the breach with the Persian
Commissioner, and Goldsmid, after consultation with
Pollock, wrote to Masum Khan that, in view of the
actions and behaviour of the Persian representatives, he
had decided to leave Seistan and to make his report at
Tehran. Summing up the position he wrote: " One
inevitable conclusion forced upon the mind was that the
Persian Government had most signally and culpably
failed in the commonest courtesy, not taking even the
most ordinary precautions to ensure that the dignity and
safety of a Mission it had itself solicited, should be suit-
ably upheld and regarded 'V It is a great pity that
Goldsmid was not provided with an escort of Indian
troops.
The Award. Goldsmid, in his arbitral award, divided
the area into " Seistan Proper " and " Outer Seistan ".
The first was bounded on the north and west by the
hamun y and on the east by the main branch of the
Helmand. " Outer Seistan " was the narrow district on
the right bank of the Helmand which stretched from
north to south for over one hundred miles. < " Seistan
Proper " was awarded to Persia and " Outer Seistan "
to Afghanistan. The decision was entirely just, as
representing the actual situation. It granted Persia her
reasonable claims, although she had to withdraw from
positions taken up on the right bank of the Helmand.
Amir Shir AH, on the other hand, who expected that
he would have been specially favoured in the award,
was much displeased, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Both parties appealed to the British Government, by
whom the decision of Goldsmid was confirmed. Much
credit is due to this officer and to his staff, who, subjected
to intolerable treatment by the Persians, carried through
a most difficult task to a successful conclusion.
1 Of. c/V, vol. i, p, 312.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE GENESIS OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
I have deputed my agent, Major-General Stolietoff, an officer high in the
favour of the Emperor. He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind.
I hope that you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as you
would myself. . . . The advantage of a close alliance with the Russian Govern-
ment will be permanently evident. KAUFMANN to Shir Ali, June 1878. Part.
Papers, 1881, xcviii (" Central Asia ", No. i).
General Kaufmann s Correspondence with Shir Ali.
By way of an introduction to this chapter, I will give
some account of the correspondence of Kaufmann with
the Amir. The opening letter of a series, which led to
his overthrow, was dated April 1 1, 1870 and referred to
the arrival at Tashkent of Abdur Rahman. In it Kauf-
mann wrote that he had answered his request to be
admitted to that city by stating that " the Emperor of
Russia graciously affords hospitality to everybody . . .
but that he must not in the least reckon on my interfer-
ence in his quarrel with you ". He also stated that he
was " quite far from longing to meddle in the internal
affairs of Afghanistan ". Shir Ali was disturbed and
perplexed as to the motive of the Russian Governor-
General in writing to him. He forwarded the letter to the
Viceroy who advised him to send a reply, thanking Kauf-
mann for his assurances. This he did, adding that he had
consulted the Viceroy in the matter. On December 20,
Kaufmann wrote again, reciprocating his friendly senti-
ments. These letters were, more or less, colourless but,
two years later, Kaufmann wrote another letter referring
to the boundaries of the state of Bukhara, which caused
a sensation at Kabul. The Amir forwarded it to the
Viceroy and drew attention to the Russian desire to
establish " a regular and frequent correspondence with
the Kabul Government ". He ended his letter with
VOL. II 97 H
98 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
an appeal to the British to bestow more serious attention
to the maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Kaufmann continued his correspondence
while " positive assurances " were being given to the
British Foreign Office that the " Imperial Cabinet con-
tinues to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond its
sphere of action ". It is possible that the British Foreign
Office, at this period, failed to realize that Russian
Turkistan was administered by the practically inde-
pendent Russian War Office.
To continue this correspondence, in the winter of
1 873 Kaufmann wrote to the Amir a long letter describing
the fall of Khiva, and Shir Ali, replying in January 1874,
congratulated the Governor-General upon his great
military success; at the same time he wrote a separate
letter in which he announced that Abdulla Jan had been
nominated his heir-apparent.
Kaufmann's next letter was dated several months
later. In it he wrote that he had been absent in Russia
and that he considered the recent alliance l between the
Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England " would
be an omen for the people of those countries which, under
the protection of the Emperor of Russia and *he Oueen
of England, live in great peace and comfort ". It is to
be noted that the royal marriage is stated by the Russian
Governor-General to constitute an alliance by which
Afghanistan was protected by the two countries con-
cerned. Such, at any rate, was the view of the Kabul
durbar.
During the period of this correspondence, the Amir
was informed that the British Government in nowise
shared or approved of his dissatisfaction at the increasing
frequency and significance of these letters. 2
The Mission of Sayyid Nur Muhammad, June 1873.
After the conclusion of the Agreement with Russia
respecting the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, and
of the publication of the Seistan boundary award by
1 The reference was to the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh to the Grand Duchess
Marie, daughter of the Tsar.
2 Vide Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, by Lady Betty Balfour, 1899, passim.
It is founded on the official documents of the period.
xxxvn GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 99
General Goldsmid, given in the previous chapter, Sayyid
Nur Muhammad, the representative of the Amir on
that Commission, reached Simla as the envoy of the Amir
to discuss these matters.
He agreed that the settlement as to the northern
frontier was, generally speaking, satisfactory to His
Highness, but he realized that no definite frontier had
been delimitated west of the great bend of the Oxus and
that the frontier Chiefs would probably lend themselves
to Russian intrigues.
As to Goldsmid's award in Seistan, the Amir's dis-
satisfaction was as strong as that of the Shah. It must
be recollected that Nur Muhammad was the Afghan
representative on the Boundary Commission, and having
failed to gain territory at Persia's expense, would naturally
attack the British award. What he wanted, was an award
in favour of Afghanistan per fas aut nefas.
But the Amir's chief concern was to know exactly
where he stood with the British in connexion with the
constant advance of Russia. Were they his allies and, if
so, would they support him against Russian invasion by
troops, by arms and by money? This was naturally the
vital question for Shir Ali.
Lord Northbrook's Proposed Guarantee to Shir Ali^
1873. Fully realizing the situation, on June 27 the
Viceroy cabled to the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of
State for India: " We think it for interests of peace that
Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and
we say in paragraph 1 8 [of despatch summing up Central
Asian correspondence with Russia] : * Although we
have abstained from entering into any Treaty engage-
ment to support the Amir by British troops in the event
of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the
complete independence of Afghanistan is so important
to the interests of British India that the Government of
India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan
with indifference. So long as the Amir continues, as he
has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice
in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally
look for material assistance from us; and circumstances
ioo HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
might occur under which we should consider it incumbent
upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to
render him such assistance.' I propose to inform Kabul
Envoy of sense of this paragraph."
The Reply of the Secretary of State for India. On
July i Argyll replied that " he did not object to the
general sense of the paragraph which you quote as a
communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but
great caution is necessary in assuring Amir of material
assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expecta-
tion ". On July 20 Northbrook again cabled: " Amir
of Kabul alarmed at Russian progress ; dissatisfied with
general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how
far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to
assure him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on
our advice in all external relations, we will help him with
money, arms and troops, if necessary to repel unprovoked
invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by
telegraph quickly."
Argyll's reply of July 24 ran: " Cabinet think that
you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his
alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you
may assure him we shall maintain our settled cpolicy in
Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external
affairs."
Shir Ali was at the parting of the ways. Had the
statesmanlike policy of Northbrook been accepted, the
Amir would have realized that we were ready to help him
against an external attack. Once again the British
Government had a golden opportunity of making
Afghanistan a friendly state, but it was lost through
lamentable lack of vision. Shir Ali perforce decided to
turn to Russia. To confirm the accuracy of this view, I
will quote Lord Roberts: " I had several interesting
conversations with Yakub Khan, and in discussing with
him Shir Ali's reasons for breaking with us, he dwelt on
the fact that his father, although he did not get all he
wished out of Lord Mayo, was firmly satisfied and con-
tent with what had been done for him, but when Sayyid
Nur Muhammad returned from Simla in 1873, ^ e
GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 101
became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures
to the Russians, with whom constant intercourse had
since been kept up. 1
The Nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-
Apparent. In November 1873 Shir Ali's favourite son
Abdulla Jan was appointed heir-apparent. The Viceroy,
the Shah, the Amir of Bukhara and General Kaufmann
(as we have seen) were duly informed. The Shah, whose
dignity was outraged by the latter being merely forwarded
through the Persian Governor of Seistan, vouchsafed no
reply to it.
The Imprisonment of Takub Khan and the Flight of
Ayub Khan. The nomination of Abdulla Jan was most
unwelcome to Yakub. At first he appeared likely to
rebel but funds were lacking and, after many pourparlers,
he visited Kabul under a safe-conduct and was im-
prisoned. Immediately after his eldest son's arrest, the
Amir wrote to warn Ayub Khan to remain loyal. Reports
reached Kabul which tended to show that Herat was
being prepared for a siege and that Persian support was
probable. However, in the event, the rebellion collapsed
and Ayub fled across the Persian border. The Viceroy
attempted to effect a reconciliation between the Amir
and Yakub Khan but, without success. Indeed Shir AH
resented his letter.
Lord Salisbury orders the Appointment of a British
Officer to Herat) 1875-1 8 76.* On January 2, 1875,
Salisbury wrote to Disraeli: " I am getting uneasy as to
our lack of information from Afghanistan. Almost all we
hear of what happens on the Western frontier comes
from St. Petersburg or from Tehran. . . . We have only
a native agent [at Kabul] who writes exactly what the
Amir tells him." 3
Northbrook considered this proposal, when it was
made officially, but held it to be inopportune to press
the Amir on the subject. Salisbury, however, repeated
1 Forty-one Tears in India, vol. ii, p. 247.
2 In 1874 a Conservative Government came into power under Disraeli and, for four
years, Lord Salisbury was Secretary of State for India. He then became Foreign
Secretary.
3 Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury , by Lady Gwendolen Cecil, vol. ii, p. 71.
102 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
his instructions, and Northbrook in his reply stated that,
if the Amir were asked to allow a British Resident at
Herat, he would certainly once again raise the question
whether the British Government would unconditionally
promise to protect Afghanistan against external attack.
Northbrook also pointed out that, even if an Agent were
accepted, he wpuld be surrounded by spies under the
pretext of guarding him and that persons visiting him
would be watched and removed. 1 Shortly afterwards,
nominally for personal reasons, Northbrook resigned.
The last words he addressed to Salisbury ran: " By
taking the initiative, I feel certain that you are throwing
away your best card, and running the risk of embarrass-
ment for the future, both political and financial ". 2
Disraeli' s Policy in Asia. To give some idea of the
policy of the Conservative Cabinet, I quote from a letter
written by the Prime Minister to Queen Victoria, dated
June 22, 1877. It described the measures that were
proposed to be taken in Asia against Russia, in case she
seized Constantinople and war were declared against
her. It runs: " It is Lord Beaconsfield's present opinion
that in such a case Russia must be attacked from Asia,
that? troops should be sent to the Persian Gulff and that
the Empress of India should order her armies to clear
Central Asia of the Muscovites, and drive them into the
Caspian. We have a good instrument for this purpose
in Lord Lytton, and indeed he was placed there with
that view." 3 From a military point of view the opera-
tions indicated in this letter were fantastical.
Lord Lytton and the Amir. In April 1876 Lord
Lytton, as the successor of Northbrook, took over his
high office as Viceroy and immediately, in accordance
with his instructions, turned his attention to the improve-
ment of British relations with Afghanistan. His first
step was to instruct General Pollock, the Commissioner
of Peshawar, to inform the Amir that it was proposed to
1 When I was Consul-General in Khurasan in 1908, the Herat Agent was practically
treated in this manner and no one dared to visit him.
2 Thomas George Earl of Northbrook^ by Bernard Mallet, 1908, p. 105.
3 Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfeld^ by Monypenny and Buckle, vol. vi,
p. 155.
GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 103
send a Mission to His Highness, to announce his own
accession to the office of Viceroy and the assumption by
the Queen of the title of Empress of India. 1 This demand
caused Shir Ali considerable apprehension. He con-
sidered that the British were alarmed by the Russian
advance towards Merv and therefore wished to obtain
his consent for the establishment of a British Mission
at Herat. If he accepted, he feared that he would be
accused of taking a step hostile to Russia. He also feared
that the reception of a British envoy might lead to a
Russian envoy suddenly entering Afghanistan. Finally
he feared for the safety of the Mission in fanatical Kabul
and not without good reason. Consequently, in his
reply of May 22, he suggested that all questions affecting
the two countries had been discussed in 1873 w ^h his
envoy and that, if necessary, a similar procedure should
be adopted in the present case.
In July, Lytton, who was irritated at what was, in
effect, a polite refusal to his proposal, wrote a second
letter to Shir Ali, repeating his wishes and assuring him
that he had been actuated by a cordial desire for closer
relations. He added: " It will for this reason cause the
Viceroy sincere regret if Your Highness, by hastily
rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to
you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of
His Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan
as a state which has voluntarily isolated itself from the
alliance and support of the British Government."
He continued that, with reference to the apprehension
that had been expressed for the safety of the British
envoy at Kabul, he was prepared to send his representa-
tive to any other place that the Amir might choose; that
the fear that the reception of a British Mission might
lead to a Russian Mission was groundless, since the
Government of the Tsar had given assurances to the British
Government that it would not interfere, directly or
indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan; and, finally,
1 I have consulted The Indian Administration of Lord Lytton^ by Lady Betty Balfour,
which is founded, so far as Afghanistan is concerned, on despatches and other State
documents.
io 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
he declared that if the reception of his envoy, as he
hoped, led to a more cordial understanding, he would
be happy to meet the Amir at Peshawar in the autumn.
Three experienced Members of his Council, to wit
Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman and Sir Arthur
Hobhouse, dissented from the views of Lord Lytton and
the majority of their colleagues. They considered that
Shir Ali was justified in declining to receive a British
Mission and that the Viceroy's letter was almost equi-
valent to a threat of war.
There is no question as to the threat contained in
Lytton 's letter. He was aware of the refusal of the
Gladstone Cabinet to accept the statesmanlike proposals
of Northbrook in 1873 anc ^ would surely have been
better advised to have informed Shir Ali that the British
Government had definitely decided to defend him against
external aggression with troops, arms and money. Such
a statement conveyed in a cordial letter would almost
certainly have created a friendly atmosphere and would
have made Shir Ali our staunch friend and ally. Further-
more it would have saved Afghanistan from the horrors
of a second war within little more than a generation after
the first, and Great Britain from a vast expenditure of
life and treasure.
The Mission of Nawab Atta Muhammad Khan. The
Amir, in his reply, avoided all references to the proposed
Mission and held to his opinion that he should send his
envoy to India. This proposal was accepted faute de
mieux, and in October 1876 Nawab Atta Muhammad
Khan reached Peshawar. In the course of more thah
one interview with Sir Lewis Pelly, the Commissioner of
Peshawar, it appeared that the Amir's aloof attitude was
mainly due to the failure to secure promise of support
against external aggression by Sayyid Nur Muhammad in
1873; to ^ e Seistan award ; to the intervention of North-
brook on behalf of Yakub Khan; and to the general
impression of the Amir that British policy was purely
selfish and neglectful of the interests of Afghanistan. The
envoy laid special stress on the desire shown by the
Amir in 1873 to en ter into an offensive and defensive
GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 105
alliance with Great Britain, and his deep disappointment
at the refusal of the British to accept his wishes.
The Reply of Lord Lytton. The Viceroy stated that
he was willing to enter into the alliance as suggested;
that, in the event of unprovoked external aggression,
assistance would be afforded to the Amir in men, money
and arms; that Abdulla Jan would be recognized as
heir-apparent to the Amir and that a yearly subsidy
would be granted. Lytton, however, laid down that the
conditions attached to these concessions were that the
Amir held no external relations with Russia, referring
the agents of that Power to the British; that British
agents should reside at Herat, or elsewhere on the frontier;
that a mixed Anglo-Afghan Commission should demar-
cate the Amir's frontier; and finally, that the establish-
ment of a permanent envoy at Kabul would be waived, on
condition that the Amir deputed a permanent envoy to
India and agreed to receive special missions whenever
requested.
The Viceroy, unfortunately as it proved, clearly
explained that unless the Amir gave his consent to the
establishment of a British agent on the frontier, as a
basis of negotiation, the above offers were cancelled.
Experienced Pelly regretted this conditional stipulation,
but Lytton insisted upon it. As a result the negotiations
which lasted from October 1876 to March 1877 ended
in failure.
The Treaty with Kalat. The history of Kalat, when it
formed part of the empire of Ahmad Shah and again
during the course of the First Afghan War, has been
dealt with in previous chapters of this work. In 1875
Captain Robert Sandeman, destined to rank among the
greatest of British frontier officers, was deputed by North-
brook to examine and report on the relations of the Khan
with his Sirdars^ which were causing unrest and serious
raiding. Sandeman reported that the Chiefs would
welcome British mediation, that they were willing to
become peaceful subjects of the Khan if their grievances
were righted, and that he had induced them to make
their submission to the Khan on these conditions.
106 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Northbrook, realizing the importance of following up
this opening, despatched Sandeman on a second mission
in April 1876. Upon Lytton taking over the Viceroyalty,
somewhat different instructions were sent to Sandeman,
but the latter, on June 16, telegraphed the terms of a
settlement which was proposed by the Khan and accepted
by the Sirdars. Finally, on December 8, the Treaty
of Jacobabad was executed. The Viceroy received the
Khan and the Sirdars at a public durbar and general
rejoicings celebrated the happy conclusion of Sandeman's
mission. By the terms of the treaty, Quetta became an
important British cantonment, while the Bolan Pass for
the first time became safe for the passage of caravans,
without payment of blackmail. It must, however, be
mentioned that the occupation of Quetta was naturally
viewed with dislike and suspicion by Shir AH and his
Councillors.
The Position in Europe. In 1875 a rebellion in
Bosnia and Herzegovina led two years later to the Russo-
Turkish War. Disraeli's policy was, as we have seen,
strongly anti-Russian, so much so that war with Russia
appeared to be a probability.
The Mission of General Stolietoff to Kabul, Juty 1878.
The bitter hostility existing in Europe between the two
erstwhile friendly Powers, induced Kaufmann, without
any instructions from the Russian Government, to
announce to the Amir the despatch of an envoy to
Kabul, in the letter which serves as a motto to this chapter.
On June 1 8 the day on which the Congress of Berlin
held its first sitting Stolietoff left Tashkent for the
Afghan capital. To support his envoy, Kaufmann also
despatched three columns of Russian troops towards
various points on the Afghan frontier. The Amir was
embarrassed by the appearance of the Mission, and was
reluctant to receive it, 1 but treated it with honour upon
its entry into Kabul.
On the day before his arrival at the capital, it appears
that Stolietoff received a letter from Kaufmann informing
1 In Argyll's Autobiography and Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 330, we read: " The Amir was
very reluctant to receive it, and was only bullied into it *'.
xxxvn GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 107
him of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin and instruct-
ing him to refrain from making any definite arrange-
ments with the Amir. Stolietoff, however, realizing the
almost independent position of the Governor-General,
produced a draft of a treaty with Russia offering assist-
ance to the Amir against an external enemy and recogni-
tion of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent.
The exact terms of the treaty are perhaps doubtful l
but, on August 23, the Amir wrote to Kaufmann that
Stolietoff had written down his wishes to strengthen
friendly relations between Russia and would shortly
return with his reply. 2 This letter proved the case against
the Amir.
The Assurance of M. de Giers. It is of considerable
importance to note that, on July 2, 1878, Lord Loftus
inquired of M. de Giers whether any Russian official
had been instructed by St. Petersburg or by Kaufmann
to proceed on a mission to Kabul. De Giers, in his reply,
categorically denied that any Mission had been sent or
was intended to be sent to Kabul either by the Imperial
Government or by Kaufmann. 3 De Giers was probably
being deceived by the Russian War Office, since his
character would be seriously affected by his denying facts
that were soon known to the world.
The Despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. The
appearance of a Russian Mission at Kabul caused a
crisis. The British Government agreed that it should
be met by insisting that the Amir should receive a Mission
under General Sir Neville Chamberlain. The letter to
thfe Amir, containing this announcement, reached Kabul
on August 1 7, the date of the death of the heir-apparent.
The Amir asked for delay on this account, but, as noted
above, he continued his correspondence with Kaufmann.
1 In Forty-one Tears in India, Appendix V, Lord Roberts gives this treaty as written
from memory by Mirxa Muhammad Nabi. Article 3 ran: " The Russian Government
engages that if any foreign enemy attacks Afghanistan and the Amir is unable to drive
him out, and asks for the assistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government
will repel the enemy either by means of advice or by such other means as it may consider
proper ".
2 Part. Papers, 1881, xcviii (" Central Asia ", No. i), p. 350.
3 Loftus to Salisbury, July 3, 1878, Parl. Papers, 1878, Ixxx ("Central Asia",
No. i), p. 132.
io8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Intervention of Lord Salisbury. Since no reply
was received from Kabul, on September 8, Lytton pro-
posed the immediate despatch of Chamberlain with an
escort of 1000 men to Kabul. Three days later Salisbury
requested Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India,
to await the receipt of a letter from de Giers which was
on its way to London. But when Cranbrook's instruc-
tions in this sense reached India, frontier officers were
already arranging with Khaibar tribesmen for the passage
of the Mission and Lytton was assured that postpone-
ment of the Mission would incur the contempt of the
tribesmen. He therefore allowed another week for the
receipt of de Giers' letter and, failing this, on Sep-
tember 20, without any further reference to London,
ordered Chamberlain to advance.
Sir Neville Chamberlain s Mission stored by Afghan
Troops. The Mission was, however, met by a strong
hostile force at Ak Masjid, and it perforce returned to
Peshawar, fortunate to escape being cut up.
The Decision of the British Cabinet. Towards the end
of October there were stormy meetings of the Cabinet.
Lytton 's policy was attacked by Salisbury, who feared
that trouble with Russia over Afghan matters might
seriously hinder the execution of the Treaty of Berlin.
Cranbrook, however, strongly supported the Viceroy,
whose views finally prevailed.
The Despatch of an Ultimatum to Shir AH. Accord-
ingly, on November 2, an ultimatum was despatched to
Kabul, which allowed until November 20 for a reply.
Shir Ali naturally turned to Kaufmann, who gave him fro
assistance whatever and suggested that he should make
terms with the British.
It is difficult not to sympathize with Shir Ali at this
juncture. The mission of Stolietoff was a Russian riposte
to the despatch by Disraeli of Indian troops to Malta. To
quote Argyll: " We had ourselves placed the Amir in a
position of extreme difficulty and had reason to believe
and to know that he was not in any way party to the
Russian policy in sending it." x Surely, under these
1 Op. cit. vol. ii, p. 330.
xxxvii GENESIS OF SECOND AFGHAN WAR 109
conditions and, bearing in mind the bitter grief of the
Amir at the sudden death of his favourite son, more
patience and more tact should have been displayed by
the Viceroy.
Lord Salisbury's Letter. By way of conclusion to this
chapter, I will quote a remarkable letter of Salisbury:
" As for the embassy to Kabul, it appears to have been
self-generated. Schouvaloff had heard nothing of it the
whole time he was at Berlin nor during the three
weeks he afterwards spent at St. Petersburg. Only when
he went to Wilbad he saw it in the newspapers. He
immediately rushed to Gortchakoff and asked, * Has
there been any Mission to Kabul?'. Gortchakoff putting
his hand on his brow and reflecting : ' Non, je ne le
crois pas V I
1 To Lord Odo Russell, Nov. 27, 1878.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you also, who are beyond
the Oxus must display the same sense of friendship and brotherhood. . . . The
Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country,
and, like last year, treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold
season passes away; then the will of the Almighty will be manifest to you
that is to say, the Russian Government will come to your assistance. The
Letter of GENERAL STOLIETOFF to the Vizier of Shir Ali, dated October 8, 1878.
And yet when I think of Shir Ali as he lies in his sepulchre low,
How he died betrayed, heart-broken, 'twixt infidel friend and foe,
Driven from his throne by the English, and scorned by the Russian, his guest,
I am well content with the vengeance, and I see God works for the best.
SIR ALFRED LYALL, The Amir's Soliloquy.
Three British Columns invade Afghanistan. No answer
to the ultimatum of the Viceroy was received from Kabul
owing, as it was subsequently proved, to delay in trans-
mission. Accordingly, upon the expiration o/ the time
limit, three columns, whose objectives were Kandahar,
Kabul by the Kurram Valley and also by the Khaibar
route under Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts
and Sir Sam Browne respectively, marched across the
frontiers of Afghanistan. 1
Sir Donald Stewart advanced on Kandahar from the
Indus, with Sir Michael Biddulph leading the advaace
force 6000 strong from Quetta, which was followed by a
slightly stronger main body. In 1878 the railway had
only reached the Indus, and the troops, as in the First
Afghan War, had the very trying march across the desert
of Kach Gandava and up the Bolan Pass. But the State of
Kalat (which included the Bolan Pass) was now under
British control, while Quetta was a relatively well-supplied
1 Among the authorities consulted, the most important is The Second Afghan War,
1878-80 (abridged official account), 1908; also Forty-one Tears in India, by Lord
Roberts; Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, by Lady Betty Balfourj and Sir Mortimer
Durand, by Sykes.
no
CH
.xxxvm THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR in
centre. There was no opposition to this column which
occupied Kandahar on January 8, 1879.
The March up the Kurram Valley. Roberts, whose
transport service had been collected haphazard there
was no organized transport service in the Indian army at
that period was very anxious about its deficiencies.
He also was aware that the mullas were tampering with
the Moslem sepoys, who did not relish taking part in
a war against the Amir. Accordingly, upon hearing
that the Afghans were holding the Peiwar Kotal in
great strength, he applied for reinforcements, which
were somewhat reluctantly granted. The fact that the
Turis of the Kurram were Shias guaranteed their loyal
support, more especially as Roberts was authorized
to promise them that the British occupation would be
permanent.
The Battle of the Peiwar Kotal^ December 2, 1878.
The Afghan troops who had retreated up the valley took
up a strong position on the pine-clad pass. A main
frontal attack was ruled out by the rugged nature of the
ground and by the necessity of advancing in single file.
The mountains on the enemy right also forbade an
attack. Most fortunately a track leading to the Afghan
left flank was discovered, and it was determined to send
a body of troops in that direction, while a frontal attack
would also be made to occupy the enemy. While the
flanking body was stumbling up the valley with constant
crossing of streams, two shots were fired by Pathans of
one of the regiments which was leading the column.
Roberts, who was with the flanking column, immediately
ordered one company of the 72nd Highlanders and one
company of the 5th Gurkhas to the front, who, on
reaching the foot of the Spingawi Pass at the false dawn,
were fired on by the enemy and charged, supported by
two guns of the mountain battery. The enemy holding
this part of the position were surprised and fled. Roberts
writes: " Its approaches were commanded by precipitous
heights, and defended by breastworks of felled trees,
which completely screened the defenders. . . . Had we
not been able to surprise the enemy before the day
ii2 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
dawned, I doubt whether any of us could have reached
the first entrenchment." l
The main body on the Peiwar Kotal was still holding
its position but, at first, part of the flanking column lost
its way and the situation became serious. Roberts also
learned that the frontal attack on the Peiwar Kotal had
been repulsed with somewhat heavy losses.
By a happy chance a route was discovered for a
further turning movement, which threatened the Afghan
rear. This caused their artillery fire to slacken, while
their infantry broke and fled from the main position
and the battle was won. Actually, owing to the exhaustion
of the troops, the Afghan position was not occupied until
the following morning when its impregnability against a
frontal attack was evident. Roberts and his splendid
troops deserve immense credit for the victory at the
Peiwar KotaL
After halting for a few days to rest the force and to
allow supplies and tents to be brought up, Roberts
marched along the Kabul road to Ali Khel. From this
camp he visited the Shutargardan Pass which rises to an
elevation of 1 1,000 feet, and obtained a splendid view of
the Logar Valley and beyond. r
The Khaibar Column. Sir Sam Browne advanced up
the Khaibar Pass at the head of a powerful column of
16,000 men. Following the example of Pollock, he
detached a strong force by the tracks over the hills to the
north to outflank the Afghan position. At noon the main
body came under the fire of the artillery at Ak Masjid
and, unsupported by his detached force, which had been
delayed, he did not involve himself in a frontal attack.
On resuming his advance in the morning, the fort was
found to be empty, the Afghans having disappeared
during the night. Browne then advanced to Jalalabad
without further opposition, although constant attacks
were made on his convoys by the predatory tribesmen.
The Flight and Death of Shir Ali. Upon the news of
the Peiwar Kotal victory reaching Kabul, the Amir was
deserted by many of his leading Sirdars^ while his soldiers
1 Forty-one Tears in India^ vol. ii, p. 141.
xxxvm THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR 113
returned to their homes. He released Yakub from prison
and appointed him Regent. Then, hoping for the promised
Russian support, and leaving a letter addressed to the
British in which he stated that he had decided to lay the
whole question before the Tsar, he fled northwards to
Balkh.
Treacherous Kaufmann, in response to the Amir's
frantic appeals, merely advised him to endeavour to make
peace with the British. He refused to send any troops
to his support and would not permit the unfortunate
Amir to visit St. Petersburg. On February 21, 1879,
worn out with illness and the knowledge that he had
been betrayed by Russia, Shir Ali died at Mazar-i-Sharif.
The Position of Yakub Khan. Lytton wrote to the
new Amir proposing that he should receive a mission at
Kabul. Yakub took council with the Afghan officers
who had accompanied Shir Ali in his flight as to his
policy, and they advised him to abandon the British and
trust to Russia. Hearing this, the British Agent, who
was the bearer of Lytton's and Major Cavagnari's letters,
fearing for the safety of a British mission at Kabul,
suggested that Yakub should, instead, visit the British
camp, which had now advanced to Gandamak. This
was agreed to and the Amir proceeded to Gandamak
where he appeared with his Commander-in-Chief, both
of them somewhat tactlessly wearing Russian uniforms.
Yakub did not create a favourable impression.
Durand, 1 who saw a good deal of him shortly afterwards,
summed him up: " He is by no means the fine young
soldier I used to imagine him; a weak vacillating face,
pleasant enough at times, but not trustworthy or in any
way impressive. The type is strongly Jewish."
Before the meeting, a proclamation, addressed by
Yakub to a tribe which had been giving the British
trouble, was intercepted. In it he exhorted the tribesmen
to have no fear of the infidels, against whom he was
organizing an irresistible force of Ghazis. The pro-
clamation terminated with the verse from the Koran:
" Verily Allah has destroyed the powerful ones ".
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 94.
VOL. II I
n 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Treaty of Gandamak^ May 26, 1879. Cavag-
nari disregarded this treacherous behaviour of Yakub
and negotiated with him the Treaty of Gandamak. 1 By
its terms Great Britain definitely agreed to protect
Afghanistan against external attack, while it was stipu-
lated that there were to be no direct communications by
that country with other Powers. The Amir was granted
an annual subsidy of 6 lakhs of rupees. To continue:
the British Government restored to the Amir Kandahar
and Jalalabad, which towns were in the possession of
British troops, but, with the agreement of His Highness,
" the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi . . . shall be
treated as assigned districts. . . , 2 The British Govern-
ment will retain in its own hands the control of the
Khaibar and Michni Passes . . . and of all relations with
the independent tribes of the territory connected with
these Passes. "
By the Treaty of Gandamak the position of Quetta and
its lines of communication with India were assured owing
to the occupation of Pishin and Sibi. The occupation
of the Kurram Valley, apart from its strategical import-
ance, was partly due to its inhabitants, who, as Shia
Moslems, were perpetually raided by their fanatical
neighbours and were thus loyal to the British, to whom
they had appealed for protection. Finally, the arrange-
ment about the passes strengthened the British control
over the restless Afridis.
Sir Louis Cavagnari reaches Kabul as British Envoy,
July 24, 1879. ^ was agreed by the Amir to receive a
British mission at Kabul. Sir Louis Cavagnari, as <he
had been gazetted, was appointed envoy with a staff of
three British officers and an escort of the Guides. He
was received by various officials, and riding on an
elephant entered Kabul with salutes of guns and of the
garrison ; he took up his residence in the Bala Hissar.
On August 30 Cavagnari wrote that, upon the whole,
the position was satisfactory, but he reported that six
1 Par!. Papers, 1878-1879, Ivi, 691.
2 In " assigned districts " the revenue was utilized for the expenses of administration,
and the balance was due to be paid to the Amir.
xxxvm THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR 115
regiments from Herat, who had arrived early in August,
had displayed mutinous tendencies and that a fracas had
taken place between the Afghan troops and some men of
his escort. On September 2 he telegraphed, " All well ".
On September 3 three of the six regiments asked for
their pay. They were offered one month's pay but
refused to take less than three months'. The troops then
mutinied and, marching to the Residency, asked Cavag-
nari to pay them. Apparently he declined to intervene,
and their fanaticism having been excited by the mullas^
they attacked the Residency. The resistance, if hopeless,
was most determined, repeated sallies being made, but
finally the gallant band was massacred and the Residency
was burned. 1 The mission had been in Kabul only six
weeks and five days when the tragedy occurred.
Apart from the loss of valuable British lives, the blow
to British prestige and the collapse of the policy of
securing a scientific frontier for the security of India
made the situation extremely serious. To quote Lytton's
letter to Beaconsfield: " The web of policy so carefully
and patiently woven has been rudely shattered. We have
now to weave a fresh and, I fear, a wider one from
undoubtedly weaker materials/' 2
The Kabul Field Force. Of the three British forces
Sir Sam Browne's had been broken up, while Sir Donald
Stewart was in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, where
only a small body of troops was stationed. The Kurram
force alone was in a position to advance rapidly on Kabul,
Roberts was therefore appointed to command the Kabul
Field Force, as it was called, with instructions to march
on the capital with all possible expedition. It included
two infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and artillery,
with horse, field and mountain batteries. The force
totalled 7500 men and 22 guns..
The question of transport and the extent of the lines
of communication, which would have to be protected,
were all causes of anxiety, but of far graver import was
the necessity to cut adrift from the Kurram line of com-
1 For Abdur Rahman's views on the tragedy <vide his o/>. V. vol. i, p. 152.
z Dated September 4. Vide op. cit. pp, 358-359.
n6 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
munication which would be closed in mid-winter, and to
rely on the Khaibar route being opened by the time
Kabul was taken.- Roberts, on reaching the camp, writes
that he was delighted with the spirit of the force, which
was burning to avenge the massacre of their comrades.
The Attitude of Takub towards the Massacre. Upon
his arrival at Ali Khel, two letters written by Yakub on
September 3 and September 4 were handed to Roberts
by the political agent. According to them, " the troops
who had assembled for their pay suddenly broke out and
stoned their officers and then all rushed to the Residency
and stoned it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. . . .
People from Sherpur and the country around and city
people of all classes poured into the Bala Hissar and
began destroying workshops, artillery park and magazine,
and all the troops and people attacked the Residency."
The question of the Amir's complicity in the tragedy
was subsequently considered, with the result that it was
found that the massacre was not instigated by him, but
that although he must be acquitted of complicity in the
outrage, he could, by acting promptly, have prevented it.
It is curious how this massacre resembled that of Burnes
a generation earlier. In each case quick, decided action
by the Amir would have been effective.
Roberts writes to the Amir. Under instructions from
Lytton, Roberts wrote to Yakub that, in view of the
murder of Cavagnari, his staff and his escort by Afghan
troops and in view of the Amir's inability to establish
his authority, a British army would advance on Kabul
with the double object of strengthening his Government
and of exacting retribution from the murderers of the
British Mission. Roberts added that since the British
Government had been informed of the despatch of
emissaries from Kabul to raise the tribes against him, he
desired His Highness to send a confidential agent to
confer with him.
The Policy of the Vizier and the Finance Minister.
Two Ministers accordingly reached the camp who, after
giving many assurances of the friendship of Yakub for
the British, evidently, in accordance with the Amir's
xxxvm THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR 117
instructions, attempted by every means " to stop the
advance of the force long enough for the whole country
to rise and attack us ", as Roberts put it. Neither of
these envoys wished to remain, so they were dismissed.
The Advance on Kabul and the Arrival in Camp of the
Amir. As soon as supplies had been collected, Roberts
resumed his march to Kabul. After crossing the
Shuturgardan Pass, to his embarrassment he was met at
Kushi by the Amir with a large following. Yakub him-
self now urged on Roberts the advisability of delay, but
realizing that the Amir's wish was to gain time for the
assembly of a strong force, Roberts marched steadily
northwards. At this period General Bright was advancing
up the Khaibar with a force of 16,000 men, while Sir
Donald Stewart, having reoccupied Kandahar and Kalat-
i-Ghilzai, was threatening Ghazni.
The Battle of Charasia. Sirdar Nek Muhammad, an
uncle of the Amir, at this period rode out to the camp
and held a secret conference with the Amir, after which,
having ascertained the exact strength of the British, he
hastened back to Kabul, obviously to organize the Afghan
army.
On Ottober 6 reconnoitring parties reported that the
range between Kabul and Charasia was being occupied
by Afghan troops, while parties of Ghilzais appeared on
the hills running along both flanks of the camp. Roberts
possessed only enough transport for half his force, and
Macpherson's brigade on this account remained a march
in rear. Realizing the necessity of immediate action,
Roberts ordered General (later Sir Thomas) Baker to
attack the right of the position, which was carried by
Major White l and the 92nd Highlanders, who captured
twenty Afghan guns. Baker also, by a turning movement
to the left, drove the enemy from the field in this area
with very heavy losses. Nek Muhammad, the leader of
the force, had his horse shot under him but escaped.
Again Roberts, by his determination to attack without
waiting for the arrival of the whole of his force, won a
complete victory. His casualties were negligible.
1 Later Field-Marshal Sir George White.
n8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Roberts enters Kabul on October 12. The British force
arrived before Kabul on October 8. Darkness prevented
an immediate attack but, during the night, the enemy
fled, leaving all their artillery, consisting of 150 guns,
behind them.
The Abdication of Takub Khan. On October 12 the
victorious general made his public entry into the city,
and Yakub Khan, accompanied by only two followers,
walked to the camp and abdicated. He said that his life
had been a miserable one; that he would rather be a
grass-cutter in the English camp than Amir of Afghan-
istan. He begged for permission to live in the camp
until he could be sent to India.
The Proclamation of Roberts. On October 28 the
victor issued a proclamation by the terms of which he
referred to the voluntary abdication of Yakub as having
left Afghanistan without a Government, and stated " that
the British Government, after consultation with the
principal Sirdars^ tribal chiefs, and others representing
the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities,
will declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to
be made for the good government of the people 'V
The Reverse in the Chardeh Valley. Roberts decided
to occupy a fortified cantonment at Sherpur, which Shir
Ali had partially constructed. It was strengthened in
every possible way, while troops were despatched to the
villages in the neighbourhood to procure supplies and
firewood. Reconnoitring parties were also continually on
the move. One of these, consisting of horse artillery and
cavalry, was attacked by overwhelming numbers in the
Chardeh Valley. The ground was cut up by deep irriga-
tion channels impassable for the guns, which were tem-
porarily abandoned. A disaster was only averted by the
timely arrival of the 72nd Highlanders.
The Assault on the Sherpur Cantonment. It was soon
evident that overwhelming Afghan forces had assembled
and Roberts decided to evacuate the Bala Hissar together
with the city, and collected his force into the well-supplied
cantonment. This retirement made a combined assault
1 Vide Roberts, op. cit. vol. ii, p. 249.
xxxvm THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR 119
by the assembled Afghans inevitable, and, at dawn on
December 23, roused to religious fervour by a religious
festival, they advanced in dense masses. Although faced
by rifle and artillery the heroic tribesmen made attack
after attack, only to suffer heavy losses. After the failure
of these assaults a sortie by British cavalry and artillery
completed their discomfiture. The Afghans, who can
only carry food for a few days, had played into the hands
of Roberts. They were beaten and speedily dispersed.
Reinforcements strengthened his military position, but
the political future of Afghanistan remained obscure.
Who was to rule as Amir and would he rule over a dis-
integrated or a united country? The answer to this
difficult problem was the reappearance of Sirdar Abdur
Rahman in Afghan Turkistan.
CHAPTER XXXIX
ABDUR RAHMAN IS PROCLAIMED AMIR OF KABUL
To Allah alone are the gates of the hidden mysteries open; no man can
know what is to happen in the future except Allah, the All-Knowing. The
Koran.
Thus is my banishment ended; it's twelve long years, well nigh,
Since I fought the last of my lost fights, and saw my best men die;
They hunted me over the passes, and up to the Oxus stream,
We had just touched land on the far side as we saw their spearheads gleam.
Then came the dolorous exile, the life in a conquered land,
Where the Frank had trodden on Islam; the alms at a stranger's hand;
While here in the fort of my fathers, my bitterest foe held sway;
He was ten years building his Kingdom, it all fell down in a day.
LYALL.
The Early Tears of Abdur Rahman. Abdur Rahman,
" the Slave of the Merciful," destined to rank as the
great Amir, who welded the loose congeries of turbulent
tribes into a nation and ruled with a rod of steel over a
united Afghanistan, had a chequered career, which is
well worth narrating, if only as demonstrating how his
character was strengthened by constant changes of
fortune, and hardened on the anvil of adversity. 1
He was, as mentioned in Chapter XXXIV, the son
of Sirdar Afzal Khan who, by the death of two elder
brothers, became the eldest son of Dost Muhammacl.
His mother was the daughter of Nawab Samand Khan,
a leading Sirdar^ and was a descendant of Shah Tahmasp.
Abdur Rahman was born in 1844 and, for the first
nine years of his life, resided at Kabul. He then joined
his father, who was Governor of Afghan Turkistan.
There he lived for ten years, during which period his
1 In this section I have consulted The Life of Abdur Rahman, and the Encyclopaedia
of Islam. Vol. I of the former work is a translation of Abdur Rahman's autobiography.
Sir Louis Dane has, very kindly, read this and the following eight chapters, and has made
valuable suggestions.
I2O
CH. xxxix ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 1 2 1
training resembled that of a medieval European of noble
family. In other words, he spent most of his time in
sport and warlike exercises, and could only read and write
with difficulty.
When he was thirteen years of age, Afzal visited
Kabul to pay his respects to Dost Muhammad and his
youthful son was left to act as Governor in his place.
His Appointment to Tashkurgan. Shortly afterwards,
he was appointed Governor of Tashkurgan by his grand-
father. This appointment he held for some two years,
reducing the revenues in case of failure in the crops and,
generally speaking, ruling with leniency. But his father,
who visited the province, after inspecting the revenue
accounts, refused these concessions and insisted on full
payment of the taxes. The young Sirdar therefore
resigned the governorship and returned to Takhtapul,
where his father had built a palace and established his
family. He now returned to his studies, but secured
physical fitness by hunting for two days a week in the
jungles of the Oxus, or fishing on the river of Balkh.
His Training under Campbell. At this period he fell
under the influence of Campbell, Shah Shuja's able
general, who, as mentioned in Chapter XXIX, had been
taken prisoner at Kandahar in 1834. Converted to
Islam, he became the Commander of Afzal's army under
the name of Shir Muhammad Khan. The young Sirdar
rightly admired Campbell whom he describes as, " a
very clever military officer, as well as a good doctor. His
character was most heroic/* For three years he " con-
tinued to be trained in surgery and military tactics ",
and there is no doubt that he profited greatly by the
instruction he received from Campbell. He also learned
to do blacksmith's work and, to quote again, " I acquired
the art of riflemaking, and I made three complete double
rifles with my own hands ".
His Imprisonment by Afzal Khan. His father must
have been a singularly harsh parent for, hearing from a
relation that his son drank wine and smoked Indian
hemp, he believed the charge, and continually found
fault with him. Abdur Rahman thereupon determined
122 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
to run away to Herat. This design having been betrayed
by his servants, he was thrown into prison with chains on
his ankles and, in this unhappy position, he languished
for one year.
Upon the death of Campbell, Afzal wished to appoint
one of his trusted followers to the post. But to quote
yet again, " he refused to accept it, saying to my father
that his own son, who had been one year in prison, and
therefore punished sufficiently for his faults, was the
proper person to take the place of Shir Muhammad Khan.
My father at first refused . . . but being urged to give me
a trial, he finally consented to send for me. I came
straight from prison to appear before my father . . . with
chains around my ankles. My father addressed himself
to all the military officers saying, ' I appoint this my
lunatic son to be General over you '. To which they
replied: * God forbid that your son should be a lunatic:
we know well that he is wise and sensible, you also will
find this out, and will prove that it is disloyal people who
give him a bad character V
His Appointment as Commander-in-Chief. In this
manner, the earliest crisis in Abdur Rahman's life, which
might well have been a story taken from the Arabian
Nights, ended satisfactorily. Thanks to his energy and
powers of organization, his father not only forgave him,
but, realizing his capacity, appointed him Commander-
in-Chief of the entire army, which represented a force of
30,000 officers and men of all arms, of whom one-half
were regulars.
The Annexation of Kataghan. At this period, Dtfst
Muhammad determined to annex the petty Khanates on
the left bank of the Oxus and Abdur Rahman, who acted
as Commander-in-Chief, under his uncle Azim Khan,
invaded the neighbouring province of Kataghan. Its
ruler, the Mir Atalikj- as he was termed, had appealed for
help to the Amir of Bukhara, who had " sent him a flag
and a tent, telling him to erect the tent in his country,
with the flag in front, to frighten the Afghans ".
1 The term means " Lord Fatherhead ". Yakub Beg, who conquered Chinese
Turkistan in 1865, was given the title of Atalik GAazi by the Amir of Bukhara.
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 123
Abdur Rahman marched on Ghori which was held
by a strong force, while the Mir Atalik " showed himself
with 40,000 sowars from the top of an adjacent hill, to
encourage his soldiers in the fort ". However, the Afghan
troops, under cover of a heavy cannonade, stormed the
outer fort and, following close on its escaping defenders,
took possession of the bazar. Thereupon the main fort,
which had only been provisioned for ten days, surrendered.
The Amir of Bukhara crosses the Oxus. The Amir of
Bukhara, at this period, decided to take a hand in the
game in the interests of the Mir of Badakhshan, and
crossed the Oxus with a large force. The situation was
difficult, since it was possible that the Uzbegs of Afghan
Turkistan, who were of the same nationality, would
rebel, while there was also the possibility, if not the likeli-
hood, of the Amir of Bukhara making a sudden attack
on the Afghans. In the event, Abdur Rahman, while
marching to the support of his uncle, heard artillery fire.
This was taken to signify the revolt of the Uzbegs and
caused great alarm among his soldiers; actually it was a
feu de joie, fired by Azim Khan, to celebrate the flight of
the Amir of Bukhara !
The Succession of Shir All Khan in 1863. Upon the
death of Dost Muhammad in 1863, Shir Ali, as we have
seen, succeeded his father, but his elder brothers rebelled.
Azim, who was Governor of Kurram, was defeated and
fled to India, while Afzal was imprisoned.
The Flight of Abdur Rahman to Bukhara. Abdur
Rahman, when summoned by Shir Ali, took refuge with
Muzaffar-ud-Din, the Amir of Bukhara, who, according
to the Sirdar's own account, did not treat him with the
honour which he considered to be his due, or indeed
with the hospitality that is usual among Moslems. Con-
sequently, he bluntly refused to accept a position at the
Amir's Court. This brought him into disfavour, but,
upon news being received that the Russians had captured
Tashkent, the Amir of Bukhara, in much alarm, left for
Samarkand.
The Return of Abdur Rahman and his Defeat by Shir
Ali. The young Sirdar, thereupon, decided to recross
I2 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the Oxus into Afghan Turkistan, where he was welcomed
by the troops. But the struggle with Shir AH, as men-
tioned in Chapter XXXIV, ended in his final defeat in
January 1869. After this disaster, accompanied by his
uncle and some faithful followers, he started on a long
weary journey round Afghanistan to Samarkand.
Among the most interesting of his experiences is the
following: " The first night I entered the Wazir country,
I had eaten nothing since my defeat, and I told my sowars
that I was very hungry, and should much like a piece of
meat. They had one piece of money between them, and
with this they bought some mutton, butter and onions.
. . . My men managed to procure an iron saucepan, and
in this I cooked some of the meat, making also some
gravy. I had been obliged to tie the saucepan to some
sticks to hang it over the fire, and as I was going to take
the cooked meat out of the saucepan, a dog, thinking the
hanging string was the intestines of some animal, seized
it in his mouth and ran off with the whole thing. . , .
Three days before I had 1000 camels to carry my cooking
utensils, and now one dog could run off with my cooking
pans, together with the food." 1
While travelling along the Indian frontier A'tair Azim
received a letter from two English officers inviting him to
take refuge in British territory. He replied, according
to the autobiography: " When the Viceroy of India
writes me a letter of invitation, promising not to take us
beyond the Indus, we will come. To this letter he asked
me to affix my seal, but I refused, saying I had never seen
the benefit of English friendship/' Actually, I imagiile
that shrewd Abdur Rahman wished to take refuge at a
convenient point from which he could watch events in
Afghan Turkistan, where most of his adherents were to be
found. That fact, rather than any dislike of the English,
probably decided his refusal.
Leaving the Wazir country in March, the refugees
proceeded to the Zhob Valley and Pishin, and passing
through Nushki, struck the Helmand, suffering consider-
1 In Chapter XII, a similar story is told of Amr-ul-Lais, and it rather looks as if
Abdur Rahman had heard of it I
xxxix ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 125
able hardships from lack of supplies, from the soaking
rain and the bitter winds. Reaching Chagai with men
and horses exhausted, they stayed there for twenty-five
days and grazed their beasts. Resuming the journey,
the Helmand was struck and, meeting a band of raiders
from Persian Seistan, Abdur Rahman made friends
with them and on reaching the delta province, the
party was hospitably entertained by Mir Alum Khan
of Kain, who was, as we have seen, discourteous to
Sir Frederic Goldsmid and the officers of the Seistan
mission.
Once in Persia, the hardships of the refugees were
finished for the time being, and the Sirdars travelled to
Meshed, the sacred city of Persia and the capital of
Khurasan, where they were received with much honour.
The Shah invited Abdur Rahman to visit him at
Tehran, but he asked to be allowed to proceed to Urganj
or Khiva. This was permitted, and leaving Azim (who
shortly afterwards died), in charge of his Meshed hosts,
Abdur Rahman continued his wanderings to Darragaz.
There his hospitable host arranged for his safety while
crossing the Turkoman country, by holding as security
one thousand camel loads belonging to Turkoman
merchants.
Passing through Askabad and Tejen, the wanderers
crossed the grim Kara Kum desert, again undergoing
severe hardships from thirst, and finally reached Khiva. In
this fertile oasis the ruler, Sayyid Muhammad Rahim Khan,
who was truly hospitable, " told me that he regarded me as
his elder brother, as his father Muhammad Amin was most
friendly to my father. . . . He offered me two of the seven
cities now under his rule." Abdur Rahman, in return
for this generous proposal, strongly advised the Khan to
make terms with Russia, but his people cried: " Death
awaits the Russians if they come near Urganj ".
Abdur Rahman again visits Bukhara. Continuing his
wanderings the Sirdar crossed the Oxus and reached
Kara Kul in Bukharan territory, where he was greeted by
his cousin Ishak Khan (son of Sirdar Azim) and by his
servants. He was received by the Amir of Bukhara at
126 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Hissar, where he remained for a few days, making little
comment on his reception which was cool.
Abdur Rahman and General Kaufmann, 1870. The
wanderer then travelled to Samarkand, now a Russian
possession, where he was kindly received by the Russian
authorities. In due course he paid a visit to the Governor-
General at Tashkent. So far as his correspondence
proves, Kaufmann behaved honestly on this occasion in
his dealings with the Afghan Sirdar. Abdur Rahman
tried hard to persuade him that it was absolutely necessary
for the interests of Russia that he should be assisted to
become Amir of Afghanistan. Kaufmann's reply was
that he had been given hospitality in consideration of
his destitute condition ; that the relations of Russia with
Great Britain were friendly and that he wished Shir Ali
a prosperous reign. 1
It was finally decided that Abdur Rahman should
be provided with a house and garden at Samarkand, and
there he lived, supported by an allowance from his hosts,
from 1870 to 1880. He had settled down in the best
centre for watching events in Afghanistan, and for eleven
years he watched and intrigued with the Chiefs across
the Oxus and with merchants who visited hin\ In con-
cluding this account of the early years of Abdur Rahman's
chequered career, it is impossible not to admire the
courage and humour which he displayed under con-
ditions that would have crushed most men. His auto-
biography certainly bears comparison with the famous
memoirs of the Emperor Baber.
Abdur Rahman decides to return to Afghanistan. In
his autobiography Abdur Rahman writes : " After two
years of my stay in Samarkand, the friendship of the
Afghans and the Russians grew stronger and stronger,
and the communication between Shir Ali and the
Government became more frequent. I discovered that
Muhammad Alam Khan, Governor of Balkh, was in the
habit of sending envoys to the Amir of Bukhara, who
forwarded these letters to General Abramoff and to the
1 An extract of Kaufmann'a letter of June 29 to Prince GortchakofF was shown to
the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
xxxix ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 127
Viceroy of Tashkent. The Russians would reply to
the letters through the same medium/'
The Sirdar was naturally excited by the tragedy at
Kabul, which resulted in the flight and death of Shir Ali
and the elimination of Yakub and Ayub. He decided
to return to Afghanistan immediately, and began to make
preparations.
The Encouragement of Abdur Rahman by Russia. It is
interesting to note that the Sirdar was encouraged to
return to Afghanistan at this juncture. He describes
how, in the absence of Kaufmann at Orenburg, his
secretary not only permitted but urged him to take
advantage of the favourable opportunity. He was, by
permission of Kaufmann, also given 200 breach-loading
rifles with ammunition and some money. He writes:
" The Russians pressed me most strongly to leave. They
said I could not leave soon enough."
This probably constitutes an accurate account of
what happened, and Lord Dufferin pointed out to M. de
Giers that the Russian Government, while professing its
desire to reassure Great Britain as to its pacific intentions
in Central Asia, in the person of Abdur Rahman, had
launched $. new element of disturbance into Afghanistan
at a critical period.
Abdur Rahman travels to Badakhshan. Acting
promptly, the Sirdar borrowed " 2000 sovereigns from
the merchants ", purchased horses and equipment and
proceeded to Khojand where he bought some thirty
pack ponies. From Khojand he made for Badakhshan,
but attempting the most direct route: " I found the
mountain like a hen's egg, being white with snow. It
was so high I was afraid we should never reach the top,
but I put my trust in Allah, and we began the ascent . . .
allowing our horses to go in front, and held on to their
tails to help us up." Having crossed this pass at great
risk, and with some cases of frost-bite among his
adherents, Abdur Rahman was informed that there were
" four more mountains " between him and Hissar.
Accordingly he decided to make for Shahr-i-Sabz
where, by orders of the Amir of Bukhara who was always
128 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP,
his enemy, the city gates were closed against him.
Moving on to Hissar, by a ruse, which he describes with
glee, he secured six horses belonging to the " chiefs
holding civil appointments in the city ". He then crossed
the Oxus and reached Rustak, a village of Badakhshan.
His reception in Badakhshan by Shahzadeh Hassan,
son of Mir Shah the latter was brother of Mir
Jahandar Shah, his father-in-law 1 was hardly encourag-
ing, since he was informed that the people of Badakhshan
11 had vowed that if a piece of their land was touched by
the feet of an Afghan, they would throw that piece of
land out of the country as well as myself, as being
impure ".
To continue : " The next morning putting my trust
in Allah, I started to face the army of Shahzadeh Hassan.
After a march of twelve miles, I saw the enemy, 12,000
strong with twelve flags in their midst, coming towards
me. When we arrived about the distance of a mile
apart, I saw to my astonishment that the enemy began
to disperse gradually in different directions, as if under
the influence of an evil spirit. I could not understand
what had happened. In the meantime, a body of sowars
belonging to the Mir of Badakhshan, the cousin of Shah-
zadeh Hassan was approaching from another direction,
praising Allah. . . . They told me they had come to
salaam Abdur Rahman.'*
After these truly amazing events, Abdur Rahman
issued the following proclamation: " O Moslems, I
have not come to fight Afghans who are true believers,
but to make ghaza. Therefore it is necessary that you
should all obey my commands, which are those of Allah
and his prophets. We are all the slaves of Allah, but
ghaza is a duty to us all." After a second dramatic event,
which proved the steadfast courage and strong personality
of Abdur Rahman, we find the troops of Afghan
Tukistan coming over to him and " giving banquets
in their joy ".
At this juncture, Abdur Rahman, who was inspecting
1 Mir Jahandar Shah was murdered by his sons in Russian territory. They were
imprisoned by the Russians, but Abdur Rahman secured their release.
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 129
the artillery, was surprised to see a suppliant, who had
thrown himself at his feet. This was Muhammad Sar-
war, who had deserted him at Samarkand. He was the
bearer of a letter from Mr. (later Sir Lepel) Griffin, the
Chief Political Officer at Kabul, which ran: "It has
become known that you have entered Afghanistan and
consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential
messenger, in order that you may submit to the British
officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire
to make to the British Government with regard to your
object in entering Afghanistan ". Muhammad Sarwar
was instructed to inform his late master that the British
were able to benefit him much more than the Russians,
and that he would be wise to open up relations with them.
He was also instructed to point out that the British had
no intention of annexing the country and that their chief
desire was to see a strong and friendly Amir firmly
established at Kabul. The astute Sirdar read " the letter
out loud and asked the chiefs to help him to compose an
answer since he did not wish ", he declared, " to do
anything without first consulting them ". Their answers
were hostile to the British and, accordingly, Abdur
Rahman t^pfore them all drafted his reply, which was
complimentary and vague, declaring that his only inten-
tion in leaving Russia was to help his nation, which was
in a state of much perplexity and trouble. Upon hearing
this reply, " on the oath of Allah and their Prophet, they
invested me with full authority to write what I thought
fit ".
The Arrival of Abdur Rahman in Afghan Turkistan
reported to the British. The news of the arrival of Abdur
Rahman in Afghan Turkistan reached the British through
a Reuter's telegram of January 7, 1880, according to
which he was reported to be at Balkh. The reaction to
this important intelligence in Afghanistan was that Shir
Ali Khan, the Wqli of Kandahar, evinced unfeigned
alarm and stated that Abdur Rahman would be welcomed
at Herat both by the garrison and the inhabitants.
Stewart agreed with this view, but Roberts, while report-
ing that many Chiefs in Kabul would dislike his
VOL. II K
1 30 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
appearance at that city, remarked that he was con-
sidered to be a capable soldier and an exceptionally
resolute man.
The Action of Mr. Lepel Griffin. The Indian authori-
ties considered that the Sirdar might possibly be a suitable
ruler for Northern Afghanistan and, upon inquiry, as-
certained from his mother, who was residing at Kandahar,
that he might be disposed to negotiate with the British.
At this juncture, authentic information reached Kabul on
March 25 that Abdur Rahman had won over the troops
in Afghan Turkistan and had been joined by the Chief
of Badakhshan. Griffin immediately decided to take
action and, on April 2, despatched Muhammad Sarwar
with the letter given above.
The Letter of Abdur Rahman. On April 21, the
friendly but guarded reply of Abdur Rahman was
received. It gave a sketch of recent events in Afghanistan,
severely blaming Yakub Khan who " raised fools to power
until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan
which during the reign of my grandfather . . . was
bright like the day ". It ended up with the wish that
" you will permanently establish the Afghans under the
honorable protection of the two Powers ". Muhammad
Sarwar, however, reported that the Sirdar was anxious
for the friendship of the British, while, at the same time,
acknowledging his obligations to Russia.
The Chief Opponents of Abdur Rahman. The Ghilzais,
whose centre was Ghazni, were known to be openly
hostile to Abdur Rahman. Consequently Griffin decided
to receive a deputation from that city which petitioned
for the restoration of Yakub Khan. At the durbar held
on this occasion Griffin declared that the British Govern-
ment would not restore Yakub Khan, but would recognize
as Amir of Kabul the Chief who was desired by the people
of Afghanistan.
The March of Sir Donald Stewart from Kandahar to
Kabul. At this juncture, Stewart was ordered to march
his division, which was between 7000 and 8000 strong,
to Ghazni, the intention at that period being to withdraw
it to India by the Kurram Valley. Leaving Kandahar
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 131
early in April 1880, hostile tribesmen in large numbers
were reported by the scouts to be advancing parallel to
the British force at a distance of some miles from the
right flank of the column. On April 14 the route passed
through low hills which bordered it for some distance
and then bent round eastwards across it. This position
was seen to be strongly held by the enemy along a front
of about two miles.
The Battle of Ahmad Khel, 1880. The British force
advanced and, upon the guns opening fire, successive
waves of Ghazis swiftly charged downhill, stretching
beyond either flank of the British, while a large body of
horsemen threatened the left and rear. The Afghan
cavalry charged, and at first, on the left flank, threw back
the 1 9th Bengal Lancers, who had to charge uphill to
meet them. Meanwhile the Afghan footmen pressed on
with such fanatical valour, that neither the guns firing
case nor the heavy fire of the infantry seemed able to stop
their rush. The situation became critical. However, the
arrival of further troops at the front and the steady fire
of the guns and infantry, which mowed down the Ghazis
by hundreds, finally broke their charge. The defeated
tribesmen moved along the hills to the west, where they
came under the fire of the heavy battery and, after an
engagement lasting just one hour, " cease fire " was
sounded.
The Account of the Battle given by Lieutenant Hamilton,
R.A. An interesting description of this battle by
Lieutenant P. F. P. Hamilton merits quotation: " Sir
Donald Stewart never expected the enemy to take the
initiative as they did, and it was for that reason that our
battery was ordered to take up a position at about 1500
yards, and not to open fire, but to wait for the infantry to
form line. . . . Hardly had we unlimbered and come into
action, than the mass of the enemy advanced boldly down,
and at a great pace, and we then discovered that they
formed the centre of a long line which was concealed by
the intervening nalas. Throwing forward their flanks,
and speedily assuming a semicircular shape, they pro-
ceeded to envelop us. You will see how quickly we have
132 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
to change our ranges. After we had been firing for about
five minutes, G/4 Field Battery galloped into action on
our left, and the two escort companies who also arrived
at this time, commenced firing very rapid volleys on
the left of G/4. Altogether twelve field guns were
making most excellent practice, and the two companies
were laying many low before them, but their advance
was in no way checked. . . . We were obliged to retire,
but after taking up their new position, the two batteries
soon cleared their front, and there was a ghastly pile
of dead heaped on the ground we had just left." This
account ends with the remark: " I only saw two Afghans
ask for mercy, and one cannot help admiring their reck-
less bravery; and the way, and order, in which they
advanced, deserved success 'V
The Afghan force, estimated at 15,000, consisted
mainly of Ghilzais, but there was also a large contingent
of Durranis from Zamindawar. They possessed but two
guns. The loss of the enemy was more than one thousand
killed. The British losses were negligible. Thus ended
the engagement of Ahmad Khel, in which British superior
armament and discipline overthrew the heroic Ghilzais
and Durranis, whose bravery, as Hamilton, declares,
merits the highest praise.
Resuming the march, Ghazni was reached on April 2 1 .
Here Stewart received orders to proceed to Kabul and
assume supreme command. While halting at Ghazni a
second tribal gathering was attacked and dispersed,
heavy losses being inflicted on the enemy.
Roberts despatches Supplies under an Escort to meet
Stewart. It had been arranged that Roberts should
despatch a convoy to meet the Kandahar force. This he
did on April 16 with a small column to serve as escort
under Major-General Ross. This column, while on
the march forty miles from Ghazni, on April 22, sighted
heliograph flashes on Shir Dahan, a pass 8300 feet in
height, and was able to open up communication with
1 Letters from Lieut. P. F. P, Hamilton, R.H. Artillery, and Lieut. E. O. F.
Hamilton, 2nd Queen*s Royal Regt., 1881. These letters were printed for private
circulation.
xxxix ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 133
Stewart by heliograph, which thus, for the first time,
proved its military value.
Roberts despatches two Columns to meet Stewart.
Roberts was informed that the Logaris of Charasia were
bitterly hostile to Abdur Rahman, and accordingly
despatched a second column 1200 strong under Colonel
Jenkins to prevent them from joining in an attack on
Ross as was their undoubted intention. Jenkins, on
reaching Charasia, reported that he was about to be
attacked by the Logaris under Muhammad Hasan Khan
in great force. Roberts thereupon immediately despatched
Brigadier-General Macpherson to the assistance of
Jenkins with another force of all arms of about the same
strength, while Brigadier-General Hugh Gough with the
Cavalry brigade took up a position half-way between
Kabul and Charasia. The event proved the wisdom of
these precautions. Macpherson, upon reaching the high
ground beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta gorge, saw that
Jenkins was being hard pressed by a force which had
formed a semicircle round his column. He promptly
attacked and scattered the Logaris.
Stewart's Arrival at Kabul. Stewart finally reached
Kabul on*May 2, and there is no doubt that the arrival
of his division and even more the crushing defeat of the
Ghilzais, followed by the punishment inflicted on other
tribes hostile to Abdur Rahman, effected more than any
other actions could have done to " make straight the
way " for the Sirdar.
A Liberal Government comes into Power. The arrival
at* Kabul of Stewart coincided with a change of Govern-
ment in Great Britain. Mr. Gladstone succeeded Lord
Beaconsfield as Prime Minister, while Lord Ripon was
appointed Viceroy of India, but did not actually assume
office until June.
The Decisions of Lord Lytton. At the end of April
1880, Lord Lytton laid down that the question of a
joint protectorate by Great Britain and Russia could not
be considered and that that Power had repeatedly
renewed the assurances solemnly given to the British
Government that " Russia considered Afghanistan to lie
i 3 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
entirely beyond the sphere of her influence ". As to the
Kandahar question, he stated that the objects of the
Second Afghan War were (a) to avenge the treacherous
massacre of the British Mission at Kabul, and ($) to
maintain the safeguards of the treaty of Gandamak by
the provision of more substantial guarantees. These
two objects had been attained; the first by the capture
of Kabul and the punishment of the crime; and the
second by the severance of the province of Kandahar.
He added that Shir AH Khan, the Wall of Kandahar,
had been recognised by the British Government as the
ruler of that province and would be maintained in this
position.
His Invitation to Abdur Rahman. With special
reference to Abdur Rahman's letter, Lord Lytton con-
sidered that the natural repugnance expressed by the
Sirdar to accept conditions which might make him appear
ungrateful to Russia " whose salt he had eaten ", did
him credit. He also laid down that neither the districts
ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any portion of
the Kandahar province would ever be restored to the ruler
of Kabul; and that the question of Herat had been
taken over by Her Majesty's Government, with whose
views the Government of India was not yet acquainted.
On the other hand the Sirdar was to be informed that
Kabul would be evacuated in October and that it was
desired to transfer to his authority the whole of the
country which would be evacuated. Finally, Abdur
Rahman was invited to proceed to Kabul and thus facili-
tate the arrangements for effecting the transfer bf
authority to him.
The Question of Herat. The question of the Herat
province may perhaps be suitably dealt with at this point.
Lord Salisbury, in the spring of 1879, recommended
making a rectification of the Perso-Afghan frontier one
of the conditions of peace, upon the conclusion of the
Second Afghan War by the Treaty of Gandamak.
The Persian Minister in London pressed for the
cession of Herat, but our representative at Tehran
pointed out that Persia's occupation of the province
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 135
would only open the door to Russia. He was not, how-
ever, opposed to the cession of Afghan Seistan, which the
Persian Government was also most anxious to secure.
The Government of India expressed their opinion that
these proposals would alienate the Kabul Government
and give offence, so far as the question of Herat was
concerned, to Russia.
The Foreign Office was, however, inclined to agree
to the above cessions, provided that the British should
insist upon the right of military occupation of Herat, in
case of certain eventualities; that a number of British
officers should also be employed in the garrison of Herat;
and finally, that the question of opening the Karun River
to navigation should be raised. In December 1879, ^ e
British Government, considering the disintegration of
Afghanistan certain, agreed to the Herat province being
ceded to Persia, subject to the above conditions. The
Shah accepted and expressed gratification but, in February
1880, under Russian influence, His Majesty refused to
accept Herat under any other conditions than of per-
manent occupation. As a result, this question, together
with that of handing over Afghan Seistan to Persia, was
dropped. *
Had this policy been carried out, the Afghans would
have been permanently estranged, while it was known
that Russia would have strongly resented any such cession
without her wishes being consulted. It is also clear that
Russian influence would have penetrated to the frontiers
of India.
The Second Letter of Abdur Rahman. Abdur Rahman,
as we have seen, had a very difficult game to play in view
of the turbulent, suspicious and fanatical people with
whom he had to justify each step he took. He thus desired
further information: What would be the boundaries of
his dominions? Would a European representative or a
British force remain in Afghanistan? What enemy of the
British would he be called upon to repel? And what
benefits would the British Government confer on him and
his country?
The Views of the Gladstone Government. At this
136 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
juncture the views of the new Government reached India.
It was pointed out that the sole result of two successful
campaigns was the dismemberment of a state which it
was in the interests of India to see strong, friendly and
independent. It was decided that Lytton's policy of dis-
integration was to be replaced by one of reconstruction,
which included the reversal of the scheme for separating
the province of Kandahar from Kabul. It was also
pointed out that the strategical value of Kandahar existed
only in connexion with a system of frontier defence, much
more extensive than any that was now required; that the
Wali could not maintain his position without British
financial and military assistance, and that finally the
financial burden of retaining the province with its ill-
defined boundaries would be intolerable. To give the
views, expressed by other authorities, Roberts had
declared that our grasp on Kandahar should never
be loosened, but Sir Garnet Wolseley considered that
although we were bound to occupy Kandahar if Russia
marched on Herat, no military advantage was secured
by its present retention.
Sir Lepel Griffin receives Abdur Rahman. To return
to Abdur Rahman, Roberts and Griffin, in view of his
proclamation in Badakhshan, entertained grave suspicions
of the honesty of the Sirdar. The Government of India,
however, ordered the negotiations to continue and, in
July, Abdur Rahman, whose following, according to his
autobiography, included about 300,000 Ghazis an im-
possible number to feed reached Kuhistan, one stage to
north of Kabul. Griffin held a formal durbar in this
district, at which Abdur Rahman was received with
honour. Griffin's report to Stewart ran: " Abdur Rah-
man Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and
rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face,
brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank, courteous
manner. The impression that he left on me and on the
officers who were present at the interview, was most
favourable: he kept thoroughly to the point under dis-
cussion, and his remarks were characterized by shrewdness
and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 137
to be on cordial terms with the British Government."
These negotiations ended in a letter from the British
proposing that a public announcement of his recognition
as Amir of Kabul should be made by them. To this
Abdur Rahman replied in a letter which ended: " I
accept from you and from the Viceroy of India, the
Amirship of Afghanistan ".
Abdur Rahman is proclaimed Amir of Kabul. At a
durbar held at Kabul on July 22, 1880, Sirdar Abdur
Rahman was formally acknowledged and recognized by
the British Government as Amir of Kabul. On the
following day the khutba was read in his name and the
Chief Kazi reviewing the whole course of British relations
with Afghanistan, eulogized their action in restoring a
Moslem ruler to a country, of which they were in military
possession.
The accession of Abdur Rahman, although, as we
have seen, it was opposed by a powerful party was,
generally speaking, hailed with enthusiasm, and helped
materially to quiet the widespread unrest prevailing in
the country. It also clearly demonstrated the sincerity
of the British Government.
The Memorandum of Obligation^ July 1880. The
new Amir was most anxious that the British Govern-
ment should negotiate a treaty with him, but this was
refused for the time being, on the grounds that his
position was not sufficiently consolidated. A Memo-
randum of Obligation was, however, granted, by the
terms of which, the British Government stated that it
h^,d no desire to interfere in the internal government of
Afghanistan, nor to appoint a British Resident, but that,
under agreement, it would appoint a Moslem Agent.
It laid down that, since both Russia and Persia were
pleased to abstain from all interference with the affairs
of Afghanistan, it was obvious that the Amir could have
no political relations with any foreign Power, except with
the British Government. Finally, to quote from the
document: " If any foreign Power should attempt to
interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should
lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your
138 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XXXIX
Highness, in that event the British Government would
be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner
as may appear to the British Government necessary in
repelling it, provided that your Highness follows un-
reservedly the advice of the British Government in regard
to your external relations ". Financial assistance was, at
first, given to the extent of 20 lakhs l of rupees.
The Evacuation of Afghanistan by the British Army.
Arrangements had been made for the British army to
evacuate Afghanistan by the Khaibar Pass and the
Kurram Valley when, on July 28, news reached Kabul of
the crushing defeat by Ayub Khan of a British force at
Maiwand. Before, however, dealing with this disaster,
which was met by the despatch southward of a strong
column under Roberts on August 8, it is to be noted
that the Amir occupied Kabul on August 1 1 , and that
the British troops under Stewart marched back to India
without a single shot being fired at them. Amir Abdur
Rahman Khan was left to make good his position at
Kabul.
The Mistaken Policy of Ayub Khan. Looking back on
the courageous initiative displayed by Abdur Rahman,
who was only supported by a handful of followers, it
is clear that Ayub Khan, who governed Herat with
a powerful force supported by modern artillery, held
practically all the cards and should have attacked his only
rival as soon as he crossed the Oxus. He would surely
have defeated him and, in view of British anxiety to
evacuate Afghanistan, he would have been able to make
terms and be acknowledged as Amir, Instead of taking
this obvious step, Ayub attacked the British, by whom
he was finally defeated and driven into exile. He
played his very strong hand extremely badly.
1 A lakh of rupees was worth about 8250 at this period.
CHAPTER XL
THE BATTLES OF MAIWAND AND KANDAHAR
I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Ayub Khan's army, who was
present at the time, that a party of the 66th regiment, which he estimated at
one hundred officers and men, made a most determined stand. They were
surrounded by the whole of the Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven
men were left, inflicting enormous losses. These eleven men charged out of
the garden, and died, fighting to the death. From the Report of GENERAL
PRIMROSE, dated Oct. i, 1880.
Ayub Khans Intention to attack Kandahar. Before
dealing with the attack made on Kandahar by Ayub
Khan in the summer of 1880, it is desirable to give some
account of the circumstances which led up to it. 1
Early in 1879, when his brother Yakub Khan
succeeded his father, Ayub was appointed Governor of
Herat. He was an exile in Persia at this period, having
taken refuge with the Shah some five years previously,
when his brother had been imprisoned by Shir All.
Established at Herat, Ayub carried on constant intrigues
with the Shah, who, as mentioned in the last chapter,
was employing every possible means to secure the pro-
vince of Herat and also Afghan Seistan. In November
1879 th e British Minister at Tehran was shown a tele-
gfam sent to the Persian Foreign Secretary in which
Ayub declared his determination to proclaim jihad and
to march on Kandahar. However, mutinies and a fight
between the Kabuli and Herati regiments delayed matters,
but the Kabuli troops were anxious to return home, while
many of his chief advisers were connected with Kandahar,
and were equally anxious to return to that city as
1 I have consulted The Second Afghan War (official account); The Second Afghan
War> by Colonel H. B. Hanna, 1810; " E/B R.H.A. at Maiwand ", by Captain H. B.
Latham (Journal of the Royal Artillery , vol. Iv, No. 3, Oct. 1928); The Royal Berkshire
Regiment, by F. Loraine Petre. Major Lynch, the last surviving officer of the 66th,
has given me an especially vivid account of the battle, from which I am quoting.
139
1 40 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
conquerors. The unjustifiable departure of Stewart's
division from Kandahar in April exposed the military
weakness of the British, and was probably the deciding
factor for Ayub and his advisers.
The March of the Wali to Girishk. Upon hearing of
Ayub's departure from Herat, Shir Ali marched his army,
which consisted of 2000 infantry, 1000 cavalry and
6 smooth-bore guns, to Girishk, situated on the right
bank of the Helmand. There, realizing the danger of
his force deserting to the enemy, he appealed for support
to the Government of India, and this it was decided to
afford him.
The Military Position at Kandahar. The military
position at Kandahar was unsatisfactory. Lieutenant-
General J. M. Primrose, who assumed command in
Southern Afghanistan after the departure of Stewart, had
long lines of communication which were constantly being
attacked. He also had a detachment, 1000 strong, at
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, which should have reinforced Kandahar.
So difficult was the position in Baluchistan that the only
reinforcement which reached Kandahar was a single
Bombay regiment. The total of the force at this city was
under 5000 men. *
The news of the advance of Ayub Khan spread like
wildfire; ominous reports of the assembling of large
bodies of Ghazis were received, while the Wait 3 troops
were mutinous. Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows was
accordingly ordered by Primrose to march his brigade to
the Helmand. His force consisted of the 66th regiment,
500 strong, native infantry, 1300 strong, with a battely
of the Royal Horse Artillery and some 600 cavalry. The
total of all ranks was 2500.
Burrows left Kandahar on July 4, and upon reaching
the Helmand a week later, camped opposite Girishk. It
was hoped that the despatch of a British brigade to the
Helmand would not only steady the Wall's force but
would check the progress of Ayub Khan, since it might
lead to the Kabuli troops breaking up and making for
their homes. The alternative of awaiting the enemy at
Kandahar would have allowed Ayub Khan to avoid that
XL MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR 141
city and strike at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and at Ghazni. The
effect of such inaction would, consequently, have been
damaging to the political and military situation. The
Government of India practically decided that Ayub must
be attacked.
The Army of the Wali deserts to Ayub Khan. The
troops of the Wali^ who had been mutinous for some
time, deserted in a body to the enemy on July 1 1, taking
with them their guns and ammunition. The cavalry alone
remained loyal until it had escorted the Governor and his
treasure to the British camp, but the force then broke
up and made off towards Kandahar. The British mounted
troops pursued the main body of the mutineers and, in
spite of the difficult terrain, captured their guns and a
quantity of ammunition. The captured battery consisted
of four 6-pdr. smooth-bore guns and two 12-pdr.
howitzers. These guns were taken over by a detachment
of the 66th regiment, which had been previously trained
in gun drill. Unfortunately the supply of ammunition
was small.
The British retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud. This mutiny
completely altered the military and political situation.
The Helijiand was now fordable everywhere ; behind the
British force was a desert twenty-five miles wide, while
supplies were difficult to procure. Consequently it was
decided to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, which directly
covered Kandahar from the Girishk direction, but not
from a northerly route via Maiwand. It was a fertile
centre.
Unreliable Information as to Ayub's Movements. The
movements of Ayub's main body were not known with
any accuracy, and Colonel St. John, the political officer,
urged Burrows to march on Maiwand, assuring him that
he would anticipate Ayub's army by at least a day. Since
Maiwand was a stage nearer to Kandahar, Burrows decided
to act on this information.
The British Troops march on Maiwand. On July 26
the troops spent the night in breaking up their standing
camp. Consequently it was a tired force which marched
off early on the following day encumbered by an un-
142 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
wieldy baggage column which absorbed a guard of 200
infantry.
At 10 A.M., when the troops halted for an hour near
a supply of water, it was reported by a spy that Ayub had
already occupied Maiwand evidently with his advance-
guard. He had thus outmanoeuvred Burrows and was
marching across his front when the two forces met.
Ayub now held the shortest route to Kandahar. Burrows
therefore decided to attack him and gave the order to
advance. The heat was very trying to all ranks and the
men had not breakfasted before starting.
The Strength of the Two Forces. Before describing the
action, it is desirable to give some estimate of the army
commanded by Ayub. His regular troops consisted of
nine regiments aggregating 4000 men; his cavalry was
3000 strong, and his artillery consisted of four field
batteries and one mule battery with a total of 30 guns.
Six of these guns were rifled Armstrong guns of superior
range and weight to any on the British side. But, as was
always the case in Afghanistan, the warlike tribesmen,
many of whom were Ghazis, provided a large number of
superb fighting men. The total of Ayub's army was
estimated at 25,000. Against this formidable force
Burrows was only able to oppose some 2000 men and
1 2 guns, six of which were smooth-bored 6-pdrs., manned
by a partially trained detachment with a totally in-
adequate supply of ammunition.
The Battle of Maiwand, July 27. The cavalry gained
contact with the enemy shortly after passing the village of
Mahmudabad, and was supported by two guns on the
right and the left. The main body passed through
Mahmudabad (where the baggage was parked), and was
deployed in rear of the advance guard, which was already
engaged. In front of it at a distance of some six hundred
yards was a dry nullah 15 to 20 feet deep which was held
by Ghazis throughout the action; and large masses of
the enemy were reported by the cavalry as stretching in a
wide semicircle to the front.
The Artillery Duel. The action commenced with an
artillery duel, in which Ayub's guns outmatched the
MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR 143
British. The Afghan regular infantry was in the centre,
but the still more formidable Ghazis working down the
nullah under cover threatened the British right, while
swarms of Afghan horsemen threatened the left rear and
the baggage. The Indian cavalry was thus obliged to
remain under artillery fire to check the Afghan horsemen,
who pressed round both flanks.
To quote Lieutenant T. F. T. Fowle: " Their
artillery was extremely well served; their guns took ours
in flank as well as directly, and their fire was concentrated.
We were completely outmatched, and although we con-
tinued to fire steadily, our guns seemed quite unable to
silence theirs. Their six Armstrong guns threw heavier
shell than ours. . . . They continued to advance, over-
lapping us on both flanks."
The Advance of the Afghans. Taking advantage of
their superior artillery, the Afghans, using the nullah
referred to above, pushed up their guns to within 500
yards of the British line, while the regular infantry and
masses of Ghazis planted their standards within 700
yards of the 66th. The smooth-bore guns, whose
ammunition was exhausted, owing to the absence of
ammunition carriages, were withdrawn, pending the
arrival of a fresh supply.
At this period the infantry fired steadily with good
effect, but the enemy were in such overwhelming numbers
and outflanked the British so completely that the force
was practically surrounded. Realizing the desperate
position of the British, the Ghazis now charged from the
nullah diagonally across the front of the British right.
The attack first struck the two companies of Jacob's
Rifles on the left, who had suffered heavily, had lost their
only British officer, and were probably discouraged by
the loss of artillery support. They broke and fell back to
their right on the Bombay Grenadiers, who had also
suffered severely, and who also broke. The 66th, who
had been protected by a fold in the ground from the
Afghan shells, fired steadily on the Ghazis, inflicting severe
losses, and were still in line when they were struck in
rear by the retreating mass of native infantry. Their
H4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
impact upset the line of the 66th and the confused mass
divided up into two separate bodies. The right section,
which included the 66th, who kept in groups, retreated
towards Khig, while the left section made for Mahmuda-
bad. Burrows had ordered the cavalry to charge, but
they had pulled up and retired.
The 66th at Bay. The 66th, which had retreated on
Khig, held fast until there remained but a group 100
strong. This band fell back to a walled garden to the
south of Khig. There a second stand was made under
heavy artillery fire. Finally the last eleven survivors
charged out of the garden and, standing back to back,
fought to the death.
On fame's eternal camping-ground their silent tents are spread,
And glory guards with solemn round the bivouac of the dead. 1
The Account given by Major Lynch. Before quitting
the subject of this battle, I would mention that I have
been especially privileged to discuss it with Major
Hyacinth Lynch, the last surviving officer of the gallant
66th. I now quote from his vivid description: " The
enemy's Cavalry got ready to charge us early in the
fight and very formidable they looked, well mounted.
We prepared for Cavalry in the usual way and, when they
were quite near, McMath gave them a volley; this
brought down many horses and riders and in the con-
fusion we commenced individual firing into them. Some
of the Cavalry came up to us but their shock action was
gone and broken and there was no speed on them. The
horses did not like the bayonets. Our men stuck the
riders and horses as they brushed against the bayonets
and I could see them riding from our left to right pushing
the bayonets to one side. They did not charge us again. "
Of the last phase of the action he writes: " Crossing
the watercourses now dry (the water had been turned off)
after being wounded, I arrived at a garden where our
men were making a stand behind thick mud walls.
While there, the artillery was hammering us, a large
portion of a wall in front collapsed and I could see the
1 This couplet is engraved on the war memorial at Dornoch.
MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR 145
Ghazis advancing with flags and their long knives
glistening in the afternoon sun. While lying on the
ground and feeling very bad, the last of the 4 Guns E/B
R.H.A. passed near me, retiring. Captain Slade saw me,
halted the gun and had me placed on the near axletree
seat. I remember that the gun was so hot from firing
that I could not touch it with my boots. "
The Retreat. The fire of the British horse artillery
during the last phase of the battle inflicted heavy losses
on the enemy. Two guns were captured, but the other
four came into action repeatedly to cover the retreat of
the survivors of the disaster.
Fortunately the pursuit was not pressed hard, the
Afghans turning their attention to the congenial task of
looting the baggage train. To quote from Slade: " All
over the wide expanse of the desert are to be seen men
in twos and threes retreating. . . . The guns and carriages
are crowded with helpless wounded officers and men
suffering the tortures of the damned. ... At last the river
is reached; it is 11 A.M. and thirty-two miles from the
battlefield."
Here Burrows reorganized his force which sighted a
relief colujnn advancing towards the retreating brigade,
whose losses were practically one-half of its strength.
Summary. Studying this action, more than half a
century later, it would appear that the responsibility for
the disaster lay principally with the Indian authorities.
They were aware or should have been aware that Ayub
possessed a powerful artillery, but yet permitted Stewart
to -march north and left the Kandahar force miserably
weak in this respect. At Ahmad Khel the situation of
Stewart's division was critical for a time, although the
Afghans possessed only two guns. With this recent
experience, it was surely unwise to match a weak brigade
against Ayub's overwhelming numbers and overpowering
artillery. Moreover, we learn that Burrows repeatedly
asked Primrose for reinforcements, which were refused
unjustifiably so in my opinion. Burrows was practically
ordered to attack an overwhelming force, supported by
a vastly superior artillery. On the field of battle he made
VOL. II L
146 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP,
the most of his force, which had no reserve, and in the
retreat his gallantry and determination were noteworthy.
The disaster certainly brought out the heroism dis-
played by the 66th regiment. It reminds us vividly of
Leonidas and his Spartans at Thermopylae, who charged
the myriads of Persia and fought to the death :
Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell
That here, obeying her behests, we fell.
The Siege of Kandahar. As a result of the Maiwand
disaster, the cantonment situated a mile to the west of
the city was hastily evacuated. The garrison, some 3000
strong, now occupied the city which, with its thick walls
of rammed clay and its gates covered by bastions, was
speedily made impregnable to any attack by Ayub Khan,
more especially after the expulsion of the entire Pathan
population, some 15,000 in number. Outside buildings
that could give cover were gradually demolished, trees
were felled, and a wire entanglement was constructed
round the walls.
Ayub Khan marches to Kandahar. On August 5
the vanguard of Ayub's army reached the outskirts of
Kandahar and, two days later, the entire force was con-
centrated in a position near Old Kandahar to the west.
An intermittent cannonade, which did little harm, was
not followed up by an attack on the city.
A Sortie from Kandahar. On August 15 an un-
successful attack on the village of Deh Khoja was made
from the Kabul Gate. This useless operation ended in
heavy losses, including the death of Brigadier-General
Brooke.
The Afghans take up a Position behind the Bab a Wall
Kotal. On August 24 the Afghans were seen to have
broken up their camp. They had heard of the approach
of a powerful British force and of the proclamation of
Abdur Rahman as Amir. A reconnaissance proved that
they had taken up a position behind the Baba Wali Kotal
and probably intended to fight the relieving force. Three
days later communication with it was established.
The March of Sir Frederick Roberts. Upon hearing
XL MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR 147
the news of the Maiwand disaster it was decided to
despatch a powerful column from Kabul under the com-
mand of Roberts and, on August 8, it started off south-
wards. The fact that Stewart had recently followed the
same route and had inflicted a severe defeat on the
Ghilzais lessened the chances of opposition, while the
strong support of the Amir, who wrote letters to all
the chiefs and sent his officials ahead to collect supplies,
was of the greatest value.
The march was uneventful. At Ghazni the Governor
presented the keys of the city to Roberts, On August 1 7
he received a letter from Colonel Tanner, who was com-
manding at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, dated August 12. In it he
reported that the Kandahar garrison on August 8 had
two months' rations and fifteen days' forage in hand.
Arriving at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, where supplies in abundance
had been laid in, the force rested for a day. Roberts
decided to add its garrison of 1000 men with 2 guns to
his force.
Upon reaching Tirandaz, thirty-one miles from Kalat-
i-Ghilzai, on August 26, information was received from
Kandahar that Ayub had retired to the Baba Wali Kotal,
where he was entrenching. On August 28 the column
reached Kobat, some nineteen miles from Kandahar.
There it was decided to halt a day and to make two
short marches into Kandahar. The men and animals
were fatigued and sore-footed but the health of the force
was excellent. St. John and the Assistant Quarter-
Master-General met Roberts at Robat. He also received
a letter from Major-General R. Phayre, who reported
that his force, marching via Quetta, could not reach
Kandahar before September 8.
The Relief of Kandahar. On the last day of August
Roberts relieved Kandahar. His force had marched
313 miles in twenty-two days. The relieving column was
given a subdued welcome. Indeed Roberts commented
severely on the loss of moral displayed by the greater part
of the garrison. He camped to the west of the city with
his right on the deserted cantonment and his left touch-
ing Old Kandahar.
i 4 8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
A Reconnaissance. On the day of his arrival at
Kandahar, Roberts sent out a reconnaissance towards
the high ground to the north-west, immediately above
the villages of Gundigan and Murghan. There the
infantry and guns were halted, while the cavalry, avoid-
ing the numerous walled gardens, penetrated to the village
of Pir Paimal situated at the north-west corner of the
Baba Wali range. As soon as the fire of the enemy had
been drawn, the cavalry retired. But the Afghans
immediately advanced in considerable numbers and
pressed the retiring force, so much so that the whole of
the 3rd Brigade fell in to support it.
The Decision to attack the Afghan Left. Roberts had
satisfied himself that any attempt to carry the rugged
Baba Wali Kotal by assault would involve heavy losses,
and he thereupon decided to threaten that position and
to concentrate his real attack on the Afghan left, which
occupied the village and walled gardens of Pir Paimal.
His force consisted of 3800 British and 11,000 Indian
troops with 36 guns. The total of the Afghan force was
probably less. The 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was to
make the demonstration against the Baba Wali range,
formed up on the right behind the low hills which
covered the British camp, while the ist and 2nd Brigades,
which were to make the main attack, were stationed on
the left. The cavalry under Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough, with horse artillery, formed up in rear of the left
with instructions to work round by Gundigan so as to
threaten the rear of Ayub's force and endanger its
retreat towards the Helmand. The Kandahar foi?ce
constituted a strong reserve.
The Battle of Kandahar. At 9 A.M. fire was opened
with the 45 pdrs. on the Kotal^ which was held in great
strength by Ghazis. This feint having been successful
in attracting the attention of the enemy, the 92nd High-
landers and the 2nd Gurkhas carried the village of Mulla
Sahibdad where the Ghazis resisted desperately. The
enemy, holding Gundi Mulla and Gundigan, now fell
back on the position at Pir Paimal, from which the
advancing troops speedily drove them.
XL MAI WAND AND KANDAHAR 149
To quote Roberts: " During the early part of the
advance the Afghans collected in great strength on the
low hills beneath the Baba Wali Kotal, evidently pre-
paring for a rush on our guns; their leaders could be
seen urging them on, and a portion of them came down
the hill, but the main body apparently refused to follow,
and remained on the crest until the position was turned,
when they at once retreated 'V
The capture of Pir Paimal opened the way to the
strongly entrenched main position and here I quote from
Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir George) White:
" The enemy occupied a position in front of their camp;
a long ditch afforded a good natural entrenchment; on
the enemy's left of this ditch his position was prolonged
by a commanding knoll, which enfiladed a ditch running
up to the position. . . . Behind the ditch was a small
square enclosure in which there were a considerable
number of the enemy. Two of their guns were just to
the left of it. ... I worked the men up to a charge
which they executed in fine style. About five or six men
were killed crossing the open, but I had the satisfaction
of seizing the guns and Ayab's last position/' 2 On the
extreme jpft, another charge by the 3rd Sikhs broke up a
band of Afghans, who had gathered round three guns.
The Flight of the Afghans. The defeated Afghan
army quickly disappeared into the gardens and orchards,
leaving to the victors their thirty guns, together with
the two guns belonging to the Royal Horse Artillery
which had been taken at Maiwand. The amazing
rapidity of their retreat and the cover afforded by the
walled orchards and villages prevented heavy losses being
inflicted on the defeated enemy by the pursuing cavalry.
The total casualties of the British force were 35 killed
and 213 wounded, while that of the Afghans was
estimated at about 1200 killed.
Thus ended the battle of Kandahar which fully
avenged Maiwand and relieved Kandahar. In view of
1 Op. cit. vol. ii, pp. 365-368. There is a pen and ink sketch of the battle-field
opposite p. 368.
2 Life of Field-Marshal Sir George White^ by Sir Mortimer Durand, vol. i, p. 261.
150 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP. XL
the great strength of the force under the command of
Roberts, the fact that the Afghan losses at Maiwand had
been severe and that only one-third of the tribesmen were
armed with firearms, the victory was, humanly speaking,
certain. Ayub Khan must have realized that he could
not possibly defeat a force that was four times more
powerful than that which he had beaten at Maiwand
after suffering heavy losses among his own men, and we
may justly pay a tribute to the courage of the Afghans
who made such a determined stand against the war-
hardened British troops led by Roberts.
The March of Major-General Phayre. A brief account
of the column which marched to the relief of Kandahar
via Quetta is now called for. The news of the Maiwand
disaster threw the whole country from Sibi to Chaman
into a state of hostile turmoil. Phayre, who was in
command of the Southern Afghan Field Force, organized
a strong column and advanced in the face of constant
attacks on his lines of communication; he also suffered
from transport difficulties. Finally, when about a long
march from the beleaguered city, he heard of the victory
gained by Roberts and was instructed to station his troops
wherever water and supplies were procurable. % Although
his force was disappointed in their hopes of relieving
Kandahar, its appearance on the scene undoubtedly
strengthened the British position in Southern Afghanistan.
Summary. To conclude, that great soldier Roberts
had successfully accomplished his double task of avenging
Maiwand and of relieving Kandahar. British honour was
vindicated and British prestige, that invaluable asset of
Empire, was restored, and on that note the Second
Afghan War, by which Russian intrigues had been
defeated and a strong ruler set on the throne of Afghani-
stan, was brought to a successful conclusion*
CHAPTER XLI
ABDUR RAHMAN IS ACKNOWLEDGED AMIR OF
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS DEPENDENCIES
My Lords, the Key of India is not Herat or Kandahar. The Key of India
is London. DISRAELI.
The Position of Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul.
Thanks to his invaluable autobiography, we can learn
much as to how the Amir viewed the position of affairs
after the departure of the British, He writes: " On my
succeeding to the throne, and after the departure of the
English from Kabul, I placed my foot in the stirrup of
progress and administration. , . . The country exhibit-
ing a rebellious spirit, I appointed private detectives and
spies to report to me all that went on among the people,
thus finding out with abundant proofs those who were
loyal ancl friendly. . . . The ringleaders and worst
offenders were the fanatical mullas and headstrong chiefs,
who had been partisans of the late Shir Ali's family. . . .
These were treated according to their actions, some of
them being banished from the country, while others
suffered the worst fate of all for their misdeeds/' He
then pointed out two things: " There was firstly, no
money to pay the army or for any other Government
expenditure ; and secondly, there were no arms, ammuni-
tion or military stores ". To quote again: " I have said
before that when I first succeeded to the throne of Kabul,
my life was not a bed of roses. On the contrary, I was
surrounded by difficulties of all kinds. Here began my
first severe fight, against my own relatives, my own
subjects, and my own people. I had hardly settled down
in Kabul, and had had no time for military preparations,
when I found myself obliged to go to war/'
152
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
The First Letter of Lord Ripon to the Atpir. On
September 10, 1880, Lord Ripon wrote to the Amir to
inform him of the victory of Lord Roberts at Kandahar
and to congratulate him on the success with which he
was consolidating his position at Kabul. This letter was
the first to be written by the Viceroy to the Amir. It was
reported that the Amir was intensely gratified at receiving
it, and had said that " so long as no letter came to him
from the Viceroy, it was to be surmised that there was a
screen of estrangement isolating him from his Ex-
cellency ". This recognition of his standing as an
important ruler strengthened his position considerably,
and he immediately wrote to Tashkent and instructed his
family to rejoin him at Kabul.
Negotiations for placing the Province of Kandahar under
the Amir. The mutiny of the Walts troops at Girishk
constituted a suitable peg on which to hang the change
of policy prescribed by the Gladstone Government in
June 1 880. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. (later Sir Alfred)
Lyall, visited Kandahar and reported that since the Wall
had not been asked to resume the Government of the
country after the defeat of Ayub, it was clear that the
situation had to be considered anew. The Wall finally
accepted the offer of a liberal pension with gratitude and,
leaving Afghanistan, settled in India.
The ground having thus been cleared to some extent,
negotiations were opened with a view to handing over
the province to Abdur Rahman. They were not as easy
as might have been expected. Abdur Rahman asked for
a personal interview with the Viceroy, which was not
granted, much to his disappointment. Again, the envoy
whom he sent to India had no authority, except to take
over supplies of arms and ammunition, which had been
granted to him. As he aptly put it: " On the one hand,
I considered the position in which I should be placed by
accepting the city, a very serious one. I knew that Ayub
was ready to attack the city immediately, without giving
me any time for preparation for its defence. . . . On the
other hand, the Kingdom of Kabul without Kandahar,
was like a head without a nose, or a fort without any
ABDUR RAHMAN 153
gate." After much correspondence in which he pressed
for more money and more munitions, in March 1881,
Abdur Rahman practically intimated to the Viceroy his
acceptance of the province. Later, he received the
additional gift of three batteries of artillery and of a
number of rifles, together with a temporary grant of
50,000 rupees -per mensem.
The Position ofAyub Khan. After his severe defeat by
Roberts, Ayub retired to Herat. In February 1881 two
envoys were despatched by him to Kandahar.^ They
represented that the Sirdar accepted the deposition of
Yakub Khan, and considered himself his lawful successor,
but that he would submit to the wishes of the British
Government. No answer was given at first to the envoys,
but on March 2 1 St. John informed them of the Amir's
acceptance of Kandahar; and the envoys departed, with
the advice to recommend Ayub to make terms with him.
Abdur Rahman occupies Kandahar. In due course
more than one hundred letters addressed by the Amir to
Sirdars^ to Government officials and to leading mullas and
merchants, were received at Kandahar. Troops followed
and, on April 21, 1881, at noon, the British flag was
hauled dywn under a salute of thirty-one guns. The
transfer of authority to the Government of the Amir was
quiet and orderly and, by April 27, all British troops had
quitted Afghan soil.
Ayub Khan again attacks Kandahar \ July 1881. The
Amir, as he had anticipated, was not allowed to hold
Kandahar without a struggle. To quote his autobiog-
raphy: " He [Ayub] possessed better war materials and
arms, and, above all, the ignorant mullas had proclaimed
jihad against me. They alleged that I was friendly to
the English, and that my rival was the Ghazi" ^
In the event, the two armies met near Girishk on
July 20. Ayub's cavalry fled but about eighty heads and
Chiefs of Ayub's army were left on the field, who, making
a desperate charge, broke the army of Abdur Rahman,
which fled. On August 7, Ayub Khan announced his
occupation of the city in a letter to St. John, who recom-
mended that he should be recognized as the de facto
154 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
ruler of the province. The Government of India, how-
ever, wisely awaited further developments.
The Amir defeats Ayub Khan y September 22, 1881.
The Amir acted with vigour and decision. Marching
from Kabul at the head of his army, a battle was fought
under the walls of Kandahar. To quote: " For two
whole hours the fighting was very severe, and it was not
known with whom was the victory. . . . My army was
beginning to fall back a little on its right and left, but
the main force in the centre was working well under the
encouragement I gave it by my presence. At this
moment, when I had pushed well forward, Ayub's forces
began to show signs of weakness, and these four regiments
of my own infantry, which had submitted to Ayub at
the time of their former defeat at Girishk, changed their
mind. It had been the usual custom of the trained soldiers
before my reign began that the moment they saw one
party stronger than the other, they left the weak and
joined the strong. These four regiments therefore,
seeing that the victory was turning in my direction, at
once fired at that body of Ayub's army, which was fighting
hard with my forces."
Ayub Khan was utterly routed and, for tjie second
time, lost his guns and camp equipage at Kandahar. To
quote again: " One of the priests who had accused me
of infidelity had hidden himself under the Prophet's
robe. 1 I ordered that an impure-minded dog such as
he should not remain in that sacred sanctuary; he was
accordingly pulled out of the building, and I killed him
with my own hands." Did not Lyall write
And they eye me askance, the Mullahs, the bigots who preach and pray,
Who followed my march with curses till I scattered Ayub that day;
They trusted in texts and forgot that the chooser of Kings is the sword;
There are twenty now silent and stark, for I showed them the ways of
the Lord.
The Capture of Herat. The Amir had realized that
Herat was very weakly held in the absence of Ayub,
and had ordered one of his adherents, Abdul Kuddus
1 This khirka, or robe, kept in a room, afforded bast or sanctuary to any criminal or
refugee.
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN
XLI ABDUR RAHMAN 155
Khan, to occupy it. This was effected without much
difficulty, the Herat troops submitting when led out
to fight his troops. Abdur Rahman thus became undis-
puted ruler of Afghanistan with the exception of the tiny
Uzbeg state of Maimena, which was occupied later on.
The Final Settlement of Ayub Khan in India. After
his defeat, Ayub Khan, accompanied by several influential
Sirdars and followers, reached Meshed in January 1882.
He was granted an allowance by the Shah on condition
that he should not live in any of the districts bordering
Afghanistan. This did not suit his plans for fomenting
troubles in that country, and for some years he continued
to behave in an unreasonable manner, which caused both
the British and Persian Governments much trouble. At
the end of August 1887 he suddenly fled from Tehran,
where he had been residing for some time, and made a
bold but unsuccessful attempt to reach Herat. He was
pursued by Afghan cavalry and, after remaining in close
hiding, finally surrendered to the British Consul-General
at Meshed. There, after much bargaining as to allow-
ances, the entire party, aggregating 814 officers, soldiers,
women, children and servants, were sent across Persia
and r^ac^ed Rawalpindi in the early summer of 1888.
At that military centre I recollect seeing Ayub Khan and
being struck by his virile hawklike features; also, when
I was Consul-General in Khurasan some years later, the
older members of the staff had much to say about Ayub
Khan and the trouble he gave them.
The Question of Sibi and Peshin. Before concluding
this chapter, it is desirable to refer briefly to the arrange-
ments made for Sibi, which is a continuation of the Kutchi
Plain and is detached from the country under Afghan
rule. Similarly Peshin is geographically part of Quetta,
being cut off from the Kandahar province by the Khojak
range.
We owe to the statesmanlike foresight of Sir Robert
Sandeman, that great Warden of the Marches, the pro-
posal made in January 1879 that these two districts
should be separated from Afghanistan. The Foreign
Secretary, at this period, informed Cavagnari that Sibi
156 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
and Peshin should be excluded from the Amir's authority,
but Yakub Khan strongly opposed this resolve, with the
result that, as mentioned in Chapter XXXVIII, it was
agreed to treat the two districts as " assigned " districts.
The Government of India had urged the Secretary of
State to agree that the retention of Sibi and Peshin should
be included among the provisions of the Treaty of
Gandamak. In 1880, however, the British Government
decided against the retention of Peshin, but, in the follow-
ing year, their relinquishment was ordered to be post-
poned. Finally, convinced by the strong arguments of
the Government of India, in 1887 it was decided to
incorporate the two districts within the Indian Empire.
Today Sibi and Peshin are recognized as being of
importance in the frontier defences of the Indian Empire.
The Results of the Second Afghan War. The evacua-
tion of Kandahar, followed by the overthrow of Ayub
and its occupation by Abdur Rahman, closed a period
and affords an opportunity for summarizing the results
of the Second Afghan War.
The Khaibar Pass, that great highway from India
to Kabul, had been taken over and the tribesmen enlisted
as road guards. Unfortunately, however, in tjje Qpinion
of many frontier officers, we did not retain Dakka and the
whole of the Mohmand country. The division of this
turbulent tribe between India and Afghanistan has caused
many expeditions with their attendant loss of life and
property which might have been obviated, had the above
arrangement been made. Further south, the British re-
tained the Kurram Valley, which constituted an important
alternative route into Afghanistan, while the loyalty of
the Turis, who were Shias and were thus hated by their
fanatical Sunni neighbours, was assured. Of far greater
importance was the occupation of Quetta, with the
districts of Peshin and Sibi, which constitutes one of the
strongest strategical positions in Asia. Communications
were rapidly improved and, before very long, not only
did the railway reach Quetta by two different routes, but
the Khojak range was pierced and the railway extended
to New Chaman, thus placing Kandahar, which would
ABDUR RAHMAN 157
have to be occupied in case of an invasion of India from
the north, within a few easy marches over a level plain.
A Tribute to Abdur Rahman. Studying the question
some fifty years after these dramatic events, it strikes me
that Abdur Rahman should have been given more time
and greater financial assistance to organize and equip his
army before being pressed to take over Kandahar, more
especially in view of the fact that Ayub had considerable
influence and was a doughty warrior. Had Ayub Khan
defeated his rival at Kandahar, Afghanistan would, once
again, have been thrown into a state of anarchy. That he
did not do so, represents the greatness of our debt to
grim Abdur Rahman. Thanks to his services, Afghani-
stan was reunited into a kingdom under a resolute ruler
who, if not always friendly to the British, at any rate
realized that it would be folly to turn to Russia. The facts
of the changed situation were recognized by the order or
the Viceroy that Abdur Rahman should thenceforth be
styled the " Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies ".
CHAPTER XLII
THE PANJDEH CRISIS AND THE RUSSOAFGHAN
BOUNDARY COMMISSION
Whose was the provocation is a matter of the utmost consequence. We
only know that the attack was a Russian attack. We know that the Afghans
suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute. We know that a blow was struck at
the credit and the authority of a sovereign our protected ally who had
committed no offence. All I say is, we cannot in that state of affairs close this
book and say " We will look into it no more ". We must do our best to have
right done in the matter. GLADSTONE.
The Anxiety of the Amir about his Northern Frontier.
The relations of the Government of India with Abdur
Rahman, whose demands for munitions and money
seemed to be insatiable, became difficult from time to
time. However, due allowances were made for him, and
the appointment of an Afghan Envoy at Calcutta and of a
British Agent at Kabul somewhat eased the situation.
The Amir had, to some extent, restored law ancf order
in Afghanistan, but only by stationing his troops at
various centres; and he had no force available for the
protection of his frontiers. As he wrote to the Viceroy
in October 1882: " I think it high time to have the
question of my boundaries settled with such a powerful
enemy as Russia, through the good offices of the British
Government. . . . The troops I have collected serve only
like the officials of a police force in their respective cities
and are engaged in guarding their own countrymen. . . .
Should I augment the army, where is the money to come
from to defray its expenses? And if I do not augment it,
how will the frontiers be put in order? My affairs are
hanging by a fine gossamer thread, which cannot sup-
port a heavy weight. "
Ripon postponed sending an immediate reply to this
letter but, in February 1883, he renewed the assurance
158
CHAP.XLII THE PANJDEH CRISIS 159
given in July 1 8 80, against unprovoked foreign aggression,
to which communication the Amir responded in an
effusively grateful manner, stating that he had now
obtained the assurances he desired. It is quite likely that
he had not kept the letter addressed to him in July 1 880!
The Grant of an Annual Subsidy. In February 1883
the Amir marched to Jalalabad with a large force and
asked his envoy to arrange an interview with the British
authorities. He wished to negotiate a treaty, thus resum-
ing a project, which he had taken up two years previously
and had subsequently dropped. A misunderstanding,
caused by his envoy carelessly omitting to forward the
reply of the Viceroy to this request, created much sore
feeling. However, the grant of twelve lakhs of rupees
annually, which was made to Abdur Rahman for the
payment of his troops and the defence of his frontier,
effectually cured his resentment.
The Views of Lord Ripon. Ripon realized that if the
Amir was unable to maintain peace on his borders before
the Russian and Afghan boundaries became contermin-
ous, the position would be critical, and that such a situation
might arise at any time. He considered that a treaty with
Russia was preferable, and that the grant of a subsidy
was only necessitated by the refusal of the British Govern-
ment to entertain the proposal.
In his letter to Abdur Rahman, in which the offer of
the subsidy was made, Ripon wrote sympathetically of
the exceptional difficulties with which he was faced on his
northern frontier. He also emphasized the declarations
previously given of support against unprovoked attack.
For reply, Abdur Rahman expressed his entire satisfac-
tion and reaffirmed his loyalty to his pledges. He stated
that he no longer desired an interview with the British
authorities. He had gained what he wanted for the time
being through their far-sighted generosity.
The increasing Anxiety of Abdur Rahman at the Russian
Advance. In spite of the support he was receiving from
India, the continual and rapid advance of Russia naturally
caused the Amir grave anxiety. He could not despatch
well-armed troops to meet a Russian attack, nor had he
160 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
any confidence in the loyalty or integrity of his officials
in the Herat province which, partly owing to its distance
from Kabul, was less under his control and remained dis-
contented. Moreover, during this period, the intrigues
of Ayub Khan constituted an additional source of anxiety.
The Views of the Government of India. Mr (later Sir
Mortimer) Durand, who was Indian Foreign Secretary,
summed up the situation in January 1884: " The only
statesmanlike course is to endeavour to come to a really
frank and friendly understanding with the Power which
we have hitherto tried in vain in a half-hearted way to
thwart and impede. I would, if possible, embody that
understanding in a formal treaty, precisely defining the
limits of Afghanistan . . . and recognizing the extension
of Russian influence up to those limits."
Again, his diary of July 23 runs: " The Russian
question has assumed an altogether new phase. We sent
home a telegram and then despatches recommending the
delimitation of the Afghan frontier, and the idea was well
received. But in the meantime the Russians occupied
Merv, then pushed up the valley of the Murghab and
finally seized Sarakhs in defiance of Persian protest." l
Lack of Geographical Knowledge by the British. At
that time the British possessed no definite knowledge as
to the exact boundaries of Northern Afghanistan. The
Amir did not help matters since he appeared to take little
interest in Persian encroachments in Badghis, which were
reported to him, while he was sending troops to the trans-
Oxus districts of Shignan and Roshan, which, by the
Agreement of 1873, ^7 outside Afghanistan. Thus the
British position was unsatisfactory, and of this Russia took
the fullest advantage.
Lord Ripon advises the Amir. In March 1884, the
Viceroy explained to the Amir the unwisdom of his
action in sending troops across the Oxus into Roshan
and Shignan, which contravened the Agreement of
1873. ^ e next referred to the fact that Persian troops
had been stationed in the Afghan district of Badghis, at
posts some twenty miles east of the Hari Rud in the
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 135.
THE PANJDEH CRISIS 161
previous summer, but had been withdrawn in the winter.
He advised the Amir that the Hari Rud constituted the
Perso-Afghan boundary in this section and urged His
Highness to occupy the district with troops. It is, of
course, clear that the Amir, who knew Afghan Turkistan
and Badakhshan intimately, was keen on advances in that
area, while his ignorance of the Herat area led to his
unfortunate display of apathy as to Persian encroachments
in Badghis.
Appointment of British and Russian Commissioners.
In May 1884 it was agreed between the two Powers
that Commissioners should be appointed, rechercher les
elements, to quote the French text, of a frontier line satis-
factory to both Powers. General Sir Peter Lumsden and
General Zelenoi were appointed Commissioners, while
Colonel (later Sir West) Ridgeway led that portion of
the British Commission which was appointed by India,
to ensure that its views should receive full weight. The
survey party and escort were necessarily supplied by
India. 1
The March of the Indian Section of the Commission.
The march of the Indian section of the Commission, con-
sisting of 1600 men, 1600 camels and some 300 horses
across *a mainly desert route, hundreds of miles in length,
from Quetta via Nushki to the Helmand and thence north-
ward to Kushan, was an arduous task. The route had
never been explored and the laying out of supplies and
water depended partly on the Amir, who had, at first,
refused to be responsible for the safety of the mission.
However, this was assured, so far as any local trouble
was concerned, by the escort of 200 cavalry and a similar
force of infantry, and the Indian party joined Lumsden
at Kushan in November without having had a single shot
fired at them.
Unsatisfactory Delays. Lumsden, upon reaching the
frontier, was informed that the arrangement by which
work should start immediately was impossible owing to
the alleged ill-health of the Russian Commissioner and
1 In Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand y ch. x, the whole question of the Commission is
fully dealt with.
VOL. II M
1 62 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
that the negotiations would have to be postponed until
the spring.
The Policy of Russia in Central Asia supported by
Germany. Before dealing with events which led to the
Panjdeh crisis, it seems desirable to study how the posi-
tion in Central Asia was affected by events in Europe.
Lord Granville was much exercised by the advance of
Russia, and to quote his biographer: " These events in
Central Asia coincided with the failure of the expedition to
relieve General Gordon, and the interruption of the cordial
relations which had existed between Great Britain
and Germany. After the death of General Gordon,
the Government narrowly escaped defeat on a motion
of censure in the House of Commons. The majority
fell to twelve. " To quote again: " It was certain in
Lord Granville's opinion that, as long as the Liberal
Government was in power, one question after another
in every quarter of the world would be stirred up to the
detriment of the country by Prince Bismarck. Although
at the time all the facts were not fully known even at the
Foreign Office, the situation had been correctly appreci-
ated by Lord Granville as a whole. It hinged on the
secret treaty of neutrality which, in 1 884, Prince Bismarck
had concluded with Russia, without the knowledge and
behind the backs of the other parties to the Triple
Alliance. Russia interpreted this treaty as giving her a
free hand in Asia, and Prince Bismarck gave a tacit
approval, as part of the new policy, to a system of per-
sistent annoyance against Great Britain." I
The Russian Advance on the Panjdeh Oasis. To
return to Lumsden, the unsatisfactory delay in com-
mencing work was rendered more serious by the receipt
of information that General Kamaroff, Governor of the
Akhal Oasis, and Colonel Alikhanoff, Governor of Merv,
had marched up the Murghab River towards the Panjdeh
Oasis where an Afghan General with a force of 100
cavalry, 400 infantry and two guns was established.
When about a stage distant from Panjdeh, Komaroff
with the main body of the troops marched back to Merv,
1 Vide The Life of Lord Granville^ by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 4.22.
TPIE PUL-I-KHISTI
THE ZULFIKAR PASS, LOOKING NORTH-EAST
(From sketches by Sir Edward Durand}
THE PANJDEH CRISIS 163
but Alikhanoff sent a messenger to the Afghan leader,
with a request for an interview. This request was
refused, and Alikhanoff, after despatching a threatening
letter, withdrew.
Lumsden visited Panjdeh and reported that Afghan
control was complete and that taxes were being levied.
Actually the Sarik Turkoman of this oasis had been
independent of Afghanistan and there was justification
for the Russian claim that they should, like the other
sections of the tribe, be included in the Russian Empire.
The Afghans had only recently appeared on the scene to
stake out claims.
In February 1885 the Russians marched on the
Panjdeh Oasis. They drove in the Afghan posts from
the north of the oasis and established a post of Sarik
Turkoman from Yulatan, at Kizil Tapa, a mound
situated about one mile to the north-west of the Pul-i-
Khisti or " Brick Bridge " which spanned the Kushk
River half a mile above its junction with the Murghab.
These Turkoman, as was evidently intended, intrigued
with their fellow- tribesmen in the Panjdeh Oasis, and
thus threatened the rear of the Afghan force, while it
was pj;ob|ibly hoped that they would provoke an incident
with the Afghan pickets situated on the left bank of the
Kushk River in front of the bridge.
The Panjdeh Crisis. Ridgeway, 1 who was at this time
in Panjdeh, protested, but received a reply from Alikhanoff
that his instructions were " to occupy the country as far
as the Pul-i-Khishti ; once established there he would
neither advance nor fight ". Unfortunately Lumsden had
informed Lord Granville that the Russians had a post at
the Pul-i-Khisti, whereas it was at Kizil Tapa, barely a
mile distant. The mistake was a slight one, but it gave
the Russians a pretext of which they took the fullest
advantage.
On March 25, Komaroff again appeared on the scene
with a strong force of all arms and camped at Kizil Tapa,
Yate, on the previous day, had received a copy of Gran-
1 I have discussed every detail of the Panjdeh question with Sir West Ridgeway and
Sir Charles Yate.
1 64 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
ville's cable that the two Governments had agreed that
there should be no forward movement on either side from
the positions then occupied. The Russians, however,
after movements of a provocative nature, issued an
ultimatum to the Afghan general, requiring that " every
single man of your force shall return to within your
former lines on the right bank of the River Kushk ". The
Afghan General declared that the Pul-i-Khisti was his
" Bridge of Heaven ", and that he would fight for it to
the death.
The Russians defeat the Afghans. The die was cast,
and, early on March 30, the Russians attacked the Afghan
force, which had been considerably strengthened, and
drove it across the bridge and from the oasis. Their
weapons were useless, as the priming was damp from the
rain, and their losses were very heavy. There was no
pursuit, but the Russians annexed the Panjdeh Oasis by
proclamation and, needless to say, the British suffered
severely in prestige.
The Visit of the Amir to India. At that time the Amir
was paying a visit to Lord Dufferin at Rawalpindi. The
honours that were accorded to him, including a welcome
by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, created a favourable
atmosphere, although with true Afghan suspicion 'he
refused to use the telephone that had been installed,
stoutly maintaining that he could not distinguish a single
word on it. He considered it to be a spying machine!
As to the Panjdeh crisis, Durand wrote: " The Amir
took it very coolly. We received the news about dinner-
time, and I drove at once to tell him of the slaughter of
his people and the wounding and death of his general.
He begged me not to be troubled. He said that the loss
of two hundred or two thousand men was a mere nothing
and, as for the general, that was less than nothing. After-
wards he pretended to take the business as an affront
only to be wiped out by the blood of many thousand
Russians; but his first feeling was certainly one of
indifference. " l
Lord Dufferin described the Amir as " a prince of
1 Op. c/V. p. 146.
THE PANJDEH CRISIS 165
frank and even bluff, yet courteous manners; quite at his
ease amid a crowd of foreigners ; speaking pleasantly of
the first railway journey he had ever undertaken ; a man
of some humour in jokes, with a face occasionally crossed
by a look of implacable severity the look of Louis XI
or Henry VIII that is now never seen in civilized life ".
Elsewhere he stated: " But for the accidental circum-
stances of the Amir being in my camp at Rawalpindi,
and the fortunate fact of his being a prince of great
capacity, experience, and calm judgment, the incident at
Panjdeh alone, in the strained condition of the relations
which then existed between Russia and ourselves, might
of itself have proved the occasion of a long and miserable
war."
The Settlement of the Panjdeh Crisis. The feeling
aroused in Great Britain was intense. Gladstone demanded
a vote of 1 1,000,000, a great sum in those days, for war
preparations, and it was declared that a Russian advance
on Herat would constitute a casus belli. Fortunately
Granville and de Giers agreed that negotiations should
be continued in London and that the Panjdeh Oasis
should, in the meanwhile, be neutralized. Thus ended
the Panjdeh incident in which a Russian general, anxious
to secure *for Russia an oasis inhabited by Sarik Turkoman,
and unwilling to await the decision of the Commission,
took advantage of a quibble to attack the miserably
armed but valiant Afghans. He thereby nearly pre-
cipitated a war that would have seriously weakened both
belligerents and would probably have resulted in the
ultimate hegemony of Germany.
Sir Peter Lumsden's Recommendations. On April 23,
Lumsden telegraphed to Granville pointing out that if
the Commission were appointed to demarcate the alleged
frontier, its position would be most humiliating in the
eyes of the Afghans, Sariks and Uzbegs. He added that,
for the present Commission, which had been so much
affronted, to have any relations with Russian officers
would be most undesirable. Accordingly he proposed
that the definite limits of Afghanistan should be fixed at
hdme on the reports and surveys which had been made.
1 66 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
These proposals were accepted; Lumsden was recalled,
while Ridgeway was left in charge of the Commission.
The Fortification of Herat. The Amir had been
repeatedly pressed to repair the fortifications of Herat,
but it was not without difficulty that British officers were
admitted to that city, thus amply confirming the Amir's
views that they would resent British assistance. Ridge-
way, after the completion of some defence works, reported
that Herat could not stand a siege for more than a month
or so and that, in case of war, he was strongly opposed
to the Mission taking refuge in that city.
The Russo-Ajghan Boundary Commission. In Septem-
ber 1885 the definition of the frontier was settled by
Lord Salisbury (who, in July 1885, had succeeded Mr.
Gladstone as Prime Minister) and the Russian Ambas-
sador. In November, Ridgeway met Colonel Kuhlberg,
the Russian Commissioner, at Zulfikar Pass, There they
erected the first two pillars which, twenty-five years later,
I sighted from the Persian bank of the Hari Rud, glisten-
ing white in the rays of the setting sun.
The long delay while awaiting instructions from home
had not been wasted by the British surveyors under Major
(later Sir Thomas) Holdich, whose triangulation was
readily accepted by the Russian Commissioner. Frbm
Zulfikar Pass to the Murghab, both parties had already
traversed the ground, which was practically known as
far as Maruchak. In spite of the Protocol the Russians
claimed a large area which would have brought them
appreciably nearer to Herat, while the Afghan representa-
tive, who served a very harsh master, naturally fought
hard for local grazing grounds. Moreover, the Amir
was undoubtedly permitting his officials to have direct
correspondence with Russian officials. However, in
spite of constant reference by the two Commissioners to
their respective Governments, the work proceeded
steadily, while the personal relations of the two camps
remained excellent throughout.
Beyond Maruchak the Mission entered the intricate
maze of clay and sandhills known as Choi, which spread
out towards Maimana, Andkhui and the Oxus. To quote
THE PANJDEH CRISIS 167
Holdich: " A wild, white, silent wilderness of untrodden
snow; a thin, blue line of jagged hills in the far distance;
a deep, intensely deep, canopy of blue sky above, and the
glare of the sunlight off the snowfields. Such was the
daily record." l
The Question of Khamiab and Khwaja Salar. A
serious dispute arose about Khamiab on the Oxus. It was
mainly due to the acceptance in the Boundary Agreement
between the two Governments of Khwaja Salar as a ferry
on the Oxus which was to constitute the termination of
the boundary. The ferry undoubtedly existed when
Burnes mentioned it some fifty years before the Agree-
ment was drawn up, but it had disappeared and been
forgotten. Ridgeway identified it with Islam, situated
some fourteen miles above Khamiab, a district inhabited
by an Afghan population that had paid revenue to
Afghanistan for a generation. Having examined the
question locally he returned to England, instructions
having been received to sign the maps and Protocol as
far as Dukchi, a distance of 330 miles to the east of
Zulfikar Pass, and to leave the dispute in question to be
settled between the two Governments.
Ridgeway 's Successful Settlement with Russia. After
reporting in London, Ridgeway was sent to St. Petersburg
as British Commissioner, to negotiate terms. He found
the military party adverse to a settlement, which put a
definite limit to their forward policy. Fortunately, how-
ever, he was received by the Tsar, and to quote his letter
to Durand: " I was positively shocked when I came home
the first time from St. Petersburg to find that Lord
Salisbury and his Cabinet wished to let the whole thing
slide. ... It was only when I assured the Cabinet, staking
everything on it, that the Emperor intended to come to
a settlement, that they agreed to let the negotiations go
on. Lord Salisbury's last words to me were: * The
demarcation is not worth the paper it is written on, but
as you have begun, you had better finish it, if you can V *
In spite of these pessimistic words, Ridgeway in-
duced the Russians to accept compensation for Khamiab
1 The Indian Borderland^ p. 153. a Sykcs, Life of Durand^ p. 148.
1 68 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XLH
on the Oxus, in the neighbourhood of Kushk. Finally,
he was able to report that " The Amir has not lost a
penny of revenue, a single subject, or an acre of land
which was occupied or cultivated by any Afghan subject ".
He certainly merited the gratitude of Great Britain, of
India, and of the Amir.
The Signature of the Final Protocols in July and August
1887. The final Protocols dealing with the Russo-
Afghan boundary from the Hari Rud to the Oxus were
signed in 1887. This Agreement was strengthened by
the frank declaration of the British Government that a
movement on Herat would constitute a casus belli. De
Giers stated that it was clear that Afghanistan lay within
the sphere of British influence and observed with much
emphasis, " C'est la parole de rEmpereur que vous avez,
non seulement la mienne ".
Contrary to general expectation at the period, this
frontier, laid down some fifty years ago, has been respected,
and its settlement on fair and honourable lines, in spite of
the crisis which it occasioned, undoubtedly improved
relations between the British and Russian Empires, while
the Amir probably realized that his interests had been
safeguarded, albeit he was most chary in making acknow-
ledgements of services rendered to him. It remains* to
add that the Tsar and his advisers considered the line of
least resistance lay towards China with the result that, in
1892, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was
commenced.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE DURAND MISSION TO KABUL
Frontiers are the chief anxiety of nearly every Foreign Office in the civilized
world, and are the subject of four out of five political treaties or contentions
that are now concluded. . . . Frontier policy is of the first practical importance,
and has a more profound effect upon the peace or warfare of nations than any
other factor, political or economic. LORD CURZON.
British Relations with the Amir under Lord Lansdowne.
The behaviour of the Amir was unsatisfactory from
many points of view when Lord Lansdowne assumed
office in December 1888. He had agreed to receive
a British Mission and, in September, Sir Mortimer
Durand was nominated to proceed to Kabul in charge of
it. But His Highness, who had been seriously ill during
the summer, was fully occupied with the rebellion of
Ishak Khan and, after considerable procrastination,
rep'lid^: f< It is a thing which must take place, but at the
proper time ".
Lord Lansdowne } s Rebuke to the Amir. Somewhat
unfortunately, the new Viceroy rebuked the Amir for
the cruel manner in which he had punished the rebels in
Afghan Turkistan. Abdur Rahman considered this to
be interference with his internal administration. He
bitterly resented it and never forgave it.
The Amir attempts to open up direct correspondence with
London. Probably, owing to his dislike of the Viceroy's
action, in 1892, Abdur Rahman attempted to open up
direct communication with Her Majesty's Government,
but without success. He also announced his intention
of visiting England, but was informed that he must first
visit the Viceroy. The Amir was naturally deeply
mortified at the failure of these two cherished projects.
Summary of the Relations with the Amir in 1892. It
169
1 70 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
seems desirable at this point to summarize the attitude of
the Amir in the most important questions which con-
cerned him and the British Government. First of these
was the fact that he treated the British Agent at Kabul
almost as a prisoner and did not even permit his brothers
to visit him. In fact, he was cut off from all intercourse. 1
Even after the Amir's visit to India, there was no change
in this attitude, the Agent being miserably lodged and
practically forbidden to ride or walk on the public roads.
With regard to other matters, the Amir permitted the
cemeteries at Kabul and Kandahar to be desecrated.
Moreover, the proclamations he issued to his subjects
displayed hostility alike to Russia and to Great Britain.
Again, by inordinately heavy taxation and by numerous
monopolies, he had ruined the trade of the country both
with India and with Russia, while he had killed or banished
practically every man of rank or influence in the country,
and was especially hostile to anyone who had assisted the
British in any manner. Moreover, the Amir had per-
sisted in holding territory to the north of the Oxus in
defiance of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873, while
his foolish proclamations of hostility to Russia exposed
himself and the British to the risk of serious complications.
The Claims of Abdur Rahman on Jandol and \lhitraL
To turn to the North- West Frontier: it had always been
the view of the Government of India that Chitral, Bajaur
and Swat formed no part of the dominion of Afghanistan.
This view had been firmly stated in 1861 when Dost
Muhammad advanced claims to Bajaur; and in 1877
Shir AH was warned that any interference with Bajaur,
Swat, Dir and Chitral would constitute a contravention
of the treaty engagement.
Abdur Rahman, however, having been permitted to
incorporate Kunar into his kingdom, occupied Asmar, a
little district further up the Kunar Valley. In spite of
remonstrances, he refused to give up Asmar and threatened
to chastise Umra Khan of Jandol if he troubled the
1 As late as 1908, when I was Consul-General in Khurasan, the British Agent at
Herat was spied upon and was unable to leave his house, except to pay an occasional visit to
the Governor.
DURAND MISSION TO KABUL 171
district. Since the Amir placed his boundary at a point
some twenty-five miles above Asmar, he would, if this
claim were admitted, be within some thirty or forty miles
of the capital of Chitral, while the independence of
Chitral, Jandol and other districts of Bajaur would be
seriously threatened. Apart from military pressure, by
use of money, the dissensions of the various Khans would
gradually, but inevitably, bring about the loss of the
independence of Chitral and Bajaur; so short-sighted
were their Chiefs.
The Intrigues of the Amir with the Afridis. Continuing
our survey southwards, the aggressive action of Abdur
Rahman in his relations with the Afridis was particularly
marked. Although, in 1883, he had written: " The
Afridi country lies in British territory ", his efforts to
win over the mullas and influential men were unceasing.
In view of the fact that Afridi levies guarded the Khaibar
Pass and enlisted in large numbers in the Indian army,
this attitude, and his open claim to be their King, con-
stituted a serious position.
The Question of the Kurram Valley. In 1880, when
Kurram was evacuated by the British troops, the Turis,
who belong to the Shia sect, and had rendered the British
valuable 'service, were promised their independence,
subject to their good behaviour. As was to be expected,
the Amir, who fully realized the strategical importance of
the valley, tried to make the position of the Turis unbear-
able, by raids followed by occupation of the northern
part of their territory by a notorious freebooter, termed
Chikkai. As a result the British were obliged to send
troops into the valley to restore order.
The Importance of the Wazir Country. Continuing
the survey, the Wazir country, which faces the Kabul-
Kandahar route, is traversed by two very important
passes, the Tochi and the Gumal, which are used by
thousands of Afghan tribesmen in their annual migrations
to and from the plains of India. The Gumal route was
held by levy posts of Mahsud Wazirs, but the Amir had
stationed at Wana, situated at the western extremity of
the Gumal, some officials who tried to induce the headmen
172 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
to ask for his protection. Here again a British force had
perforce been sent into the Gumal Pass to maintain order
and to reassure the Mahsud headmen.
The Question of Chagai. Abdur Rahman, as we have
seen, spent some days in the district of Chagai after his
flight from Afghanistan. It is situated 150 miles to the
south of the Helmand, from which it is separated by a
wide stretch of desert, termed the Lut, and was always
considered to belong to the desert state of Kharan which
state rendered allegiance to the Khan of Kalat. The
Amir had occupied Chagai, in May 1886, and refused
to vacate it.
The Grievances of the Amir. It is only fair to state
that, during this period, the British were steadily advanc-
ing, opening up the passes of the North- West Frontier
and guarding them with local levies. But, chief among
these grievances, was the fact that the Khojak range had
been tunnelled and a railway station and fort built at
New Chaman, which pointed at Kandahar. The Amir
somewhat crudely termed this advance as " running an
awl into his navel ", while a shrewd British navvy was
heard to remark: " Well, I don't think that 'ere 'ole was
made thro' the 'ill to peep thro'." Moreover, at this
period, there was a scheme in existence for the construc-
tion of a railway from Quetta to Seistan, which might
have passed through Chagai.
The Amir's riposte to the railway extension, which
had much upset his subjects, was to order his merchants,
under pain of death, to ignore the railway station at
Chaman and take their camel caravans to the first station
beyond the range; while the marked increase of Ghazi
outrages in Baluchistan at that period was probably
instigated from Kabul.
The Proposal to send Lord Roberts to Kabul. In July
1892, Lansdowne proposed to the Amir to send Lord
Roberts on a Mission with a powerful escort of all
arms. The reaction of the Amir to this proposal runs:
" I considered the position very critical, to receive 10,000
soldiers, whom I was expected to receive as my guests. I
had therefore to prepare 100,000 to receive them." It
XLIII DURAND MISSION TO KABUL 173
was indeed hardly likely that the Amir would care to
receive the victor of the Paiwar Kotal and of Kandahar
at the head of an army. Accordingly, while expressing
his pleasure at the proposal, he said that he could not
fix a date until the Hazara rebellion had been crushed.
He also employed an attack of gout and all the arts of
Oriental diplomacy to procrastinate, being aware that
Roberts would soon leave India, upon completion of
his period of command.
Mr. (later Sir S alter] Pyne visits Simla. The situation
remained as unsatisfactory as possible, and the British hav-
ing detained a large consignment of munitions, ordered
from Europe by the Amir, he decided to send Pyne, his
trustworthy English engineer, to Simla. There Pyne 1
stated frankly that the Amir considered Durand to be
his personal enemy and that the Viceroy had, owing to
his Foreign Secretary's hostility, become unsympathetic.
He also pointed out the rapid occupation by the British
of various districts bordering on Afghanistan, whose
inhabitants had formerly looked to Kabul.
Pyne was given full opportunities of making himself
acquainted with recent events on the Afghan frontier,
and in, particular with the intrigues of various Afghan
officials with frontier tribes, which had created trouble
between the Amir and the Government of India.
The Durand Mission, 1893. Pyne's Mission was
most successful. He explained to the Amir that the
Government of India was reasonable in its attitude and
that he was entirely mistaken as to Durand, who was his
friend and well-wisher. This led to the proposal by
Lansdowne that Durand should be sent on a Mission to
Kabul, which proposal was cordially accepted by Abdur
Rahman.
The Mission, which assembled at Landi Kotal, was
met on the frontier by Ghulam Haidar Khan, the Com-
mander-in-Chief and an escort of cavalry. Treated with
lavish hospitality, upon reaching Kabul, it was given a
1 Pyne, a clerk in a Bombay firm, was sent to Kabul with a consignment of goods.
There he attracted the attention of the Amir, who gave him the contract for the erection
of an arsenal and, when it was completed, placed him in charge of it.
174 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
splendid reception, " a salute of twenty-one guns being
fired, bands playing ' God save the Queen ' and fanfares
of trumpets being sounded at every corner ".'
The Reception of the Mission. Durand writes of the
Amir: " He really seemed very well, much better than
in 1885, though thinner. But the great change is in his
manner. I looked in vain for my old acquaintance of
1885, with his burly figure and Henry the Eighth face
and ready scowl. I suppose the scowl is ready still when
wanted, but the Amir of today is a quiet gentlemanly man."
The Opening of Negotiations with the Amir. After
this visit of ceremony, Durand started negotiations in a
garden-house where the Amir took good care to place
the envoy facing the light, while he was equally careful
to turn his own back to it. He also arranged for every
spoken word to be written down by a secretary who was
concealed. Durand found that his best plan was to
forgo reasoned arguments and to bring the Amir by
indirect means to the point, while avoiding anything
that would irritate a despot. He realized that from time
immemorial the Afghans, inhabiting a poor mountainous
country, had lived by conquering or by raiding neigh-
bouring countries, as indeed their history proves. No
Amir had maintained his army entirely at the expense of
his subjects and it was clear that once the boundaries
were fixed, only the miserably poor mountains of
Kafiristan were left to be annexed.
Durand negotiates the Question ofRoshan and Shignan,
The most important question, a question in which
Russia was concerned, was the surrender by the Amir of
his claims in the trans-Oxus districts of Roshan and
Shignan. Durand pointed out to him that the Russian
Government pressed for the literal fulfilment of the
Agreement of 1873 and that the British Government
considered itself bound to abide by the terms of that
Agreement. He finally gained the Amir's consent,
being helped by a provocative journey of a Captain
Vannovsky, in the area under discussion, which was
effectually stopped by the Afghan officials breaking down
1 Sykes, Lift of Durand, p. 209.
XLIII DURAND MISSION TO KABUL 175
a wooden gallery built into the cliff. Durand emphasized
the risk of the recurrence of such events and finally, the
Amir said: " My people will not care, or know, whether
I go backwards or forwards in Roshan or Shignan, but
they care very much to know exactly how they stand on
your side ". l Finally, Durand succeeded in inducing
the Amir to agree to the evacuation of Roshan and
Shignan in return for the districts not in his possession
on the south side of the Oxus in this section.
The Amir's Attitude as regards Wakhan. The Amir
for a long time refused to hold Wakhan. To quote
Durand: " He says he had a hand cut off at Somatash
the other day, and he is not going to stretch out a long
arm along the Hindu Kush to have that shorn off
also ".*
Negotiations about the North- West Frontier. After
many interviews, during which the Amir fought hard
for his point of view, Durand was successful in persuading
him to accept the following conditions. In return for
retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as Chanak,
the Amir agreed not to interfere in any way with Swat,
Bajaur, or Chitral. The British Government ceded the
Birmal tract of the Wazir country to His Highness, who,
on * hfe part, relinquished his claim to the rest of the
Wazir country and to Dawar. He also renounced his
claim to Chagai.
With reference to the Chaman question, the Amir
withdrew his objection to the British cantonment at New
Chaman and conceded to the British Government the
necessary water-rights, which he had himself purchased.
Finally, to mark their sense of the friendly spirit of His
Highness, the Government of India, realizing that his
revenue was too small for the upkeep of an army and
other expenses, undertook to increase his subsidy from
1 2 to 1 8 lakhs of rupees a year.
It remains to add that by the Durand settlement all
the tribes inhabiting territories east of the line were
recognized as belonging to the British " sphere of
1 Op. cit. p. 212.
2 Of>. cit. p. 213. For Somatash vide ch. xliv.
1 76 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP,
influence ". This, in effect, constituted tribal territory as
British territory and the tribesmen as British subjects,
At one time the area between the administered territory
and the Durand Line was sometimes erroneously termed
" Independent Territory ", a dangerous expression to
employ since our aim, both in the interests of the tribes-
men and in our own, should be to establish some form of
British control by the construction of roads and by other
civilizing agencies.
The Mohmand Question. It is only right to state
that the question of the Indo-Afghan boundary in the
Mohmand country was not satisfactorily settled. The
Durand Agreement ran that this shall follow the line
shown in the map attached to the Agreement. The Amir
said: " I understand that this line gives me the
Mohmands ". Durand replied that the map was a small
one and that when the large map was prepared, the
matter would be clearer. Actually the Mohmand country
had not been surveyed and the line that was drawn cut
across the main subdivisions of the tribe. This situation
was remedied in a modification subsequently offered to
the Amir.
The Great Durbar at Kabul. After the signature of
the documents * the Amir held a durbar, which was
attended by four hundred leading Sirdars. To quote
Durand: " He made a really first-class speech beginning,
' Confidence begets confidence. Trusting his safety and
that of his Mission to my care, I have protected him/
He then urged his people to be true friends to us and to
make their children the same. He said that we did them
nothing but good, and had no designs on their country.
After each period of his speech, there were shouts of
'Approved! Approved'. On this occasion he was a
great orator/'
The Important Results of the Durand Mission. Durand,
more than once, told me that the Amir was the strongest
man with whom he had to deal. Thus two strong men
met, and the Amir, after many conversations and due
cogitation, finally decided that Durand was truthful and
1 They form Appendix C.
xun DURAND MISSION TO KABUL 177
that the British were his sincere well-wishers. The im-
portance of this decision was far-reaching and it was
without doubt mainly due to it that his successor Habibulla
remained loyal to the British during the last Great War.
Durand thus secured for the Indian Empire its most
important achievement of external policy during the
nineteenth century. He not only materially helped to
end the long advance of Russia towards India, but
removed a constant source of misunderstanding with that
Empire. He thereby undoubtedly paved the way for the
Anglo- Russian Agreement of 1907, which materially
facilitated the co-operation of the two Powers in the
last Great War. From another point of view Durand,
the great boundary-maker, was the great peace-maker and,
although his valuable services were most inadequately
rewarded, the fact that the boundary of the North- West
Frontier of India is known as the " Durand Line ",
constitutes an honourable memorial to this great English-
man.
VOL. II N
CHAPTER XLIV
THE PAMIR AND OTHER BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS
The plain is called PAMIER, and you ride across it for twelve days together,
finding nothing but a desert without habitations or other green thing, so that
travellers are obliged to carry with them whatever they have need of. The
region is so lofty and cold that you do not even see any birds flying. And I
must notice also that because of this great cold, fire does not burn so brightly,
nor give out so much heat as usual, nor does it cook food so effectually. MARCO
POLO.
The poet, wandering on, through Arabic,
And Persia, and the wild Carmanian waste,
And o'er the aerial mountains which pour down
Indus and Oxus from their icy caves,
In joy and exultation held his way.
SHELLEY, Alastor.
In Chapter XLII I have dealt with the delimitation
of the northern frontier of Afghanistan from Zulfikar
Pass to the Oxus. In this chapter I describe, firstly, the
labours of the Pamir Commission which completed the
delimitation of the northern frontiers of the Amir in ^895.
This international Commission was of premier importance.
Secondly, I shall deal with the boundary Commission
under Mr. (later Sir Richard) Udny, which was charged
with delimiting the Afghan boundary from the Hindu
Kush to the recognized frontier at Landi Kotal, to be
followed by other missions to the Kurram Valley and to
Waziristan.
Anglo-Russian Rivalry on the Pamirs. The question
of the settlement of the Afghan frontier to the east of
Khamiab created considerable friction between Great
Britain and Russia. Our geographical knowledge was
scanty, largely because the Amir had refused to permit
Ridgeway or any other British officer to examine the
area. The country was by nature difficult of access to the
British, but relatively easy for Russian parties, as I found
when I approached the Pamirs from Kashgar. It must
178
CH.XLIV BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 179
also be recollected that Great Britain, as representing
Afghanistan, and Russia were not the only Powers con-
cerned, since China, who held the Sarikol Valley to the
east with a garrison at Tashkurgan, also laid shadowy
claims to portions of the Pamirs. Finally it was most
desirable in the interests alike of Afghanistan and of the
Indian Empire not to leave any gap between the pos-
sessions of China and those of Afghanistan.
Colonel Tonojff arrests Captain Tounghusband and
Lieutenant Davidson. In the summer of 1891 Colonel
Yonoff with a squadron of Cossacks was despatched from
Osh to the Pamirs, nominally " to shoot the Ovis Poll
and to practise rifle-shooting! " In reality, YonofFs
mission was to expel any Chinese or Afghan detachments
from the area and anticipate, by these forcible means, the
proposed diplomatic settlement with Great Britain, In
this connexion the Alichur Pamir had been the somewhat
disputed boundary between the Afghans and Chinese
long before the appearance of Russia on the scene.
Indeed there was a stone, inscribed with a trilingual
record in the Chinese, Manchu and Turki languages, on
the shore of Yeshil Kul or the " Green Lake ", which
commemorated a victory of a Chinese general over
Kafnfuck Chiefs in 1759. The place was thenceforward
named Somatash or " the Inscribed Stone ",
Yonoff crossed the Pamirs and at Bozai Gumbaz,
situated in the Wakhan Valley, which by the Agreement
of 1873 had been acknowledged Afghan territory, he
met Captain (later Sir Francis) Younghusband, whom
he illegally arrested. At the same period Lieutenant
Davidson, who was travelling in the Pamirs, was also
arrested at Somatash by Yonoff, who expelled a then
Chinese official with a detachment of troops from this
centre. In the spring of 1892 the Chinese reappeared
at Somatash, but were driven out by a small Afghan
force. Yonoff, however, returned to the Pamirs with
his Cossacks somewhat later, and ordered the Afghans
to retire. Although hopelessly outnumbered, they stood
their ground bravely and were massacred. The Amir,
with good reason, complained bitterly to Durand of this
i8o HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
unwarrantable action of the Russians and threatened to
withdraw entirely from Wakhan.
British Negotiations with Russia, 1893, 1894. At
long last apologies were made for Yonoff's unjustifiable
actions, but it was clear that Russia was pursuing dilatory
tactics in her negotiations while strengthening her posi-
tion on the Pamirs, In August 1 893 the Russian Govern-
ment proposed to draw a line from the eastern point of
Lake Victoria so as to leave Bozai Gumbaz to Russia,
and to continue it along the slopes of the Muztagh to
the north of the valley of the Wakhijir. Upon being
consulted as to this proposal, the Government of India
pointed out that such a diversion could not be of the
slightest value to the Northern Power except for the
purpose of threatening the passes of the Hindu Kush.
Later in the year more reasonable proposals were
made but, in 1894, Russia suggested a line by which
she would gain control of the routes running to Hunza,
Wakhan and Sarikol. In this year Russian troops occupied
Shignan, from which district the Amir prudently withdrew
his troops.
The Final Settlement of the Pamir Question, in March
1895. The final settlement laid down that the spheres
of influence of the two Powers should be divided"^ a
line which, starting from a point on Lake Victoria near
its eastern extremity, should follow the crests of the
mountain range running somewhat to the south of the
latitude of the lake as far as the Benderski and Orta Bel
Passes. It was agreed that a joint Commission should
settle the precise line and should also be charged to
report any facts bearing on the situation of the Chinese
frontier with a view to enabling the two Governments to
come to an agreement with the Chinese Government.
The execution of the Agreement was contingent upon
the evacuation by the Amir of Afghanistan of all the
territories occupied by him on the right bank of the
Panja, and by the Amir of Bukhara of the portion of
Darwaz, which lay to the south of the Oxus.
The Arrangement made with the Amir. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, Durand had persuaded the Amir
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 181
to accept the above Agreement. It was obviously most
important for him to retain the administration of the
valley of Wakhan, which, as Durand shcivs, he was
unwilling to do. Realizing that the British Government
were anxious for him to hold this buffer district, he, first
of all, bargained for the cost of a force of 400 sowars
and 1000 levies, but finally accepted a special annual
subsidy of 50,000 rupees.
The March of the British Commission to Lake Victoria.
Holdich, that truly great surveyor of boundaries, gives
an interesting account of the very difficult country which
represents the boundary of the Indian Empire at its
north-east corner. From Gilgit, through the Yasin
Valley to Darkot, there was only a narrow track. The
Darkot Pass he describes as " a dangerous and wearisome
climbing way, over broken moraine and fissured glacier
till one arrives at the snowfields of the pass some 1 5,000
feet above sea-level, ere plunging or sliding down again
to the Yarkhun river ".
To continue: " The advantages we gained on the
Darkot lasted us across the Yarkun River and the main
chain of the Hindu Kush (which, as all the world knows, is
not a Difficult range to cross at this point) into the Wakhan
Vilfty, and there for a space we were completely non-
plussed. Up the valley of the Wakhan we worried and
twisted our way, day after day, along the devil's pathway
which flanks the river gorges. There were no flat spaces,
and no reasonable footpaths along that route. If we were
not engaged in a rocky scramble upstairs, we were zig-
zagging down into depths measuring thousands of
feet merely to make a fresh start in another climb after
stumbling through a river at the bottom/' 1
The Meeting of the Anglo-Russian Commission at Lake
Victoria^ July 1895. On ^ s Commission Great Britain
was represented by Major-General Gerard, who had
served as Military Attach^ at St. Petersburg, with
Holdich as his Chief Survey Officer. The Chief Russian
representative was General Pavolo Schveikovski, Governor
of Ferghana, with M. Benderski as his Chief Survey
1 The Indian Borderland^ pp. 289, 290.
1 82 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Officer, who had served on the earlier boundary Com-
mission. Two Afghan representatives attended, but
were unprovided with any credentials, which the Amir
stubbornly refused to supply.
The Commencement of the Demarcation. On July 28,
1895, t ^ LC ^ rst pM ar was erected at the eastern end of
the lake and, before the middle of August, the boundary
line had been demarcated to the Orta Bel Pass.
It was decided by the Commissioners that Lake
Sarikol l should henceforth be termed Lake Victoria,
that the range to the south should be called the Emperor
Nicolas II range, and that the peak nearest the range
should be known as Le Pic de la Concorde.
Changes made in the Actual Demarcation. Difficulties
arose beyond the Orta Bel Pass, since its position, as
also that given to the Beyik Pass on the map were about
6' south of their true positions. In these circumstances,
Gerard recommended the acceptance of a line proposed
by the Russians running southwards to the watershed
of the Taghdumbash, which the Russians acknowledged
to be the Chinese frontier. It remains to add that the
river flowing westwards from Lake Victoria was officially
accepted as a part of the northern boundary of Afghanistan,
which was continued thence to Khamiab along the River
Oxus.
The Boundary of the Chinese Empire. No Chinese
representatives had appeared on the scene, and when the
Russo-Afghan boundary had been thus settled, Holdich
crossed the Beyik Pass and rode down towards the great
Taghdumbash Valley and the Chinese station at Tash-
kurgan. He passed a Chinese post, which signified
permanent occupation, and had intended to travel to
Tashkurgan, but the Chinese authorities, who had
evidently watched the proceedings of the Commission
from afar, would not permit this.
The Acceptance by the Russian Government of the
Demarcation Line. In March 1896 the Russian Govern-
ment accepted the line as agreed upon by Generals
1 Sar-i-Kul actually signifies " head of the lake ", and was erroneously applied by
Captain Wood to the lake itself.
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 183
Gerard and Pavolo Schveikovski. In October the Amir
duly took over the Cis-Oxus Darwaz and, at the same
period, the Russians made over the evacuated districts
of Trans-Oxus Roshan and Shignan to the Amir of
Bukhara.
To quote Holdich, from the last pillar " the boundary
projected into a place where no pillars or mark-stones
could be raised to witness it, amidst the voiceless waste
of a vast white wilderness 20,000 feet above the sea,
absolutely inaccessible to man and within the ken of no
living creature but the Pamir eagles there the great
empires actually meet. It is a fitting tri-junction. No
god of Hindu mythology ever occupied a more stupendous
throne." '
The political results of this Commission were favour-
able to Russia, since she had been permitted to annex the
Pamirs (with the exception of 'the Taghdumbash Pamir,
which was left to China) and had advanced her boundaries
towards Afghanistan. From the British point of view,
however, the delimitation of a definite boundary was of
great importance, a boundary which, moreover, did not
touch the Indian Empire at any point, thanks to the
Amir's acceptance of the narrow district of Wakhan.
'
The Udny Commission, 1894-1895. The Commission
which was appointed to delimit the Afghan boundary
from the Hindu Kush to Landi Kotal was led by Mr.
(later Sir Richard) Udny as Chief Commissioner, with
Holdich as Chief Surveyor. It was met on the frontier at
Landi Khana by an Afghan escort and, proceeding along
the well-worn Kabul route, was joined by Ghulam
Haidar, the Amir's Commander-in-Chief and Chief Com-
missioner. The Kabul River was crossed and the almost
unexplored Kunar Valley was entered.
The Route followed by Alexander the Great. The
Mission was treading on historical ground, since the
ancient highway from Central Asia to India ran through
the Laghman Valley to Bajaur. It was followed by
Alexander the Great, who, from Bajaur, crossed the Swat
1 Op. c/V. p. 293.
1 84 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Valley and by a superb feat of arms captured Aornos,
situated in a great bend of the Indus. 1
The Political Situation in the Kunar Valley. To resume :
the Amir had constructed a road up the right bank of the
river to Asmar, which district marked the limits of
Afghanistan. Some sixty miles farther up the river was
Chitral.
Ghulam Haidar, under plea of the danger from hostile
tribesmen of Jandol, would not consent to a complete
survey of the country being executed. However, by
dint of tact and perseverance, some of the hills were
climbed with good results and the necessary data were
secured.
The Siege of ChitraL Early in January 1895 news
was received of the murder of the Mehtar of Chitral.
This caused an upheaval in that turbulent state, and led
to Dr. (later Sir George) Robertson, the political agent at
Gilgit, marching to Chitral with an escort. The situation
was rendered difficult by the inopportune release from
captivity at Kabul of Shir Afzul, a popular member of
the ruling family, who, in alliance with Umra Khan of
Jandol, besieged the British force, which suffered heavy
losses in a sortie. The British, however, held the fort for
some six weeks in spite of attempts at mining arfld'at
setting fire to it. They were relieved by Colonel Kelly's
remarkable march from Gilgit at the head of a small
column. 2
The Commission and Umra Khan. Needless to say the
Commission camping on the frontier of Bajaur, and
incidentally sheltering an escaped Chitrali Chieftain and
his followers, took a deep interest in the struggle, and
Holdich formed the opinion that members of the Afghan
force stationed at Asmar had undoubtedly joined Umra
Khan's army. There is little doubt that the Amir's Com-
mander-in-Chief was fishing in the troubled waters and
aiding and abetting the besiegers. Probably he hoped to
add the state of Chitral to Afghanistan. But the brilliant
1 Vide On Alexander** Track to the Indus, by Sir Aurcl Stein.
* Chitral, by Sir George Robertson, gives a most interesting account of the general
political situation and of the siege.
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 185
relief of Chitral by Kelly, followed by the march of a
British division under Sir Robert Low, who defeated the
valiant Pathans at the Malakand Pass, occupied the
Jandol Valley without resistance being offered, and crossed
the Lowari Pass into the Chitral Valley, ended the power
of Umra Khan and definitely settled the fate of these
petty states.
The Claims of the Amir. So far as the Hindu Kush
range was concerned there was no need to demarcate it.
From the neighbourhood of the Dora Pass, which leads
from Afghan Turkistan to the upper tributaries of the
Kunar River, the boundary turns southward and follows
the crest of a gigantic range termed Shawal, which con-
stitutes the western limit of the Chitral Valley.
By the Udny Agreement of 1893 the Bashgol or
Arnawai Valley, which formed part of Kafiristan, was
laid down as belonging to the Chitral State. The
Amir, however, claimed the whole of Kafiristan as
Afghan territory and declared that the Arnawai of the
Agreement was a stream which joined the Chitral River
(as the Kunar River was known in this section) from the
east.
wished not only to convert the pagan Kafirs to
but to establish a trade-route between Jalalabad
and Badakhshan. From the strategical point of view, it
would have been unwise for the state of Chitral to have
held this outlying valley our responsibilities were
sufficiently great as it was, for Kafiristan is separated from
Chitral by the snow-capped Shawal range, which is
impassable for many months in the year. Consequently,
the decision was given in the Amir's favour.
The Expedition into Kafiristan. In order to fix the
positions of the numerous mountains which are situated
between the Hindu Kush and Jalalabad, it was necessary
to make an expedition into Kafiristan. By way of pre-
caution Ghulam Haidar first secured a number of Kafir
hostages and the explorers were guarded by a strong
Afghan escort. To quote Holdich: " Our first day's
march was hot and steamy, and we crawled but slowly
1 For the Amir's conquest of Kafiristan vide Chapter XLV.
1 86 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
over the slippery limestone crags, and the crumbling
schistose rocks that border the close little valley of the
Darin. Up and down those ragged spurs, and through
the undergrowth of thickets which were but a tangle of
reeds and briars shadowed by wild fig-trees, olives, pome-
granates, vines, apricots and oaks, we pushed our slow
way for the livelong day, till evening brought us to the
foot of the rocks on which was perched the village of
Darin." Continuing the march, on the fourth day,
" after a straight up and down climb of 5000 feet we
reached the Bozasar peak, and this is what we saw. The
whole world ringed with snow, line upon line, ridge upon
ridge of snow-bound mountain-tops encircling the horizon
in one vast sea of snow- billows . . . we could recognize
the peaks fixed by the Indus triangulation, and could
connect them together." l
This concluded the proceedings of the Commission,
since the question of the boundary in the Mohmand
country had been ruled out of court for the time being,
and, after rendering these valuable services to exploration,
Holdich received orders to join the still more important
Pamir Commission.
*
The Settlement of the Mohmand Boundary, 1896*. It
was not until 1896 that this difficult question was settled
by assurances given at a public durbar held at Shabkadar
in that year. The clans which accepted the political
control of the Government of India were afterwards
known as the " assured " clans. Sir Louis Dane subse-
quently constructed a canal which irrigated their waste
lands and converted them into rich sugar and cotton
tracts, with the result that raiding practically ceased.
The Boundary in the Vicinity of Arandu. There was
also the small matter of the boundary from the Nawe
Kotal at the western extremity of Banjaur to the limits,
of Chitral. The boundary was described under the Udny
Agreement as a series of watersheds, but it was not
demarcated. In 1932 a Commission under Captain
W. H. Hay as British Commissioner, Sirdar Habibulla
1 Op. cit. pp. 275-279.
XLIV BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 187
Khan Tarzi as Afghan Commissioner, and Nasir-ul-
Mulk, eldest son of the Mehtar of Chitral, met at Dokalim.
They took the boundary almost due north to a point on
the Arandu stream just above where it emerges from the
hills, leaving the Dokalim lands in Afghan territory. 1
The Delimitation of the Kurram V alley ^ 1894, The
delimitation of the boundary from the slopes of the Safid
Kuh southwards through Kurram was not especially
difficult. The inhabitants of the higher slopes of the
valley were, as previously mentioned, Turis who, as
Shia Moslems, were considered to be heretics by their
fanatical neighbours and were anxious for British pro-
tection. Consequently there was little or no obstruction
in this section.
The Boundary of Waziristan, 1894-1895. One of
the most difficult areas to be dealt with was Waziristan.
As a preliminary measure it was decided to form a military
post at Wana, a barren plain situated north of the Gumal
Pass at the south-west corner of Waziristan. Wana
absolutely dominated the Ghilzais and commanded the
chief route from Ghazni to India. It ranks as a key
position.
In v i $94 it was decided to occupy the plateau with a
brigade. Survey operations were at once commenced
and the party marched with the Delimitation escort to
Wana. The survey was continued in different directions,
but during a sudden attack on the escort camp, Lieutenant
Macaulay was killed. Major Wahab, who was in charge
of the survey operations, joined the Boundary Com-
mission under Mr. L. W. King at Domandi in late
January, and the survey and demarcation of the boundary
from that point to Khwaja Khidr, at the head of the Birmal
and Shawal Valleys, was carried through under excep-
tionally difficult conditions. Later the party entered the
Tochi Valley and the demarcation southwards was finally
completed in the late spring. By these Commissions
the Indo-Afghan boundaries were delimited from the
Hindu Kush to Domandi in the Gumal Pass.
1 Vide " Demarcation of the Indo-Afghan Boundary in the Vicinity of Arandu ", by
Major W. R. Hay, Geog. Journ., vol. Ixxxii, No. 4, Oct. 1933.
1 88 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN C
Much credit is due not only to the gallant and enter-
prising survey officers, but also to the political officers
and to the officers and men of the escorts. Apart from
the dangers of attack, the tasks involved considerable
hardships of every kind, and some loss of life.
CHAPTER XLV
ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES HIS REBELLIOUS SUBJECTS
Where the word of a King is, there is power: and who may say unto him,
" What doest thou? " ECCLESIASTES viii, 4.
I look from a fort half-ruined, on Kabul spreading below,
On the near hills crowned with cannon, and the far hills piled with snowj
Fair are the vales well watered, and the vines on the upland swell,
You might think you were reigning in Heaven I know I am ruling Hell.
And far from the Suleiman heights come the sounds of the stirring tribes,
Afridi, Hazara, and Ghilzai, they clamour for plunder or bribes;
And Herat is but held by a thread; and the Uzbeg has raised Badakhshan;
And the chief may sleep sound, in his grave, who would rule the unruly
Afghan. LYALL.
Abdur Rahman describes his Subjects. In his auto-
biography Abdur Rahman writes: " Every mulla and
chief of every tribe and village considered himself an
independent king. . . , The tyranny and cruelty of these
men was unbearable. One of their jokes was to cut off
the heads of men and women and put them on red-hot
sheets of iron to see them jump about."
In this chapter I propose to deal with the rebellions
of the Ghilzais, of Ishak Khan and of the Hazaras, while
I shall also touch on the remarkable views held by Abdur
Rahman on more than one subject.
The Shinwari Expedition. But, before dealing with
these important rebellions, a brief reference is called for
to the typical case of the Shinwaris. For many years this
tribe had made the Peshawar-Kabul road unsafe by
murdering travellers, by looting caravans and by driving
off the flocks of the villagers. In 1883 Abdul Rahman
visited Jalalabad and, at a durbar, tried to influence the
Chiefs and mullas to stop these outrages, but to no
purpose. A strong force was launched against the tribe;
they were worsted in four engagements, and were
189
190 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
punished with ruthless severity.
Abdur Rahman concludes the account of this cam-
paign by quoting a Pushtu poem :
You may try gently for hundreds of years to make friends,
But it is impossible to make scorpions, snakes, and Shinwaris into friends.
The Ghilzai Rebellion, 1886. The Ghilzais, as we
have seen in Chapter XXII, had captured Isfahan in 1722,
and ruled Persia for some years. They were the most
powerful tribe in Afghanistan, noted for their bravery,
their fanaticism and their lawlessness, as recorded in
previous chapters. They had also desired the return of
Yakub Khan to the throne and were unfavourable to
Abdur Rahman being proclaimed Amir. Abdur Rahman
mentions that he had imprisoned some Ghilzai Chiefs,
and in The Amirs Message Lyall describes the mistrust
which he inspired:
The Ghilzaie Chief wrote answer Our paths are narrow and steep,
The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep;
The fords of the Kabul river are watched by the Afreedee;
We harried his folk last springtide, and he keeps good memory.
High stands thy Kabul citadel, where many have room and rest;
The Amirs give welcome entry, but they speed not the parting guest.
*
Their Religious Leader. Their religious leader* was
the notorious Mushk-i-Alam, who had headed the jihad
against the British a few years previously. Abdur Rahman
had not only ordered the tribe to pay taxes, which was
considered almost an insult, but he had filled the cup
of his iniquity from the ecclesiastical point of view by
abolishing the stipends paid to religious luminaries. They,
therefore, called on the Ghilzais, who were most ready
listeners, to rebel.
The actual outbreak of hostilities was caused by the
murder of a Sirdar of the Barakzai clan, by the Ghilzai
Chief Shir Khan, who carried off the family and property
of his victim. About the same time a regiment of Durrani
recruits, which was marching without arms, was attacked,
camels and treasure being carried off. The Ghilzais at
first won a success, while both the members of their
tribe and the Hazaras who were serving as soldiers at
XLV ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES SUBJECTS 191
Herat, mutinied and broke away to join the rebels.
There was much hard fighting, but finally the Ghilzais
were crushed and submitted.
The Rebellion of Ishak Khan, 1888. Ishak Khan, son
of Azim Khan, who accompanied Abdur Rahman in his
wanderings, has already been mentioned more than once.
Abdur Rahman appointed him Governor of Afghan
Turkistan during the first year of his reign, and, relying
on an oath sworn on the Koran, trusted him implicitly.
To quote: " Having not the slightest idea of his dis-
loyalty, I placed the best rifles and arms at his disposal,
because he was on the frontier of Russia ". Ishak Khan,
however, decided to bid for the throne. He won over
the mullas by posing as a very strict Moslem, while to
attract his Turkoman subjects he became a disciple of
one of the dervishes of the Nakhshband sect. 1
The Amir heard that Ishak was amassing funds
from the revenue while continually drawing on Kabul
for money, and was plotting against him. He instructed
him therefore to visit Kabul, but he excused himself on
the grounds of ill-health. In June 1888 Abdur Rahman
became seriously ill and the rumour spread that he was
dead, whereupon Ishak proclaimed himself Amir and
coined money in his own name.
The Campaign against Ishak Khan. The battle with
the usurper took place near Tashkurghan. It began early
in the morning, and late in the afternoon one column of
Abdur Rahman's army was defeated and fled. While
the main body was still holding firm, some " disloyal
soldiers [to quote from the Memoirs'] galloped towards
the hill, where Muhammad Ishak was seated, in order to
submit to him. He, thinking that these men were
galloping towards him to take him prisoner, and that his
army was defeated, fled away. His army continued to
fight until long after sunset . . . while Ishak busied him-
self in running away as fast as he could. When the news
was taken to the soldiers that their master had fled, they
1 The story runs that the founder of the sect was a potter who, while tending the
firing furnace, repeated the name of Allah so intently that it appeared on each of the
pots. Hence the sect of Nakhshband, which signifies an engraver.
192 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
lost heart, and were ultimately defeated. In short, on
September 29 a glorious victory was won by my General,
Ghulam Haidar Khan." Surely this is one of the most
dramatic stories of Eastern warfare! The punishments
inflicted on the rebels, as might be expected, were
extremely severe.
The Hazara Rebellion. The last of these rebellions
was that of the Hazaras, who, as already mentioned, inhabit
the heart of Afghanistan, holding the mountainous country
from Kabul, Ghazni and Kalat-i-Ghilzai westwards to the
neighbourhood of Herat. They are a mixed race; the
descendants of a military colony founded by the Mongols.
They were notorious raiders and, as members of the Shia
sect, hated the Afghans. In 1888 the Shaykh AH tribes-
men, who inhabited the district to the south-west of Balkh,
revolted, but were pardoned. Two years later they again
revolted. A punitive expedition was despatched: " They
were defeated, some were killed, others submitted to my
rule, the remainder being brought to Kabul as prisoners.
I treated the prisoners very kindly and soon restored them
to their homes."
Again, in the spring of 1 89 1, the Hazaras living in the
Ghazni area revolted. To quote the Amir onc$ again:
" The Hazaras had raided and plundered the neighbour-
ing subjects for about 300 years past, and none of the
Kings had had the power to make them absolutely peace-
ful. They considered themselves rather too strong to be
defeated, and were very proud of their power." However,
the Amir's army defeated the rebels and occupied
Uruzghan, the strongest centre of the Hazaras.
The Final Crushing of the Hazaras. It might have
been thought that a third defeat of the rebels, with the
capture of their leader, would have ended the rebellion,
But Muhammad Husayn, Hazara, who had commanded
the Afghan troops in this successful campaign and had
been appointed Governor of Hazarajat, turned traitor and
incited other tribes of the Hazaras to join him. On this
occasion the Amir issued a call for volunteers to fight the
heretical Shia Hazaras. Some thousands of his subjects,
inspired by fanaticism and hopes of slaves and plunder,
XLV ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES SUBJECTS 193
started under their Chiefs for the Hazara country, which
was invaded from every direction, and by the capture of
the traitorous Muhammad Husayn Khan and other
leaders the Amir crushed this, the last rebellion.
The Amir gazetted a Grand Cross of the Bath. Abdur
Rahman was gazetted a G.C.B., and on being presented
with the insignia he referred to his friendly alliance with
the British and declared: " I will wear the insignia on a
battlefield in the presence of the Russians ".
Shahzada Nasrulla Khan's Visit to England in 1895.
Abdur Rahman's main object in wishing to visit England
himself, or to send his son as his representative, was to
secure direct communication with the British Govern-
ment. He wished to have an Ambassador in London
and would possibly have accepted the appointment of a
British Ambassador at Kabul. He contended that, as
independent Amir of Afghanistan, an Ambassador was
the proper intermediary, and that he was denied a
privilege which was accorded to the Shah of Persia. He
had written a letter to Lord Salisbury in 1892, the gist of
which was that the Government of India did not treat
him as a friend and made complaints against him, and
that he, desired direct communication with the English
Government. To this Lord Salisbury wrote a friendly
reply stating that Lord Lansdowne was the sincere friend
of His Highness and it was hoped to hear through the
Viceroy that outstanding questions had been settled
between him and His Highness, who would then be
invited to pay a visit to the Court of Her Majesty.
The Amir decides to send Nasrulla Khan. Owing to
the serious state of his health, which also precluded the
possibility of allowing Habibulla to leave Afghanistan,
the Amir decided to send his second son, Shahzada
Nasrulla Khan, to represent him in England. To guide
Jiim, we learn that a book of instructions, which he was
ordered to follow implicitly throughout the whole of his
journey, was composed by his father.
The Reception of Nasrulla Khan by the Queen-Empress.
The Shahzada landed at Portsmouth on May 24 and
was greeted with a royal salute. He was received
VOL. II O
194 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
unofficially at Windsor on May 27, and read a message
from the Amir, expressing regret at being unable to
visit Her Majesty in person and trusting that friendly
relations between the two countries would be more
firmly established by his son's visit. The Shahzada
attended the Derby, a review at Aldershot, made a
provincial tour, was present at Ascot and, on July 2,
travelled in state to Windsor, where he presented Her
Majesty with the letter of which he was the bearer from
the Amir, and also with valuable presents.
The Request for the Appointment of an Ambassador in
London. On July 20 he was accorded a farewell
audience. On this occasion he addressed the Queen
from a paper written in Persian, which expressed the
one request of the Amir, that there should be permanently
appointed in London a trustworthy person or, in other
words, an Ambassador. This letter was, almost certainly,
taken from the book of instructions.
The Reply of the Secretary of State for India. The
reply of Lord George Hamilton was that, owing to the
greater proximity of the Government of India, the better
local information at the disposal of the Viceroy, and the
exalted position of Her Majesty's representative, the
present procedure was the more convenient one 1 . " '
The Letter of Lord Salisbury. Finally, Lord Salisbury,
in a letter to the Amir, pointed out that the presence of a
British officer at Kabul had on two occasions led to tragic
events which are still remembered, and that until a
British officer could with safety live at Kabul and travel
in the country, it would not be possible to receive an
Afghan envoy in England. In the same letter it was
mentioned that the Queen-Empress had been pleased to
confer the G.C.M.G. on Habibulla Khan and on Nasrulla
Khan.
The Disappointment of the Amir. The Amir was^
bitterly disappointed at his failure to establish direct
relations with the British Government and expressed
his feelings as follows: " It is the custom, not only
among the aristocracy, but among our poorest people as
well, that a guest should never return in despair at his
XLV ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES SUBJECTS 195
request being refused, even if he be an enemy. . . . But
my son, who was the son of a sovereign and the guest
of another illustrious sovereign, was returned with a dry
but polite refusal to my request. " It remains to add that
Nasrulla Khan, who viewed every honour that was paid
to him with suspicion, remained hostile to Great Britain
to the end of his life.
The Subjugation of Kafiristan^ 1895-1896. The
political situation of Kafiristan was indirectly settled by
the following clause in the Durand Agreement: " The
British Government thus agrees to His Highness the
Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as
Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand, that
he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur
or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgul Valley."
The Amir, however, maintained that the Arnawai and
Bashgul Rivers were not synonymous, the former draining
into the Kunar from the east, the latter from the west.
The Government of India, as we have seen, wisely con-
ceded the point, and the Amir decided to annex this
mountainous country. He mentioned that, among his
reasons was the risk of Russia suddenly seizing the
country, the military objection to leaving warlike raiding
triBs unsubdued, and the benefits to commerce that the
opening up the routes from Jalalabad, Asmar and Kabul
towards the north would ensure.
A Successful Winter Campaign. Abdur Rahman
decided that the best season for annexing the country
would be the winter, when the Kafirs were perforce
confined to the valleys. The campaign was conducted
with considerable skill, columns being quietly organized
to invade the country from the west through the Panjshir
to Kullum, the strongest fort in the country, from Asmar
on the east, and from Badakhshan on the north; a small
force also marched from Laghman on the south-west.
Kafiristan was conquered, without very great difficulty
within forty days, according to the Autobiography.
Many of its inhabitants were settled in the province of
Laghman, while their country was occupied by retired
soldiers and other Afghans. The Kafirs were forcibly
196 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
converted to Islam, and their country renamed Nuristan
or " The Land of Light ".
Troubles on the North-West Frontier, 1897. The
defeat by the Sultan of the Greeks, 1 the commitments of
Great Britain in the Sudan, taken together with the
ceaseless advance of the British, constituted the main
factors underlying the tribal risings. British prestige for
a while was low, and the Amir, who was undoubtedly
influenced by these events, addressed an important
assembly of mullas and declared that it was the duty of
all true believers to kill the infidels and, at this time, he
assumed the title of " Light of the Nation and Religion ".
He also published an " Almanac of Religion ", which
dealt with jihad.
Lord Curzon and Abdur Rahman. Lord Curzon
landed at Bombay on December 30, 1898. He had
already travelled widely in Asia and, in 1 894, he had made
a remarkable journey to the Pamirs and proved that the
River Panja, issuing from a glacier of the Wakhijir Pass,
was the true Oxus. He had next visited the Amir at Kabul
where he spent a fortnight, having constant interviews
with his host, who in a conversation announced for the
first time that it was his definite determination that he
should be succeeded by Habibulla. 2
The Amir, who had tried without success to obtain
money from the Government of India for the construction
of an elaborate system of fortification along his northern
frontier, commented adversely on the construction of
forts by the British on the North- West Frontier, ex-
claiming, " We are members of the same house, and to
that house there should be but one wall ".
When Lord Curzon was appointed Viceroy it was
hoped in London that his personal influence would result
in improved relations with the stubborn Amir. This
showed an entire lack of comprehension of that potentate's
point of view. Abdur Rahman had made a confidant of
Curzon and had hoped that, as a Member of Parliament,
1 In Makran the fanaticism excited by the defeat of the nation of Alexander " Lord
of the Two Horns " at the hands of the Turks, led to the murder of a British Inspector
of Telegraphs. Vide Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, p. 274.
2 I have consulted The Life of Lord Curxon, by the Earl of Ronaldshay, 3 vols., 1928.
XLV ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES SUBJECTS 197
he would constitute his ace of trumps and would aid him
to escape from the Government of India, which he
cordially disliked, by gaining direct communication with
London. Somewhat naturally, to the Amir, the appoint-
ment could only present itself to his subtle mind as a
prearranged plan and, since Curzon made no efforts to
win him over by a display of tact and friendliness, their
relations remained unsatisfactory throughout.
The Progress effected by Abdur Rahman. There is no
doubt that during his ten years of exile Abdur Rahman
observed keenly and learned much from Russian admini-
stration, which constituted a considerable improvement
on the chaotic rule of the incapable Khans it replaced.
He also learned much from the English. Perhaps his
most important reform was that of justice. When he
took over the government the price of a life was 400
(Kabuli) rupees. 1 He instituted the law that a murderer
is entirely at the mercy of the relatives of the murdered
person. In case they chose to accept a money ransom, it
was fixed at 7000 (Kabuli) rupees and, even then, the
Government still retained the right of granting or with-
holding pardon. Again, by Afghan custom, if a woman
lost h^r husband, his next-of-kin had the right of marrying
hef" against her wish. The new law declared that the
woman was entirely free upon the death of her husband.
To take the question of administration, he created govern-
ment departments modelled closely on the system pre-
vailing in Europe. Nor did he forget education or
hospitals.
The Organization of the Afghan Army. His father,
following the advice of Campbell, the soldier of fortune
referred to in Chapter XXXIX, had organized his force
into divisions, brigades and regiments of cavalry and
infantry with batteries of artillery, this replacing the old
order under which the army was simply a mass of fighting
men. Abdur Rahman also instituted training for the
officers, tested by examinations. Recruiting for the army
was organized on the system termed Hasht Nafri, or
" one man in eight ". The Afghan army, as we have
1 A Kabuli, or Afghani rupee, is worth about one quarter of an Indian rupee.
198 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
seen, gained much experience in the rebellions that were
so frequent and Abdur Rahman watched the behaviour
of each unit, punishing with grim severity incompetence
or cowardice. He was fond of quoting from Jami:
The mass of an army is not the only thing required,
Two hundred competent warriors are better than one hundred thousand
shouters.
Realizing that it was essential to have a munitions
factory and powder mills, Abdur Rahman employed
British engineers, chief among whom was Sir Salter Pyne.
Under their supervision, a mint, tanning and dyeing,
furnaces for smelting ore, and other factories gradually
dotted the country round Kabul. The story runs that
when a soap factory was opened some poorer Afghans
ate the soap and thanked the angry Amir for providing
them with a new and delicious sweetmeat!
The energy that was needed to induce the con-
servative Afghans to support these enlightened efforts
was tremendous. They complained that the work could
be better done by hand and that buying machines meant
sending money out of the country. But the Amir, who
was a good mechanic himself, quoted Sadi:
**
If a gentle-armed man fights with an iron-arm, *~
It is sure that the iron-arm will break the gentle-arm.
Abdur Rahman was certainly the " iron-armed man ".
The Death of Abdur Rahman^ October i, 1901. For
the last ten years of his life the Amir was constantly
suffering from attacks of gout, which gradually took a
stronger hold upon him until he was unable to stand and
had to be carried about even in his room. In the spring
of 1901 he had a stroke but lingered on until his death
on October i.
His Character. To understand the character of
Abdur Rahman it is necessary to realize that both ruler
and ruled belonged to the Middle Ages. The Great Amir
he surely merited the title broke the feudal power
of the local chiefs and the fanatical leadership of the
mu/tas, and, by his genius, welded the country into the
kingdom of Afghanistan. He certainly used both whips
XLV ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES SUBJECTS 199
and scorpions, dealing with stiff-necked tribes, whose
evil ways he rebuked in a manner that reminds one of
the Jewish Prophets, His justice was grim and cruel,
very cruel according to our standards. But, in dealing
with his stubborn, treacherous subjects, his methods
were the only methods that would have secured law and
order. It was typical rough justice of the only kind that
his people understood, while they also realised that he
was a devout Moslem. Again, his system of espionage,
owing to which no one was safe from arrest on a charge
of treason, with every chance of a painful death or long
imprisonment, created an atmosphere of fear or mistrust,
but, yet, in Afghanistan of that period, it was probably
inevitable.
Abdur Rahman realized that he must rule with a
rod of iron, but he was far ahead of Dost Muhammad in
his statesmanship. He realized also that his grandfather's
policy of making his numerous sons rulers of the various
provinces, each with his own force and revenue, involved
a fratricidal struggle for power on his death. Indeed,
nothing is clearer in the history of Afghanistan than the
constant civil wars, occasioned in almost every case by
revolt^ of brothers or sons of the ruling Amir. To
obfiate*this evil Abdur Rahman kept all his sons at
Kabul, while he gradually placed Habibulla, his eldest
son, in charge of every department, only retaining the
conduct of foreign affairs in his own hands. He also
insisted on his younger sons taking part in the administra-
tion but, at the same time, attending the daily durbar of
Habibulla. As he wrote: " None of them [i.e. the
younger sons] are in a position to take up arms against
that one who has absolute control over the army, the
treasury and everything else ".
His advice to his sons and successors was " to struggle
day and night for the peace, happiness and welfare of
their subjects. If the people are rich, the kingdom is
rich if the subjects are peaceful, the Government is at
peace." He also quoted Sadi on this subject:
Subjects are like roots and kings like trees;
Trees, O my children, cannot stand without their roots.
200 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
In reading the Life of William the Conqueror, whose
eldest son rebelled and whose half-brother Odo he was
obliged to imprison, we realize the difficulties with which
he was faced. To quote the Peterborough Chronicle of
1087: " Stark man he was and great awe men had of
him. So harsh and cruel was he that none dared with-
stand his will. ... If a man would live and hold his lands,
need it were he followed the King's will/'
It is generally considered that William was cruel, from
policy rather than from character. In reading the lives
of these two great warriors, both of whom were dominat-
ing personalities and possessed of genius, both of whom
created a kingdom, and both of whom sought to establish
law and order by means which appear cruel to us in the
twentieth century, I would ask if there is not some
similarity between William the Conqueror of England
and Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. However
this may be, the British policy of proclaiming Abdur
Rahman Amir of Kabul was justified by its fruits. It
gave us thirty-nine years of a united Afghanistan which,
if not always friendly to Great Britain, constituted a
valuable asset in the Great War.
CHAPTER XLVI
THE McMAHON MISSIONS
The vagaries of the Helmand in Seistan, where it is the boundary between
Persia and Afghanistan, have led to two Boundary Commissions in thirty
years. LORD CURZON on Frontiers.
O Seistan! May the clouds refuse their beneficent rain, may ruins and the
desert cover thy soil! In winter, thou art a place of suffering and misfortune;
in summer, a mass of serpents and insects. Allah created thee as a punishment
to men, and has made thee a hell. From an Arab poem.
Four Boundary Commissions. In this chapter I have
dealt with the two Missions carried out by Sir Henry
McMahon. The first was the Indo-Afghan frontier.
In the second he was appointed to arbitrate between
Persia and Afghanistan on the questions that had arisen
owing to a change in the course of the Helmand in the
delta province of Seistan. I have also given a brief
account of the delimitation of the western frontier of
Afghanistan from a point near Bandan to the vicinity
of the Hashtadan Plain by General Fukhur-ud-Din, a
Turkish officer, in 1935, an< ^> finally reference is made
to the arbitral award on the Hashtadan Plain by Major-
General C. S. MacLean, in 1891.
The Indo-Afghan Boundary Commission, 18941896.
The first Mission of Captain (later Sir) Henry McMahon
was the extremely difficult task of delimiting and demarcat-
ing l the Afghan frontier from Domandi, situated at the
junction of the Gumal and Kundar Rivers to Kuh-i-Malik
iSiah, where Baluchistan and Afghanistan alike meet the
Persian border.
The Area under Discussion. Geographically speaking,
the area falls into two distinct sections. From Domandi
1 I would acknowledge Sir Henry McMahon's assistance in this chapter.
201
202 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
to Chaman, a distance of 330 miles in length, it consisted
of high rugged mountains, inhabited by warlike tribes
generally on bad terms with one another, whereas the
second section, 470 miles in length, ran through a water-
less country, with sandy plains and naked hills which
were almost void of inhabitants. Indeed, so little known
was the area under consideration, that only three places
could be noted with any precision, Domandi, the starting
point, New Chaman, situated about half-way along the
line, and the terminus at the Kuh-i-Malik Siah, " The
Hill of the Black Chief," the word Malik probably
denoting a pre-Islamic belief in a being, who ranked
below a Pir or Saint.
The Nomadic or Semi-nomadic Inhabitants. Apart
from the physical difficulties and the danger of a sudden
attack, which McMahon only just escaped at the hands
of a strong raiding force of Wazir tribesmen, there was the
necessarily vague manner in which the course of the line
was defined in the Durand Agreement to be taken into
consideration. To secure a satisfactory demarcation, it
was necessary to ascertain the territorial limits of tribes,
who might be wholly or semi-nomadic. Moreover the
question of the boundary naturally aroused wilct excite-
ment among those concerned which, in the case oT the
more warlike at feud with one another, created situations
fraught with anxiety and danger.
The Ordeal of the Koran. Fortunately for the peace
of the frontier, there existed a method of determining a
boundary, a method rarely used and by no means popular,
of laying down a boundary line by oath. To quote
McMahon: " Let us take a case where both sides have
at last agreed to this expedient. Some leading man of
the one or the other side is chosen and accepted by both
sides for the ordeal. Then, when his reluctance to
undergo that ordeal has been overcome, the fatefqj
moment arrives amid a scene of excited tribesmen stilled
for the moment by anxious expectation. With the Koran
firmly held on his bare head and with bare feet, the oath-
taker steps forward, but not until every care has been
taken to ensure that no loophole has been left him for the
XLVI THE McMAHON MISSIONS 203
saving of his soul from the sin of perjury. The Koran
must be a genuine Koran; it must be held on his bare
head, with nothing intervening; and the soles of his feet
must be both bare and clean, with no particle of his own
tribal soil adhering thereto. Thus prepared the oath-
taker steps out, and the course he follows becomes the
boundary line of tribal territory." J
The Arrival of the British Commission at Domandi.
McMahon reached Domandi on April 5, 1894. The
Commission included a strong survey party with an
escort of 150 men of the Punjab Frontier Force and a
squadron of cavalry; including contingents of friendly
tribesmen it amounted to 1000 men and 500 animals.
On arrival at Domandi, there was no definite news of
the appearance of Sirdar Gul Muhammad, the Afghan
Commissioner, but this delay enabled McMahon, not
only to extend his survey operations, but also to
gain contact with the local tribesmen, and to institute
inquiries.
The Gumal Pass. The Gumal River cuts its way
through the Sulaiman range and issues on to the Derajat
plains of the Punjab. The Gumal Pass has, from ancient
days, constituted a great trade-route between Afghanistan
and*lndia. The Ghilzai and Lohani tribes, commonly
known as the Powindahs, march down it in their thousands
every autumn with their families, their camels, their sheep
and their goats. At this period they were marching back
to their mountain pastures and complained bitterly of
attacks by Wazir tribesmen, which had caused serious
loss of life and of camels.
The Appearance of an Afghan Representative. On May
30, the representative of the Afghan Commissioner,
Khalifa Mir Muhammad, appeared on the scene. He
was accompanied by various chiefs of the Ghilzai tribe,
*vho were quarrelling among themselves regarding certain
vague claims which they each made against one another
to lands on the British side of the proposed boundary
line. With the idea of avoiding bloodshed, they had
1 " International Boundaries ", by Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Journal of the
Royal Society of Arts, Nov. 15, 1935.
204 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
marched by different routes to the British camp, which
had been moved some distance up the Kundar to facilitate
the extension of the survey. The Afghan party had
practically no supplies and welcomed a gift of sheep and
other provisions.
The Stan of the Negotiations. When negotiations
commenced, it appeared that the Amir had ordered his
Commissioner not to meet McMahon in person, but
to communicate by letters or verbal messages through
envoys. Moreover, the Commissioner did not possess a
copy of the map of the Kabul Agreement, but had an
entirely different map, on which the boundary was marked
in a totally incorrect manner. To add to McMahon's
difficulties, the Khalifa Mir Muhammad was on bad
terms with the Afghan Commissioner.
The British Commissioner surveys the Boundary. In
spite of this almost impossible position, McMahon, while
carrying on negotiations, steadily moved onwards along
the boundary line, surveying all the time. Reaching the
plains of Khurasan, lying at an altitude of some 6000 to
7000 feet above sea-level, the position began to improve.
The Amir had apparently hoped to wear out the patience
of the British Commissioner, with the object of inducing
him to admit indiscriminate Afghan claims, but heThad
discovered that he was mistaken. The Afghan camp also
began to run out of supplies, which were secured by force
and rarely paid for, whereas the British, who paid for
everything, drew supplies even from distant Ghazni, in
spite of the efforts of the Afghan Commissioner to
prevent it.
The Question of the Map. On August 18, the two
Commissioners, McMahon and Gul Muhammad, met
for the first time. The only topic of conversation was the
question of the maps. The Sirdar had not received any
instructions cancelling the former ones, which laid down
that he was to recognize no map but the one with which
he had been provided by Abdur Rahman. However,
thanks to the communications which had passed be-
tween the Government of India and the Amir, the Afghan
Commissioner finally received a copy of the Kabul
XLVI THE McMAHON MISSIONS 205
Agreement map, and this marked a turning-point in the
negotiations.
The Demarcation of the Boundary Commences. It was
now possible to commence the demarcation, in spite of
constant objections raised by the Afghan representative.
He feared the wrath of the Amir who evidently wished
to jockey the British; forged documents were also
occasionally produced. To add to the difficulties, the
country was unexplored and had to be surveyed.
Fortunately the approach of winter, which would not
only make the mountains impassable, but would cut off
supply caravans, eased the situation and lessened the
number of wearisome objections. Finally the boundary
was demarcated; the pass over the Khwaja Amran
range was crossed just in time; and the British Com-
missioner descended to the plains and reached New
Chaman on Christmas Eve nine months after starting
work.
The Agreement and Maps signed for the First Section.
In spite of infinite trouble caused by the Afghan Com-
missioner, who wished to deprive New Chaman of the
springs on which its water-supply depended, at the end
of February 1895 t ^ ie Afghan Commissioner signed the
final* agreement and the maps relating to this section of
the frontier. He then took his departure.
The New Afghan Commissioner. Sirdar Muhammad
Umar Khan, Chief of the Nurzai Durrani tribe, the
new representative of the Amir for the second section
of the frontier, met McMahon at New Chaman early in
March. 1 Owing to intrigues by interested persons he
attempted to reopen the boundary question which had
been already settled in the neighbourhood of New
Chaman, but this was firmly resisted.
The Temporary Break-up of the Mission. His attitude,
Jiowever, made progress extremely difficult and it took
over a month to demarcate the boundary to a point only
some thirty miles from Chaman. The position then
became impossible, owing to the unreasonable claims
1 A good account of the second section of this Boundary Commission and of the
Seistan Mission may be read in The Frontiers of Baluchistan, by G. P. Tate.
206 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
made by the Afghan Commissioner who, although
personally willing to accept McMahon's proposals, dared
not do so in view of the opposition of the headmen
attached to his staff by the Amir, Consequently, in June,
the British Mission broke up temporarily, to allow the
Government of India to negotiate with the Amir.
The Reassembly of the Mission and Fresh Difficulties.
In January 1896 the work of the Commission recom-
menced and so did the difficulties. The Viceroy had
conceded the district of Iltaz Karez to the Afghans and
the Amir had agreed, in consideration of this concession,
that the boundary should follow straight lines from
point to point. However, to his Commissioner he had
merely written that " he was to use his wits and be careful
that he was not taken in."
The Boundary demarcated to Robat. There was much
discussion about an area known as Bahram Chah, but the
Afghans had practically run out of supplies, except such
as were furnished by the British and were anxious to
complete the work: so finally, the boundary was de-
marcated up to Robat, where there was a supply of good
water.
The March across the Desert. From Robat,, it was
decided that the two Commissioners should take Small
parties to the Kuh-i-Malik Siah. The distances from one
watering-place to the next, on occasions, were fifty miles
and, in one case, seventy miles, which necessitated carry-
ing a water-supply for two or three days on the unfor-
tunate camels, who suffered great hardships as, owing
to a prolonged drought, there was no moisture in the
dried-up bushes on which they fed. The marches were
made at night to avoid the heat of the day, but the
lack of competent guides, and the sandstorms which
obliterated the tracks of the caravan, nearly caused the
loss of individuals belonging to both parties, while th$
heat by day was severe. There were many escapes from
horned vipers and other poisonous snakes, which abound
in arid Baluchistan.
The Kuh-i-Taftan. As the Commissioners approached
the Persian frontier the white summit of Kuh-i-Taftan,
THE McMAHON MISSIONS 207
rising to a height of 13,270 feet, was visible, and, on
reaching the border, abundant supplies of good water were
found, while some sheep were purchased. McMahon
notes that for a space of nine weeks only three inhabitants
of this desolate area had been seen !
The Cairn erected on Kuh-i-Malik Siah. The Gaud-i-
Zireh, a salt lake some twenty-five miles wide, which is
mentioned in the motto, was next visited. The long two
years' task was now practically completed and, on
April 1 6, 1896, a massive stone cairn was built on the
summit of the trijunction of the three states, amid general
rejoicings. The two Commissioners met again at Robat
and, in May 1896, the final agreements and maps,
dealing with a boundary line measuring 470 miles, were
completed and signed.
The Results. The total length of the boundary
which had been delimitated and demarcated between
March 1894 and May 1896, amounted to 800 miles.
The question of securing for the railhead at New Chaman,
not only the valuable water-supply as negotiated by
Durand, but also sufficient room for its future growth,
was perhaps the most important military question to be
settled^ Of some importance, however, was the inclusion
in Btitisft Baluchistan of Chagai, which, in spite of protests,
had been held for many years by the Amir.
The Benefits to Afghanistan. The benefits to
Afghanistan were also considerable. There is nothing
which causes more hostility between neighbouring
peoples than a disputed boundary, and the removal of
this cause along a long boundary line, together with the
gradual incorporation of its tribes in the two adminis-
trations, made for peace and progress.
In conclusion, there is a saying that " when Allah the
Almighty created the world, Baluchistan was formed
/rom the refuse material." Only those who like myself
have travelled widely in this desert country can realize
the constant difficulty of procuring food, forage and
grazing, while the scanty water supplies would almost
invariably be described as undrinkable on medical
analysis. Much credit is then due to the members of
208 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
both Commissions who, in the face of hardships and
risks, successfully completed a most important task.
The Seistan Arbitration Commission. In January 1903,
McMahon left Quetta at the head of a Mission, to act as
British Commissioner and Arbitrator between Afghan
and Persian claims in the delta province of Seistan. In
Chapter XXXVI I have given an account of the Goldsmid
Mission which constituted the Helmand as the boundary.
It also laid down somewhat vaguely the Kuh-i-Malik
Siah as " a fitting point " to the south, while " a line
drawn from the Naizar or Reed Area to the Kuh Siah
near Bandan constituted the north-west terminal point ".
As already described, General Goldsmid was seriously
hampered both by the local authorities and by the
Persian Commissioner and was unable to obtain a
thorough knowledge of the country. Such, then, was
the state of affairs, which worked without serious local
troubles, until in 1896 a new situation developed by the
Helmand changing its course westwards and creating a
new main channel known as the Rud-i-Parian.
The Situation in 1899. When I founded the British
Consulate in Seistan, in 1899, I speedily realized that the
change in the course of the Helmand created an entirely
new situation. 1 I travelled widely in the cultivated area
and, crossing the Rud-i-Parian, entered the district of
Mian Kangi, which was covered with a dense growth of
tamarisk some twenty feet high. It was formerly thickly
populated, as was proved by a number of mounds rising
perhaps eighty feet above the surrounding country, on
some of which were ruins of fortified villages.
Reaching a shallow dry river-bed some thirty feet
wide, I was at first inclined to doubt the guide's statement
that this was the old bed of the Helmand. But there was
no doubt about it nor of the fact that the Sikhsar, as it,
was termed, was still considered to mark the boundary.
Northwards from a low mound termed the Tappa-i-
Tildi the eye ranged over miles of thirsty ground covered
with the dry roots of reeds. In the absence of life-giving
1 Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, pp. 361-393.
THE McMAHON MISSIONS 209
water there was the stillness of death.
Russian Intrigues. It seems probable that no serious
disputes would have arisen between the Afghans and
Persians there were none when I was in Seistan but
for the arrival on the scene, in 1900, of M. Miller, who,
as Russian Consul, exerted his undoubted talents to
create mischief between the two nations, hoping thereby
to be appointed to settle their differences. Owing to the
tension which was created through his intrigues, a
Persian Commissioner, Yamin-i-Nizam, was appointed
to settle boundary disputes with an Afghan Commissioner,
Musa Khan of Herat. The latter made fruitless attempts
to meet the Persian Commissioner, who treated him with
gross discourtesy, and the Governor of Chakansur brought
matters to a climax by occupying an important Persian
village in Mian Kangi. This act caused the situation to
become really serious, and the Persian Government, under
the terms of Article 6 of the Treaty of 1 857, called upon
the British to intervene. Arbitration was then accepted
by both the Afghan and Persian Governments, with the
right of appeal to the British Foreign Minister.
The Composition of the British Mission. The Mission
comprised 1 1 British officers, with an escort of 200
infantry *and 60 cavalry. Its total strength amounted to
1500 officers and men, 156 horses, 2200 baggage and
50 riding camels. A large staff of surveyors, levellers
and draughtsmen was included, while skilled artisans of
all kinds completed a body of men especially well con-
stituted for their very difficult task. There was no
intention, on this occasion, of permitting His Majesty's
Commissioner to be flouted and baffled by local un-
friendliness. 1
The March of the Mission to Seistan. The Mission left
Quetta on January 10, 1903, in severe weather. On its
Arrival at Khwaja AH on the Helmand, on February 4,
it was received by the Afghans with honour. Further on,
in Rudbar, the Afghan Commissioner, Akhundxada Fakir
Muhammad Khan, Governor of Chakansur, joined it, and
1 Vide " Recent Survey and Exploration in Seistan ", by Colonel Sir Henry McMahon,
Gcog. Journ., Sept. and Oct. 1906.
VOL. II P
2io HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
on February 20 it camped at Khwabgah opposite the
Band-i-Seistan. To mark the friendly feelings of the
Amir a detachment of Afghan cavalry and infantry was
ordered to form the personal escort of the British Com-
missioner, while the members of the Mission were treated
as the guests of the Amir during their stay in Afghan
territory.
Further Russian Intrigues. As already stated, the
disputes regarding the Seistan boundary and irrigation
canals were mainly the result of mischievous instigation
by the Russian Consul, M. Miller, 1 who hoped by these
means to secure Russian intervention. When, however,
these disputes were referred to the British Government,
every effort was made by Russia to persuade Persia to
withdraw from the arbitration. The importance of the
differences was minimized on the one hand while, on the
other, the Persians were informed that the British un-
doubtedly intended to seize the fertile province; or,
failing that, to cede a large part of it to Afghanistan. The
Russians urged their right to be represented in the
Mission, but this was denied by the British, and McMahon
received instructions accordingly.
Failing in this direction, the Persian Commissioners,
the Yamin-i-Nizam and the Karguzar, or Foreign Office
Agent, were reminded of the insults to which the Gold-
smid Mission had been subjected, and were urged to
repeat the same tactics. Incidentally the Karguzar was
the nephew of the obstructive Masum Khan, while his
Assistant was the son of that official! In short, every
effort was made by the Russian representative, who was
aided and abetted by the Persian Commissioners, to
ensure the failure of the Mission and to reduce British
arbitration to a farce.
The Claims of the Persian Officials. Upon the arrival
of the Arbitration Mission in Seistan the Persian Com-^
missioners were informed by their Government that the
arbitration applied only to water questions. McMahon,
1 M. Miller founded the Russian Consulate at Kerman in 1904, where he also dis-
played considerable energy in anti-British intrigue without, however, gaining any marked
XLVI THE McMAHON MISSIONS 211
however, insisted on their accompanying him along the
portion of the boundary that was disputed. They con-
tended that the award map of Sir Frederic Goldsmid was
no authority and that in the section south of Kuhak the
boundary should run not in a straight line to Kuh-i-Malik
Siah but should include the Tarakun tract. Northwards
it followed the Helmand and the Sikhsar channel and
thence northwards to the northern edge of the hamun
and so to Siah Kuh.
The Afghan Claims. The Afghan Commissioner, on
the contrary, considered that the line shown on Goldsmid's
award map constituted the sole authority on the subject.
To summarize these views: the Persians based their
claims on their own interpretation of the award and
professed complete ignorance as to the map, while the
Afghans knew nothing about the award and insisted upon
strict adherence to the map.
The Decisions taken by McMahon. McMahon had
ordered a new survey of the area to be made on a large
scale, and based on this, in spite of difficulties caused
by the complete change in the landscape, he decided on
a line which fulfilled the conditions laid down by Goldsmid.
Starting^ northwards from Kuhak, no question as to the
boundary arose until Mian Kangi was reached. There
the Afghans had encroached to the west of the old
Helmand, and McMahon decided to take advantage of
a number of mounds, Tappa-i-Tilai, Tappa-i-Shahraki
and Tappa-i-Kurki, which ran parallel to the Sikhsar,
since the ancient bed of the Helmand, shrunk to a small
dry ditch, would have been unsuitable for the purpose.
Continuing northwards along a spit of land which con-
tained a miserable village, Takht-i-Shah, the subject of
much discussion, and which ended at Shalghami, he
decided to draw the line east of this tract and from
halgami straight to the terminal point at Siah Kuh,
which was also called Nar Ahu. Southwards from
Kuhak he decided upon a straight line to Malik-Siah
Kuh.
The Attitude of the Persian Government. Such were
the decisions arrived at, but the Persian Government,
212 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
frightened by the Russian Legation into the belief that
British arbitration would result in large portions of
Persian Seistan being ceded to Afghanistan, still con-
tended that no boundary questions were involved. How-
ever, in June 1903, an opportune quarrel over the dis-
puted lands on the frontier, in which some Afghans were
wounded, gave McMahon the desired opportunity of
intervening, and he issued an arbitrary order in the form
of an intermediate award, laying down the boundary
along the mounds mentioned above and calling upon
both Commissioners to order their respective subjects to
observe it.
The Acceptance of McMahon' s Decision. After much
intrigue at Tehran, in which the Russian Legation took
a leading part, the Persian Government, in November
1903, finally accepted McMahon's line unconditionally.
The Afghan Commissioner, whose attitude throughout
these tedious years deserves a special tribute, also agreed
to it, but stated that the Amir might think it unbecoming
to his dignity to show undue alacrity in expressing his
approval. This supposition proved to be entirely correct,
and it was not until September 1904 that the news of
the acceptance of the award by His Highness^ eached
McMahon. The demarcation was then carried out to
the genuine satisfaction of those most intimately con-
cerned.
Summary. The British Commission had spent over
two years suffering from heat and cold and from insect
pests which took a very heavy toll of camels and horses.
The force of the blizzards was also terrific, one being
recorded with a velocity of 120 miles an hour, which
constitutes a record.
Worse than these plagues was the fact that in the
winter of 1904-1905 a serious outbreak of hydrophobia
infected the dogs, jackals and wolves of the country, whc
went mad and attacked men and animals. On the night
that the great storm was raging, mad wolves attacked
the camp and bit seventy-eight camels, of whom more
than one half subsequently developed hydrophobia. But
the culminating tragedy was the death of Shaykh
THE McMAHON MISSIONS 213
Mohiuddin, a gallant surveyor, who, penetrating into
the unexplored Dasht-i-Margo with a small party, lost
his life from thirst. One of his chain-men with supreme
heroism wrapped the precious map round his body and,
half unconscious, tottered off with his comrades. He
alone was succoured by an Afghan. This expedition cost
seven valuable lives.
To conclude: the strategical position of Seistan with
reference to the security of the Indian Empire made it
an objeqt of a political attack by Russia at a period when,
as is shown in Chapter XLIX, Anglo-Russian relations
were undergoing a crisis. Thus the task that McMahon
undertook was rendered doubly difficult, and its successful
accomplishment proves the courage, tact and patience
which he displayed, while he was loyally supported by
his staff, his escort and the native followers.
The Frontier from Seistan to the Hashtadan Plain.
In 1935 General Fakhur-ud-Din Altai, a Turkish officer,
was appointed arbitrator between the Persian and Afghan
Governments, with a mission to settle the Perso-Afghan
boundary on the undefined section from Siah Kuh, in
the vici^jty of Bandan, to a point where General MacLean,
in 1891, demarcated the boundary of the Hashtadan
Plain.
The new boundary at first runs due north, keeping
well to the west of the assumed line. In 1899 I followed
a parallel route along it and, from Duruh, I climbed the
range to the east. It rises to an altitude of 6000 feet and
on its summit I found a fort of solid construction with
three or four empty water-tanks. I enjoyed an extensive
view eastwards, where the ranges sank down to the
aptly named Dasht-i-Naumid or " Desert of Despair ".
Farther north, the fort at Tabas Sunnikhana, a fertile
district, was said to have been built by the architect who
designed the Herat fort. The new boundary line from
opposite Duruh turns north-north-west and then north-
north-east to Yezdan, around which it circles, thus
leaving that village to Persia. From the vicinity of
Yezdan the boundary swings north-west for a short
2i 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XLVI
distance, but finally resumes a general north-north-west
direction to latitude 34 15'. There it bends due east to
the previously demarcated point 39 on the Hashtadan
Plain.
The Arbitral Award on the Hastadan Plain. The
question of the frontier in this area had caused much
local ill-feeling, but an application for the good offices of
the British Government resulted in an arbitral award
given by Major-General C. S. MacLean in i88 and,
in 1891, the boundary was duly demarcated by that
officer.
The Completion of the Boundaries of Afghanistan,
From the Hashtadan area the Perso-Afghan boundary
strikes the Hari Rud at the point where it bends to the
north, and this river continues to be the frontier to
Zulfikar Pass, where our survey ends.
It is impossible to conclude the account of these
Boundary Commissions, which were carried through
under such difficulties and with some loss of life, without
paying a tribute to the magnificent services of the British
and Indian officials who endured so greatly and who,
supported throughout by loyal staffs and followers,
achieved so much for the benefit of Afghanistan.
CHAPTER XLVII
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN NEGOTIATES A NEW TREATY
Afghanistan is the door of India, and the safety of India depends on keeping
that door Strong and shut. KING HABIBULLA KHAN.
The Situation after the Death of Abdur Rahman. When
the Amir was at the point of death the princes and leading
officials, who had been warned, assembled in the Bagh-i-
Bala palace. During the night of October I, upon the
announcement of his death, a high official took the late
Ruler's kulla and, setting it on Habibulla's head, declared
him Amir. The princes and officials approved the act,
and, taking him by the hand, one by one proffered their
allegiance to him. 1 Habibulla then proceeded to the
Ark, situated inside Kabul, which was strongly held by
reliable troops, and contained the arsenal and treasury;
in the'ittorning, the corpse of the Amir was also brought
to the same stronghold.
Rumours of Risings and the Burial of Abdur Rahman.
It was generally expected that, as was customary, there
would be a mutiny of the troops, and the citizens pre-
pared for trouble by burying their jewels, strengthening
their poor defences and buying up supplies. Wild men
from the countryside, clad in rags, appeared in the city
bazaars like vultures, and added to the apprehension that
was felt. It was also rumoured that there was a plot to
seize and cut into pieces the late Amir's body on the way
to the tomb, which he had constructed outside Kabul,
but this plot, if it existed, was foiled by the burial, on the
morning of October 2, of the corpse close to the Ark.
The spirit of the soldiers was undoubtedly mutinous,
but the policy of the late Amir which permitted no dis-
1 Under the Absolute Amir, by Frank A. Martin, 1907, p. 127 et seq.
215
216 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
tinguished soldier, nor indeed any subject, to become
powerful, and had concentrated all authority in the hands
of Habibulla, averted this very real danger.
Sirdar Habibulla Khan proclaimed Amir. On October
3, 1901, Sirdar Habibulla was proclaimed Amir of
Afghanistan. The ceremony was both religious and civil.
The religious ceremony was conducted by the chief mulla
of the Juma Masjid, who, after praying, wound a lungi
of white muslin round the head of the Sirdar. A Koran
and relics of the Prophet were then presented to him,
after which he was declared to be duly elected Amir of
Afghanistan.
At the civil ceremony Sirdar Nasrulla Khan placed
the late Amir's kulla on his brother's head; the late
Amir's sword was also presented to him. Habibulla then
made a speech in which he swore to keep Afghanistan
intact, to repel foreign aggression and to promote reforms.
He also promised to abolish the hated spy system.
Habibulla, whose mother was the daughter of the Mir
of Badakhshan, had been born at Samarkand and was
thirty-two years of age at the time of his accession.
Habibulla announces his Accession to the Viceroy. In
India grave anxiety, based on alarming rumour^ in the
bazaars, naturally prevailed but, on October 10, Curzon
received a letter from Habibulla Khan informing him
that " he had been accepted by the army and nation as the
lawful sovereign of Afghanistan ". " My duty ", he
added, " is to behave in the same manner as my revered
father used to do, and I will be a friend of his friends and
avoid his enemies." x
Lord Curzon s invitation to the New Amir. In view of
the fact that the treaty with the late Amir was considered
by the Viceroy to be a personal one, although that was
not at all certain, it was decided to inform His Highness
that the Agreements with his father could not be renewed*
without a discussion of various difficult questions, and he
was invited to pay a visit to the Viceroy for the purpose.
Unfortunately Curzon's dictatorial attitude to the late
1 In this section I have consulted The Life of Lord Curzon, by the Earl of Ronaldahay,
three vols., 1928.
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN 217
Amir had not tended towards an improvement in Anglo-
Afghan relations. This is clearly shown by the statement
made later by Amir Habibulla at a durbar held on August
21, 1907. On this occasion His Highness, referring to
Lord Minto's invitation to him to visit India in 1906,
declared: " Before this, Lord Curzon also invited me to
India, but his letter was not really a letter of invitation;
it was a threat that the subsidy would be stopped if I did
not obey the summons ".
The Reply of Habibulla. In his reply to the invitation
of the Viceroy, Habibulla denied that there had been any
misunderstanding between the Government of India and
his father. He wrote: " My kind friend, I am fully
convinced that there is not a single thing, either big or
small, omitted from the terms of the Agreement, or which
would now be deserving of description or record ".
The non-acceptance by Habibulla of the Viceroy's
invitation to meet him at Peshawar in the spring of 1902
was a grievous disappointment to Curzon. He had been
most favourably impressed by the new Amir on the
occasion of his visit to Kabul, and had described him as
" a very charming personality who talked with a wisdom
and ser^e far beyond his years ". Also he had felt that,
upon the death of the old Amir, he would be able to place
Afghan affairs on a more satisfactory footing.
The Views of Habibulla on the Agreement. Added to
his disappointment was the rigid adherence of the new
Amir to the view that the Agreement made by the
Government of India with Abdur Rahman was binding
on that body as regards himself, and that there was no
need for a new Agreement. Early in June Curzon
repeated his invitation but received no reply.
The Views of Lord Curzon and of the British Govern-
ment. The anxiety of Curzon was increased at this
juncture by rumours, which gained some credit on the
North- West Frontier, that the Amir was considering an
alliance with Russia. The stage was set for a great
durbar at Delhi in the following January, and Curzon
informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Amir
responded to his overtures, he would, upon the con-
2i 8 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
elusion of the ceremony, write a stern letter, in language
that would compel a reply, upbraiding him for his dis-
loyal and unfriendly attitude and requiring definite
assurances from him. Curzon's attitude in demanding a
new treaty before paying the subsidy and giving promises
of protection was identical with that of Lytton which, as
we know, led to the Second Afghan War, The British
Government, on the other hand, took the view that the
Amir would probably become more friendly if promises
of the subsidy and of British protection were given first
and other questions were raised later. In any case the
Cabinet strongly objected to " any action likely to entail
military operations ".
The Letter of Habibulla. Fortunately the danger of
a breach with Afghanistan was averted by the receipt, on
December 12, 1902, of a letter from the Amir, which
renewed his protestations of friendship and contained his
acceptance of British arbitration in Seistan, a question
which has been dealt with in the previous chapter.
Although this letter was not wholly satisfactory, it opened
the way for a resumption of normal relations.
The Dane Mission to Kabul. During the course of
further negotiations and inquiries, it appeared^hat the
unwillingness of the Amir to visit India was partly due
to the risks that he might run as to the stability of his
position by leaving Afghanistan. It was therefore decided
to despatch Mr. (later Sir Louis) Dane on a Mission to
Kabul. He was instructed to insist that the engagements
made with Abdur Rahman were personal; he was to
embody in a treaty the assurances given to Abdur Rahman
in 1880; he was to insist on the absolute control
by the British Government of the foreign relations of
Afghanistan; he was to offer the Amir the personal
subsidy of 18 lakhs granted to his father, provided he
displayed a friendly spirit and carried out the stipulations
of the Treaty. Other points were that the Amir should
assume a benevolent attitude towards the projected
railways in the Khaibar and Kurram; that the British
Agent at Kabul and the News-writer at Kandahar should
be treated with greater courtesy, while the question of
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN 219
more liberal trade relations was to be discussed. There
was also the question of the subsidy which had been
withheld.
The Negotiations. Furnished with a draft treaty
which, in substance, repeated the old engagements, Dane
entered Afghan territory on November 28, 1904, and,
stopping to repair the cairn l on Forty-fourth Hill, which
had been erected by his cousin Major Waller, he reached
Kabul a fortnight later. At the formal durbar held on
December 14, and at the first business interview on the
following day, the Amir, whose utterances were friendly,
evinced anxiety to arrange for some scheme of military
co-operation. Indeed, he went so far as to suggest a
combined attack on Russia, which Power was, at that
time, involved in war with Japan.
Dane had been instructed to advise the Amir that
his troops were not sufficiently well organized or equipped
to support a serious attack by a Russian army, and that
if he desired assistance from Great Britain he must
co-operate by the improvement of communications be-
tween India and Kabul, and by arranging for consulta-
tion with British military experts.
Th\ reply of the Amir was that he fully realized that
his army could not resist Russia unaided and that he
relied on British support. He was not, however, pre-
pared to allow the construction of a railway from Peshawar
to Kabul since that would be regarded by all his subjects
as a spear pointed at the heart of Afghanistan. He went
on to say that he and his advisers believed that, with
British support in munitions and money, the Afghans
could effectively hold the Hindu Kush range. But, at
the same time, they clearly realized that they could
not face the Russians in the open country of Western
Afghanistan, on which side the main attack would
probably be delivered. If the British would accept the
task of guarding their western frontier, land would be
given them for a railway or road along the Helmand and
also for a cantonment in the fertile area of Seistan,
Furthermore, the Amir proposed a continuation of the
i Vide Chapter XXXII.
220 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
railway or road northwards to Hashtadan situated to the
south-west of Herat, where a second cantonment would
be constructed. " That ", he emphatically declared,
" would constitute a shield for Afghanistan. 1 '
In reporting this far-reaching scheme, Dane urged
that were cold water thrown on it, the negotiations in
hand would suffer, and that the matter should receive
consideration. Curzon, however, curtly replied that
Dane was not authorised to discuss the scheme but that,
if the Amir visited India, it would be dealt witlj by the
proper authorities.
Dane perforce discouraged the Amir's project of an
attack on Russia, while he was not able to give any support
to his military scheme, which, to some extent, was
actually carried out by the British in the last Great War
by the construction of a railway from Nushki, through
British Baluchistan and crossing the Persian frontier to
the south of Seistan. He also could not hold out any
hopes of an increased subsidy, another advantage that
the Amir and his Councillors had hoped to secure.
These discouraging statements caused a marked
change in the atmosphere. The Amir and his Coun-
cillors, who were mortified at their military scher^ being
entirely ignored, became resentful and suspicious.
The Amir produces a Draft Treaty. On January i ,
1 905, the Amir, who had persistently refused to sign the
treaty drafted by the Government of India, brought
matters to a head by producing a draft treaty of his own,
which, he stated, represented the utmost limits to which
he would go. In this remarkable document x he asserted
that in matters great and small he had acted and would
continue to act in accordance with the Agreement made
by Abdur Rahman, This draft was not considered
acceptable by the Government of India, and Dane,
realizing the danger of a deadlock, attempted to help*
matters by announcing that the intention of the Govern-
ment of India was to pay up the arrears of the subsidy.
The Amir and his Councillors were, however, deeply
chagrined by the refusal to discuss their scheme for
1 It is given as Appendix D.
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN 221
military co-operation, on which they had evidently set
their hearts. They also considered that Russia had been
made powerless for many years to come by her defeats
at the hands of Japan, and that Afghanistan was strong
enough to deal with the Northern Power in case of
hostilities. Furthermore, there was the feeling that
Great Britain had yielded to Russia in insisting on the
evacuation by Afghanistan of Roshan and Shignan,
whereas, if left to themselves, the Afghans believed that
they could have retained both provinces. Consequently,
the attitude was assumed by the arrogant Sirdars^ his
councillors, that the alliance was much more necessary
for the British than for themselves, and that they could
therefore dictate the terms of any treaty they vouchsafed
to negotiate. The situation was furthermore adversely
affected by the Amir's serious illness, which lasted from
January 12 to the beginning of March, with the un-
fortunate result that Sirdar Nasrulla Khan and Abdul
Kuddus Khan, the First Councillor and the Kotwal of
Kabul, who were both extremely fanatical and anti-British,
dominated the negotiations during this period. Later,
the return of Sirdar Inayatulla Khan, the eldest son of the
Amir, from a visit to India where he had been shown
much hospitality and friendliness, influenced Habibulla
as did his father-in-law who had accompanied the young
Sirdar. These facts and the recovery of His Highness
secured a more friendly attitude.
The Amir's Treaty. The situation was, however, a
difficult one. Curzon advocated that, unless the Amir was
prepared to make some advance towards accepting the
views of the Government of India, Dane should be
instructed to leave Kabul. The British Government,
however, decided to accept the Amir's treaty, which did,
at any rate, include the obligations undertaken by his
father.
The Signing of the Treaty. This treaty was accord-
ingly signed on March 21, the Afghan New Year's Day.
As the Amir was affixing his signature, he shook some ink
from his pen over the English copy of the parchment
and exclaimed: " It is spoilt; we must write out other
222 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
treaties''. Dane, a notable Persian scholar, replied:
" This is only a mole on the fair face of the treaty ",
and quoted from Hafiz: " If this Shiraz beauty will
accept my heart, for her Hindu-dark mole I will give
Samarkand and Bukhara ". This apt quotation eased
the situation, but Abdul Kuddus exclaimed: " See, Your
Majesty, Mr. Dane gives you Samarkand and Bukhara ".
But Dane's prompt reply was: " Nay, the mole is on the
face of the British treaty and for this the Amir abandons
Samarkand and Bukhara ". The treaty is still known as
" The Treaty of the Mole ". It must be remembered
that the engagements made with Abdur Rahman referred
to in Chapter XLIII were contained in letters written
to various authorities. Some doubt was expressed by
Sirdar Nasrulla Khan as to their authenticity. Con-
sequently, after verification, these letters were attached
to the treaty.
The Results of the Mission. It cannot be claimed that
this mission was successful in carrying out many import-
ant questions that would, it was hoped, be settled. How-
ever, the Amir agreed to demarcate the Mohmand
boundary at an early date; he showed no hostility to the
proposed railways in the Khaibar Pass and the Kurram
Valley, while he somewhat improved the status and treat-
ment of the British agent at Kabul and of the news-
writers at Kandahar and Herat. Perhaps the best result
that was achieved was the contact by the British Com-
missioner and members of his staff, with officials, officers
and other Afghans during their three months' residence
in Kabul. It lessened the fanatical, suspicious attitude of
the Amir's Councillors and subjects while he himself, in
spite of his unfortunate illness, was courteous throughout.
When it was known that the Amir's treaty was to be
signed, both the Amir and his Councillors became
extremely friendly. They had every reason to feel
satisfied. In addition to having had his own way as
regards the treaty, Habibulla had gained the acknowledge-
ment of the British Government that he was " Independent
King of Afghanistan and its Dependencies ". Independ-
ence was the dearest wish of the Amir and of all Afghans.
AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN 223
The Views of the Government of India. Lord Curzon's
Government in their despatch forwarding the report on
the Dane mission wrote, in May 1905: " The one
satisfaction to which we may look is that the Amir,
having obtained his main objects and obtained them in
his own way, appears to have been left by the British
Mission in a favourable and friendly frame of mind. It
is not denied that such an attitude is in itself more
valuable than any paper stipulations, but for the value to
be substantial, the attitude must be lasting. We have
yet to ap|)ly it to the test of every-day experience."
The Secretary of State for India on the Mission. In
June 1905, Mr. Brodrick (later, the Earl of Midleton)
declared that: " It was not the case that the negotiations
had resulted in failure. As stated by Lord Lansdowne,
the main objects of our negotiations with the Amir of
Afghanistan were, first, to renew the agreements entered
into with the late Amir, and, secondly, to have friendly
negotiations with him, with regard to a number of sub-
sidiary points. The first object was achieved by an
Agreement that covered all the engagements entered into
by the Amir Abdur Rahman. We also arrived at a
thoroughly friendly understanding with the Amir on a
number *J>f subsidiary points." Lord Midleton, in his
Records and Reactions^ sums up: " It would thus appear
that the experienced Anglo-Indians on the Council were
more than right in warning us that the alternative
hectoring policy might have led us into the same morass
as Lord Ellenborough and Lord Lytton found themselves
before ".'
The Credit due to Sir Louis Dane. It was pleasing to
note that, in spite of his failure to secure a complete settle-
ment, there was no question as to the ability and courage
shown by the British representative while contending
tr the principles and objects originally put forward,
qually praiseworthy was the dignity with which he
acted on the orders to accept the proposals of the Amir.
Looking back on these negotiations and realizing the
weakness of Habibulla's position, together with the
' p. i 99 .
224 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XLVH
fanatical, anti-foreign feelings of his advisers and his
subjects, it was essential for the Amir to prove that he
had won success in his negotiations with the British, This
he undoubtedly did and thereby was inclined to be
friendly, which attitude led to his important visit to India
in 1907. Accepting this point of view, it would appear
that the treaty Sir Louis Dane signed was a good treaty.
Finally, Curzon's appeal to history warrants it as such.
The immediate result was the visit of the Amir to India
and the ultimate result was the loyal adherence of His
Majesty to his treaty obligations under conditions of
considerable difficulty and danger throughout the course
of the Great War.
CHAPTER XLVIII
HIS MAJESTY HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA
In the name of Allah. Dated Jamrud, March 7, 1907. At the time of
returning from my journey to India, and of re-entering Afghan territory.
My tourin India, which has lasted sixty-four days, has given me so much
pleasure that I cannot find words to express it. Every kindness has been shown
to me by the Government of India, His Excellency the Viceroy, the Commander-
in-Chief, and other Military officers and Civil authorities in India, and I have
found them all friends.
I am able to declare that, during this short tour in India, I have made more
true friends for the Government of Afghanistan and for myself than I could
have made in twenty years had I not come from Afghanistan to India.
Autograph Message of His MAJESTY THE AMIR to Reuter.
Lord Minto's Invitation to the Amir. During the
early months of 1 906, it had been reported from various
sources that the Amir, if invited to pay a friendly visit to
India, would probably accept. Lord Minto l accordingly
despatched a warm invitation in June 1906, outlining a
programme, which would include some big game shoot-
ing. The Amir in his reply asked that it should be under-
stood that his visit would be purely a friendly one and
that there would be no discussion of the recently signed
treaty. This assurance he required in order to satisfy
the suspicions of his subjects and thereby gain their
approval of his acceptance. It appears that the anti-
British Nasrulla Khan opposed the whole project and
had asked permission to undertake the pilgrimage to
Mecca, but was informed that he must act as Regent
in the absence of the Amir.
The Acceptance of the Invitation. In August at a
Burbar the Amir said: " I cannot hesitate to accept the
invitation of His Excellency, which is couched in such
terms of friendship, expressing a desire for an interview
between friends ".
1 Mary, Countess of Minto has very kindly read through this and the following
chapter. Her help has been moat valuable.
VOL. II 225 Q
226 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Amir's Staff and Escort. Having decided to
visit India, the Amir selected the Sirdars who were to
accompany him, some of whom it was not prudent to
leave in Afghanistan during his absence. The total of
his party, which included his bodyguard, cavalry and
infantry, aggregated some 1 100 officers and men. During
his absence he arranged for Sirdar Nasrulla Khan to
assume full powers, while Sirdar Inayatulla Khan was
placed in charge of the army, but under the supervision
of Nasrulla Khan.
The Reception at Landi Khana, January 2,' 1907.
The Amir was met upon his arrival at Landi Khana by
Sir Henry McMahon, who as a member of the Durand
Mission had made his acquaintance at Kabul in 1893,
and who had been placed in charge of His Majesty during
his visit to India. 1 A salute of thirty-one guns was fired,
but of far greater importance was a cable of welcome
from the King-Emperor in which, for the first time, he
was addressed as " His Majesty ".
The Reception at Agra. Lady Minto gives a brilliant
description of the reception of the Amir at Agra, of the
investiture of His Majesty with the Grand Cross of the
Order of the Bath and of the impression created on him
by the review of 30,000 British troops. 2 At the banquet
which followed, the Amir, in reply to the Viceroy's
speech of welcome, said: " I am very glad that the first
occasion on which I left my home has been to come to
my friend's house, and I hope and sincerely trust from
my heart that I have found a personal friend for myself
and for my Government, and I am very highly pleased."
Habibulla and Lord Kitchener. The Amir was enter-
tained at a banquet by Lord Kitchener who also, apart
from a review, had arranged a combined artillery and
cavalry display. The Amir then rode past miles of troops,
the band of each regiment playing the Afghan Antheiru
Finally, he was shown the military balloon and made an
ascent in it.
The Visit to Aligarh College. The Amir displayed
1 Sir Henry McMahon has kindly read this chapter.
2 Minto and Morley, p. 75 et seq.
HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA 227
the keenest interest in the inspection he made of the
Moslem College. After examining the students minutely
in religious ritual, and in obligations of fasting, in his
speech, much to their surprise, he exhorted them to seek
Western education.
The Visit to Gwalior. Later, thanks to the courtesy of
His Highness the Maharaja, a visit to Gwalior, with its
beautiful palace and gardens, its well-drilled troops and
its tiger shooting, was a complete success, more especi-
ally as, to his delight, the Amir shot a tiger.
Cawnpore, Delhi and Calcutta. Cawnpore with its
factories, and Delhi with its historical buildings were
alike examined in considerable detail, while, at Calcutta,
the mint, the museum, the zoological gardens, the
hospitals and, perhaps above all, the shops delighted His
Majesty, who was indefatigable. He also inspected the
ordnance factories at Cossipore and Dum-Dum with the
keenest interest, while he expressed his earnest wish to
be able to manufacture cordite at Kabul. On another
day he was taken round the docks, which deeply impressed
an inhabitant of Afghanistan who had never seen a ship.
To turn to another question, as was perhaps to be
expectecj from the ruler of a nation clad in sheepskin, he
severely criticized the fat bare calves of the Bengalis,
while their scanty clothing made him remark: " If the
British after 250 years of rule, have not managed to
induce them to wear more clothes, it shows that they
were not intended by nature to improve! " This attitude
recalls the horror of the ancient Persians at the Greeks
exercising in a state of nudity. It remains to add that the
Amir expressed his ardent wish to be initiated into the
mysteries of freemasonry and, not without some difficulty,
this was arranged by the Calcutta Lodge.
The Visit to the British Fleet. At Bombay, where the
Afghan monarch described the sea as " quite a large
tank," practice of the big guns in the forts had been
arranged and the Amir fired a xo-inch gun at a moving
target some 5000 yards distant. He also was received
by Admiral Sir E, Poe on H.M.S. Hermes and visited
the engine-room, watched gun drill, and made detailed
228 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
inquiries into everything. He fired a torpedo at a moving
target with complete success; and lastly, he fired a
submerged mine. At dusk he watched the illumination
of the fleet.
Karachi and Lahore. Leaving hospitable Bombay
with deep regret, the voyage to Karachi, where all the
ships were dressed with flags, was uneventful. After the
official reception, the Amir steamed to the Manora
entrance of the harbour where an old hulk was blown to
atoms by a submarine mine. On the way to Lahore, he
stopped to inspect the great bridge over the Indus at
Attock. It is interesting to recall that his father, after
inspecting it, wrote to Lord Dufferin suggesting various
changes and improvements in its structure!
Habibulla was delighted with Lahore, which had
once been in the possession of his dynasty. He also
visited the Golden Temple at Amritsar, where he made
friends with the Sikh priests. " I respect all religions ",
he said to McMahon, " but despise those who are
lukewarm in their own faith. " This unusual attitude of
toleration to the religion of their hereditary enemies dis-
pleased the Afghan Sirdars, who also resented the Amir's
open friendliness to British officials and their wives.
The Islamia College. At Lahore the Amir carried out
his promise of laying the foundation of the Islamia
College. His speech ran: " Oh! my Moslem brethren,
endeavour to acquire knowledge, so that you may not
wear the clothes of the ignorant. It is your duty to
acquire knowledge. After your children have thoroughly
acquainted themselves with the principles and laws of the
faith of Muhammad, turn their attention towards the
acquirement of the new sciences, as, unless you acquire
Western knowledge, you will remain without bread."
He followed up this excellent advice by making a donation
of 20,000 rupees towards the building fund and promised
an annual grant of 12,000 rupees.
Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Resuming his journey,
the Amir stopped at Rawalpindi where he visited one
of the outlying forts. He also inspected the arsenal,
and was much impressed by the thousands of rifles no
H.M. KING HABIIU'LLA KHAN
(Ry favour uf Sir Ijiiiis Dane)
HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA 229
less than 70,000 being stacked in a single room. He
then left for Peshawar.
The Farewell. The Amir awarded various decora-
tions to the British officers who had served on his staff.
He presented McMahon with the Order of the Sardari
of the First Class as a token of high esteem, and, in reply
to a question, stated that the order had been instituted
by his father some years ago, but that hitherto it had not
been awarded to anyone.
On the morning of March 7, the Amir accompanied
by McMahon drove up the Khaibar Pass to Landi Kota/ y
where he accepted the invitation of the officers of the
Khyber Rifles I to lunch. He then mounted a horse and
rode slowly along the winding mountain road that leads to
the British frontier near Landi Khana. There he was met
by a force of cavalry and large numbers of tribesmen,
who gave him a vociferous welcome. Finally, after
embracing McMahon, with tears streaming down his
cheeks, he rode off down the valley to Kabul.
Summary. The Amir, upon his arrival in India, dis-
played a strong vein of suspicion lest some slight to his
own dignity and the honour of Afghanistan might be
offered him, but these feelings were soon dissipated by
the genuine warmth of his reception, and as the days
passed, he became more and more intimate with the
officials with whom he was associated. He revealed him-
self to be a broad-minded, cultured Afghan ruler, pos-
sessing a remarkably strong character with a great regard
for truth. Deeply religious, he was singularly free from
bigotry. On the other hand, he was a shrewd, far-seeing
man of business, knowing exactly what he wanted and
taking care to secure it. Above everything, he was an
ardent patriot, ready to sacrifice himself for his country,
and staunchly loyal to his friends, so long as his friends
ijemained loyal to him. He was a good sportsman, a
good shot and a good mechanic. Curiously enough he
did not speak Pashtu with any fluency.
To conclude, friendship with Sir Louis Dane, which
was sincere, induced Habibulla, in spite of strong opposi-
1 I am bound to retain the old spelling for this force.
230 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.XLVHI
tion from his advisers, to accept Minto's invitation to
India. At first, like his brother Nasrulla in London, he
was suspicious, but gradually it dawned on him that he
was being treated not only as a King but also as a friend.
He was deeply impressed by the dignity of the Viceroy
and the splendour of the official functions. Still more
deeply was he impressed by the army, the fleet and the
administration. But most of all was he impressed by the
personality of Minto, of Kitchener and of many other
officials whom he met, while he absolutely trusted and
felt deep affection for McMahon. Realizing, ds he re-
peatedly stated, that Russia was the enemy of Afghanistan,
he made up his mind that he would, through thick and
thin, be loyal to his engagements with Great Britain,
provided that he was shown equal loyalty and confidence
in return. History proves how well he kept his word.
Plot against the Amir. It was noticed that, owing to
the Amir's warm friendship with his English hosts, the
members of his entourage considered themselves to have
been neglected, which was certainly the case. They also
disliked the pleasure he evinced in English society and
the courtesy with which he treated Hindus and Sikhs.
Above all, they resented the fact of his having been
admitted into the brotherhood of freemasonry. Indeed,
the admiration for Western civilization which was frankly
expressed by Habibulla upon his return to Afghanistan,
went far to alienate his conservative subjects. As a proof
of these feelings, the mullas of Laghman, whose fanaticism
was undoubtedly aroused by wild rumours as to his
actions in India, plotted against the Amir. But the plot
was discovered and the conspirators were executed.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION
Essential as a friendly Afghanistan may be to our position in India, equally
essential, I submit, is a friendly Russia to our general international position,
both as regards the actual situation, and also in respect to that in the not distant
future. . . . We have secured an undertaking with France. That with Russia
is in its very early infancy, and will require, for reasons which I need not explain,
careful nurture and treatment. Any serious check to this infant growth may
kill it before it has advanced in years, and its disappearance would doubtless
eventually react on our relations with France. . . . SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON
to Sir Edward Grey, July 1908.
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 produced a dttente> but not an
entente. G. P. GOOCH.
The Anglo-Russian Convention. In this work, when
dealing with the very important question of the Anglo-
Russian Convention, I have described it primarily as
affecting the Anglo-Afghan relations, which is my main
theme. While acknowledging the importance of the Con-
vention on our relations with Persia and Tibet, I have
dealt with these questions in a somewhat less detailed
form.
Russian Attempts to open up Direct Communication with
Afghanistan. In 1900 a letter dated February 21, which
was written by Ignatieff, the Political Officer at Bukhara,
to the Afghan Commercial Agent, was communicated by
the Amir to the Government of India. In this document
Ignatieff expressed the sincere desire that his letter might
constitute the first step towards direct friendly relations
between the two countries; the document also contained
g,n assurance that " Russia had not, and never had enter-
tained, unfriendly feelings towards Afghanistan ". Refer-
ence was further made to the movements of Russian
troops in Transcaspia, which had attracted attention,
principally owing to their coinciding with the reverses
sustained by Great Britain in South Africa.
231
232 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Count Lamsdorff sought to justify IgnatiefFs action
and, in London, M. de Staal again raised the question. 1
Lansdowne replied that His Majesty's Government while
willing to consider the question in the most friendly
spirit, would object to any change being made in the
system hitherto observed without their previous consent,
and would regard any attempt at such a change as a
departure from the understanding between the two
Governments and a contravention of the repeated assur-
ances of the Russian Government that they considered
Afghanistan to be entirely outside the sphere 'of their
influence.
Habibulla Khan's Declaration. In September 1902
Habibulla, at a durbar, read out another Russian com-
munication urging the opening of trade-routes for
Russian caravans from the railhead at Kushk to Kabul
and Herat, and offering in return special trade privileges
to Afghan traders. The Amir then announced that his
policy was identical with that of his father and replied
that all future communications should be addressed
through the Government of India. The feeling in the
durbar was hostile, and a Chief exclaimed: " Let this
Turki dog, who carries messages for Infidels, be beaten
on the head with shoes, until his hair falls off. This
should be our answer to the Russians."
Serious Russo-Afghan Friction in 1903. In the spring
of 1903 friction had arisen between Russian and Afghan
officials owing to the alleged destruction of boundary
pillars in the neighbourhood of Herat and other minor
incidents. In June it was reported that letters from the
Governor of Transcaspia, dealing with these questions,
were being received by the Governor of Herat. Lans-
downe drew the attention of Count Benckendorff to this,
only, at first, to receive an evasive reply. But in a Pro-
Memoria dated September 22, 1903, in dealing with the
question of the replacement of certain pillars on the Russo-
Afghan frontier, which the British wished to arrange
1 I have consulted the admirable Origins of the War, vol. iv, by G. P. Gooch and
Major H, W. V. Temperley for this chapter. I would also thank the Honble. Harold
Nicolson for kindly reading it. Vide also Sykes op, cit. vol. ii, pp. 410-415.
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 233
by the despatch of British and Russian officers, but
which the Russians wished to treat as a purely local
affair, the Russian minute ended as follows: " Le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres ne peut que reit^rer
sa ferme decision de suivre le proced indiqu dans ses
communications anterieures et se fait un devoir d'ajouter
qu'apres les explications franches qu'il dtait a mSme de
donner k ce sujet, il consid6re la question dont il s'agit
comme definitivement close ".
Lansdowne informed Benckendorff that His Majesty's
Government deeply resented the tone of the Russian
communication and had written a long despatch to the
British Charg d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, which was
intended as a defence of British conduct and, he was
afraid he must add, an indictment of that of the Russian
Government. A copy of this despatch, which had been
withheld owing to conciliatory communications from
Lamsdorff, was now handed to Benckendorff to read.
Anglo-Japanese Treaties^ 1902 and 1905. In 1902,
Great Britain, renouncing definitely her policy of isola-
tion, negotiated a treaty with Japan by the terms of
which, " in the event of either party becoming involved in
war with a third Power, the other Power was to remain
fceutral unless any other Power or Powers should join in
hostilities against that ally, when the contracting party
will come to its assistance". Three years later, in 1905,
a Treaty of Alliance was concluded, which bound the
contracting parties to come to each other's assistance in
case of unprovoked attack on the part of any other Power
or Powers ; this treaty was renewed in 1911.
In October 1905 Sir Charles (later Lord) Hardinge
asked Count Lamsdorff to express his opinion on the
Anglo- Japanese Treaty. He replied that it had created
a most unfavourable impression in Government circles.
Jrlardinge thereupon pointed out that Russia at great
cost had constructed a series of strategical railways to
the frontiers of Afghanistan, which the Russian Govern-
ment had frequently declared to be outside their sphere
of influence, and to the very gates of Herat. Their one
object was to facilitate an attack on Afghanistan or India.
234 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
It was undoubtedly intended that there should be a
perpetual means of exerting pressure on England by
military movements on the Afghan frontier and it con-
stituted a standing menace to India. 1
Against this point of view it is only fair to note that
the Russian military authorities believed that, in case of
hostilities breaking out between the two empires, the
British would incite the Amir to cross the Oxus at the
head of the Afghan army and raise the fanatical Moslem
inhabitants against their Russian masters. They also
held the view, which cannot be gainsaid, that while Great
Britain could attack Russia by sea in more than one
portion of her empire, her rival's only avenue of attack
was that leading across Afghanistan to India.
The Resumption of Anglo-Russian Negotiations, 1905.
Upon the outbreak of war with Japan in 1904, it was
agreed that negotiations could not be advantageously
continued, but, in 1 905, Lansdowne, in reply to a question
by Benckendorff, informed him that British policy towards
Afghanistan had not changed. He invited Benckendorff,
in return for this declaration, to give an assurance that
the Russian Government considered that their policy also
was unchanged and that they continued to regard Afghan-
istan as lying wholly outside their sphere of influence. In
case of this assurance being given, the change desired by
Russia in the status quo to arrange for the interchange of
communications between the Russian and Afghan officials
on non-political questions of a local character would be
allowed. Benckendorff assured Lansdowne verbally in
March 1905 that the Russian Government also desired
that Afghanistan should remain a buffer state.
The Russo-German Treaty of Bjorkoe, 1905. In July
of this year it is to be noted that, persuaded by the Kaiser,
the Tsar signed at Bjorkoe a personal treaty of alliance
between Russia and Germany, Russia thereby entering
the orbit of German diplomacy. This treaty was not
ratified by the ministers of either state, but, shortly after
signing it, the Kaiser wrote to the Tsar that it was
directed against England and that France would be
1 Op. cit. vol. iv, p. 206.
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 235
obliged to join it, thus practically converting it into a
Pan-European Alliance against England and Japan. His
efforts to disrupt the Franco-Russian alliance and the
Anglo-French understanding were also unceasing. It
thus became clear to Great Britain that continued friction
with Russia would only have played into the hands of
the strong pro-German party at the Russian Court.
The Anglo-Russian Convention^ 1907. Hostilities
between Russia and Japan were officially ended by the
Peace Treaty that was signed on August 23, 1905. The
defeat of Russia produced a readiness among the states-
men of the Northern Power to effect a settlement with
Great Britain in Asia. The Agreement that was ulti-
mately negotiated represented a comprehensive and final
effort to deal with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia,
Afghanistan and Tibet, 1 the underlying idea being to
embody in its principles and articles terms that would
remove all possible causes of friction in the future.
Generally speaking, the British invited concessions in
Afghanistan and Tibet, while displaying readiness to make
sacrifices in Persia.
The Correspondence between Lord Minto and Lord
Morley. Early in 1907 Morley informed Minto that
negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Convention were on
foot and sent him an outline. Minto in his reply especially
deprecated the concession of direct communication be-
tween Russian and Afghan officials. He also wrote: " It
seems to me that, in entering into any agreement with
Russia affecting Afghanistan, unbeknown to the Amir,
we stand to lose a friendship of incalculable value, not
only in respect to the defence of India, but as regards
a frontier war ", 2
During the course of the negotiations, the former
question was dropped, but Morley, although the Foreign
Office supported Minto's statesmanlike views, tactlessly
decided that " since the Agreement altered nothing in
the Treaty of 1905, the Amir should not be consulted,
but be merely advised of its terms after signature ".
1 This Agreement forms Appendix E.
2 India^ Morley and Minto, by Mary, Countess of Minto, 1934.
236 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Viceroy informs the Amir. Upon the conclusion
of the Agreement, Minto, in his letter of September
10, informed the Amir that Articles I and II of the Con-
vention reaffirm in the clearest manner respect for the
sovereign rights of His Majesty, and the policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of the country; that
the Russian Government recognize for the first time in a
formal document that Afghanistan lies outside the sphere
of Russian influence and engage that all their political
relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through
the intermediary of the British Government; that, by
Article III, Great Britain concedes to Russia her per-
mission for Russian and Afghan frontier officials, specially
appointed, to settle purely local questions; and that, by
Article IV, the principle of equal treatment for British
and Russian commerce in Afghanistan is laid down.
The Reply of the Amir. In his reply Habibulla
forwarded the views of a Council of State which con-
sidered that the Convention destroyed the independence
of Afghanistan and possessed no advantage. It also, in
their opinion, gave the right to both Powers to construct
railways in Afghanistan. The real trouble was, of course,
mainly due to Morley's lack of tact in ignoring the Amir.
As Minto pointed out, the Amir himself was favourable
to the Convention but was not strong enough to override
the anti-British party headed by Sirdar Nasrulla Khan.
Russia decides that the Adhesion of Afghanistan was not
necessary to the Validity of the Treaty. In the autumn of
1908, Isvolski most fortunately declared that whether
the Amir gave his formal adhesion or not, the Russian
Government would treat the Convention as a valid in-
strument. The Amir persisted in his refusal to sign the
Convention, which lessened the friendship engendered by
his visit to India. It certainly stands to his credit that,
in spite of German and Turkish overtures, he remained
loyal to his engagements during the World War.
Persia and the Anglo-Russian Agreement. So far as
Persia, whose ruler was not consulted by the two great
neighbouring Powers, was concerned, the chief obstacle
to a friendly agreement between Great Britain and Russia
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 237
was the strategical importance of Seistan. As mentioned
in Chapter XXXVI, I had founded the British Consulate
in that fertile province in 1899 and in the following year
a Russian Consulate was also founded. From the start
there was bitter rivalry, more especially on the Russian
side, and upon the arrival of Sir Henry McMahon in
1903, to arbitrate between Persia and Afghanistan on
the new situation created by the change in the course of
the River Helmand, as described in a former chapter, the
Russian representative displayed open antagonism to the
British arbitrator, whose efforts to ensure a peaceful settle-
ment were, however, ultimately successful. Partly owing
to these strenuous intrigues of the Russian Consul against
the British arbitrator, the military party in Russia con-
sidered that the surrender of Seistan, when the creation
of the two spheres of commercial influence were discussed,
demanded an important equivalent concession by the
British.
In the Convention, as finally agreed upon, Great
Britain and Russia bound themselves mutually to respect
the integrity and independence of Persia. The two
Powers then divided up the country into zones of com-
mercial influence with a large neutral zone which sepa-
rated the two areas in the south-west. The area assigned
to the Northern Power contained the capital and practic-
ally all the great cities of Persia together with the largest,
most fertile and best-watered areas in the country, while
its boundaries marched with Russia on both sides of the
Caspian Sea.
Great Britain, on the other hand, was content with
a relatively small sphere which consisted mainly of
semi-desert areas, and contained only one city of import-
ance in Kerman, the capital of the province of that name.
The boundary, however, as drawn, did prevent Russia
Jfrom marching with the western frontier of Afghanistan ;
it included Seistan and also the port of Bandar Abbas,
thereby preventing the creation by Russia of a harbour
giving access to the open waters of the Arabian Sea.
To turn to the neutral zone, which included the very
rich Karun Valley and the fertile province of Pars, with
238 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the historical city of Shiraz: the Government of India
urged the great importance of placing the head of the
Persian Gulf and the lower Karun Valley within the
British sphere, realizing that Germany might well peg out
claims in it, as indeed she attempted to do. The whole
question was, however, hurried through, without giving
time for proper discussion, owing to the fact that there
were strong pro-German forces, headed by some of the
Russian Grand dukes, which were working to wreck
the Convention. The enormous developments in oil in
this area have alone proved the validity of the Govern-
ment of India's contention and, as in the case of the
Baghdad Railway, and of the status of Kuwait, the results
of the Great War were distinctly beneficial to Great
Britain.
We now come to the point of view of Persia. No
nation, least of all one with such a glorious past as she
could claim, likes to be slighted, and Persia felt bitterly
on this point. Of even greater practical importance to
her statesmen was the fact that the basis of their policy,
which was the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia,
had now disappeared. They considered and rightly
so in the case of Russia that the creation of spheres of
influence was but a stage on the road to annexation. As
a result, Great Britain, who had long been considered to
be the trusted friend and protector of Persia, owing to
her agreement with Russia, was now held to be her
enemy. To conclude this section, I will quote from a
Persian poem addressed to Sir Edward Grey:
Not Persia only feels the Russian squeeze,
'Tis felt by Afghans and by Kashgaris!
" Russia her pact will keep ", you answer me :
Her records read, and wondrous things you'll see!
Not I, but human nature, tells you plain
That pacts weigh naught compared with present gain;
The more since Russia longs for India still,
As longs the hawk for partridge o'er the hill;
Else why did she o'er Persian lands let loose
Her Cossack hordes to crown her long abuse?
British Relations with Tibet. In the nineteenth
century our relations with Tibet were unsatisfactory,
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 239
mainly owing to the zenophobe character of both its
rulers and its population. In 1885 Colman Macaulay,
Secretary to the Government of Bengal, secured Chinese
assent to lead a British Mission to Lhasa. He had, how-
ever, failed to secure the consent of the Tibetan Govern-
ment, and the mission, after being stopped on the
frontier, was subsequently withdrawn. Somewhat natur-
ally, considering that the retirement of the mission con-
stituted a proof of weakness, a Tibetan force invaded
Sikkim^ and constructed a fort some eighteen miles
inside the boundaries of that state. This position was
attacked by the British in 1888 and the Tibetans, who
suffered many casualties, were driven out of Sikkim.
In 1890 a Chinese representative met Sir Mortimer
Durand on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier to discuss various
questions. No progress with these negotiations was
effected until the impracticable Chinese official was shown
the great pit in which the Tibetans, who had been killed
in the attack on their fort in 1888, had been buried.
This action rendered the Celestial envoy more reason-
able and, as a result, Great Britain and China ultimately
signed a Convention, by the terms of which Sikkim was
recognized to be a British protectorate, while a Boundary
Commission was decided upon. Further negotiations
led to a Trade Treaty in 1893, but the Tibetans con-
structed a fortified wall, which ran across the valley close
to the trade-mart at Yatung, in order to prevent traders
from penetrating into their country.
Such was the position in 1899 when Lord Curzon,
realizing the futility of attempting to deal with the
Chinese Amban at Lhasa, attempted to negotiate direct
with the Dalai Lama. His letters, despatched through
various agents in 1899, 1900 and 1901, were, however,
returned without having been opened. The Dalai Lama,
alarmed by British attempts to penetrate his sacred home-
land, now decided to turn to Russia. His adviser and
agent was Dorjieff, a Mongol Buriat by birth and a
Russian subject, who had formerly been his tutor. The
Dalai Lama accordingly despatched this envoy to Russia
in 1901, where he was received by the Tsar. His
2 4 o HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
mission was hailed with delight by the Russian press,
which declared that the Dalai Lama had turned to
Russia as being " the only Power able to frustrate the
intrigues of Great Britain ". Among the gifts brought
back to Lhasa by Dorjieff was a magnificent set of
Russian episcopal robes for the Dalai Lama; there was
also a consignment of Russian arms and ammunition.
The position for the British, at this juncture, had
become serious. Not only had the Dalai Lama rebuffed
the advances of the Viceroy, but he had sent a mission to
Russia, their rival in Asia, while there were rumours of
the conclusion of a secret agreement between Russia
and China, which later proved to have been unfounded.
However, the result of this mission was to upset the
borderland states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.
Immediate action was imperative and, in 1903,
Curzon instructed Colonel (later Sir Francis) Young-
husband to march into Tibet with an armed escort. The
Viceroy's proposal was that he should proceed to Lhasa,
but the Cabinet, still involved in the South African War, 1
would only permit him in the first instance to march to
Kampa Dzong, situated a few miles across the frontier.
Owing to Tibetan obstructiveness there was a delay of
five months at this place before instructions were received
to march up the Chumbi Valley. This advance was
resisted by the badly armed Tibetans, who suffered heavy
losses, and the British column, which had been reinforced,
finally entered Lhasa.
The Dalai Lama and his staff fled to Urgai in Outer
Mongolia, but the Tibetan authorities, impressed by
Younghusband's friendly attitude, and influenced by the
Amban, by the representative of Nepal and by the ruler
of Bhutan, were prepared to negotiate. Under these
favourable conditions, in September 1904, a Convention
was signed, which included the recognition of the Anglo-*
Chinese Convention of 1890 while the sites of trade-
marts were fixed. An indemnity of 75,000,000 rupees
was agreed upon, while the Chumbi Valley was to be
temporarily occupied as security. The British Cabinet
1 Vide Records and Reactions, by the Earl of Midleton, p. 199.
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 241
reduced the indemnity to one-third, to be paid in three
annual instalments. The Chinese Government carried
out these payments and the Chumbi Valley was evacuated
in 1908. The Cabinet also, remembering the fate of
Cavagnari at Kabul, vetoed the establishment of a British
Agent at Lhasa.
The Younghusband mission excited unfavourable
comment in Russia, but Lansdowne replied to the Russian
Ambassador that, for a Power which had encroached in
Manchuria, Turkistan and elsewhere, the protest was
" beyonci measure strange ", and that the sole object of
British action was to obtain satisfaction for Tibetan
affronts.
The Chinese Government, awakened by British
activity in Tibet, decided to restore their authority in that
country and, in 1906, a Convention was concluded
between Great Britain and China, by which the latter
Power assumed responsibility for the preservation of the
integrity of Tibet. 1
Such then was the position of affairs when the section
of the Convention concerning Tibet was negotiated with
Russia. It contained five short articles, which after
acknowledging the " special interest of Great Britain in
the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations
of Tibet ", bound both Powers not to interfere with its
internal affairs; it also bound both Powers to deal with
Tibet, through the intermediary of China, except as
regards matters arising out of the Lhasa Convention;
and finally bound them not to seek for concessions for
roads, mines, etc.
Summary. Looking back, it is clear that the task of
Sir Arthur Nicolson was most difficult. 2 There was the
soreness due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the sus-
picions instilled into the Emperor's mind by the intrigues
?f the Kaiser and the pro-German party. 3 Moreover the
question was dealt with at St. Petersburg by an inter-
1 Gooch and Temperley, op. cit. vol. iv, pp. 323-326.
* The Life of Lord Carnock, by the Hon. Harold Nicolson, p. 254.
3 In September 1907 Isvolski stated to Sir E. Goschen that it had required all his
patience to withstand the constant " hammering " to which he had been subjected from
Berlin, where the idea of the Convention had been most distasteful.
VOL. II
242 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
departmental Committee instead of by the Foreign
Minister. So far as Afghanistan was concerned it trans-
pired during the negotiations that Russia was genuinely
afraid that we might use Afghanistan as a spearhead for
aggressive action in Central Asia. Evidently her defeat
by Japan had upset her balance. However, Nicolson,
perhaps our ablest diplomatist, finally carried through the
negotiations to a successful issue. A proof of the import-
ance of this Convention may be found in the Kaiser's
minute on the despatch which informed him of its
conclusion. It ran: " Yes, when taken all round, it is
aimed at us ". In this view the Kaiser was right, since
the Anglo-Russian Convention, in spite of the sinister
activities of Russian officials in Persia, who aimed at
annexing their sphere of commercial influence, cleared
the way for Russia to fight on the side of Great Britain
in 1914.
Russo-Afghan Relations up to the Great War. It is
interesting to note the situation on the Russo-Afghan
frontier during the years that followed the signature of
the Anglo-Russian Convention. Among the questions
raised by the Russian authorities were the depredations
of locusts, who had no respect for frontiers. In dealing
with this pest, they pressed for co-operation between the
Russian and Afghan frontier officers. The Amir, how-
ever, replied to a letter on this subject from the Govern-
ment of India that he had not heard of any special
depredations by locusts, but that, if such depredations
were reported, each country should attack the pest in its
own way.
Another subject of complaint was the treatment of
Russian trade by the Afghan Government, but it was
pointed out by the British that, according to the Russian
press, it was prospering and increasing. Moreover, it
was added, there was no information tending to shov
that the Amir accorded it less favourable treatment than
that given to Indian commerce.
The question of crimes on the Russo-Afghan frontier
was also raised but, in this case, there was no difficulty in
demonstrating that their number was insignificant on
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 243
the northern frontier in comparison with those on the
Indo-Afghan frontier, while there was every reason to
believe that the Amir was doing his best to bring the
perpetrators to justice and to prevent the commission of
such outrages.
The difficult question of irrigation in the case of
rivers which flowed from Afghanistan into Russian
territory was also brought forward. The answer given
was that the Amir had reported a diminution in the
precipitation of snow and rain in the Hazarajat and that
no new* irrigation channels had been dug. Actually, in
1905, both the Hari Rud and the Murghab Valley were
carefully examined by a British officer, who noted a
decrease of irrigation and cultivation in these Afghan
areas. Moreover, it was explained that the custom in
Afghanistan gives to owners on the upper reaches of a
river a prior claim to the use of its water, and the fact
that on the Russo-Afghan frontier there was a special
arrangement for the Kushk and Kashan Rivers proved the
existence of this custom in the case of Afghan rivers in
general. 1
During the years 1908-1909 some friction was
caused by the flight from Afghanistan of thousands of
the Jamshidi tribesmen. Some of these immigrants were
interned at Samarkand, but others were permitted to
remain near the Afghan frontier. Much correspondence
ensued and the notable raiders were moved further
inland. To conclude this section: upon the whole the
situation might be described as not unsatisfactory.
'North-West Frontier Troubles. It was unreasonable
to expect that the friendly relations established between the
British and the Amir would bring peace to the North-
West Frontier, more especially as Nasrulla Khan remained
openly hostile to the British. Moreover, it must be
remembered that the turbulent, well-armed but poverty-
stricken tribesmen to some extent depended for their
livelihood on raiding the fertile plains. Consequently
1 In North-east Persia the Russians took advantage of the weakness of that country
to destroy the peasants' crops and thereby reduce the area cultivated. I heard instances
of these acts of injustice when travelling in that area just before the last Great War.
244 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
these raids continued to cause anxiety, more especially
as numbers of modern rifles imported via Bandar Abbas
were now in the hands of the tribesmen, 1 To give an
example: in the summer of 1907 the Zakka Khel
Afridis visited Kabul, where Nasrulla Khan " not only
increased their allowances, but also afforded them
facilities for purchasing large numbers of rifles which
had become available from the Persian Gulf source of
supply ". 2
In the autumn of 1907 Minto, who, it must be
remembered, was a professional soldier and had served
in the Second Afghan War, reported to Morley that the
position was becoming intolerable, what with raids on a
large scale by Wazirs, and by gangs who were especially
sent out to murder the Political Agent at Wana, three
of whose predecessors had been murdered in fourteen
months. Morley's reply was unsympathetic.
Needless to say, the Zakka Khel raiders grew bolder
and actually raided Peshawar city early in 1908 and thus
forced the British Government to agree to a punitive
expedition. Its sudden despatch surprised the Zakka
Khels, who were rapidly brought to their knees after suffer-
ing heavy losses. It speaks volumes for the influence of
Colonel (later Sir George) Roos-Keppel that although
the Khyber Rifles contained a large number of Zakka
Khel tribesmen they insisted on accompanying him to
fight their relations and destroy their property. Again,
when Roos-Keppel went out alone to meet the Zakka
Khel peace deputation the first question the Chief asked
was: " Sahib, did we put up a good fight?*' It is
impossible not to admire the martial qualities of these
fierce mountaineers.
Minto corresponds with the Amir. There was every
reason to believe that Sirdar Nasrulla Khan was foment-
ing the trouble which again broke out, the offenders or?
this occasion being the Mohmands. Minto wrote to the
Amir in April 1908 recognizing his difficulties and
1 I had reported the existence of this traffic in 1897 but no immediate steps were
taken to cope with it.
2 Quoted from The Problem of the North-West Frontier , by Captain C. Da vies, Ph.D.,
p. 145. I would acknowledge my indebtedness to this valuable work.
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 245
urging him to restrain his tribesmen, to which the latter
replied that he had ordered his frontier officials to prevent
his subjects from helping the Mohmands. There is
reason to think that the Amir was doing his best, but no
Afghan could resist the excitement of a fight with its
chances of securing plunder. Finally, in May, the
turbulent Mohmands, who were largely supported by
Afghan levies, were attacked and duly punished, thanks
in part to the new quick-firing 1 8-pounder gun.
An ^Anglo-Afghan Commission. The best frontier
officers deplored these expeditions, which inflicted heavy
loss to life and property and left behind an enduring
legacy of hate. They realized that the only method was
to construct roads and hold strategical centres from which
the tribes could be dominated and civilized.
In 1910 an Anglo-Afghan Commission met to settle
cases on the Tochi-Khost border. The Afghan repre-
sentatives refused to take up cases against outlawed
subjects of the Indian Government, who were being
settled in Afghan territory some fifty miles distant from
the frontier, which enabled them to continue their raids.
In spite of this failure to deal with the chief cause of
unrest, various agreements and reconciliations between
frontier tribesmen were effected and, in numerous cases,
money compensation was arranged to be paid. Perhaps
the most important result was that the British and Afghans
worked in perfect harmony.
CHAPTER L
THE TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO THE AMIR
DURING THE GREAT WAR
I will so long as the sublime God-granted Government of Afghanistan
remains in security and peace, hereafter continue to abide the same way as I
have hitherto been abiding by my friendly treaty and engagements with the
illustrious British Government, and will not, please God, as far as lies in my
power, give preference to the false ideas of ignorant and short-sighted persons,
over the interests and welfare of the affairs of my State. Letter of the AMIR to
the Viceroy, dated March 23, 1915.
At the peace settlement, the most important of the national claims of
Germany will be that for a German India. DOCTOR HANS DELBRtJCK, 1915,
in The Heritage of Bismarck.
The Amir's Declaration of Neutrality. Upon the out-
break of the World War the Amir announced the
neutrality of Afghanistan in a durbar held at Kabul on
August 24, 1914. Again, at another durbar held on
October 3, he reaffirmed the policy of neutrality and con-
tradicted wild rumours as to his hostile feelings towards
Russia. 1
The Entry of Turkey into the War^ October 1914.
The Ottoman Government, under German instigation,
was induced to take naval action against Russia in the
Black Sea, which resulted in Russia and Great Britain
declaring war on the great Moslem state. Upon the
Viceroy informing Habibulla Khan, he replied: " I am
sorry that the Ottoman Government has also commenced
war with the exalted British Government ". For the
Amir, the position immediately became one of the
greatest difficulty, in view of the existence of a strong
pro-Turkish party, headed by Nasrulla Khan, which was
supported by the mullas and other fanatical elements,
The Letter of the King-Emperor. In September 1915
the King-Emperor wrote an autograph letter to the Amir.
1 The late Sir Michael O'Dwyer read this chapter and made helpful suggestions.
246
CH. L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 247
In it His Majesty expressed his gratification at the
scrupulous and honourable manner in which the Amir had
maintained the attitude of strict neutrality as guaranteed
by him at the beginning of the war. It pointed out that
this attitude was not only in accordance with the Amir's
engagements but that, by it, he was serving the best
interest of Afghanistan and of Islam.
The Sarhang of Dakka, who had been instructed to
receive the letter, appeared at Landi Khana with an
escort of Khassadars who wore new uniforms for the
occasiofi and carried a large standard. The guard of
honour, furnished by the Khyber Rifles, consisted of a
British officer, two companies of infantry and 100
mounted infantry, and, after the exchange of courtesies,
the ceremony of handing over the letter of the King-
Emperor took place.
The reply of the Amir, which was written on January
6, 1916, ran as follows : " I am grateful that your Majesty
is convinced of the neutrality of the God-granted Govern-
ment of Afghanistan, for which Your Majesty has ex-
pressed your gratification and pleasure to me. In future
also, provided that no injury or loss occurs to Afghanistan,
the sublime, God-granted Government of Afghanistan
will remain neutral and will always view with satisfaction
and honour the friendship of Your Majesty's Govern-
ment."
The Amir's Statement to the British Agent at Kabul.
In January 1916 the Amir stated to the British Agent
that he would keep his pledges loyally, that he was upset
at what was happening in Persia; that he did not care
for Germany, Austria or any other Power, but that he
was anxious about Turkey, " who was foolishly taking
part in the war and who possesses a great religious
attraction on the common mind of the ignorant Moslems
of the world in general and on the rude Afghans in
particular ". In this statement the Amir evidently spoke
with the fullest sincerity. The appearance of German
Missions in Persia, who drove out the British and
Russian colonies from Central and Southern Persia, upset
Habibulla Khan, who was naturally affected by the
248 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
position in Persia, but the influence of Turkey on the
minds of his subjects was a matter of supreme importance
to him.
On the occasion of a durbar being held at Kabul on
January 24, 1916, large crowds assembled outside the
palace in the expectation that Jihad would be proclaimed.
Actually the Amir deplored the existing chaos in Persia
and, dwelling on the impossibility of forecasting the
ultimate outcome of the war, he impressed upon his
hearers the absolute necessity for unity and co-operation.
The Dawn of German Influence in the Middle *East.
Before dealing with the German Mission to the Amir,
which created a crisis of the first magnitude in Afghanistan
and was a source of the gravest anxiety in India, I propose
to outline the thoroughness with which Germany worked
to gain influence in Turkey, Iraq and Persia, alike by
political and commercial action. 1
The Visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople, 1889,
The first visit of the Kaiser to Constantinople initiated
the grandiose Pan-German scheme, known in Germany
as the Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad (B.B.B.), while the
Kaiser spoke of " a Germanic wedge reaching from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf ". The Deutsche Bank had
already gained control of the railways of European
Turkey, while, as far back as 1883, Major (later Field-
Marshal) von der Goltz had begun to reorganize the
Turkish army and to bring it under German influence.
The Baghdad Railway. The most important part of
the scheme was the construction of a trunk railway across
Asia Minor to Baghdad with its terminus at a port in the
Persian Gulf. It would be guarded by Turkish troops
under German officers and was intended to constitute a
serious challenge to British paramountcy in those torrid
waters. In 1903 the concession was signed and Turkey
guaranteed interest on the cost of construction of the liner
at a most generous rate.
Attempts to secure a Port at Kuwait. In 1900 the
1 I have consulted the excellent article in the Revue du monde Musulman, " Les
Allemands en Perse", by Georges Ducrocq, vol. Hv, 1923. Vide also Sykes, History of
Persia (3rd ed.), vol. ii, pp. 431-456 and 541-545; and Unter der Glutsonne Irans, by
Oskar Niedermayer.
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 249
German Mission, that was making a preliminary inspec-
tion of the alignment of the railway, reached Kuwait. Its
leader explained to Shaykh Mubarik, its ruler, the im-
mense wealth that he would acquire if the terminus of the
railway were to be placed in his territory and offered to
lease an area of twenty square miles for this purpose.
Mubarik, however, in 1899, had signed a secret Agree-
ment with Great Britain by the terms of which he had
engaged not to sell or lease land without her consent.
The German proposal was consequently refused.
Germany declined to accept this rebuff as final and
induced the Turkish Government to despatch a naval
expedition to seize Kuwait, but the presence of a British
cruiser defeated this- scheme. Yet a third attempt was
made. Behind Bubian Island, which bounds the bay of
Kuwait to the north, are two deep inlets which run north
to within some twenty miles of Basra. On one of these,
Khor Abdulla, it was decided to build the terminus of
the railway. Although the territory belonged to Kuwait,
Turkish troops were posted on it and, in spite of all
remonstrances, were kept there. However, in 1914 an
Agreement with Germany was being negotiated by
which there would have been two British members on
the board of the Baghdad Railway, whose terminus would
have been constructed at Basra, while Kuwait was to have
been constituted an autonomous enclave. The outbreak
of the Great War most fortunately put an end to these
negotiations.
German Activities in the Persian Gulf. The campaign
was opened in 1896, when the firm of Wonckhaus
established itself at Lingah and began to deal in mother-
of-pearl. In the following year I met Dr. Henck, who
was founding the German Vice-Consulate at Bushire.
Among his successors was Wassmuss, whose efforts at
gaining concessions, and in other directions, were in-
variably foiled by our able Resident, Major (later Sir
Percy) Cox. In 1901 the headquarters of the Wonckhaus
firm were transferred to Bahrein, and the Sultan, whose
claims in the Persian Gulf were most shadowy, was
asked to grant Germany a monopoly of the valuable pearl
250 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
fisheries. He was proceeding to do this when the
British Government intervened and vetoed the scheme.
The next attempt was more serious. The Shaykh of
Shargah, a Trucial Chief, who was bound by treaty not
to enter into an agreement with any other power than
Great Britain, granted a concession to work the red oxide
deposits on the island of Abu Musa to three Arabs,
Wonckhaus acquired the concession, which was there-
upon cancelled by the Shaykh^ who expelled the original
concessionaries. This action raised a storm of protest
in the Berlin press, but the German case was inde-
fensible and was not followed up.
In 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika Line started a
regular monthly service to the Persian Gulf, which
speedily competed with the British. In 1907 not only
were pilgrims booked free to Jeddah, but cargo was
accepted at half the rates charged by the British. The
line was evidently heavily subsidized by Germany.
The Potsdam Agreement , 1911 . To turn to Persia : in
1910, at the famous Potsdam meeting between the
German and Russian Emperors, Sazonoff agreed to
support the Baghdad railway, while Germany in return
pledged herself to support Russian interests in Persia. 1
The British objected to Sazonoff giving unlimited support
to the Baghdad railway, to which the Russian Foreign
Minister replied that this support was only intended to
extend from Konia to Baghdad. He was consequently
requested to correct his draft by the inclusion of the
words "jusqu'a Baghdad", but declined to do so.
Needless to say, Germany took full advantage of this
omission.
To continue this subject: Germany had decided to
construct a branch line from the Konia-Baghdad railway
at Sadija to the Persian frontier at Khanikin, while Russia
intended to secure a concession from the Persian Govern-
ment for the construction of a line from Tehran to
Khanikin. In August 1911 the Potsdam Agreement was
signed. Russia thereupon agreed not to oppose the con-
1 For this section I have consulted vol. x of Origins of the War, by G. P. Gooch and
H. Temperley.
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 251
struction of the Baghdad railway. She also agreed to
obtain a concession for a line from Tehran to Khanikin
to meet the German line from Sadija to Khanikin as soon
as this branch line was constructed. Russia, moreover,
agreed that if, two years after the completion of this latter
line by Germany, she had not commenced the construction
of the Tehran-Khanikin line, the German Government
was at liberty to apply for the right to construct it. In the
event nothing more was heard of these railway schemes,
but Russia's policy, which certainly weakened the Entente
created by the Anglo-Russian Convention, strengthened
the influence of Germany in the Middle East.
Germany gains Influence in Persia. A definite success
of Germany in Persia was the foundation at the capital of
a college staffed by German teachers, to which the
Persian Government contributed an annual subsidy.
The Deutsche Bank also opened an office at Tehran with
branches at Tabriz and Bushire. Of greater importance
was the fact that the German Legation had such close
relations with the Persian " democrats " 1 that, upon the
crushing of the Majlis by the Shah in 1908, many of
them settled at Berlin and during the Great War were
the chief organizers of the German Mission to Persia and
Afghanistan.
In addition to the " democrats ", through Turkish
influence in Iraq, several Mujtahids, or " Doctors of the
Sacred Law ", were won over to Germany by the state-
ment that the entire nation had been converted to Islam
and that the Kaiser had made the pilgrimage to Mecca
and was known as Haji Wilhelm! Moreover, owing to
the Anglo-Russian Convention, the British, and even
more so the Russians, were unpopular. Finally, the
Swedish officers of the Persian Gendarmerie were
bought by Germany. 2
During the pre-war period German Agents were
busy in Persia. Among them Captain Oskar Nieder-
mayer, an artillery officer and a trained geologist,
1 " Revolutionaries " would be a more correct name to apply to the party.
2 To quote from Zugmayer's diary: " The gendarmerie is always entirely with us
and is paid by Germany ".
252 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
travelled widely in North-east Persia and was my guest
at Meshed during the summer of 1913. Zugmayer, a
German scientist, travelling at the same period, pene-
trated to British Baluchistan. In 1916 he was the leader
of the Germans whom I captured at Shiraz. 1
To conclude this section: does it not constitute a
striking example of German Weltyolitikt Looking back
on that period of. tension I recall a Persian proverb :
' History is the mirror of the past and the lesson of the
present '. May we learn the lesson!
The Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan. The
originator of this scheme was Enver Pasha. It consisted
in a proclamation of Jihad at Constantinople and at other
Moslem centres. A Mission of Germans and Turks
preaching the " Holy War " was to cross Persia to
Afghanistan, furnished with credentials from the Caliph,
and it was hoped that the appeal of the head of the Moslem
religion, strengthened by promises of armed support and
of money, would induce the Amir to lead his fanatical
subjects to invade India in overwhelming numbers.
Upon the outbreak of the War, Indian seditionists,
whose headquarters were in distant areas, such as Har Dyal
from California and Barkutulla from Japan, assembled at
Berlin, where they were organized into an Indian Political
Department under the German Foreign and War Offices.
This department was strengthened by the adherence of
some leading Persians and of some Europeans, the
subjects of neutral states.
German Agents in Persia. In addition to the Mission
to the Amir and supporting it, the plan included the
despatch of Agents furnished with arms and gold who,
aided by the Swedish officers of the Persian gendarmerie,
would drive out the British and Russian subjects and
seize the treasuries of the Imperial Bank of Persia and of
the Russian Banque d'Escompte. These Missions would,
moreover, be strengthened by German officers who would
enlist and train Persians into a force capable of joining
in the invasion of India. It was the scheme of Napoleon *
revived under considerably more favourable conditions.
1 Sykes, op. cit. vol. ii, p. 475. 2 Vide Chapter XXV, p. 377.
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 253
The Mission of Wassmuss. Wassmuss was instructed
to return to the area behind Bushire, where he was suc-
cessful in organizing attacks which necessitated the
garrisoning of that port by British troops. He also
organized a combination of tribes who invested my force
at Shiraz in 1918. He was the only German Agent who
was in any way successful. 1
The Position at Tehran in 1915. To resume: the
German propaganda proclaiming the conversion of their
monarch and nation to Islam was supported not only by
various * religious leaders, but by powerful gangs of
robbers, who were especially valuable as messengers.
Moreover, the escape of some hundreds of German and
Austrian prisoners from Tashkent turned the enemy
Legations at Tehran into armed camps. However, in
November 1915, the advance of Russian troops in
Northern Persia caused the enemy Ministers to flee
from Tehran, after a fruitless attempt to persuade the
weakling Shah to join them. This failure at the capital
reacted on the general situation in Persia, but the German
Missions had succeeded in driving the British and
Russian subjects out of Central and Southern Persia by
the end of 1915.
The Formation of the South Persia Rifles. In the spring
of 1916 I landed at Bandar Abbas with instructions to
raise a force for the Persian Government, which was
termed the South Persia Rifles. 2 Before long I received
numerous petitions from the religious and land-owning
classes, followed by deputations begging me to expel the
German Missions from Kerman, where their followers
had created insecurity for life and property. In May I
marched to Kerman, where my small force of Indian
troops was welcomed as deliverers. The German Missions
fled in small parties, and were captured to the number of
V)me sixty German and Austrian officers. These, together
with a dozen Turkish soldiers and a few Afghan deserters
from the British army, were handed over to me upon my
1 In ffassmuss, by Christopher Sykes, an interesting account of the inception of the
German Mission is given together with a full account of the activities of " the so-called
German Lawrence ". 2 Sykes, op. ctt. vol. ii, p. 452 et seq.
254 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
arrival at Shiraz in November 1916. In this manner no
German supporting Missions were left in Southern Persia.
As a result the Amir was encouraged to remain loyal,
and German prestige was diminished.
The Failure of von der Goltz, 1916. The plan of
forming a Persian army was a complete failure. Field-
Marshal von der Goltz, who was in supreme command
of the German and Turkish troops in Iraq and Persia,
proceeded to Kermanshah, where a staff of German
officers was attempting to organize the recruits who had
been enlisted. The Persians disliked his Turkish escort
and they still more disliked their German instructors,
von der Goltz's summary of the position in February 1916
runs: " Anarchy in Persia; nothing to be done; dust,
cupidity and cowardice ; vast expenditure and no return ".*
A few days after this report was written, the Russians,
encouraged by their splendid feat of arms at Erzerum,
swept the Germans out of Persia.
Differences between the Germans and the Turks. It is
noteworthy that the Turks did not see eye to eye with
the overbearing Germans. They feared, and with reason,
that, in case of victory, Germany would treat Turkey as
a conquered country. The Germans, as we have seen,
aimed at the invasion of India by winning over Persia
and Afghanistan to their side, whereas the Turks under
Kazim Bey tried to combine Jihad with Panturanian
propaganda which included the union of the Turkish
tribes of Central Asia under the banner of the Sultan.
Actually, the alliance between the two Governments was
in no way popular so far as the Turks were concerned.
The Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan^ 1916.
The Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan was especially
disliked by the Turks. Kazim Bey, who accompanied it
with a staff of officers imbued with the idea of the union
of Islam, worked on those lines and only on those lines
His incorporation in the Niedermayer Mission was
apparently purely nominal. It remains to add that the
German Mission was strengthened to some extent by the
1 Vide Generalfeldmarschatt Colmar Freiherr von der Goltx : Denkwiirdigkeiten, Berlin,
1929.
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 255
addition of prisoners of war who had escaped into Persia
from Russian Turkistan.
Captain Oskar Niedermayer, the leader of the German
Mission to the Amir, experienced considerable trouble
with the Turkish authorities at Baghdad, who wished to
utilize the services of the Mission against the British in
Iraq. They even tried to prevent it from penetrating
into Persia. In spite of these difficulties, Niedermayer
crossed the border early in 1915, when he was warmly
welcomed by the Swedish officers of the Persian gen-
darmerie.
His party, to which was attached the Turkish Mission
under Kazim Beg, included twelve Germans, the Indians
Mahendra Pratap and Barkatulla, and some Persian
gendarmerie, was about eighty strong. He travelled across
Western Persia to Nain to the north-west of Yezd, and
then entered the Lut desert and passed through Tabas
and Duhuk.
Upon approaching the Afghan frontier he divided
up his party into three sections with a view to himself
escaping the British and Russian troops that were patroll-
ing the southern and northern sections of the Perso-
Afghan boundary respectively. He despatched one
party, consisting mainly of sick camels, to the north, a
second, composed of camels laden with stones, to the
south, to attract the patrols, while he himself moved
rapidly due east with lightly laden mules to Yezdan,
the last village on the Persian side of the frontier.
Successfully avoiding the patrols, he crossed the Afghan
frontier and arrived at Herat on August 24, 1915. An
independent party, which had reached Kain ahead of
Niedermayer under Wagner, was driven off by Russian
Cossacks with the loss of their baggage and money.
The Reception at Herat. At this city the Mission was
provided with supplies, but was placed under guard
in a garden outside the city and no intercourse with
the inhabitants was permitted. During its stay at Herat,
tactless criticisms of the Afghan troops and of the Kabul-
made rifles by the Germans created an unfavourable
impression.
256 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
The Arrival at Kabul Leaving Herat on September 7
the Germans reached Kabul some twenty days later and
were placed under guard in the Bagh-i-Baber, outside the
city.
The Attitude of the Amir. The Amir immediately
reported the arrival of the mission at Herat to the
Viceroy. He stated that he had instructed the Governor
to forward it to Kabul, where he would certainly
ascertain its intentions. He ended his letter with assur-
ances that its arrival would have no detrimental effect
whatever on the neutrality of Afghanistan.
The Turko-German Mission at Kabul. The Amir kept
the German emissaries, who were not allowed to leave
the garden for some weeks, waiting for an audience until
towards the end of October. In a letter addressed to the
German Minister at Tehran, which was intercepted,
Niedermayer wrote in November 1915: " We were at
last received by the Amir in a friendly manner on
October 26. The Amir's explanations did not give us
much hope. Please send as soon as possible the Turks
for my expedition. "
Another letter from Roehr (a member of the mission)
ran: " I believe it is quite possible to draw Afghanistan
into the war if about one thousand Turks with machine
guns and my expedition arrive here. Perhaps we shall
find it necessary to begin by organising a coup d'ttat. It
is absolutely necessary that gendarmerie should accompany
my expedition from Isfahan to the frontier as the roads are
held by the enemy." Needless to say, copies of these
letters were sent to the Amir and, no doubt, opened his
eyes as to the intentions of his German guests. In the
summer of 1916 the mission was strengthened by the
arrival of the supporting party under von Hentig.
The Dilemma of the Amir. The position of the Amir in
1915 was most difficult. The declaration of Jihad by
the Sultan, who was also the Caliph, naturally excited the
Mullas and the fanatical Afghans, although they were
fortunately aware that a fatwa of Jihad published in
Turkey was not binding in Afghanistan, unless it were
also proclaimed by its own ruler. Apart from this, the
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 257
basis of Afghan policy had been that her two powerful
neighbours, Great Britain and Russia, were generally
hostile to one another. The chief value of Afghanistan
to Great Britain was the fact that it served as a buffer
state, and though bound to Great Britain by treaties and
obligations, the Amirs could yet, to some extent, play off
one powerful neighbour against another. Great Britain
and Russia thus entirely occupied the stage, whereas
Turkey and Germany, although known in a somewhat
vague way, had never had any direct contact with
Afghanistan and were far distant countries.
When the World War broke out, Afghanistan was
faced with the somewhat alarming fact that Great Britain
and Russia were allies. The credit side of this new
position of affairs was that the Amir was thereby able to
point out to his Councillors who pressed him to declare
'Jihad that it would obviously involve the ruin of
Afghanistan.
The Amir's Diplomacy. The Amir, in view of the
strong pressure exercised on him by the pro-Turkish
party, headed by Nasrulla Khan and favoured by Inaya-
tulla Khan, played a very difficult hand with consummate
skill. He delayed matters by convening an assembly of
leading Mullas and Chiefs, to whom he expressed his
firm determination to maintain neutrality for the reasons
given above, and followed this up by engaging in in-
terminable consultations with his advisers. In, January
1916 he signed a draft treaty of alliance with Germany
in which he demanded the assistance of a strong force
and insisted on receiving fantastic sums of gold. To
quote Niedermayer: " One day the Amir says he is for
us and the next against us ". Twice Niedermayer had
decided to leave, but the Amir detained him by giving
positive assurances, and again backed out of them.
Niedermayer also stated that the Amir was unwilling to
let the mission leave in case circumstances should change
and Afghanistan should declare war. In this case, as he
realized, German officers would be necessary to him.
Finally Niedermayer, bitterly disappointed with the
Indian seditionists, who invariably failed him when any
VOL. II S
258 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
action was required, realized that without the arrival in
Afghanistan of a powerful Turkish force, there was no
hope of winning over the astute Amir. The scheme
for a coup d'etat was considered, but was found to be
impracticable.
The Dismissal of the Turko-German Mission. There is
little doubt that the capture of Erzerum by the Russians
in March 1916 proved the impossibility of a Turkish
division reaching Afghanistan, while the fall of Kut-al-
Amara does not appear to have greatly perturbed ^Afghan
opinion. The mission had definitely outstayed its
welcome when, in May 1916, it was dismissed by the
Amir in the presence of Sirdars Nasrulla Khan and
Inayatulla Khan. Leaving Kabul on May 22, its members
scattered, and, owing to the capture of most of the sup-
porting German parties by my force and the vigilance of
the frontier patrols, some of them were taken prisoners.
Niedermayer, although wounded by brigands, finally
reached Hamadan. His mission was a complete failure,
but his courage and initiative, under most difficult con-
ditions, were remarkable.
The Amir's Statement to the British Agent. On Septem-
ber 6, 1916, the Amir stated to the British agent that he
had entirely disapproved of the aims of the German
mission and that it had left disappointed. He added
that, to his annoyance, Mahendra Pratap, Kazim Beg
and Barkatulla had stayed on and that since they were
his guests, he had not seen his way to expel them. He
solemnly declared on his oath that nothing had shaken,
or could shake, his firm determination to keep his
covenant of neutrality. Owing to his loyalty, the crisis
was thus satisfactorily dealt with.
The Silk Letters Conspiracy. The ramifications of a
wide-spreading conspiracy in which Mahendra Pratap
and Barkatulla played important parts and which ia
generally known as the Silk Letters Conspiracy constitute
an interesting episode at this period.
The proclamation of Jihad by the Sultan in his
position as Caliph at Constantinople was soon known in
India and eagerly seized upon by the revolutionary
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 259
element. 1 The leading Moslem Theological College is
that of Deoband, which is attended by students not only
from India but also from the tribal territory and from
Afghanistan/ The head of the college was Maulana
Mahmud-al-Hasan, who was a widely respected religious
leader. Strenuous efforts were made to secure his
support and Maulvi Abdul Rahim of Lahore (the Obay-
dulla of the conspiracy) convinced him that India was
Dar-al-Harb or a " Country of Disturbance " where
Moslem religious rites could not be freely carried out
and that consequently Jihad was obligatory. It is usual
for Moslems at Friday prayers to pray for the ruler.
Since the British Government was not a Moslem Power,
the custom had arisen in India of praying for the Sultan
of Turkey as Amir-al-Muminim or " Commander of the
Faithful " and it was expected that on this account
Mahmud-al-Hasan would proclaim Jihad. Contrary to
expectation, however, the Maulana held that the teaching
of the Koran forbade revolution or sedition and that the
only course for Indian Moslems was hijrat or " migra-
tion " from India. He therefore sailed with a number of
his followers bound for Mecca, where he intended to
join in the Jihad. At Mecca, the Turkish Governor,
Ghalib Bey, gave a cold welcome to the party. He
attempted, but in vain, to induce the Maulana to return
home and stir up revolt locally. Many of his followers,
however, gradually drifted back to India. Among them
was Saif-ar-Rahman who, under the adopted name of
Muhammad Mian, returned to his home in the Peshawar
district bearing a letter from Ghalib Bey, known as the
Ghalibnama, which incited the tribesmen to invade the
Punjab. Visiting Abdul Wahid, known as the Haji of
Turangzai, at the instigation of Muhammad Mian, this
holy firebrand was successful in stirring up the Mohmands
to make their first attack on British territory, as mentioned
later in this chapter.
The Mujahidin or " Warriors of the Holy Wars ". In
1 This conspiracy is ably dealt with in the late Sir Michael O'Dwyer's India a
I Knew //, chs. xii and xiii. I would also thank Mr. J. H. Adam for valuable in-
formation on the subject.
260 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
1820 a certain Sayyid Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, who had
adopted the especially fanatical tenets of the Wahabis,
founded a colony of Mujahidin ; for a short period they
ruled the Peshawar district, but were driven out by the
Pathans. Later, they established themselves in tribal
territory where they subsisted on subscriptions secretly
collected in India and joined, to some small extent, in
raids on British territory. Generally speaking, however,
they were only anxious to live at ease on their income.
Indian Students abscond to Afghanistan. Obaydulla,
who had not followed the " migration " to r Mecca,
influenced some fifteen Indian students, whose oath on
the Koran he secured, to " migrate " to Afghanistan,
where they would preach Jihad and the invasion of
India. Changing their names by way of precaution, they
crossed the frontier and were welcomed at Asman by the
Mujahidin. Disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm dis-
played by these tame " Warriors of the Holy War ", the
students crossed into Afghanistan and reached Jalalabad,
where they were placed under arrest. The authorities
then forwarded them to Kabul where, for some time, they
remained under guard. Realizing that they were not
welcome, they asked for permission to proceed to Turkey,
which was refused. They declined to return to India
when invited to do so and their position was distinctly
unpleasant until, thanks to the representations of Nasrulla
Khan, they were set at liberty and were granted a very
small daily allowance of money.
The Activities of the Conspirators. The flight of the
students was followed by inquiries which resulted in
Obaydulla hastily crossing the frontier. At the same time
Maulvi Fazal Ilahi with some of his fanatical followers
fled to the Mujahidin^ whom they goaded into displaying
genuine activity. Fazal Ilahi insisted on forming a branch
colony at Chamarkand in Bajaur, situated close to the,
Afghan boundary. Punjabi seditionists incited the Buner-
wals and the Hindustani fanatics, referred to above, to
invade British territory. Later they were partly re-
sponsible for the raid of the Mohmands into the Peshawar
district.
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 261
Mauhi Obaydulla organizes the Plot. The student-
conspirators met Inayatulla Khan who expressed deep
sympathy with them, but their activities remained some-
what aimless until Maulvi Obaydulla, who arrived at
Kabul in August 1915, induced them to co-operate for
a common purpose. The plot was designed to unite all
the states of Islam, the Turks, the Arabs, the Afghans,
the Uzbegs, the Frontier tribes and the Moslems of
India in a combined effort to overthrow the British Raj.
The Mujahidin were to raise the fanatical tribesmen and
be supported by a general rising of the Moslems of India.
It was hoped that the revolutionary Hindus and Sikhs
would join the Moslems and that their united forces
would sweep the British into the Indian Ocean.
The plot was woven with some skill and emissaries
were despatched to Mecca, to Turkey, to Russia, to Japan,
to China, and elsewhere, to announce the creation of a
Provisional Government of India and of an Army of
Allah, with the aged Mahmud-al-Hasan as its Com-
mander-in-Chief. The President was to be Mahendra
Pratap, the Prime Minister Mulla Barkatulla of Bhopal,
while Obaydulla, the moving spirit, was to be Foreign
Minister. If the Amir agreed to join in the plot, he
would be acknowledged as King of India. It would
appear that the Amir was cognizant of the aims of the
conspirators, while Nasrulla Khan was heart and soul
with them. Indeed, had a Turkish force reached
Afghanistan, he would most probably have killed the
Amir and, after the proclamation of Jihad, would have
led his fanatical subjects to the invasion of India.
The Silk Letters. In July 1916, Obaydulla gave
Abdul Hak, the leader of the Indian students, three yellow
silk handkerchiefs on which letters were written. His
orders were to hand them over to a Shaykh at Hyderabad
(Sind), who was instructed to convey them in person or by
a reliable messenger to their leader, Maulana Mahmud-al-
Hasan, at Medina.
In due course Abdul Hak, who evidently felt some
misgivings, reached the house of a fine old Moslem officer,
a Khan Bahadur at Multan, whose two sons, much to his
262 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
grief, had absconded to Kabul with Abdul Hak, of whom
he was, to some degree, in charge. Upon the Khan
Bahadur asking why he had returned without his young
masters, the reply given by Abdul Hak was so unsatis-
factory that he was soundly beaten and thereupon gave
up the letters. The Khan Bahadur handed them to the
local authorities, who considered them to be unintelligible,
but sent them to O'Dwyer ; the latter realized their great
importance and forwarded them to Simla.
The letters described the situation at Kabul and in
India, referred to the arrival of the Turko-Derman
mission and its departure, and gave the plan for the
formation of the " Army of Allah ". The headquarters
were to be at Medina with the Maulana as Commander-in-
Chief, while Obaydulla was to be the General Officer
Commanding at Kabul. The absconding students were
also given high military rank. To conclude this section :
these letters, which were handed over to the Criminal
Intelligence Department, revealed a plot with wide
ramifications, and by their seizure, it was nipped in the
bud. It was, however, no closely organized, dangerous
conspiracy, but rather ineffectual plans, which depended
entirely on the invasion of India by the Afghans. As it
happened, the revolt of the Sharif of Mecca against the
Turks, in June 1916, divided Islam and wrecked all
hopes of combined Moslem action against Great Britain.
Sharif (afterwards King) Husayn also handed over
Mahmud Hasan and other Indian conspirators to the
British authorities.
The Letters from the German Emperor to the Princes of
India. It remains to add that, in 1916, I seized at
Kerman a number of letters beautifully inscribed on
vellum, signed by Bethmann Hollweg and addressed to
the reigning Princes of India. Copies of these letters
reached Kabul with the Mission and on them the
seditionist leaders wrote endorsements. They were duly
despatched to Bajaur for transmission to India, but were
seized by the vigilant Indian authorities.
The North- West Frontier during the Great War. By
way of conclusion to this chapter, it seems to be desirable
L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 263
to make a brief reference to some disturbances on the
North- West Frontier which, considering the efforts made
by enemy agents, were of less importance than might
have been expected.
The tribes kept quiet until Turkey joined the enemy,
when, excited by the letter written by Ghalib Bey, and by
the preaching of the Haji of Turangzai in April 1915,
the Mohmands raided the Peshawar district in force, but
were speedily driven out. At the same time, the Khost-
walis raided the Tochi Pass and were only dispersed
after serious fighting.
Later in this year, the Swatis attacked a British force
at Chakdara, while the Bunerwals, joined by the Hindu-
stani fanatics, attempted to invade British territory. Once
again, in spite of the Amir's express prohibition, the
Mohmands, in September, raided the Peshawar district
and, on this occasion, they burned the Shenkargarh
bazaar.
The economic blockade of the offending tribe and
military operations forced it to sue for peace and to agree
to pay a fine. But a new lashkar of 6000 men was again
collected, which was dispersed by the terrifying action of
the first aeroplane, termed Malik-ul-Maut or " Angel of
Death " by the tribesmen, and in August 1917 peace was
finally re-established.
The Mahsuds. A still more serious outbreak took
place in Waziristan, but here again the appearance of a
large force supported by aeroplanes, forced the warlike
Mahsuds to sue for peace in August 1917. Thus, after
two and a half years, quiet was finally restored to the
North- West Frontier. It is noteworthy that the powerful
Afridi tribe remained loyal, thanks mainly to the personal
influence of Sir George Keppel, that great Warden of the
Marches.
Throughout this very critical period, the Amir took
a strong stand against the dangerous hostility of Nasrulla
Khan, who was supported by the mullas. Moreover, he
wrote to the Viceroy and advised him not to allow Frontier
troubles to become magnified or to punish the recalcitrant
tribesmen too severely.
CHAPTER LI
THE ASSASSINATION OF KING HABIBULLA AND THE
ACCESSION OF AMANULLA KHAN *
O Nation with a sense of honour! O brave army! While my great nation
was putting the crown of the Kingdom on my head, I declared to you with a
loud voice that the Kingdom of Afghanistan should be internally and externally
independent and free, that is to say, that all rights of Government, that are
possessed by other independent Powers of the world, should be possessed in
their entirety by Afghanistan. The Proclamation of AMIR AMANULLA KHAN.
The Rise of Nationalism in Afghanistan. The keynote
of recent history in Central Asia and indeed more or less
everywhere in Asia may be found in nationalism. The
so-called " unchanging East " realized the power and
wealth of the West and its impact gradually caused it to
awaken. Indeed, the victory of Japan over mighty Russia
in 1904, proving that the West was not invincible, came
to the East as a revelation. In neighbouring Persia it
bore fruit in a revolution which resulted in the abdication
of Muhammad Ali Shah, in 1909, but, in conservative
Afghanistan with a large primitive population occupying
the remote valleys of its gigantic ranges, the movement
was slow.
Sirdar Muhammad Tarzi. The nationalist movement
in Afghanistan was initiated by Sirdar Muhammad
Tarzi, a member of the Kandahar branch of the Muham-
madzai. Exiled by Abdur Rahman Khan, he had lived
at Damascus where he married a Turkish wife. Upont
the accession of Habibulla Khan, he returned to Afghan-
istan and became the undisputed leader of the advanced
party, advocating external independence and internal
reform. His influence was great as the father-in-law of
Inayatulla and of Amanulla and also as the editor of the
264
CH.LI ASSASSINATION OF HABIBULLA 265
Siraj-ul-Akhbar, in which journal he made constant attacks
on Great Britain. Apart from this, the collapse of the
Russian Empire seemed to offer the races of Central Asia
the prospect of recovering their liberty.
The Amir's Demand for Representation at the Peace
Congress. In the spring of 1916 the Amir put forward
a demand that he should send a representative to the
Peace Conference. There was no doubt that this demand
represented the views of what might be described as those
of the party, which was headed by Sirdars Nasrulla Khan
and Inayatulla Khan.
During the years of the Great War, Afghanistan, as
we have seen, had been visited by a Turko-German
mission, accompanied by capable Indian seditionists.
Moreover, in 1918, with the complete defeat of Turkey
by a Christian Power and the occupation by the victors
of some of the Holy Places of Islam, fanaticism was
aroused together with the bitter feeling that Afghanistan
had failed Islam in her hour of need.
Owing to the Amir's inestimable services in main-
taining the neutrality of Afghanistan, in the face of hourly
danger to himself, its independence should surely have
been promptly acknowledged after the Armistice. Had
this boon been granted, is it not possible that the pro-
clamation of independence by Habibulla would have
restored his lost popularity? Might it not also have saved
both countries the Third Afghan Wart
On February 2, 1919 more than two months
after the Armistice Habibulla, who clearly realized
the tense situation in Afghanistan, again wrote to the
Viceroy demanding recognition by the Peace Conference
of the " absolute liberty, freedom of action, and perpetual
independence " of his kingdom. Before an answer,
explaining that the Peace Conference was strictly con-
fined to belligerents but that the interests of Afghan-
istan would be carefully guarded, reached the Amir, he
was dead.
The Assassination of King Habibulla Khan. The Amir,
who remained devoted to sport and especially snipe-
shooting, went to Laghman for this purpose accompanied
266 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
by an escort under the command of Ahmad Shah Khan
of the Musahiban family. 1
In the morning of February 20, 1919, it was dis-
covered that an unknown assassin had entered his tent
and had shot him through the ear. As was natural,
suspicions were aroused but since the descendants of
the mullas of this district whom he had executed for a
plot would be naturally anxious for vengeance, it may
be that one of the number was the assassin.
His Character. In a previous chapter King Habibulla
is described as a patriotic ruler, keen on benefiting
Afghanistan. He established a Council of State for
tribal affairs and introduced Western medical and surgical
methods. He also abolished the slave trade and founded
a college conducted on European lines, but suitable to
Afghan needs. If, in later years, he spent too much time
and money on his pleasures, it is best to remember him
as the Amir, who in face of almost overwhelming pressure
and, at the constant risk of his life, remained true to his
pledge of neutrality, and saved Afghanistan from the
horrors of war.
The Accession of Sirdar Nasrulla Khan. The position
on the day of the assassination was that Nasrulla Khan,
the Ulya Hazrat (mother of Amanulla Khan, the third
son). Nadir Khan, the Commander-in-Chief and other
members of the powerful Musahiban family were either
at Jalalabad itself or in the royal camp.
Amanulla Khan was the Governor of Kabul, but
1 The Musahiban family, which now occupies the throne of Afghanistan, is descended
from the elder line of Sirdar Painda Khan, whose fourth son was Amir Dost Muhammad.
At this period it consisted of two brothers, termed " Musahiban-i-Khas ", or " Personal
Equerries ", Muhammad Asaf Khan and Muhammad Yusuf Khan, who had followed
Yakub Khan to India with their families, who were educated at Dehra Dun. The
younger brother married into the Sadozai family, and consequently his son, Muhammad
Nadir Khan, who ascended the throne, united the two great Durrani sections. The
brothers supported Habibulla Khan in his policy of neutrality during the War and were
the chief opponents of Nasrulla Khan and his party.
Ahmad Shah Khan, son of Muhammad Asaf Khan, was, as mentioned above, in
command of the guard on the Amir's tent on the night he was murdered and, on this
account, the soldiers arrested the members of the family. There was no reason whatever
to suppose that he was guilty of the crime.
Muhammad Yusuf Khan had four or more sons who were well educated at Dehra
Dun, among them Sulayman Khan, Nadir Khan, who became King, Hashim Khan, who
is now Prime Minister and Shah Wali Khan. Their sister, known as the " Hindustani
Queen ", was a wife of King Habibulla, but only bore him a daughter.
LI ACCESSION OF AMANULLA KHAN 267
Inayatulla Khan, the eldest son of the late Amir, had left
Jalalabad to take over charge of that important post by
his father's orders. On the death of the Amir being known
he was, however, recalled to Jalalabad.
The succession to the throne lay between Nasrulla
Khan, representing the Conservative party, who was
strongly supported by the mullas and tribes, and one of
the sons of the late Amir. Inayatulla, the eldest, aged
twenty-one, had no following and, at a Council composed
of Inayatulla and the leading officials at Jalalabad,
Nasrulla Khan was acclaimed Amir. On February 21,
at a public durbar, Inayatulla, other members of the
royal family, and the leading officials confirmed Nasrulla
Khan's election as Amir. The Viceroy was informed and
Nasrulla's accession was reported to be popular with the
mullas and tribes.
The Accession of Amanulla Khan. Meanwhile Ama-
nulla, the third son, aged twenty-nine, who held the
capital, the treasury, the army headquarters and the arsenal
decided to bid for power. While Nasrulla remained
inactive at Jalalabad mourning his brother, instead of
riding to Kabul as advised, Amanulla outbid his uncle
by offering the army 20 rupees a month pay as against
1 1 rupees. He also vehemently denounced the failure of
Nasrulla Khan to investigate and punish the assassin of
his father. This energetic action in which the influence
of his mother the Ulya Hazrat, the chief wife and a
member of the Barakzai family, was most valuable,
was decisive; the army at Kabul accepted him as Amir,
while the troops at Jalalabad not only acclaimed Amanulla
as Amir, but arrested the members of the Musahiban
family. Nasrulla, thereupon, threw up the sponge and
on February 27, wrote to Amanulla tendering his sub-
mission. He was sent to Kabul as a prisoner. It is
significant that in Amanulla's proclamation, part of which
serves as a motto to this chapter, the " nation " and the
" army " are formally addressed, but not the mullas.
The accession of Amanulla was accepted throughout
Afghanistan without any serious disturbances taking
place. The Governors of all the provinces were replaced
268 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
by his partisans, mainly members of the Musahiban
family, with the sole exception of Kandahar, where the
Loinab Khushdil Khan was a half-brother of the Ulya
Hazrat.
Amanulla Khan informs the Viceroy of his Accession.
On March 3, Amanulla informed the Viceroy of his
accession in a letter which contained the following
passages :
Nor let this remain unknown to that friend that our independent
and free Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready, and pre-
pared, at every time and season, to conclude such agreements and
treaties with the mighty Government of England as may be useful
and serviceable, in the way of commercial advantages to our
Government and yours.
To this the Viceroy cautiously replied:
From this it seems possible that the commercial requirements
of Afghanistan are thought to call for some agreement with the
British Government, subsidiary to the treaties and engagements
above mentioned.
Nasrulla Khan sentenced as responsible for the Murder.
At a public durbar held on April 13, Nasrulla Khan
was declared to be guilty of instigating the murder of the
late Amir and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Colonel Shah AH Riza was declared to have been the
actual assassin and was bayoneted at the conclusion of
the durbar.
Nasrulla Khan died shortly afterwards, although his
death was not announced until some months later; and
Inayatulla, as a possible rival, was kept in prison for a
considerable period. The members of the Musahiban
family were honourably acquitted and restored to favour.
The Result. The action of Amanulla in condemning
his uncle, the champion of the mullaSj and in reinstating
the members of the Musahiban family, alienated alike the
mullas and the army. Discontent spread rapidly, and,
on April 25, the khutba was not read in the Amir's name
at Kandahar.
Amanulla declares Jihad. Realizing the storm that
he had raised, Amanulla decided to unite the nation by a
LI ACCESSION OF AMANULLA KHAN 269
proclamation of Jihad. The date of the durbar, at which
Amanulla's actions landed him in almost inextricable
difficulties, coincided with the tragedy of the Jhalianwala
Bagh at Amritsar (where General Dyer had taken stern
action against rebels '), and there is every reason to believe
that accounts of the serious position in the Punjab
encouraged him to take his hazardous resolve. To give
typical instances from correspondence that was seized :
The English are distracted in mind on account of the European
War, an4 have not the strength to attack the Afghans. The people
of India too are much dissatisfied with the English on account of
their tyranny and oppression. They will never hesitate to raise a
revolt, if they can find an opportunity, as their hearts are bleeding
at their hanas.
The Amir's endorsement ran :
Seen. You will try your best to keep us informed of affairs of
this sort.
And again :
The Provisional Government has entered into a compact with
the invading forces. Hence you should not destroy your real
interest by fighting against them, but kill the English in every
possible way.
This manifesto, found at Thai, was signed by Obaydulla,
Wazir of the Provisional Government of India, who is
referred to in the previous chapter. In addition to these
main reasons, there is evidence that Amanulla Khan was,
to some extent, influenced by Russian advice.
Thus the die was cast, and Amanulla, throwing to
the winds the friendship with the British Government on
which his grandfather and his father had firmly based
their policy, forced an entirely unjustifiable war on the
British, a war which was known as the " Third Afghan
War ".
1 For the necessity of such action vide India as I Knew 7>, by Sir Michael O'Dwyer,
p. 283 et seq.
CHAPTER LI I
THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR
my pious, brave nation! O my faithful lion-hearted army! Nobility
fame, honour, courage and valour are among your attributes. Patriotism,
piety and virtue are your natural characteristics.
1 proclaim to all of you, the truthful subjects of my royal person, that the
treacherous and deceitful English Government has been, since a long time,
practising with diabolical treachery and fraud, many shameful oppressions
I call upon my pious and brave royal army to strive and do their best,
and upon all my faithful subjects to wage Jihad in the path of God with their
life and property. AMANULLA KHAN'S Proclamation of Jihad.
Cardboard brown hills flat against the skyline! Hills that had shape without
bulk, and where the rock faces showed, the cardboard was stained and darkened.
The first thing I noticed about the Khy ber was its lack of detail. . . . Anything
that moved on the mountains was without individuality. No wonder aero-
planes are of little use against the invisibility with which the hills protect their
own. At five hundred feet, it would be difficult for an observer to pick out as
many tribesmen ambushed on an apparently barren summit. ROSITA FORBES.
The Policy of the Amir. In the First and Second
Afghan Wars, British armies invaded Afghanistan,
captured Kabul and held various other important centres.
On this occasion the Afghans invaded India, but merely
penetrated a few miles into British territory from which
they were speedily ejected with heavy losses.
Amanulla's policy was to raise the warlike and fanatical
tribes on both sides of the frontier by the declaration of
Jihad and by the assembling of troops at various points on
the Indian frontier who, while avoiding engagements
with the British, would foment rebellion on the North-
West Frontier and in the Punjab. Acting on this plan,
he despatched a force under Saleh Muhammad, who
had replaced Nadir Khan as Commander-in-Chief, to
Dakka, a second, under Nadir Khan, to Khost, and a
third, under Abdul Kuddus, to Kandahar.
270
CH.LH THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 271
Internal Disturbances in India. In the spring of 1919
serious internal disturbances caused the authorities grave
anxiety. 1 So much so was this the case that it was
necessary to detain large bodies of troops awaiting
demobilization or embarkation to England, to guard
important centres and the vital lines of communication.
These disturbances had, without doubt, encouraged the
Amir to pursue his hostile policy.
The Military Position in India. The most important
factor, in May 1919, was the large number of war-trained
units still serving abroad. Moreover, to quote the official
account: 2 " demobilization of British personnel had begun
and large numbers of men had left for England without
being replaced. The shortage of skilled artisans and
mechanics in the technical branch was especially marked.
The Indian units throughout were temporarily short of
effectives . . . and a full complement of Indian officers
and men had been permitted to proceed on furlough for
the first time since August 1914." To conclude this
brief survey: stocks of aeroplanes, railway plant, and
military stores, which were only procurable from the
United Kingdom, had run down and, owing to shortage of
shipping, could not be speedily replaced. Animal trans-
port, especially the supply of mules, had been completely
exhausted and ponies, which are greatly inferior, were
perforce employed, even in the Field Army. There was
also a shortage of camels, partly owing to disease. On
the other hand, many miles of roads suitable for
mechanized transport had been constructed along the
North- West Frontier, while the duplication of the road
in the Khaibar, by which there was an upper motor
traffic road and a lower one for slow-moving transport,
constituted a noteworthy improvement. There were also
sufficient supplies of food.
To give some idea of the immensity of the problem,
the strength of the British and Indian forces engaged
north of the Indus aggregated 340,000 men and 185,000
1 India as I Knew //, by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, ch. xvii.
* I have consulted the Official Account of The Third Afghan War and would thank
the Secretary of State for India for his permission to use some of the excellent sketch
maps which it contains.
272 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
animals. 1 Fortunately Sir Charles Munro was a most
capable Commander-in-Chief.
The Disposition of British Troops. In accordance with
Lord Curzon's scheme of 1899, regular troops were
mainly concentrated on the Indian side of the Admini-
strative frontier, while the trans-border tracts were held
by irregulars, with the exception of the garrisons of
Chitral, of the Malakand and in the Tochi Valley. This
system had worked well until 1919, although its risks
and drawbacks were obvious.
A striking force, consisting of two divisions and two
cavalry brigades, was available for offensive action on the
Khaibar front and half that force on the southern front.
A defensive role was assigned to troops in the Central
area and to the garrisons of Malakand and Chitral. A
general reserve of one division, two mobile brigades and
one brigade of cavalry was kept in readiness. These
latter units were short of effectives and of transport.
Generally speaking, the force suffered from the drawbacks
detailed above, but it had the great advantage of being
provided with aeroplanes, although these were few in
number and of an inferior class.
The Afghan Military Forces. In this work I have
pointed out more than once that the real military strength
of Afghanistan lies in its armed population rather than
in its army, but the difficulties of supply strictly limit the
numbers of armed tribesmen who can be kept in the
field for any long period. Afghanistan, at this time, was
divided into ten military districts, all of them, except in
the case of Kabul, being in touch with its frontiers. Its
effectives were nominally 38,000 infantry, 8000 cavalry
and 4000 artillerymen. They were badly trained, with
obsolete guns and rifles, although their courage and
endurance were beyond dispute.
As shown in the sketch map, number i, in the Kunar
Valley there were 6 battalions of infantry and 8 pack
guns available for operations against Chitral. At Ningra-
har, available for operations against the Khaibar, there
1 Vide The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Munro^ by General Sir George
Barrow.
No. I
BADAKHSHANj
3 Bns Inf \
AFGHAN
TURKISTAN
KUNAR
[cBns
i 8 burrs
!l20bso!eteGuns
NINGRAHAR
14 Bns Inf
Bn Pioneers
1/2 Regts.Cav.
44 Guns
4 Obsolete Guns
KABUL (Reserve)
11 Bns. Inf.
5k Reg ts Cav
Guns
6 ObsolebeG
KHOST&GHAZW
KANDAHAR
13 Bns inf
3 Regts.Cav
60 Guns
62 Obsolete Guns
DERA ISMAIL KHAN
SKETCH MAP
showing
(A) COMMUNICATION BETWEEN INDIA
AND EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Bi DISTRIBUTION of TROOPS, BRITISH
AND AFGHAN ON THE 6th. May 1919
Scale 1 inch ^48 miles
HERAT* FARAH
12 Bns Inf
3
26 Guns
85 Obsolete Guns
REFERENCE
Bn:ish Troops
Roads
Came! Tracts
Afghan Troops
Roads
Camel
Durand Line
Undemarcated Frontier
Admmistrattue Border
LII THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 273
were 14 battalions of infantry, i battalion of pioneers, i J
regiments of cavalry and 44 guns. A still stronger force,
concentrating in Khost under Nadir Khan, included 16
battalions of infantry, 2 battalions of pioneers, 4 regiments
of cavalry and 60 guns. Concentrating at Kandahar were
13 battalions of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry and
60 guns. Finally, at Kabul, there was a general reserve
of 1 1 battalions of infantry and 5^ regiments of cavalry
with 40 guns. The only arsenal, which was scantily
supplied with equipment and munitions, was situated
close to Kabul.
The First Act of War. On May 3 an escort of
Khyber Rifles which was, as usual, escorting the caravan
to the Afghan border, was turned back by Afghan pickets
who had established themselves on the British side of the
frontier. On -the following day large numbers of copies
of the farman^ signed by the Amir and exhorting all
Moslems to Jihad, were distributed through the Afghan
post office at Peshawar, together with leaflets which
announced that Germany had resumed military operations
and that India had revolted.
The Phases of Operations. In consequence of the
Amir's action, orders were issued on May 5 for the
mobilization of the field army. The operations fall under
three distinct heads:
Phase (i): Actions on the Khaibar front from May
6 to 25.
Phase (2): Invasion of the Central area by Nadir
Khan and the siege of Thai from May 26 to June 2.
Phase (3): From June 3 to August 8 cessation of
hostilities by Afghan regulars, but considerable activity
of border tribes under the instigation of Afghan leaders.
Finally the capture of the Spin-Baldak Fort and operations
by the Chitral force deserve mention.
The Operations on the Khaibar Front. It would appear
that Saleh Muhammad, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief,
misunderstood or disobeyed the Amir's instructions by
commencing hostilities before the hoped for risings in
India and among the tribesmen had taken place. 1 Arriv-
1 He was dismissed and not restored to favour.
VOL. II T
274 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
ing at Dakka towards the end of April, Afghan regulars
crossed the frontier on May 3 and occupied Bagh and the
heights above Landi Kotal I with a force which, by the
evening of May 6, included three battalions of infantry
and two guns. A second body of 350 infantry with two
guns held two hills situated some five miles to the
north of Landi Kotal, while Shinwaris and Mohmands
from Afghan territory were gradually assembling and
joining the Amir's regular forces in large numbers.
The British Garrison at Landi Kotal. During this
critical period the British garrison at Landi Kotal merely
consisted of two companies of Indian infantry and 500
men of the Khyber Rifles. Owing to the cry of Jihad
and hostile propaganda among the tribes, the loyalty of the
latter body could not be depended upon, and it was most
fortunate that the Afghans allowed this golden oppor-
tunity to slip. Had they overpowered this weak force, the
neighbouring tribes would undoubtedly have risen. As it
was, rather in accordance with their custom, they watched
to see what would happen. The situation was saved by
the arrival, on May 7, of British reinforcements in lorries,
to be followed by the I st infantry brigade, which reached
Landi Kotal on May 8.
Brigadier-General G. F. Crocker attacks the Afghan
Position. Crocker, expecting the speedy appearance of
further reinforcements, decided to attack the Afghans on
the morning of May 9. They held a well-defined ridge
facing north-east, but parallel to their line of retreat.
Realizing the possibility of tribesmen assailing his right
flank from the north, he detached a large proportion of
his small force to the Ashkhel ridge. In consequence,
on attacking the Afghan invaders he was only able to
recover the water-supply and to secure a position for a
further advance when reinforcements reached the front.
The Attempted Rising in Peshawar City. The decisive
action was, however, delayed by an attempted rising in
Peshawar city, which the Afghan Postmaster had
organized in co-operation with the Indian Revolutionary
Committee. Its purpose was to destroy the mobiliza-
1 Vide Sketch Map of the Khaibar (No. 2) in Official Account.
No.
Landi
KafirKot .
KhargaU Michni
SM/I-
SKETCH MAP
THE KHYBER
From ' The Official Account of the Thkd Afghan War ' by permission of The Government of India, Central Publication Branch,
in THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 275
tion stores, to burn the railway station and the canton-
ment. This threat was met by the sudden investment
of Peshawar city, by the almost simultaneous closing of
its gates and by the seizure of the Afghan Postmaster
and the revolutionary leaders.
The Capture of the Afghan Position at Eagh. On
May 1 1 the Afghan position at Bagh was attacked in
force. In spite of the great heat, which necessitated
resting the troops at intervals, the Afghans were driven
into flight with heavy losses, while the Royal Air Force
completed the victory by bombing and machine-gunning
groups of fugitives. On the following day the Royal Air
Force bombed the Afghan camp at Dakka, whereupon the
Amir's army hastily retired on Jalalabad, while their
Mohmand allies, true to type, looted the camp. Dakka
was subsequently occupied without opposition by the
British.
Afghan Attack on the Camp at Dakka. On May 16
a reconnaissance in force passed through the Khurd
Khaibar Pass and advanced to the Mohmand village of
Girdiz, which was occupied. Large numbers of the
enemy, with artillery, who had concentrated for an attack
on Dakka, threatened this column, which retired hard
pressed back to its camp. Indeed, a charge of the King's
Dragoon Guards had to be made before the pursuers were
checked.
The Capture of the Afghan Position at the Khurd
Khaibar. The enemy had taken up a strong position in
the hills from the Khurd Khaibar westwards, which made
the British camp untenable. Relying on promises of
reinforcements and a fresh supply of gun ammunition,
Crocker attacked at dawn on May 17. Partly owing to
the lack of ammunition, the attack was held up, but
the opportune arrival of three lorryloads enabled the
artillery to become active once again. An hour later,
the appearance of British reinforcements under General
Sir Andrew Skeen, on the right flank of the Afghans,
changed the situation. The main attack had been
timed to start at 2 P.M., but the Afghans, owing to the
deadly fire of the British howitzers and the threat to
2 76 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
their right flank, began to retire at i P.M. and dispersed
so rapidly that, although they left five out of their seven
Krupp guns behind, their losses were not as heavy as
was hoped.
The Afridis display Hostility. In spite of the British
victory of May n, sections of the Afridis, seduced by
Afghan money, raised the cry of Jihad. This movement,
combined with the open enmity of an influential headman
and an attack on a column, affected the loyalty of the
Khyber Rifles, who began to desert with their arms and
ammunition. The force was consequently disbanded,
and the pass was strongly held by British regular
troops.
The Bombing of Jalalabad and of Kabul. To resume
the main narrative: the Royal Air Force, although
greatly handicapped by the inferior quality of its machines,
carried out concentrated bombing raids on Jalalabad,
where large portions of the military quarter were burned;
troops on parade were also bombed. During the panic
which ensued the neighbouring tribesmen looted arms,
ammunition and treasure. To quote from an Indian
eye-witness: " A few aeroplanes came over Jalalabad
and made a bombardment for hours, two bombs explod-
ing near the room I occupied at only a few yards. This
bombardment caused a bad confusion and disorder both
in the civil and military quarters alike. . . . The Sipahi
[soldier] wanted to excel his General in flight and the
General his Sipahi."
To continue: on May 24 Captain R. Halley of the
Royal Air Force performed a notable feat in bombing the
Amir's palace and the ammunition factory at Kabul.
This demonstration that the capital was within reach of
British aircraft produced a profound impression and an
earnest desire for peace. Again we have the report of
an Indian eye-witness : " At 6 A.M. an aeroplane made-
appearance at Kabul for the first time. , . . Three guns
fired from the hills and Ark, numerous rifle fires and a
few foolish revolver fires were made by the public and
military. There was a great humming sound in the town
after the airship had disappeared, denoting public terror
No. 12
[ Peiuar Hotal
SKETCH MAP
CENTRAL AREA
Scale 1 inch 16 miles
Miles 10 5 o 10 20
30 Miles
K H Si T
From ' The Official Account of the Third Afghan War ' by permission of The Government of India, Central Publication Branch.
m THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 277
and sensation followed by a death silence after a few
minutes. To appease the public from the panic, a band
was played and a regiment brought on the parade ground
for a few minutes, quite at unusual times.'*
The Amir's Request for an Armistice. Preparations
for an advance on Jalalabad were being made during this
period, but unofficial Afghan overtures culminated on
May 31 in a formal request from the Amir for the
conclusion of an Armistice. Instructions were conse-
quently issued that, although preparations were to con-
tinue, no further advance was to be made without fresh
orders. Actually the position in the Central area called
for strong reinforcements, which necessitated the transfer
of a part of the mechanized transport of the Khaibar
force.
The Central Front. The force which held the Central
Area was weak and lacked transport. Consequently it
was not intended to assume the offensive. In the Upper
Kurram Valley we were bound to defend the loyal Turis
against their Afghan enemies, in spite of the disad-
vantageous fact that the valley formed an extremely narrow
salient, with Afghan territory flanking it throughout on
the west and to a less extent to the north. The exposed
position was Parachinar, 1 where, on May 7, a battalion of
infantry, a squadron of cavalry and two sections of
mountain guns had been sent to reinforce the Kurram
militia. This weak force was later substantially
strengthened by the 3rd Guides and a Motor Gun
Company.
The Movements of Nadir Khan. Nadir Khan, whose
movements were fortunately deliberate, reached Matun,
the chief centre of Khost, on May 19. There he was in
a position to march on Thai or on the Tochi, or, again,
to sever our communications with Parachinar and establish
contact with the Afridis, and it was impossible to know
which objective he would select. On May 23 it was
reported that he was marching on Spinwam, which was
evacuated and was almost immediately occupied by the
Afghans. Nadir Khan was now equidistant from Thai,
1 Vide Sketch Map of Central Area (No. 12).
278 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Bannu or Idak on the Tochi. He finally decided to attack
Thai and, using a route which had been reported as unfit
for the passage of field guns, but which was passable for
the elephants and mules which carried them, he appeared
before Thai on May 26.
The Evacuation of the Tochi Valley and of Wana. In
view of the intense sensitiveness of the frontier tribes to
any appeal from Kabul, it was considered that the Afghan
advance would almost certainly result in a rising of the
Mahsuds and Wazirs. Consequently, since the despatch
of reinforcements was impossible, it was decided, on May
21, to withdraw the loyal elements of the militia without
delay. This was a serious decision, since evacuation
certainly meant that the surrounding tribes would become
hostile and join the enemy. Moreover, in view of the
strength of the posts, which could beat off any attack by
tribesmen unsupported by artillery, withdrawal at this
juncture was to be deprecated.
The Retreat of Major Russell. Under the leader-
ship of Major Russell, the most difficult evacuation of
the posts was successfully carried out by means of forced
marches into the Zhob Valley. No halt was made until
the post of Mogulkot, forty miles from Wana, was
reached. In this post there were only rations for twenty-
four hours and, after halting for a day, Major Russell,
starting before dawn, made for Mir AH Khel. Mean-
while large numbers of tribesmen who had assembled,
attacked the retreating force, and it was only with the
greatest difficulty that Russell was able to press on until
met by the Zhob Militia from Mir Ali Khel. Finally
Fort Sandeman was reached but, out of a total of eight
British officers, four were killed and two were wounded.
The losses by death and desertion were very heavy. Sir
Charles Munro in his despatch of November i, 1919,
wrote of this retirement: " The exploit stands out as one
of the finest recorded in the history of the Indian frontier ".
The Position in the Zhob Valley. This retirement,
excited the tribesmen, and the Kakars, Mando Khels and
Sherannis, who were enlisted in the Zhob Militia,
deserted.
LII THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 279
During the difficult period that followed, the destruc-
tion of a convoy and heavy casualties suffered by a
column which marched out to rescue it, have to be
recorded. It should be pointed out that these serious
reverses were partly due to the officers and men, in some
cases, being young and inexperienced in frontier warfare.
However, reinforcements from Quetta relieved Fort
Sandeman, which had been invested, and by the end of
July the tribesmen had been punished and the disturb-
ances caused by the repercussions of the Afghan War
were ended.
The Thai Position. To return to Nadir Khan: the
fort at Thai, which was only built for defence against tribes-
men armed with rifles, was the centre of the position, with
an outer and an inner line of defence. It was garrisoned
by four battalions of Indian troops, with two sections of
mountain guns and two 3-inch trench howitzers. Its
water-supply was obtained from a well situated 300 yards
to the north-east of the fort.
The Afghans shell Thai. The Afghan force consisted
of 3000 infantry with two lo-centimetre (3-8 inch)
Krupp field howitzers, seven 7 ^-centimetre Krupp pack
guns and a large force of tribesmen. The fort suffered
severely from the fire of the howitzers, which outranged
the British artillery and only temporary relief was obtained
by two aeroplanes of the Royal Air Force, which bombed
the Afghan gun emplacements. On May 28 the
howitzers set on fire the petrol dump, the bhoosa stacks
and the rations, while the wireless station was hit and
temporarily put out of action. That morning a force of
Afghan regulars, which occupied Thai village, made a
half-hearted attack in the direction of the fort, which
was repulsed without difficulty.
The Relief of Thai Brigadier-General R. H. F,
Dyer led the relief force, which concentrated at Togh on
May 30. It included four 1 5-pdrs. The force marched
eighteen miles in intense heat and started off again before
dawn on June i to cover the last nine miles to Thai.
Dyer, in the first place, attacked some 4000 Khostwal
and Wazir tribesmen who were holding a deep nala to
280 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
the south of Thai. His sudden assault and the artillery
fire scattered them and the position was taken. The
15-pdr. guns then silenced the Afghan howitzers.
The Defeat of Nadir Khan. On the following morn-
ing, June 2, an attack was launched against the main
Afghan position, on the slopes north-west of Thai. As it
was developing, Dyer received a letter from Nadir Khan
stating that he had received the instructions of the Amir
to suspend hostilities. He asked for an acknowledgement
to the communication. Dyer replied: " My guns will
give an immediate reply, and a further reply will c be sent
by the Divisional Commander, to whom the letter has
been forwarded ". It soon became clear that the Afghans
were retiring from the position, which was captured with-
out loss. Armoured cars and aeroplanes pursued the
defeated army, while the tired infantry was able to rest.
The enemy camp was occupied on the following day and
preparations were being made for exploiting the victory
by a march on Matun, but the signing of the armistice on
June 3 officially ended the war. Much credit for the
relief of Thai is due to the indomitable Dyer and to his
force.
The Tactics of Nadir Khan. The advance of Nadir
Khan on Thai, using a route considered to be impassable
for field artillery, was an excellent move, but he failed com-
pletely to take advantage of the initiative he had gained.
The British force was weak and consisted mainly of young
soldiers. No general attack, however, on the vulnerable
position was attempted, Nadir Khan allowing his
powerful force to remain spectators of his bombardment,
although he was surely aware that he must strike quickly
before the arrival of British reinforcements. Having, by
his march on Thai, prevented a further British advance on
Jalalabad, he was content with this success and saved his
army from disaster by a timely and rapid retirement^
Before quitting this subject, I would mention that the
Parachinar force throughout this critical period displayed
striking initiative, which was rewarded by success.
The Chitral Front. The Afghans had a considerable
force in the Upper Kunar Valley. The armed forces of
THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR 281
Chitral included 450 rifles of the i/n Rajputs, one
section of a mountain battery and the Chitral Scouts,
1000 strong, commanded by British officers, and the
Mehtar's bodyguard. The Afghans invaded Chitral, but
were driven out by the defending force, which crossed
the frontier in pursuit and captured the village of Birkot.
Other minor operations followed in which, generally
speaking, the Chitral force more than held its own.
The Southern Front. The situation on the southern
front possessed the advantage that from the Gumal Pass
southwards the frontier of the two states marched
together and that, with the exception of a portion of the
Zhob Valley, there were no tribes in unadministered
territory to be considered. The boundary cantonment,
as mentioned in Chapter XLVI, was New Chaman,
distant some seventy miles from Kandahar, and five miles
within Afghan territory was the Afghan fort of Spin
Baldak.
At the outbreak of hostilities, the Afghan forces at
Kandahar were estimated at 13 battalions, with 3 regi-
ments of cavalry and 60 guns. There were also large
forces of fighting tribesmen available. The Quetta-
Zhob force consisted of 1 2 battalions of infantry, 4^ regi-
ments of cavalry with 24 guns and 34 machine-guns.
Reports were received of large gatherings of Afghan
troops on the Zhob border, who were probably sent there
to aid the neighbouring tribes in an attack on Fort
Sandeman. Lieutenant-General Wapshare considered
that it would be strategically unsound to divide his force
by sending reinforcements to the Zhob Valley and that
the capture of the Spin-Baldak fort would produce a
considerable effect on the tribesmen.
The Storming of the Spin-Baldak Fort. In pursuance
of this plan, on May 29, 1919, cavalry surrounded the
fort, followed by two infantry brigades. The artillery
consisted of two batteries of 1 8-pdrs. in one case and of
two 4- 5-inch and four 5-inch howitzers in the other.
After a bombardment which breached the walls in several
places, the fort was assaulted by the 1/22 Punjabis and
the 4th Gurkha Rifles ; the Duke of Wellington's
282 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.UI
regiment gallantly captured the ridge and towers before
the main defences had been scaled. The Afghans dis-
played great bravery and were almost all killed or captured.
The fall of the fort relieved the situation in Zhob, but
the retirement of the remnants of the Wana garrison,
referred to above, upset the neighbouring tribesmen
and necessitated the despatch of a mobile column to that
area.
Summary. To conclude this brief outline of the
Third Afghan War: in spite of the difficulties of the
situation, which I have described, India placed 140,000
troops on the North- West Frontier within a fortnight
of the commencement of the war. Within eight days of
the opening of hostilities, in spite of the extreme heat, the
main Afghan Army had been defeated and scattered at a
distance of forty-five miles from railhead. Moreover, the
rapid advance of the British in force up the Khaibar
discouraged the Afridis and Mohmands and averted a
long and far more serious campaign. Coming so soon
after the close of the titanic conflict of the World War,
this relatively insignificant clash of arms with Afghanistan
passed almost unnoticed in Great Britain, but yet, taking
all the circumstances into account, it represented no
mean achievement, and many British and Indian units
added to their laurels.
CHAPTER LIII
AFGHANISTAN ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE AN
INDEPENDENT STATE
After the breakdown of the Russian Empire in 1917, the sole inducement
for Afghanistan to remain within the British orbit was removed (at any rate
for the time being) and events were to prove that the sudden cessation of the
pressure from the north had made a greater impression on the Afghan mind
than the victory of Great Britain. ARNOLD TOYNBEE, Survey of International
Affairs, 1920-1923.
Peace Negotiations the Amir's Letter. The Afghan
forces in every area of hostilities having been defeated, as
described in the last chapter, Amanulla perforce decided
to make peace. On May 28 a letter was received from
the Amir, who ascribed the outbreak of the war to a
misunderstanding and stated that Saleh Muhammad's
operations were of a purely defensive nature. The Amir
further complained of the air bombardments of Kabul and
Jalalabad as unjustifiable acts of aggression, but added
that he was " nevertheless prepared to be magnanimous "
and had issued orders for the cessation of hostilities.
The Armistice Terms. The Viceroy in his reply
refuted the Amir's version of the causes of the war and
laid down the terms on which an armistice would be
granted. It was decided that the treaty for the restora-
tion of peace should be followed by a probationary period
of six months, during which the Amir should show signs
of friendship and that, upon the fulfilment of these con-
ditions, a " Treaty of Friendship " would be concluded.
The readiness of the Government of India to accept
the Amir's offer was criticized in some quarters, but it
was realized that an advance to Kabul would have prob-
ably meant the disintegration of Afghanistan, possibly
for some years, and the consequent weakening of the
283
284 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
invaluable buffer state between India and Soviet Russia,
which she represented. Add to this question of policy
the fact that the military operations had already cost
over 1 6,000,000.
The Peace Treaty of Rawalpindi. The Amir replied,
objecting to the terms of the Armistice and pretending
to misunderstand their purport, but agreed to send his
representatives to India to discuss them.
The Afghan delegates, who possessed plenary powers,
came to Rawalpindi with unduly inflated ideas.^ They
expected that, even if they could not secure the old
advantages of the subsidy with arrears, they would win
something tangible which would permit them to return
to Kabul with credit. They adopted at first a distinctly
truculent and defiant attitude, refusing even to attend the
first meeting unless they were permitted to retain their
armed escort, alleging that their honour was involved in
its retention. Their bluff was, however, called and they
were informed that, unless they did attend as arranged,
their train would take them back that night and hostilities
would be resumed. Upon receiving this ultimatum, they
became somewhat less unreasonable.
The main objects of the delegates were to gain
freedom from British control of foreign relations, the
avoidance of any loss of territory, the surrender by the
British of Waziristan and other tribal areas, and a new
subsidy.
In view of these preposterous claims, it was decided
to present the Peace Treaty to them as an ultimatum.
After long discussions it appeared that the Afghan
delegates were prepared to agree, if their independence
and the freedom of their foreign relations could be
secured. Finally, on August 8, the Treaty of Peace was
duly signed and the chief British representative, Sir
Hamilton Grant, wrote a letter which acknowledged that
" Afghanistan was officially free and independent in its
internal and external affairs ".'
The Release of British Control of the Foreign Relations
of Afghanistan. Grant was severely taken to task in some
1 This treaty and the letter are given in Appendix F.
LIU AN INDEPENDENT STATE 285
quarters for this letter. But it was evidently impossible
to continue the old arrangement without making far-
reaching changes. The old order had served its purpose
well in keeping Russia from annexing Afghanistan, but
the Russian Empire had fallen to be succeeded by the
chaos of Bolshevism which did not, at the time, appear
likely to be permanent. Moreover, atheistical Bolshevism,
although it is apparently now moving far away from the
ideals of its early days, will never be permanently accept-
able to religious Islam. Accordingly, taking the long
view tliat it is in the interest of Afghanistan to be friendly
with Great Britain, not only on account of trade relations,
but also for securing help in case of invasion from the
north, it would appear that the policy was justifiable and
sound. At the same time, it was natural that the Peace
Treaty should have been badly received by the army,
since it conceded to the defeated enemy terms that
would have been more suitable if the Afghans had been
victorious.
The Afghan View. As was to be expected, in Afghan
eyes the admission of the independence of their country
by the British Commission was regarded as a triumph,
and Amanulla declared that he had drawn the sword to
vindicate the claim of Afghanistan to independence, and
had won it. Annual celebrations are held to com-
memorate Afghan independence, symbolized for some
years by a column with a chained lion, representing
Great Britain, at its base; and the Afghans or many
of them firmly believe that they gained it by victory.
The Amir thus found his gamble justified and on this
note the first chapter towards the restoration of normal
relations with Afghanistan may be concluded.
Summary of Events in the Near and Middle East.
Before dealing with the Conference, which was to be
held at Mussoorie, it seems desirable to mention events
occurring in neighbouring countries which, in no small
degree, influenced Indo-Afghan relations. To take the
position of Turkey, at the Boulogne Conference held on
June 21, 1919, military action by the Greeks in Anatolia
was sanctioned. Turkey at this period still maintained
286 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the Khalifat (Caliphate) and the action of the allies was
bitterly denounced throughout the Moslem world. In
India, the Khalifat movement gathered force and, in
June 1920, developed into Hijrat y l some 18,000 Indian
Moslems emigrating to Afghanistan. At first they were
welcomed, but admission was perforce finally refused;
and the disillusioned emigrants gradually returned to
their homes, where the benevolent Government of India
arranged for them to regain their land and houses.
To turn to Russia: the Whites, who were advancing
steadily in August 1919, had been defeated by the
Bolshevists in April 1920. The Soviet and Ankara
Governments had drawn together, while a Soviet Mission
had been despatched to Kabul. Again, in Persia, the
Anglo-Persian Agreement had been signed on August 9,
1919, but a year later it had not been ratified by the
Majtis, which finally rejected it. 2 In Iraq there were
serious troubles among the tribes, which culminated in
the Arab revolt of July 1920. Taken in conjunction with
the sinister unrest in Ireland, the situation, so far as
Great Britain was concerned, had distinctly deteriorated.
The Situation on the North- West Frontier. The
position on the North- West Frontier after the termination
of hostilities caused grave anxiety, since the Wazirs and
Mahsuds involved the war-weary British army in yet
another campaign of some importance during the autumn
and winter of 1 9 1 9-1 920 ; raids were also frequent along
the frontier from Peshawar to Dera Ismail Khan. Stout-
hearted Munro, however, recommended the permanent
occupation of the Khaibar Pass, with the construction
of a railway line to the Afghan frontier. The settlement
with the Afridis which included a fine of 50,000 rupees
and the return of Government arms and property was
announced in November 1919, but raids by irreconcil-
ables continued.
Nadir Khan held ijirga at Hada on January 31,1 920,
at which he distributed black standards to the Afridis
and Mohmands, and warned them to be prepared for
1 Hijrat here signifies quitting a country governed by a ruler who cannot be accepted
by Moslems. 2 Sykes, op. cit. (3rd ed.), vol. ii, p. 548.
un AN INDEPENDENT STATE 287
war. However, in spite of these intrigues, satisfactory
progress was made with the Afridis and other warlike
tribesmen. In Waziristan, Colonel Shah Daula, an
Afghan officer, remained at Wana, but the decision to
occupy Razmak and to construct a circular road in that
area improved matters. It remains to add that the
gradual re-establishment of British authority among the
tribes was a severe blow to the Amir, who counted on his
influence with them to serve as a diplomatic lever in his
negotiations with the British.
T$e British Conditions of Friendship. The Amir was
asked to prove the sincerity of his intentions by the
dismissal of Bolshevist missions and agents. He was
also asked to dismiss Obaydulla, Mahendra Pratap,
Barkatulla and other Indian seditionists. Friendly rela-
tions in connexion with the frontier tribes were also
insisted on and, finally, improved treatment of the
British Agent at Kabul.
Anglo-Afghan relations after the Treaty of Peace.
There is no doubt that Amanulla and his advisers entirely
misunderstood British intentions and, as was only natural
under the circumstances, believed that the British
expected that the Bolshevists would have been defeated
and that Turkey would have been partitioned during the
six months probation ; and finally that Afghanistan would
be forced to accept unpalatable terms or, once again, be
invaded. Apart from these ideas, the British attitude
was wounding to Afghan pride. Amanulla thereupon
decided to secure the support of Russia and of Turkey,
Russo-Afghan Relations. In June 1919 an Afghan
Mission bound for Moscow passed through Tashkent.
An invitation was also sent for a Bolshevist envoy to visit
Kabul. In response, Bravine, the Bolshevist representative,
whom I recollect as a somewhat temperamental secretary
of the Russian Consulate-General at Meshed in 1913,
reached Kabul in September 1919. By November, in
return for an undertaking from Afghanistan to facilitate
the despatch of arms and propagandists to the Indian
frontier tribes and to India, the Bolshevists made offers
which are given below. Bravine was superseded by
288 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Suritz at the end of the year and the negotiations hung
fire fpr the time being, 1
The Amir's Policy. Amanulla in this manner flouted
the British demand for the exclusion of the Bolshevists.
As to the dismissal of the Indian seditionists, friendly
Habibulla Khan was not strong enough to take a step,
which violated all Moslem ideas of hospitality, whereas
Amanulla considered them useful allies to be encouraged.
The question of the frontier tribes, which Amanulla
rightly held to constitute his ace of spades, was the last
question on which he would yield and, somewhat ^natur-
ally, fearing a new British attack, intense intrigues by
Afghan officials with the frontier tribes were the order
of the day. Finally, the British Agent at Kabul was
practically held a prisoner and was not released from
confinement until August 8, while his correspondence
was seized.
The Khaibar Demarcation , August-September 1919.
To add fuel to the fire, the undefined frontier, in the
vicinity of Landi Khana from Sisobi to Palosi on the
Kabul River, was demarcated by Mr. (later Sir John)
MafFey, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty.
The proceedings were watched by an Afghan representa-
tive, whose report formed the subject of a strong protest
at the Mussoorie Conference. Before quitting this
subject, it is to be noted that, by the terms of Article II
of the Treaty of 1921, the Afghan frontier was advanced
approximately 700 yards along the main road; the Tor
Kham ridge to the south of the road was also restored to
Afghanistan,
The Mussoorie Conference^ 1920. The chief British
representative at this conference was Mr. (later Sir
Henry) Dobbs, while Mahmud Tarzi was the chief
representative of Afghanistan. Four meetings were held
in the middle of April, but the conference was suspended
on account of the three following acts of Afghan aggres-
sion. In Baluchistan, at the instigation of Abdul Kuddus,
the Governor of Kandahar, a loyal headman in British
1 Upon his supersession, Bravine became an Afghan subject. He was murdered at
Ghazni in January 1921 at Bolshevist instigation, according to general belief.
LIU AN INDEPENDENT STATE 289
territory had been abducted by order of the Governor of
Spin Baldak; in the Kurram Valley, at the instigation of
Nadir Khan, Tandisar, situated on the British side of
the Peiwar Kotal, had been occupied by Afghan forces,
as had also been the case of Lambarbat in Chitral. After
these questions had been satisfactorily disposed of, the
conference was resumed early in June.
Mahmud Tarzi now raised the question of the
Khalifat^ of the Turkish Peace terms and of the Holy
Places, but was informed that the Sharif of Mecca was
entirely independent, that the Khalifat had nothing to
do with the British Empire, and that no modification in
the Turkish Peace terms could be made out of regard
for Afghan feelings.
As to the agitation among the frontier tribes, Dobbs
pointed out that it was due to Afghan support, to Bol-
shevist intrigues encouraged by Afghanistan, and to
Indian revolutionary agitation in tribal country. The
Afghans thereupon boldly claimed that the tribes should
be handed over to them and a yearly subsidy be paid to
Kabul for controlling them! During the Conference,
Dobbs, realizing how the world situation had deteriorated,
replaced the demand for the dismissal of Bolshevists and
Indian seditionists by a request for their control, to prevent
them from using Afghanistan as a centre for hostile
propaganda against the British. Other subjects to be
discussed were the reception of a British Minister at
Kabul with consuls at important centres, and the appoint-
ment of an Afghan Minister to London with a Consul-
General at Calcutta and Consuls at other centres in India.
Both Dobbs and Mahmud Tarzi were in favour of
proceeding to conclude a Treaty at Mussoorie, Dobbs
being especially influenced by the inopportune arrival at
Kabul of Jemal Pasha, a famous Turkish general. He
Kras appointed to reorganize the Afghan army, while
his presence was calculated to encourage anti-British
activities. 1 It was, however, decided that Dobbs should
present an Aide-Memoir e^ containing a summary of the
1 He left Kabul in September 1921 and was assassinated at Tin 1 is in the following
year. a Fid* Appendix G.
VOL. II U
290 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
intentions and wishes of the British Government to the
Afghan delegates at the close of the Conference.
Although no striking success could be claimed for this
meeting, some obstacles to the restoration of good
relations had been removed, and the discussions had
ranged over a wide area.
Russian Policy and its Reaction on Feeling in Afghanistan.
At this period Lenin and his chief henchman Trotsky
were denouncing Great Britain as their chief enemy. In
Central Asia, however, Moslem revolts were suppressed
with ferocity and the Amir of Bukhara was driven out
and took refuge in Afghanistan. His arrival and that of
hundreds of Uzbeg refugees opened the eyes of Amanulla
and his people to the real nature of Bolshevist policy and
produced a revulsion of feeling in favour of the British
and a readiness to negotiate a defensive alliance with
them. Accordingly, on October 6, 1920, the Amir
addressed the Viceroy and invited " trustworthy re-
presentatives, invested with power to conclude a Treaty ",
to Kabul. Had this invitation been immediately accepted,
the situation would have been distinctly more favourable
than it was three months later.
The Dobbs Mission to Kabul. In response to the
Amir's invitation, Dobbs proceeded to Kabul, ac-
companied by a large staff. In January 1921, at the first
private meeting between the Amir, Mahmud Tarzi, and
Dobbs, a Draft Treaty was produced by the Afghans and
rejected by the British representative as being entirely
unacceptable. On April 5 an amended Afghan draft,
stated by Mahmud Tarzi to be "absolutely final", was
also declared by the British envoy to be " wholly un-
acceptable ".
On January 18, at a Conference with Mahmud
Tarzi and Nadir Khan, assurances were given that the
ratification of the Russo-Afghan Treaty had not yec
taken place, and that Jemal Pasha would not be allowed
to intrigue with the frontier tribes. Nadir Khan, in
return, pressed for some concessions to Afghan pre-
tensions in connexion with the tribes on the British side
of the frontier. This was met by Dobbs drafting a clause
un AN INDEPENDENT STATE 291
which provided for reciprocal information by the two
Governments regarding any measures that might appear
necessary for the maintenance of order among the tribes
on the common frontier. It also proposed periodical
meetings between British and Afghan frontier officials.
The Treaties of Afghanistan with Russia, Persia and
Turkey. Arnold Toynbee, in his survey of the position
of the Soviet Government after the revolution of 1917,
writes that during the first ten years of its existence in
its constant efforts to break the cordon of the " Capitalist "
phalanx, it turned to the three Middle Eastern countries. 1
He points out that after the Armistice Great Britain
caused alarm to these three countries and opened the way
for two sets of treaties, the first of which was built up
during the year 1921, and the second during the years
1925-1928. In the former year we have the Russo-
Afghan Treaty. There were also the Turko-Afghan
Treaty and the Perso-Afghan Treaty, thus, since each
country had a treaty with Russia, constituting a system
of treaties linking Afghanistan, Turkey and Persia with
Soviet Russia, and proving clearly that Russia was
determined to build up a strong entente with these
Moslem powers, and to unite them with one another.
The community of interests at this period was mainly,
it would seem, hostility towards Great Britain.
The Russo-Afghan Treaty, which was ratified by the
Amir in August of that year, provided for the reciprocal
establishment of Legations and for Russian Consulates
to be established at Herat, Maimena, Mazar-i- Sharif,
Kandahar and Ghazni. Seven Afghan Consulates were
to be established at Petrograd and other centres. Other
important clauses included a " yearly free subsidy to the
extent of one million gold or silver roubles, in coin or
bullion, together with a supply of munitions to be given
to Afghanistan; finally, the transfer of the Panjdeh
district to Afghanistan, and the construction of a Kushk-
Herat-Kandahar-Kabul telegraph line were also promised,
It is, however, to be noted that the Russian Minister at
Kabul promised not to establish consulates at Ghazni or
1 Vide Survey of International Affairs^ 1928.
292 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Kandahar, and the British Envoy was informed of this
promise.
The British-Russian Trade Agreement. The almost
simultaneous signing by Sir Robert Home and M.
Krassin on March 16, 1921, of a British-Russian Trade
Agreement, which had been negotiated without the
knowledge 6f the Government of India, added con-
siderably to the difficulties of Dobbs, since it would be
unreasonable to expect Afghanistan alone to maintain
opposition to Russian policy, while such oppositipn had
not been shown by Great Britain.
The Afghan Mission to Europe^ 1920-1921. It seems
desirable at this point to refer to the Mission headed by
Sirdar Muhammad Wali Khan, who conducted conversa-
tions in Russia in 1920 preliminary to the negotiation
of a Russo-Afghan Treaty. From Moscow the Mission
visited Berlin, where arrangements were made for the
engagement of German engineers and air personnel. At
Rome it was received by the King and the Foreign
Minister and an Agreement was signed by Count Sforza
for the despatch of a Commercial Mission to Afghanistan
and for the initiation of reciprocal diplomatic relations.
Lord Curzon protested against the conduct of the Italian
Government in concluding this Agreement. A treaty
was next signed in Paris providing for the exchange of
diplomatic representatives. At Washington, on the other
hand, reciprocal diplomatic representation was not agreed
to, but the possibility of appointing an American Consul
to Kabul was considered.
In August 1921 the Mission reached England, where
its members were treated as the guests of His Majesty's
Government. Muhammad Wali was the bearer of letters
from the Amir to the King-Emperor and from Mahmud
Tarzi to the " Foreign Ministry ". The Afghan dele-
gates persistently refused to enter into any relations with
the India Office, whose desire to facilitate their objects
was accordingly frustrated.
On August 14 they were received by Lord Curzon,
who, when Muhammad Wali began making a reference
to the negotiations pending at Kabul, abruptly terminated
AN INDEPENDENT STATE 293
the conversation, declaring that these negotiations had
nothing to do with him, but were the sole concern of the
Government of India and the India Office. The letter
to the Foreign Ministry was then presented but was
unopened during the interview; the Amir's letter to the
King was also handed over to Curzon.
It was most unfortunate that this Mission was
despatched to Europe before the conclusion of the treaty
which was being negotiated at Kabul; a different course
would have prevented misunderstandings. The in-
struct&ns received by the Afghan representatives to
have no dealings with the India Office were equally
unfortunate and placed the Foreign Office in a very
difficult position. However, a more courteous and
sympathetic attitude by Lord Curzon might well have
avoided compromising the sufficiently difficult position
at Kabul.
A Suspension of Negotiations. To return to that city:
the suspicious loss of the Mission mailbag of July 30
caused a suspension of negotiations. During this period,
on August 28, Mahmud Tarzi had written a note
couched in terms of studied rudeness, complaining of the
reception accorded to the Afghan Mission in London.
This letter he cancelled shortly afterwards, but it supplied
proof that the Amir was deeply offended.
Lord Curzon's Note to the Soviet. At this period, on
September 7, 1921, Curzon wrote a note to the Soviet
Government protesting strongly against the continuance
of hostile activities and stating that the Russian Treaty
with Afghanistan was the most serious charge of all
that the British Government had to make against the
Soviet Government. Assuming that the contents of this
note reached Amanulla, it might well have stiffened his
attitude towards the British and thereby have added to
the difficulties of Dobbs.
Negotiations Resumed. On November 8 the Amir
stated that without large tribal concessions an under-
standing was impossible. Matters had apparently reached
a complete impasse and a date was fixed for the departure
of the Mission after a final official meeting.
294 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP, un
The Amir signs the Treaty. However, on November 1 5,
1921, the Amir, maintaining to the last the " extraordinary
fiction " that his Foreign Minister knew nothing of the
discussions preliminary to this decision, signed the
Treaty. 1 Complimentary messages were then exchanged
and, in a friendly communication from the King- Emperor,
Amanulla was accorded the style of " Your Majesty ".
A Retrospect. The difficulties of the British Envoy
were serious enough owing to the intransigent attitude
of the Afghans. But they were materially increased by
the signature of the Russo-Afghan Treaty shortly after
the commencement of negotiations, by the deterioration
of the world situation, by disturbed political conditions
in India and by the frigid reception of the Afghan Mission
by Lord Curzon. Finally, as we have seen, the Amir
arranged with the Russian envoy that Russian consulates
should not be founded at Ghazni or Kandahar and,
apparently acting on impulse, signed the treaty.
Much credit is due to the ability and patience dis-
played by Sir Henry Dobbs, and, to close this somewhat
depressing account of the negotiations in a lighter vein,
I quote the remarks made by Brigadier-General Muspratt,
the Military Adviser to the Mission: " The tedium of
the negotiations was varied by a succession of ultimatums
and last words. More than once the Mission was packing
up, but the dove with the olive branch arrived in time.
It was a most reliable bird/'
1 Vide Appendix H,
CHAPTER LIV
KING AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS
Afghans are never at peace among themselves except when they are at
war.
The Situation in the Near and Middle East. Before
dealing with the situation which confronted Major (later
Sir Francis) Humphrys on founding the British Legation
at Kabul, a brief reference to external affairs in which
Afghanistan was deeply interested is desirable. To
commence our survey with Turkey: by the autumn of
1922 the Turks had defeated and driven out the Greeks
from Asia Minor. The neutral zone covering the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles was threatened, and the
French and Italians withdrew from the Asiatic shore,
leaving the British unsupported. Hostilities were
narrowly averted at Chanak, but a modus vivendi was
arranged by the conclusion of the Mudania Convention
and, in July 1923, a treaty was signed at Lausanne. In
October of the same year the Turkish Republic, with
Mustafa Kemal as President, was inaugurated and, in
the spring of 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, while
the Sheikh-ul-Islam was excluded from the Council of
Ministers; the religious estates and funds were con-
fiscated.
To turn to Russia: on May 3, 1923, a strong
British note, protesting against Russian propaganda in
Afghanistan and among the frontier tribes, concluded
with a demand for the recall of the Russian Minister
Raskolnik, who was transferred to another post. To sum
up: in the spring of 1924 the general situation showed
distinct improvement in the British position in Asia,
more especially owing to the abolition of the Caliphate,
295
296 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
which dumbfounded the leaders of the Khilafat move-
ment in India.
. The Arrival of the First British Minister. Humphrys,
who founded the British Legation at Kabul in March
1922, was a distinguished frontier officer and was also
thoroughly conversant with Afghan mentality. It was
clear that Russia, by paying a handsome subsidy in
money and munitions, occupied a strong position at
Kabul, albeit the Amir must have realized that any
Russian threat to India could only be made good at the
expense of Afghanistan. S<
As regards the tribes on the Indo-Afghan frontier,
the Amir and his advisers naturally disliked British
determination to occupy the misnamed " independent "
area and they fished continuously in these troubled
waters. Needless to say, they particularly disliked the
construction of the Khaibar railway. The Soviet Minister
thus found numerous agents ready and competent to
conduct his sinister intrigues with the Wazirs, Mahsuds
and other turbulent tribesmen.
The Amirs Dream of Bukhara. At the time of the
arrival of Humphrys the Amir, who was keenly interested
in the rebellion of Bukhara, and hoped to draw advantage
from it, had despatched troops under Nadir Khan to the
Oxus frontier. He pressed for the public recognition of
the independence of Bukhara and Khiva by Great
Britain, which was, of course, out of the question. Ulti-
mately the death of Enver Pasha, leader of the Bukharan
revolt, who fell into a Russian ambush on August 4,
shattered Amanulla's fond hopes of territorial expansion
in Central Asia. It remains to add that the ex-Amir of
Bukhara, who had taken refuge in Afghanistan in the
spring of 1921, decided to live there permanently.
The Expulsion of the Indian Seditionists. In October
1922, realizing that the Russians were financing the;
Indian seditionists, the Amir finally expelled Obaydulla,
who led one party to Tashkent, while the other under
Kazi Abdul Wali proceeded to Turkey. This expulsion
constituted a real service to the Government of India.
The Amir and British Tribes on the Indo-Afghan
LIV AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS 297
Frontier. As was to be expected, upon the frustration of
the Central Asian dream, the Amir once again turned
his attention to the tribes of the Indo-Afghan Frontier.
The British policy of an advance on Razmak at this period
involved bombing action against hostile tribesmen, who,
in consequence, fled to Afghanistan. The Amir strongly
protested, more especially when some casualties occurred
in Afghan territory. A Court of Inquiry was, however,
promptly held, and the British paid an indemnity of
1 7,000 rupees Kabuli. This settlement was of consider-
able political value, since it proved the readiness of the
British Government to act justly and pay for losses
inflicted on Afghans. Generally speaking, however, the
complaints made by the Afghan Government were proved
to be based on unsubstantial grounds and were mainly
an expression of Afghan fears as to " the thinning of the
prickly hedge ".
A Crisis in British-Afghan Relations. Murders of
British officers and their wives, abduction cases and raids
were, however, numerous at this period and naturally
caused grave anxiety. The Afghan Government at first
failed to fulfil their promises in seizing the guilty and in
other ways, but were finally induced to comply with the
reasonable demands of the British Government. This
compliance weakened the position of the Amir in Afghan-
istan, not only as having yielded to British pressure but
as having presumably lost their goodwill.
The Arrival of French, German, Italian and Turkish
Representatives and Subjects at Kabul. In 1922 two
French archaeologists, Messrs. Foucher and Godard,
whose Government had secured the monopoly of excavat-
ing ancient ruins, appeared at Kabul and, in due course,
commenced their successful labours on the Buddhist
remains at Bamian. A Minister founded the French
Legation in the autumn of 1923, and three French
professors also opened a school. The German colony,
which was represented by a Chargt d' Affaires^ included
engineers and doctors. Among them was Oertel, who
had been an associate of Wassmuss in Persia. The
Italian colony, which included six agricultural experts,
298 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP
numbered seventy-one. Turkey was represented by
Fakhri Pasha, a fanatical Anglophobe. He was ac-
companied by a staff of instructors whose services were
not utilized much to his disgust.
Afghan Relations with Russia. The promised subsidy
to Afghanistan began to be paid in part, but was kept a
good deal in arrears. Munitions were also supplied to
some extent, but there was no indication of the promised
transfer to Afghanistan of the Panjdeh area, as stipulated
in Article IX of the treaty. Moreover, the expulsion by
the Amir of the Indian seditionists was much r^ented
by the Russian Minister.
The Internal Position in April 1924. The Amir had
attempted to push through his reforms, some of which
were excellent, but all of them were disliked by his
fanatical and suspicious subjects. Especially obnoxious
was the new Administrative Code, drafted by a Turkish
adviser, which the Mullas declared to be unlawful.
Apart from this, the people resented the appearance of
foreign doctors and engineers at Kabul, who were seen
strolling aimlessly about the city. Meanwhile the army
had been neglected, was unpaid and had deteriorated.
The Khost Rebellion, March 192 4- January 1925.
A serious revolt, which was symptomatic of Afghan
feeling, broke out in the spring of 1924. It grew in
strength until, in August, an Afghan force was cut to
pieces, and panic-stricken Kabul lay practically un-
defended. However, Mohmands, Shinwaris, Wazirs and
Hazaras were enlisted by lavish expenditure of money,
while Jihad was declared against the rebels. Finally, in
January 1925, the revolt was crushed by the capture of
its leader, the " Lame Mulla ", who with the male members
of his family was executed. It would appear that the
tribesmen united mainly in opposition to a section in the
new Code which deprived the father and husband of his,
power to treat his daughter and wife as mere chattels.
The Results of the Rebellion. The cost of the rebellion,
which was estimated at approximately 5,000,000 or
two years' revenue, was very heavy. It had seriously dis-
credited and discouraged the Afghan army ; it had checked
LIV AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS 299
schemes for educational progress and had caused a serious
deterioration of administration.
The British had helped Amanulla by the supply, on
payment, of Lewis guns, rifles and ammunition, while
two aeroplanes which were also supplied did much to
restore the moral of Kabul and discouraged the rebels.
Against this assistance, the appearance in Khost of Abdul
Karim, a slave-born son of ex-Amir Yakub Khan as a
claimant to the throne, aroused charges of British bad
faith, which the suspicious Afghans readily accepted.
T}h Army. At this point some brief account of the
condition of the army, on which Amanulla mainly
depended, may be appropriate. The soldiers were hardly
able to feed themselves on the miserable pittance they
received, and were very badly equipped. Their position
was practically that of menial servants when stationed as
guards to Government offices, etc. Their military training
was utterly inadequate and medical treatment was lacking.
The staff and the senior regimental officers were recruited
from among young Afghans who had received a smatter-
ing of modern military education, either in Europe or at
Kabul, and the older officers bitterly resented being
superseded by these inexperienced youths. Generally
speaking, except in time of need, the Amir grudged
expenditure on his army.
The Piparno Case. In July 1924 an Italian engineer,
Piparno by name, shot dead an Afghan policeman who
had been ordered to arrest him upon his refusal to obey
a summons from the Police Commandant at Kabul. In
January 1925 the case was settled in accordance with
Moslem law by the acceptance of a large sum as blood
money by the heirs of the deceased Afghan. But the
Amir, alarmed by hostile public opinion, was afraid to
release Piparno, who was sent back to prison until the
rights of the State, as distinguished from those of the
relations of the murdered man, were vindicated. In
March, Piparno was allowed to escape, but, losing his
nerve, gave himself up to the Afghan guards on the
Oxus frontier. He was thereupon taken back to Kabul,
where he was secretly retried, sentenced and hanged.
300 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
This grave miscarriage of justice caused the Italian
Government to demand an official expression of regret,
including a visit to the Italian Legation of the Afghan
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the return of the blood
money and an indemnity of 7000. Meanwhile they
held up a cargo of munitions on which 25,000 had been
paid; they also attached the Afghan Minister's bank
balance at Rome, amounting to 15,000. Negotiations
proceeded on the lines so familiar to the British, and
both the Italian and Afghan Governments were prepared
to withdraw their Legations. On August i4/ ;> a few
hours before the members of the Italian Legation were
due to leave Kabul, the Amir intervened and the case
was settled by a visit of the Under-Secretary of the
Afghan Foreign Office to the Italian Legation to apolo-
gize, the dismissal of the Chief of Police and an in-
demnity of 6000. This unfortunate episode resulted
in the departure of most of the Italian subjects from
Afghanistan.
The Afghan-German Treaty of 1926. The German
colony in Afghanistan prospered, and schemes for a
bank, for an air service with Tashkent and for wireless
installations were mooted but failed to materialize.
German airmen flew the two aeroplanes mentioned above
during the Khost rebellion, but one of them was shot
dead by a compatriot in a private quarrel and the other,
unable to work with the Russians, who had taken charge
of the Afghan Air Force, left the country. In 1924 a
school for boys was opened by German teachers.
To continue this account: in November 1925 a
German, Dr. Sauer, who was travelling to Kabul on a
bicycle, shot an Afghan under circumstances which were
not cleared up. He was sentenced to four years' imprison-
ment, but was pardoned by the Amir. In 1926 a formal
treaty was signed between Afghanistan and Germany. \
Russian Policy. At the close of 1924 the creation
of the nominally independent nationalist states Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was viewed with
deep suspicion in Afghanistan, where it was considered,
rightly perhaps, that it was intended as a step in the
LIV AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS 301
direction of the annexation to the Soviet Union of
Afghan Turkistan.
The Urtatagai Incident^ 1925. In December there
was a collision between Afghan guards stationed on
this island (situated in the Oxus) and some Soviet troops
who drove them out and occupied it. For a while there
was extreme tension at Kabul, but finally it was realized
that the trouble was due to a misunderstanding and the
Soviet troops were withdrawn.
The Russo-Afghan Security Pact, 1926. Partly owing
to the 'above incident, which increased Afghan appre-
hensions, a " Pact of Neutrality and Non-Aggression "
was negotiated between the two countries. This colour-
less instrument, which was barren of material advantages
to Afghanistan, was of little importance and in no way
compensated for the blow to Russian prestige of the
Urtatagai incident.
A Retrospect. To conclude: an attempt has been
made in this chapter to show how Afghanistan was
shaping under new and very difficult conditions, Ama-
nulla's basic ideas were sound and reasonable. He sought
association with the more highly civilized Powers of
Europe, partly to avoid being a pawn in Anglo-Russian
relations, and also with a view to the introduction of
western ideas of progress, and the formation of the
Afghans into a united nation, but he was quite unable
" to hasten slowly ". Had Amanulla cherished his army
and secured its efficiency and contentment, the situation
might well have been more satisfactory.
CHAPTER LV
KING AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE
During our stay in England such favours, acts of kindness, and sincere
regards were so profusely shown us by Your Majesties, members of <ne Royal
Family, Your Majesty's Government and the people of England, that they
will always remain treasured in our memories. Message of KING AMANULLA
upon leaving England.
The Invitation to King Amanulla. The first official
intimation of King Amanulla's intention to visit Europe
via India, and to include London among the capitals
which he would visit, was conveyed to the Foreign Office
by the Afghan Minister in London in September 1927,
who also stated that the Amir would leave Kabul on
December 7. On October 2 the British Charge d y Affaires
at Kabul personally delivered to King Amanulla a cordial
invitation from King George to visit London, The
Viceroy, Lord Irwin, also invited him to stay at Delhi
on his way to Bombay, if that arrangement would be
convenient to His Majesty.
The Journey to Bombay. The Afghan party, which
included the Queen, Ghulam Sadik Khan, the officiating
Foreign Minister, and many other high officials, were
welcomed at Chaman, where Colonel St. John handed
His Majesty telegrams of welcome from King George
and from the Viceroy. During the passage of the Khojak
tunnel, after leaving Chaman in a special train, a member
of the Afghan party somewhat unfortunately pulled the
communication cord. This resulted in the breakage of
couplings, which took some time to repair. Fortunately
a strong wind was ventilating the tunnel, but even so,
with four engines smoking, it was a disagreeable
experience.
At Karachi King Amanulla attended a garden party
302
CH.LV AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE 303
where addresses were presented to him. He made a
speech dwelling on the friendly relations existing between
the Afghan and British Governments and peoples and
strongly urged religious and social tolerance, especially
warning his Moslem hearers against being led astray
by ignorant Mullas. This speech was intended to be
his " message to the people of India ".
The Visit to Bombay. At Bombay, where Sir Francis
Humphrys met the Amir and took over political charge,
Lord Irwin, who had intended to meet His Majesty, was
unfortunately unable to do so owing to an attack of
malaria. This contretemps caused grave suspicions in the
mind of the Afghan Foreign Minister, who behaved dis-
courteously in various ways, more especially as regards
the question of seating at the banquet.
There was, without doubt, an intrigue on foot among
the Afghan Ministers to make the visit a failure. This
party had gained an initial success by refusing to accept
the Viceroy's invitation to break the journey at Delhi,
and wished to pursue their policy still further. However,
thanks mainly to the firmness and tact of Humphrys, the
plot was foiled. Generally speaking, the Amir was
gratified by the warmth of his reception, by the playing
of the Afghan National Anthem and by the display of
the Afghan flag. He was especially gratified by the
participation of troops in his official receptions and by
the aerial escort furnished by the Royal Air Force, which
not only escorted him from Chaman but flew out to meet
the royal train from Karachi, a significant proof of air
mobility.
Embarking on the P. & O. Rajputana^ at Aden the
Amir was received by General Stewart and drove through
streets lined with troops to the Memorial Hall, where
prominent citizens were presented to him. He then
inspected the famous tanks.
The Arrival of King Amanulla in Egypt. The Amir
reached Suez on December 26, where he was honoured
by a salute of twenty-one guns. He landed at Port Said
to be received by a cousin of the King and was welcomed
at Cairo by King Fuad himself, driving with him through
3 o 4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
crowds whose greeting was most friendly. He attended
a State banquet, visited the Pyramids, and Fuad conferred
tht grand cordon of the Order of Mehemet AH on him.
It was reported that Amanulla asked Fuad whether, in
view of the. recent war with Great Britain, he would
be well received in England. The reply was: "The
English are the most generous nation in the whole world
and you will be welcomed like a long-lost son ".
King Amanulla visits Italy. Leaving Egypt, early in
January 1928, Amanulla landed at Naples from the
s.s. Italia, and at Rome was welcomed by the Kiftg and
Queen while military aeroplanes wheeled over and around
the airship Esperia. Troops were massed at the station
and lined the streets. There was the usual State banquet
and the King conferred the Collar of the Annunciation
upon his royal visitor. Amanulla also visited the Pope
and received the Order of the Golden Spur from His
Holiness. He was also well received by the populace.
The Visit to Paris. The Afghan royal party which
had left Nice on January 25 was met in Paris on the
following morning by President Doumergue at the
railway station, where troops and bands were massed.
The President drove with the King, while M. Briand
escorted Queen Souriya in the second carriage, to the
Foreign Office, where a sumptuous suite of rooms had
been arranged for their reception. At the Hotel-de-Ville
the King was presented with the gold medal of the City
of Paris. He was also given a rifle, while a dainty clock
was offered to the Queen. Of especial interest to the
royal visitors was the meeting with one of their sons, a
handsome youth of sixteen, who was undergoing an
examination before entering St. Cyr.
Queen Souriya on Afghan Women. The Queen, who,
it must be understood, had been educated in Syria, at an
interview she granted, stated that she was the first womari"
to work for the emancipation of women in Afghanistan
and that, in spite of fierce opposition from the old-
fashioned Moslems, she had founded a school with 800
girls. Under the direction of her mother, they were
being trained entirely on European lines.
LV AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE 305
King Amanulla visits Berlin. On February 23, for
the first time since the revolution, Berlin gave a welcome
to royal guests. A deputation met the party on the Swiss
frontier and, at Berlin, President Hindenburg, who was
dressed in black clothes and wore a silk hat, received
King Amanulla. In the subsequent drive through streets
lined by the Reichswehr there was an unpleasant incident
near the Brandenburg Gate. The former Crown Prince
suddenly appeared in his red motor-car to be greeted by
cheering, which was immediately countered by hissing.
Later, Visiting the Tempelhofer Field, the Amir was
presented with a Junkers commercial aeroplane. During
the visit hopes were expressed by Hindenburg and other
officials that Afghanistan would make use of capable
German doctors, teachers and engineers. During this
visit, Amanulla was much embarrassed by the people
shouting, " Long live the Monarchy and down with the
Republic 1"
King Amanulla reaches England. On March 1 3 King
Amanulla was greeted at Dover by the Prince of Wales.
At Victoria Station he was welcomed by King George,
Queen Mary, the Prime Minister and other officials and
drove in a State procession to Buckingham Palace. Later,
visits were paid to the Cenotaph and to the Unknown
Warrior's Grave; at night there was a State banquet.
On the following day the Amir drove to the Guildhall,
where he received an address prior to an official luncheon
to which 800 guests were invited; and in the evening the
Afghan visitors were entertained at a banquet given by
His Majesty's Government at the Foreign Office. This
concluded the official entertainment and, the following
day, the royal party proceeded to Claridge's Hotel.
A full account of the Amir's activities while in England
is hardly called for, but, of special importance, a display
by the Royal Air Force, a tank demonstration at Lulworth
and the inspection of a mechanized force at Tidworth
may be mentioned. Visits were also paid to Woolwich
Arsenal and to the Royal Military College at Camberley.
At Portsmouth the Amir was conducted over the
Victory and the Tiger. He then embarked on a submarine
VOL. II X
306 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
which hoisted the Afghan flag, and, with the s.s. Alresford
conveying Queen Souriya and the suite in her wake,
steamed out of the harbour. The submarine then sub-
merged, the movement causing apprehension to Her
Majesty, but she was speedily reassured by a message
which ran, " I send you my best wishes from under the
sea ". The King was then invited to fire two torpedoes
at the target ship. He fired and was immensely gratified
by the receipt of a signal that both shots were hits. At
a later date he visited the Atlantic Fleet and witnessed
various demonstrations by destroyers, submarines and
aircraft.
Their Majesties were also the guests of the Lord
Mayors of Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. The
speech at Liverpool, it may be noted, contained a Persian
couplet, the translation of which ran :
May the King's body be ever without pain,
May his sitting ever be upon treasure,
May the commander of his army ever be glad,
May his mind be serene and his treasury full!
The tour also included the Royal Observatory at Green-
wich and the University of Oxford, where His Majesty,
who was praised for his determination to found a Uni-
versity at Kabul, received the degree of D.C.L. He also
went to the Royal Geographical Society to receive the
Diploma of Honorary Membership of the Society. Nor
were sporting events neglected, since their Majesties
attended the Grand National Race, the Oxford and
Cambridge Boat Race and an Association football match.
On April 5 King Amanulla, after enjoying experi-
ences that no Afghan can possibly have equalled, left
England to continue his tour. His message to his hosts
serves as a motto to this chapter and proves that our
Afghan visitors had thoroughly enjoyed themselves. ^
Summary. The Afghan King and Queen were deeply
impressed by the cordiality of their reception by King
George and Queen Mary and this, combined with the
magnificent pageantry of the State visit and the con-
ferring upon Amanulla the Collar of the Royal Victorian
LV AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE 307
Order, dispelled any suspicions that they may have enter-
tained. Moreover, the warm popular welcome that
greeted them wherever they went, alike in towns and
in the countryside, made the royal guests fully realize
the genuine nature of British hospitality. A point that
was noted during the visit was Amanulla's indifference
towards Moslem circles and institutions in England,
where, indeed, he refused to receive an address. Again,
the calm efficiency of the police never failed to excite
his admiration. Of Windsor Castle he remarked: " It
is the^perfect abode of mighty Kings who have reigned
through the centuries ", and, on driving away from it,
he experienced similar feelings to those his father had
expressed on leaving India after his visit to Lord Minto.
Indeed, a member of his suite with true Oriental hyper-
bole exclaimed: " No Englishman has the right to go
to heaven when he is dead, since he has already enjoyed
it on earth! " To conclude these remarks: The Times
aptly compared the visit to England of Amanulla with
that of Peter the Great of Russia.
The Visit to Russia. On May 4 the Afghan royal
party reached Moscow, where they were welcomed by
the President, Mikhael Kalinin. They inspected the
Kremlin, and there was a gala performance of Eastern
music at the State Opera House. They also witnessed
a sham battle which embraced all arms of the Russian
service. Gifts consisting of two tractors, specimens of
peasants' work and an album were presented to them.
As may be supposed, the reception of royal visitors by
Soviet officials constituted a difficult task and the views
of the suite, if not of the King himself, might be summed
up in a single word anticlimax.
The Afghan King in Turkey. Towards the end of
May King Amanulla, who had embarked on a Turkish
Steamer at Sevastopol, arrived at Constantinople, escorted
by Turkish men-of-war and by aeroplanes. Landing
at Haidar Pasha, he inspected the Turkish guard of
honour and some fifty young Afghan officers who were
being trained at the Turkish Military Academy. On
arrival at Angora he was welcomed by Mustafa Kemal
308 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
Ghazij and a banquet was given in honour of the royal
visitors. At this function their host referred to the
common origin of the two peoples, to their successful
struggles for independence and he praised the work of
social restoration undertaken by King Amanulla. In
reply, the royal guest expressed his affection and admira-
tion for Turkey and declared that " our two sister nations
have the same policy and the same duties. Afghanistan
is ready to perform those duties. "
King Amanulla visits Persia. At Constantinople
where, on his return from Angora, he was receivect with
much enthusiasm, Amanulla spent three days in witness-
ing a regatta, visiting the Military Academy and in
sightseeing. He also saluted the troops at a march past.
He then proceeded to Persia and, at Tehran, he was
warmly welcomed by Shah Riza Pahlavi, who is one of
the outstanding figures of this generation. While at this
capital, in order to accentuate the new order introduced
by the Shah, he personally drove the Queen and her
sister into the bazaars.
The End of the Journey. The long journey was
finally ended by Amanulla driving his Rolls Royce via
Meshed and Kandahar to Kabul, where his return was
celebrated by three days' holiday, with general rejoicings
and illuminations. Thus ended a seven-months' journey,
during which, for the first time, an Afghan King had
visited the majority of European countries and also
Egypt, Turkey and Persia.
The Second Series of Treaties between the U.S.S.R. and
the Middle-Eastern States. In Chapter LI I a summary
was given of a first series of treaties forming a network
between the U.S.S.R. and the states of the Middle East,
who also negotiated treaties with each other.
To continue with the second series in August 1926 a
treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression betweer*
the Soviet Government and Afghanistan was signed at
Paghman. In 1928 negotiations for a commercial treaty
with Russia was also initiated, but since the Soviet
Government denied the permission for the transit of
goods imported from a third country over Russian
AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE 309
territory, the negotiations broke down. It is note-
worthy that owing to the change in the international
situation the influence that Russia had exercised over
the Middle Eastern states had waned. In proof of this,
whereas the treaties of 1921 were all signed at Moscow,
in 1925-1928, only one out of eight instruments was
signed at the Russian capital, as against six at either
Tehran, Angora or Kabul. Moreover, at this period,
Afghanistan, Turkey and Persia were extending their
treaty relations, Turkey, for instance, concluding a
treaty' *of neutrality, conciliation and judicial regulation
with Italy in 1928. This extension of relations with the
West was foreshadowed in the Turko-Afghan Treaty of
1928.
To quote Toynbee: "By 1928 it had come to be
realized in the Middle East that the aggressions of the
Western Powers, which had evoked the defensive treaties
of 1921, was a temporary after-effect of the General
War of 1914-1918 . , , and that Western Governments,
increasingly sensitive to opinion at home, were showing
a correspondingly greater disinclination to act with a
high hand." '
1 Op. cit. for 1928, p. 366.
CHAPTER LVI
THE TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA
Haste is from the Devil. Persian Saying.
The Five-Day Speech of Amanulla. Upon his safe
return to Kabul from his long journey, King Amanulla
delivered a speech which lasted for five days. It con-
tained a full narrative of his tour in Europe, Turkey and
Persia, and referred with pride to the treaties which had
been signed with many countries; it continued with an
account of the impressions he had formed and concluded
with a detailed outline of the policy he intended the
Afghan nation to adopt. It was, indeed, a Homeric
speech, which ended with the King embracing a soldier,
an official, a civilian and a student as representatives of
his subjects.
The Conflict between the Old Order and the New.
During the long absence of their King the Mullas had
been busy. The fact that the Queen had appeared
unveiled while in Europe and had been photographed
was most unfavourably commented on; much fuel was
added to the fire when, after her return, she dined
unveiled at a banquet. Both the King and Queen, how-
ever, encouraged by the success of Mustafa Kemal and
of Shah Riza in their reforms, were determined to carry
through similar reforms in Afghanistan.
The Protest of the Mullas. Shortly after his return to
Kabul a Deputation of Mullas waited on Amanulla to v
protest against the appearance of the Queen and her
ladies in public without veils. The King in his reply
pointed out that there was no purdah in the villages.
The Mullas said that poor village women discarded their
veils since they must work. Amanulla thereupon replied
310
CH.LVI TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA 311
that, when the village women wore veils, the Queen
would also cover her face in public. The Mullas there-
upon departed thoroughly disgruntled.
The Formation of a Legislative Assembly, 1928. In
September a Jirga, under the instructions of Amanulla,
decreed the establishment of the first Afghan Parliament
to be elected by the votes of all literate Afghans, It con-
stituted a Legislative Assembly of 1 50 members selected
from the Grand Assembly to sit at Kabul for eight months
every year. At its meeting, Queen Souriya was pro-
claimtid Queen and the King's ten-year-old son Heir-
Apparent. The length of compulsory service in the
army was also increased from two to three years and all
exemptions were abolished. Moreover, a national levy
of 3 rupees for every male and a month's pay from every
official was ordered to cover the purchase of armaments.
The question of polygamy was then brought up, and
Amanulla declared that it was the chief cause of corrup-
tion and that any Government servant who took a second
wife would have to tender his resignation. Yet another
proposal to fix the age of marriage for girls at 1 8 years
and for youths at 22 years excited such strong opposition
that it was withdrawn.
The Scheme for Education. Amanulla decided that
education should be universal and very cheap, while it
was to be free for the poor. This measure met with
approval, but the training of Afghan girls on European
lines was bitterly opposed by the conservative Afghans.
Dress Regulations. To continue: in November 1928,
an order was issued to come into force in March of the
following year. By its terms the inhabitants of Kabul,
and Afghans visiting the capital, were ordered to wear
complete European dress, including hats. The result of
this preposterous edict was to create a body of men who
set up booths on each high road and let out the necessary
clothes to villagers visiting the capital! It is stated that
Amanulla personally tore turbans from the heads of citizens
who had adopted European clothes but clung to their
cherished headgear.
The Outbreak of the Revolt. Amanulla should have
3 12 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
realized that Mustafa Kemal was not only a victorious
general, who was supported by a disciplined, well-
paid army, but that Turks and, in a lesser degree,
Persians, had been in touch with Europeans for many
generations, whereas Afghans living, generally speaking,
in isolated valleys in snow-clad ranges or on wide semi-
desert plains, had hardly ever met with Europeans,
whom their Mullas invariably termed Kafirs or Infidels.
Indeed, to anyone acquainted with Afghan tribes-
men, it was evident that the issue of orders for new
unpopular reforms almost weekly, without the*' loyal
support of the army, would soon arouse the spirit of
revolt. The first notice of tribal unrest, as it was euphem-
istically termed, was a rising of the Shinwaris who, living
up to their reputation for lawlessness, attacked Jalalabad
and burned the hangars of the local aerodrome, together
with its contents. Failing to capture the city by blowing
up a section of its wall, the rebels cut off its water-supply
and closed the Peshawar-Kabul road. So intense was
the indignation of the Mullas against the abolition of the
purdah and the education of girls on European lines that
they openly denounced Amanulla as a Kafir.
The Rise of Habibulla, "the Child of the Water-Carrier".
In the district of Kuhistan to the north of Kabul, a
brigand, known as Bacha-i-Sakau or " Child of the Water-
Carrier ", had gained considerable wealth and had
collected a powerful band of robbers by blackmailing
caravans moving between the Oxus and Kabul. Realizing
the unpopularity which Amanulla had excited, not only
by the taxes which he had levied to finance his tour,
but also by his reforms, Habibulla, who was perhaps
encouraged by a Mullahs prophecy that he would be
King, gradually conceived the idea of driving out Ama-
nulla and reigning in his stead. Every day the position
at Kabul deteriorated. The Mullas denounced the King as
a madman; tax-collectors who tried to wring fresh taxes
from the people were murdered ; and there was a general
drying up of financial resources, together with an almost
complete cessation of trade.
Habibulla attacks Kabul. Habibulla collected 2000
LVI TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA 313
men and commenced his attack on Kabul by incessant
sniping at night with the idea of alarming its citizens.
Amanulla had despatched a strong force under Abdul
Ali Jan to subdue the Shinwaris, and the capital was
weakly held, while the feeling of the city was hostile to its
King. News reached Kabul that the royal troops had
been defeated by the Shinwaris, whereupon Habibulla
increased his sniping which frightened the merchants
and shopkeepers, who began to shut their doors and to
hide their goods. Amanulla used his artillery without
much ^success against bodies of rebels who made feints
outside the walls, and at last, Habibulla, who had been
joined by many of the unpaid soldiers, attacked the
city in earnest.
The Abdication. It was in vain that on January 7
Amanulla published a proclamation by the terms of
which he cancelled most of his obnoxious reforms. On
January 14, realizing that his soldiers had deserted him,
" of his own free will ", as he declared, Amanulla
abdicated in favour of his elder brother, Inayatulla Khan,
and escaped by car to Kandahar.
The Abdication of Inayatulla Khan. The position of
Inayatulla was an impossible one. Left in the Citadel,
surrounded by a small body of personal servants, he was
bombarded by his own artillerymen, who had joined
Habibulla. Realizing his helplessness, he opened
negotiations with the brigand chief, who requested Sir
Francis Humphrys to evacuate King Inayatulla who only
ruled for three days. He was indeed fortunate to escape
from a very dangerous position, and was taken in a
British aeroplane to Peshawar, whence he subsequently
rejoined Amanulla at Kandahar.
The Position at the British Legation. The attack on
Kabul by wild Kuhistanis occasioned serious anxiety in
Ifidia, anxiety which was fully justified. The Legation
occupied twenty acres of terraced ground some two miles
to the west of Kabul, and consisted of scattered buildings.
It was protected merely by a wall of sun-dried bricks.
Habibulla had captured two outlying forts of the capital,
and his men wished to occupy the Legation as an advan-
3 i4 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
tageous position. Humphrys, however, speaking through
the closed gates, warned the would-be invaders of the
immunity from attack of all foreign Legations. Thanks
to his personality and intimate knowledge of the language,
he averted this danger, but, throughout this period, the
buildings suffered from shell fire while most of the
window panes were broken by rifle bullets. The British
women were thus living in daily risk of their lives, only
one central building being at all safe. However, they
bravely carried on.
The Evacuation of Women and Children. The British
Government adopted a policy of the strictest neutrality
between the various claimants for the throne, in which
category Amanulla was classed. In view of the serious-
ness of the situation, it was decided to evacuate the
British women and children. Fortunately the Kabul
landing-ground was available albeit under fire at
times and the Royal Air Force supplied a Vickers-
Victoria machine which was specially constructed for the
transport of troops, together with escorting aeroplanes.
After carrying the British to safety, members of the
foreign colony were evacuated; the Russian colony also
proceeded to Tashkent by air. It is to the credit of
Habibulla, who wished to stand well with the British,
that, on more than one occasion, his men guarded the
aerodrome, while the Vickers-Victoria was loading up
and carrying off the refugees.
" The Child of the Water-Carrier " proclaims himself
Amir. Habibulla entered Kabul as a victor with his
following of bandits. Reaching the Citadel within a few
minutes of the departure of Inayatulla, he issued a formal
notice of his assumption of sovereignty under the title of
Amir Habibulla, Ghdzi and demanded written guarantees
of allegiance from the citizens.
The Position of Habibulla. The Brigand-Chief heW
Kabul and the surrounding country but, apart from the
forces of Amanulla at Kandahar, there was every likeli-
hood of his rule being disputed. To begin with, he was
of mean birth and a Tajik peasant. Again, the powerful
Afghan merchants of Peshawar, who realized that they
LVI TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA 315
would be ruined under the new regime, were equally
anxious to end it and, considering Amanulla unacceptable
to the nation, initiated a search for a leader, who would
overthrow Habibulla. Meanwhile the new Amir was
attempting without much success to form an administra-
tion. He had found the treasury empty and immediately
resorted to " squeezing " wealthy merchants to secure
funds, with which to pay his supporters. Supplies were
very scarce in the city, since there was no confidence
as to payment being made under the reign of terror which
was inaugurated.
The Proclamation of the New Amir. One of Habi-
bulla's earliest acts consisted of the issue of a proclama-
tion signed by eighty religious leaders and officials
declaring that Amanulla's heresies and the obnoxious
innovations which he had introduced justified his dis-
missal. The proclamation announced that arrears of
revenue would be written off, that conscription would be
abolished, as well as all taxes that were additional to the
lawful revenue. The new schools were also abolished.
The proclamation then attacked the abandonment of
Islamic clothing, especially the turban, the unveiling of
women, the education of girls and the ex-King's objection
to growing beards and clipping the middle portion of the
moustache which was the practice of the Prophet
Muhammad.
Amanulla hoists the Royal Standard at Kandahar,
January 1929. At this juncture Amanulla, owing to
the influence of his mother, gained support from the
Durrani tribesmen, and, once again, proclaimed himself
King. But the Ghilzais who could put 200,000 men
into the field held the Ghazni area and were, generally
speaking, hostile to their hereditary enemies the Durranis.
They also hoped to secure independence. Again, the
Afghans admire valour and, apart from the unpopularity
gained by his reforms, the feeling grew that Amanulla,
who had abdicated and fled, was not brave enough to lead
Afghans successfully against the usurper.
The Evacuation of the British Legation, February 1929.
In view of the fact that Habibulla only controlled the
3 i 6 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
capital and its vicinity and that conditions in Afghanistan
were chaotic, it was decided to withdraw the British
Minister and his staff. The last to leave was the gallant
Humphrys, who bore with him the British flag which
he had kept flying with such courage. The King heartily
congratulated Humphrys on his safe return. His
Majesty also congratulated the Royal Air Force on the
great feat which it had performed. In eighty-two flights,
carried out with consummate skill over snow-clad ranges,
in the depth of winter, and in a country practically ^devoid
of landing grounds, British flying officers had evacuated
580 passengers of many nationalities without a single
casualty.
The Last Attempt of Amanulla. In the early spring of
1929 Amanulla, who, as mentioned above, had won the
support of the Durrani tribe, despatched an advance
guard 1000 strong to Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Early in April
his main body, 4000 strong, which included regular
troops, was reported to have reached Shah Jui, situated
between Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni. According to fairly
reliable statements the royal troops, supported by a large
contingent of Wardaks, had inflicted considerable losses
on the opposing Sulayman Khel section of the Ghilzai
tribe and were about to enter Ghazni. However, fear of
treachery by members of his staff, who were alleged to be
plotting to lure their master into Ghazni and then to
leave him to the tender mercies of Bacha Sokau, caused
Amanulla to throw up the sponge. Whatever the facts
may have been, he retired to Kalat-i-Ghilzai preparatory
to fleeing the country. Reaching the outskirts of
Kandahar in the small hours of the morning, where he
was joined by the Queen and Inayatulla, and travelling
rapidly, the party, numbering seventy persons, arrived at
Chaman at noon on May 23.
Amanulla leaves India. A special train was speedily
provided for the Afghan refugees and Bombay was
reached on May 27. There Amanulla, who had received
a gracious message from the Viceroy while on the journey,
remained some weeks for urgent domestic reasons. Mean-
while, the task of disposing of the various members of the
LVI TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA 317
party was a delicate one, but was carried through success-
fully. There were difficulties raised in the case of
Inayatulla, but Persian visas were finally secured for
him and his party, which proceeded up the Persian Gulf
bound for Tehran, while the other Sirdars went in
different directions. Finally, on June 22, 1929, the
ex-King and his reduced party sailed for Europe.
Summary. It is not difficult to analyse the causes of
King Amanulla's failure. He must have been badly
served by his ministers, but, even so, to force schemes
of refoVm on conservative tribesmen without the support
of a well-disciplined and well-paid army made disaster
certain, not only for himself but for Afghanistan. While
reigning he showed no fear in mixing with the wild,
treacherous tribesmen, but, as a leader in the field, he
lacked coolness and decision. He had certainly not
inherited the staunchness of his grandfather and father.
At the bar of history he stands condemned for having
brought upon Afghanistan the scourge of the " Water-
Carrier's Son ". Yet, in his defence, it may be pleaded
that many of the reforms for which he lost his throne
were desirable and will in the future gradually be carried
out.
CHAPTER LVII
NADIR KHAN OVERTHROWS THE BRIGAND HABIBULLA
AND IS ELECTED KING OF AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan affords an interesting contrast between the extremes of feudalism
and democracy as represented by the tribesmen and townsfolk. The Govern-
ment is an autocracy vested in the hands of one family. It is beneficent so far
as the country is concerned, but ruthless with regard to its political opponents.
And there is a gap of a thousand years between the point of view of the officials,
many of them young intellectuals educated abroad, responsible for the modernisa-
tion of the cities, and that of the tent-dwelling nomads, unchanged since the
days of Alexander or Genghiz Khan. ROSITA FORBES.
Alt Ahmad Jan and Jalalabad. In the last chapter
the flight of Amanulla, that of his brother Inayatulla and
the occupation of Kabul by Habibulla, " the Son of the
Water-Carrier ", have been described.
Two days later Ali Ahmad Jan, the brother of Uliya
Hazrat) who had been in command of a force that had
been despatched to quell the rebellion of the Shinwaris,
proclaimed himself Amir of the Eastern Province but,
early in February 1929, his force was attacked and
defeated at Jagdalak by these tribesmen and the Khugi-
anis. So complete was the defeat that Ali Ahmad Jan
became a refugee, and, arriving at Peshawar at the end
of the month, proceeded to join Amanulla at Kandahar.
Jalalabad, meanwhile, had been looted by the tribesmen
and the explosion of a magazine added materially to the
destruction of this ill-starred city.
The Success of Habibulla. We now turn to the
usurper, who, having secured funds from the wealthier
inhabitants by means of cruel tortures, recruited some
ten thousand men, mainly from his native Kuhistan.
With this force he was able to deal with the Hazaras to
the south-west, who were always hostile to him, and to
defeat the Tagavis to the south with heavy losses.
318
CH.LVII NADIR KHAN ELECTED KING 319
Nadir Khan appears in Afghanistan. Nadir Khan,
the future King, was recovering from an attack of
pleurisy at Nice when he heard of the capture of Kabul
by the brigand Bacha-i-Sakau. Carried on board the
P. & O. steamer on a stretcher, he reached Peshawar on
February 28. He decided to proceed to Khost, where
he had commanded the force which, as we know, had be-
sieged Thai. Two of his brothers accompanied him, while
a third, Muhammad Hashim, proceeded to the vicinity
of Jalalabad to raise the tribes in that neighbourhood.
T/le General Position. Nadir's reception in Khost
was most disappointing, owing to tribal jealousies.
Accordingly, he travelled to the outskirts of Gardez,
where he opened negotiations with the Ghilzais, the
Mangals and the Jajis. The general feeling among the
fighting races was anger that a despised Tajik y or peasant,
should usurp the throne. On the other hand the tribes-
men much enjoyed looting and reviving ancient feuds.
Treachery was everywhere, and Ghaus-ud-din, the Chief
of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais, who had declared himself
Amir of Ghazni, was playing a double game. By the
flight of Amanulla the contest had become a straight
fight between Habibulla and Nadir Khan. Habibulla,
who occupied a central position with all its advantages,
could rely mainly upon the districts to the north of
Kabul ; he was also supported by the tribesmen of Khost
and by various sections of the other tribes, many of
whom had, however, joined Nadir.
The Hazaras, as adherents of Amanulla, were always
hostile to him. In the northern provinces Gholam Nabi
Khan, a son of Ghulam Haidar, Cherkhi, the Commander-
in-Chief of Amir Abdur Rahman and " The Red Chief "
of Kipling, 1 who was a supporter of Amanulla, had
crossed the Oxus, and with a force of Turkoman and
Uzbegs, which he had raised in Russian territory, had
captured Mazar-i-Sharif ; he had also engaged a force of
Habibulla's adherents near Tashkurgan. However, upon
hearing of Amanulla's flight, he had retired across the
Oxus.
" Ballad of the King's Jest."
320 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
The Defeats of Nadir Khan. Nadir Khan, at first,
had no luck. He engaged the Kabul forces at Baraki,
but was defeated by the treachery of Ghaus-ud-din, who
attacked his rear and compelled him to retire to the
Mongol country. Patiently reorganizing his force, he
failed to hold Gardez, which was captured on June 26.
Again, on July 10, his second offensive in the Logar
Valley was defeated.
At this period Habibulla felt strong enough to
despatch troops who occupied Kandahar. The irrepres-
sible Ali Ahmad Jan, who had hoisted his flag in that
city on the flight of Amanulla, was seized and taken
prisoner to Kabul. There savage Habibulla nailed his
arms and feet to the ground and then drove a nail
through his head from temple to temple.
The Propaganda of Nadir Khan. Many men would
have thrown up the sponge at these repeated reverses,
but Nadir, in spite of his bad health, remained undis-
mayed. He knew his fellow-countrymen. In July he
was able to publish a weekly paper aptly named Islah, or
" Peace ", with the result that his appeals gradually pro-
duced their effect on the Kabul Khel Wazirs, and these
doughty fighters of the North- West Frontier decided to
send a lashkar to his aid, as did also the Mohmands.
The Third Offensive. Late in August 1929 Nadir
Khan launched his third offensive and, on the 2 9th,
captured Gardez, taking 600 prisoners and a quantity
of arms and ammunition. This constituted his first
important success. Almost simultaneously the Hazaras
defeated Habibulla in two engagements at Sirchashma,
situated only thirty miles north of Kabul, while it was
reported that the Bandit Amir was making axes for his
troops, a significant proof of a shortage of rifles.
The Defeat of Ha shim Khan. The usurper, however,
was not yet beaten, and, in September, he despatched '&
column of 2000 men with guns which defeated Hashim
Khan, who took refuge at Parachinar in the Kurram
Valley. An attempt made by the Kabul usurper to disarm
the tribes excited intense hostility, which spread far and
wide, while, about this period Durrani tribesmen occupied
NADIR KHAN ELECTED KING 321
Kandahar city without encountering much opposition,
but did not capture the citadel.
The Final Offensive. On September 18 the Wazir
lashkar, which played the leading part in the third act of
the drama, joined Nadir Khan's forces at Ali Khel and,
marching on Kabul through the Logar Valley, reached
the historical battlefield of Charasia on October 6. There
the final battle was fought. Habibulla's troops were
entrenched in this very strong position but, deceived by
a feigned flight of the attackers, they left their trenches
and pursued them. The Wazirs, delighted at the
success of their ruse, suddenly turned round and, carry-
ing all before them, captured the position and drove the
enemy into headlong flight. At this juncture Sirdar
Shahwali, who was in command, received reinforcements,
and, on October 10, Kabul city was captured. Three
days later, after a bombardment, the citadel was also
taken.
Nadir Khan proclaimed King. Nadir Khan entered
Kabul as a victor. He was received with enthusiasm
and was urged to accept the sovereignty, but at first
declined to do so. In the event, the cry of the tribesmen
that they would immediately disperse to their homes if
he persisted in his refusal turned the scales. In this
manner Nadir Khan ascended the throne of Afghanistan.
The Capture and Execution of Habibulla. Habibulla,
who had escaped from the citadel, was hotly pursued,
but effectually delayed his pursuers by scattering handfuls
of English sovereigns. Having reached his native wilds
of the Kuhistan, he decided that his Commander-in-Chief
should surrender to Nadir Shah and make terms with
him for them both. However, with true Afghan
suspicion, he feared that his envoy would make terms
for himself only. He accordingly followed on his heels,
surrendered and was promised his life by Nadir Shah.
The tribesmen, however, were furious at this leniency
being extended to the bandit who had wrought so much
harm to Afghanistan and, since Habibulla was proved to
have set his prison on fire, hoping to escape once again,
he was condemned to death, as were his chief followers,
VOL. II Y
322 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
by the National Assembly. The miscreants were shot
and each tribesman fired a bullet into the corpse of
Habibulla so as to be able to boast, " I helped to kill
the Bacha-i-Sakau ".
The Early Career of King Nadir Shah. In Chapter L
a brief account is given of the Musahiban family, as it was
termed, and it was shown that the new King was descended
from both of the ruling branches of the Durrani tribe.
Born at Dehra Dun on April 9, 1 883, he was educated in
that town and learned English, Arabic and Urdu. In
1 900 his grandfather, Sirdar Yahya Khan, obtained per-
mission for the family to return to Afghanistan, where, in
1903, Nadir Khan was appointed to command a regiment
of Household Cavalry and was promoted general a year
or two later. He accompanied King Habibulla to
India. His position after the assassination of that
monarch and his actions as a general in the Third Afghan
War have been already recorded. He continued to be a
leading personage at Kabul under Amanulla until, owing
to his opposition to the injudicious haste that that ruler
displayed in his reforms, he fell out of favour and retired
to the post of Afghan Minister at Paris. This appoint-
ment he resigned owing to illness, which did not, how-
ever, prevent him from responding to the trumpet-call
of duty.
The Reopening of the British Legation. In May 1930
Mr. (now Sir Richard) Maconachie, the new British
Minister, reached Kabul and shortly afterwards the
Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 was reaffirmed.
Local Risings in 1930. As was only to be expected,
there were some local risings against the new government.
In February the hotheads among the Shinwaris revolted
in favour of Amanulla, but, unsupported by the elders of
the tribe, the movement was promptly suppressed. In
July the misguided Kuhistanis, led by an uncle of the
late Bandit Amir, also rose in rebellion. Thousands
of these wild people took part in it, some 3000 of
whom were captured and eleven of the ringleaders were
executed.
The North- West Frontier Province. At this point a
LVII NADIR KHAN ELECTED KING 323
brief reference to the sinister activities of some Moslem
inhabitants of this area, who are termed Red Shirts, is
desirable. Their moving spirits were Abdul Ghaffar and
his brother Khan Sahib, sons of a landowner on the
Peshawar border. Both brothers were educated at the
Church Missionary Society School at Peshawar. Khan
Sahib also took a medical degree at Edinburgh and, at
one time, was medical officer of the Guides. Their sister
married the Haji of Turangzai, a notable firebrand.
Abdul Ghaffar in 1919 started a violent agitation
against the Rowlatt Act, and, but for the defeat of the
Afghans in the Khaibar Pass, the trouble would have been
serious. Later, the brothers joined the Congress party
and organised an unscrupulous campaign of hatred and
vituperation against the British Raj.
In 1930 this occasioned the most serious crisis with
which the British authorities had been faced since I897. 1
The Peshawar district was invaded with extraordinary
rapidity from the west by large numbers of Afridis and
threatened on the north by Mohmand and Utman Khel
lashkars. Elsewhere, too, as in the Tochi Valley and
Southern Waziristan, posts were attacked, while attempts
were made by hostile Mullas to raise Mohmand and
Bajaur lashkars. The Kurram Valley was also invaded.
Winning the votes of the unsophisticated tribesmen
by fantastic promises, Khan Sahib defeated the Ministry
of the later Sir Abdul Qaiyum in September 1937 by
a narrow majority, and was Chief Minister until the
Congress Government resigned towards the close of 1939
under orders of the Congress Working Committee. It is
obvious that the disturbances caused by the mischievous
activities of the Red Shirts must have reacted unfavour-
ably on our position in Afghanistan. It is, however,
satisfactory to know that the Afghan Government dis-
couraged the movement, while the Afghans, generally
speaking, disapproved of the alliance between Moslem
Red Shirts and " the idolaters ", as they termed the
Hindus.
1 I have consulted North- West Frontier Province Border Administration Report for
324 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
A Soviet- Afghan Treaty. In July 1931 a new treaty
of neutrality and non-aggression between Russia and
Afghanistan was negotiated. By its terms each Govern-
ment undertook not to tolerate the existence in its
territory of organizations or of individuals pursuing
objectives which were hostile to the other. The treaty
was to run for five years and included the neutrality of
the one Power if the other Power were involved in war.
The Position in 1931. It is interesting to note the
steady progress made under Nadir Shah's beneficent
rule. Shah Mahmud Khan, the Minister for War* after
a campaign in the northern provinces, which involved
much fighting, had subdued the lawless elements. He
also had driven Ibrahim Beg, the " Robin Hood " of
Bukhara, across the Oxus into the arms of the Soviet
troops. Ibrahim Beg had been one of Enver Pasha's
associates.
Peace thus reigned throughout Afghanistan, and the
steady improvement of communications made for stability
of government in this mountainous country. Nadir Shah
was careful to restore to the Mullas their privileges and
had rescinded the secularization of the laws and the aboli-
tion of purdah, the two changes which had most embittered
them. He felt the necessity for reforms, but realized the
fundamental importance of " hastening slowly ".
Foreigners at Kabul, apart from members of the
various Legations, were few in number. Russia main-
tained an efficient weekly air service between Termez and
Kabul and part of the mechanical staff of the Afghan air
force was Russian, but, generally speaking, foreigners
were not encouraged to reside in Afghanistan, nor to
visit it, except for purposes which were approved of.
The number of Europeans was estimated at seventy and
included French archaeologists, a German Director of
Posts and two Italian officers employed in the Artillery
school.
The Declaration of Policy. On November 27, 1932,
King Nadir Shah published a declaration of policy in
ten points ; first, the foundation of the Government upon
the principles of the law of Islam; second, the absolute
LVII NADIR KHAN ELECTED KING 325
prohibition of alcoholic beverages; third, the establish-
ment of a military school and of an arsenal for the manu-
facture of modern weapons ; fourth, the maintenance of
the diplomatic relations established by King Amanulla with
foreign powers. Other measures included the repair of
telegraphs and telephones and the reconditioning of
roads ; the collection of all arrears of public revenue;
the development of commercial relations with foreign
powers; the advancement of public instruction; and
finally, the reconstruction of the old Council of State and
the appointment of a Prime Minister who would form a
Cabinet, subject to the royal approval. The Cabinet
which was formed consisted of Shah Wali Khan as Prime
Minister, with Shah Mahmud Khan as War Minister.
A Minister of the Interior and a Foreign Minister were
also appointed.
The Support of the leading Mulla of the Ghilzai Tribe.
King Nadir was especially fortunate in securing the
strong support of the Hazrat Sahib of Shorbazar, the
leading Mulla of the Ghilzai tribe and the brother of
Shir Aza, his staunch supporter. In a speech he made
to Afghan students this divine exhorted them to study
the occidental as well as the oriental sciences on the
ground that " all sciences are useful, being light from the
lights of Allah ". Furthermore, he exhorted them to study
foreign languages in order to equip themselves for frus-
trating the knavish tricks of foreign enemies. It would
seem that these statesmanlike exhortations proved that
the Hazrat Sahib had realized that this was the only
means for Moslem Afghanistan to regain and to retain
economic and political independence. It was perhaps
the most important pronouncement ever made by an
Afghan divine, who must have fully realized the danger
he ran of being assassinated by his fanatical fellow-
Countrymen.
The World Disarmament Conference^ 1932. During
this year a great effort was made to secure disarmament,
which is dealt with at length in the Survey of International
Affairs. In voting on a resolution putting it on record
that practically all the nations of the world were firmly
326 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CH.LVH
determined to adopt measures for the substantial reduction
of armaments, the vote was adopted by forty-one votes to
two, with eight abstentions. The two votes against
adoption were those of Germany and the U.S.S.R., while
Afghanistan and Turkey figured among the abstaining
states.
CHAPTER LVIII
THE ASSASSINATION OF KING NADIR SHAH AND THE
ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR SHAH, 1933
Master of Masters, O Maker of heroes!
Clean -slicing, swift-finishing,
Making death beautiful,
Life but a coin to be staked in the pastime,
Whose issue is more than the transfer of being
I am the will of God,
I am the Sword.
HENLEY.
The Plot of Gholam Nabi Khan, 1932. When the
revolution led by the brigand Habibulla broke out
Gholam Nabi Khan, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, acting in the interests of Amanulla, captured
Mazar-i-Sharif, but upon hearing of the abdication of
that monarch he had retired across the Oxus. After
the accession of Nadir Shah, Gholam Nabi, tendering
his submission, returned to Afghanistan. Proofs were,
however, shortly forthcoming that, aided by Soviet
agents, he was conspiring with Ghilzai, Durrani and
other tribesmen for the restoration to the throne of
Amanulla. Confronted by Nadir Shah with the proofs
of his guilt, Gholam Nabi made no attempt to justify his
treasonable conduct and was summarily executed. On
the following day the General Assembly approved of
this act of justice, which had taken place on November 8,
1932.
The Assassination of King Nadir Shah, November 8,
1933. The new order in Afghanistan was not destined %
to be established without three tragedies. The first was
the murder at Berlin in July, 1933, of Aziz Khan, an
elder brother of the King, who was Afghan Minister,
The assassin was a member of a body of Afghan students
327
328 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
who were drug addicts. Upon his arrest he declared that
his action constituted a protest against the British being
permitted to take control of the tribes of the North- West
Frontier. In the same year another member of the same
body, after failing to reach the British Minister, murdered
the Mir Munshi and an English chauffeur. The third
tragedy was by far the most serious. On that November
day King Nadir Shah was attacked by some of his own
trusted servants just outside the royal harem. The
assassins shot him three times and then despatched him
with daggers. The cause of this murder was revenge
for the execution of Gholam Nabi, the chief assassin
being the son of one of that traitor's servants. He struck
exactly one year after the death of Gholam Nabi.
Thus fell King Nadir Shah, who ranks among the
greatest rulers of Afghanistan. Without money or
following, and suffering from very bad health, by sheer
force of personality and courage, he had rescued his
country, which was groaning under the tyranny of a
cruel usurper, and had thereby saved it from a period of
anarchy that might well have lasted for a generation. On
ascending the throne, by a blend of firmness, tact and
kindness he had succeeded in bestowing the priceless gift
of peace on Afghanistan and had laid anew the foundations
of national unity.
The Accession of King Zahir Shah. It speaks well for
the stability of the Government created by the murdered
King and for the capacity and loyalty of Sirdar Hashim
Khan and his brothers, that King Nadir's son, Zahir
Shah, was immediately proclaimed King. It was hardly
to be expected that there would be no disturbances. In
Khost the " Crazy Mulla ", as he was termed, predicting
the speedy arrival of Amanulla on an aeroplane, collected
a following, which was joined by some Wazirs. How-
ever, the Afghan troops stationed at Matun gained a
victory over the insurgents, and the attitude of the
British authorities, who sternly forbade their own tribesmen
from taking part in the rising, ended what might have
developed into a serious situation. The Press showed
grave doubts as to the stability of the position of Zahir
ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR 329
Shah, but these forebodings were happily falsified.
King Muhammand Zahir Shah, The son of King
Nadir Shah, who ascended the throne under such tragical
circumstances, was born in 1914 and accompanied his
father to France at the age of ten. There he studied for
six years and learned French well ; he also speaks English.
Returning to Afghanistan in 1930, in the following year
he married Princess Umaira, the daughter of his uncle
Sirdar Ahmad Shah, and the union has been blessed by
the birth of two sons and two daughters. In this year he
attended the Military College at Kabul and, in 1932, was
appointed Assistant War Minister.
Zahir Shah has clearly inherited his father's ability,
as is proved by the keen interest he takes in his army
and, more especially, in his air force. In short, he is
essentially a virile Afghan, devoted to manly sports.
Under the guidance of his uncle, the able Sirdar Hashim
Khan, His Majesty is studying the intricate problems
with which Afghanistan is faced and is winning golden
opinions by the courtesy of his manners, alike to the rich
and to the poor.
The Afghan Constitution. The Government is a con-
stitutional monarchy, supreme legislative power being
invested in the King, the Senate and the National
Assembly, who constitute the Parliament. 1 The Senate
consists of 45 members, nominated for life by the
King, while the 109 members of the National Assembly
are elected. The ancient Loe Jirgah or " National
Assembly " is summoned at irregular intervals to discuss
national questions of especial importance that are re-
ferred to it by the King. The Government includes
departments for War, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs,
Education, Commerce, Justice, Public Works, Revenue,
Health, Posts and Telegraphs.
* The Foundation of the National Bank of Afghanistan.
Upon his accession Nadir Shah was faced with an empty
treasury. As a result the Afghani or Kabuli rupee
worth about one-quarter of the Indian rupee began to
fall sharply and it became an urgent matter to correct
1 In this section I have consulted The Statesman's Tear-Book.
330 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
the adverse balance of trade which existed. After an
unsuccessful attempt in 1931, two years later, a National
Bank was founded to deal with exchange, of which it
was granted a monopoly, while the commercial side was
dealt with by the formation of the Ashami (or Joint-
Stock) Company. To it monopolies were granted which
covered (a) the import of sugar and petroleum products ;
() purchases and sales on behalf of Government; and
(c) exploitation of all mines and the establishment of
industrial concerns in Afghanistan.
The Economic Policy of the Government. By vfray of
preface to the following remarks on the commercial
policy of the Government, it must be remembered that
Afghanistan is a poor country which supports an agri-
cultural and pastoral people, many of whom perforce
lead a nomadic life.
The chief export, which is a Government monopoly,
is the sale of Karakuli lambskins, averaging perhaps one
million sterling per annum. The second important
export, which is valued at perhaps one-half of the former,
is the fruit crop. The fact that the chief article of export
is distinctly a luxury commodity, depending alike on
prosperity and on changing fashion, constitutes a distinct
weakness in the economic system of the country.
The policy of the Government has been to reduce
imports by growing cotton and sugar beets, while factories
have been established for the manufacture of cloth and
sugar by the Ashami Company. The latest reports on
this subject, however, tend to show that the Government
has decided to sell these factories to private capitalists.
It is to be noted that no luxuries can be imported into
Afghanistan.
A second object that the Government has aimed at
is the elimination of middlemen and the securing of all
profits for the Afghan Government or the shareholders
of the Ashami Company. This policy has naturally
caused much soreness among the influential merchants of
Peshawar and has many disadvantages.
O/7. One of the most important imports, since lorries
are gradually displacing camel transport wherever roads
ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR 331
have been made, is petrol. In 1937 a concession to
search for oil over an area covering 270,000 square miles
in Western Afghanistan was granted to the Inland
Exploration Company of New York. The existence of
oil was, I understand, proved, in the Herat area, but
most unfortunately the small size of the field, the distance
to the coast of the Arabian Sea, involving the construc-
tion of an expensive pipe-line, and the insignificant local
demand for the product, compelled the company to
relinquish the concession.
German Mining Concession. In the autumn of 1937
a company termed " Afghanistan Mines Ltd. " was
registered under joint German and Afghan management.
Although minerals probably exist in the country, the
company met with little or no success and the concession
has been relinquished.
To conclude this brief sketch: in December 1938
the reports show that while exports have been main-
tained, imports have decreased, with the satisfactory
result that the year closed with a favourable balance of
6,119,609 Indian rupees, a result on which the Govern-
ment may be justly congratulated.
Modern Afghanistan in the Making. Nadir Shah,
before his untimely death, had laid the foundations of
a modern state and thanks mainly to the ability, high
principles and courage of Sirdar Hashim Khan, and his
brothers, slow but steady progress in this direction is
being effected. It has to be remembered that there is
a deep gulf, which it is difficult to bridge, between an
Afghan educated in Europe and a tent-dweller or an
inhabitant of the almost inaccessible mountain valleys.
Hashim Khan fortunately, while himself a well-educated
Sirdar^ understands and sympathizes with his country-
men of every class while they, on their side, realize that
hfc is a master of men.
Politically his position is both difficult and delicate,
since he has to hold the balance between Russian officials
and the representatives of Great Britain. The Afghans,
quite naturally, have not forgotten the Third Afghan
War. At the same time they fear the Soviet Government,
332 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
mistrust its policy and abominate its atheism.
The Position on the North-West Frontier. Nor is the
position in relation to the restless fanatical Wazirs and
their neighbours lacking in delicacy. For generations, as
we have seen, the Amirs have used the tribes on the
British side of the frontier as an important card in their
dealings with that Government, the ex-King Amanulla
being notorious in this respect. However, under the
present conditions, with a government which has estab-
lished law, order and education in Afghanistan, is it not
reasonable to hope that the tribesmen who are now
living between two organized areas of civilization may
gradually give up their passion for feuds and raiding
and become law-abiding citizens? Recent reports from
the North- West Frontier tend to show that roads, educa-
tion and hospitals, together with settled conditions under
the pax Britannica, are beginning to be appreciated by
the warlike tribesmen, if only from the commercial point
of view, as affording access to markets for their crops.
The Position of Women. As we have seen, Amanulla
lost his throne, partly owing to his insistence, among
other reforms, of women, headed by the Queen, throwing
aside their veils. Today women in the towns are veiled
as completely as before, in spite of the abolition of the
veil alike in Turkey and neighbouring Persia, but this
is not necessarily a permanent state of affairs in Afghan-
istan, more especially as the nomad women do not follow
the custom.
Education^ Roads and Postal Service. Education is
being energetically but unobtrusively conducted, and is
gradually producing satisfactory results. English is the
medium of instruction in higher education.
Much money is being spent on roads which, if not
comparable with those of Western Europe, bring the
chief cities much nearer to one another and, generally
speaking, are an agency for the spread of civilization.
The same remark certainly applies to the postal service
which now runs six days a week between the capital and
Peshawar and links up all important centres.
Turkey^ Russia and Afghanistan become Members of
ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR 333
the League of Nations. When the League of Nations
came into existence in January 1920 Amanulla was in
sullen mood after his defeat in the Thfrd Afghan War,
and took no part in its formation. The passing years,
however, changed the situation, but for more than a
decade, following the policy of holding aloof from the
League favoured by the Soviet Government, neither
Afghanistan nor Turkey desired membership in it.
Persia had already joined the League before negotiat-
ing hjr treaty with Russia in 1921 ; Turkey followed in
the same year and the Soviet Union, undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the militant policy of Japan, joined the League
in September 1934, to be followed a few days later by
Afghanistan.
The Four-Power Treaty of Saadabad, 1937. In 1934
there arose a dispute between Iraq and Persia as to the
rights of each Power on the Shatt-el-Arab. The tangled
question came up before the League Council in January
1935, b ut without result. However, the case was
subsequently removed from the agenda of the Council
Meeting and the two Powers came to terms. More than
this, in the autumn of 1935, preliminary negotiations for
the formation of a Middle Eastern Pact were under-
taken on the initiative of Persia, with the strong support
of Turkey, who feared the ambitions of Italy in the
Eastern Mediterranean. On July 4, 1937, an Iranian-
Iraq Agreement, which settled on reasonable terms the
boundary dispute in the Shatt-el-Arab, was signed, and
the Four-Power Middle Eastern Pact, termed the
Treaty of Saadabad, was signed at the " Palace of
Felicity " (to translate the word), near Tehran, a few
days later.
The Pact may be described as one of bon voisinage y
but is not a military alliance. In it the four Powers also
reaffirmed their loyalty to the Briand-Kellog Pact and to
the League Covenant. After the act of signature had
been performed, a Permanent Council of the Four
Middle Eastern Powers was set up. The first resolution
passed in the session which followed was to support the
candidature of Persia, and then of each other, for election
334 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
to a seat on the Council of the League of Nations.
Of this important treaty the Istanbul Correspondent
of The Times writes: J " Its signature will receive general
approbation, inasmuch as it indicates that these four
Moslem countries some of them so long strangers or
enemies one to the other are now desirous of co-operat-
ing for their mutual benefit ". It remains to add that,
owing to the treaty of Iraq with Great Britain, and the
treaty of Turkey with Soviet Russia, the Pact of Saadabad
was signed with the approval of both the above-pamed
Powers.
The Policy of the British Government. In a recent
speech 2 Lord Zetland, His Majesty's Secretary of State
for India, made the following statesmanlike declaration:
" A strong, stable and friendly Afghan administration
has always been a British interest, and never more so
perhaps than it is today, and if in the past we sought to
secure our interests by a measure of control over and by
granting subsidies to the Government of that country,
we have now recognized the advantages of securing them
through the agency of a stable, friendly and independent
kingdom ; for we are satisfied that the friendship of an
independent sovereign State is a surer foundation on
which to rest our common interests than a State subject to
an uneasy subserviency, irksome to the freedom-loving
spirit of the Afghan people. That there is a powerful
bond of common interest between India and Afghanistan
must be apparent to anyone who considers the geo-
graphical, the political, and the economic circumstances
of the two countries.
" Hence the satisfaction and the sympathy with which
we have watched the internal progress of the country
during the past ten years under the wise policy of orderly
development inaugurated by Nadir Shah and continued
under the present King with the powerful aid of his
July 19, 1939.
2 This pronouncement was made after I had delivered a lecture at the Caxton Hall
on " Afghanistan : The Present Position " to a joint meeting of the Royal Central Asian
Society and The East India Association on March 13, 1940, at which Lord Zetland
presided. It was followed by the tragic murder of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and the
wounding of Lord Zetland, Lord Lamington and Sir Louis Dane.
LVIII ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR 335
uncles, Muhammad Hashim, the Prime Minister, Shah
Mahmud, the Defence Minister, who visited us here
in London in 1937 and 1936 respectively, and Shah
Wali, who was King Nadir's first representative at the
Court of St. James. . . . The two countries have like-
wise a common interest in the maintenance of peace in
the tribal areas which lie between their respective
boundaries, and when, as unhappily sometimes occurs,
we are driven by the lawlessness of the tribes to embark
upon^military action against them, we always bear closely
in mind the possible repercussions of any action which
we may have in mind upon the tribes upon the Afghan
side of the border and upon the interests, consequently,
of the Afghan regime."
The Strategical Position of Afghanistan. Before con-
cluding this work it seems desirable to make a few
remarks on the strategical situation of the country. The
Afghan army is recruited by a mixture of compulsory
service for two years and of voluntary service for life.
Officers are recruited for life. The peace strength of
the army is 60,000, but its armed tribesmen, who may
be half a million strong, constitute a formidable second
line. Mechanized transport has been introduced to
some extent, and a small air force has been established.
It is clear that Russia alone is her potential enemy, and
will be treated as such. Kabul, the capital, is protected
from invasion by the U.S.S.R. owing to the lofty and
rugged double range of the Hindu Kush. But Badakh-
shan and her other provinces in the Oxus Valley could
not be effectually held against large Russian forces that
the railway could transport to Termez, more especially
as no reinforcements could be sent from Kabul during
the winter months. Again, Russia, from the Trans-
Caspian Railway (which runs from that sea to the main
northern line), constructed a strategical branch line from
Merv to New Kushk, which is situated only some eighty
miles from Herat, with no intervening physical barrier,
and Herat could hardly offer a long resistance to Russian
heavy artillery. From Herat to Kandahar is some 200
miles by the caravan route via Sabzawar and Farah. The
336 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN CHAP.
country to be crossed presents few physical difficulties
and is suitable for tanks, whippets, and lorries, albeit the
roads are little more than tracks in most cases. If Persia
were allied to Afghanistan, she might be able to attack
the Russian lines of communication to some small extent.
We now take the other side of the situation. From
the days of the Moghul Empire, Kabul and Kandahar
have been held to be the Keys of India, and I should not
envy the position of a Russian army which could only
be supplied by a single-track railway from an immense
distance, whether we reckon from Moscow via Oren-
burg and Bukhara or via the Caucasus and the Caspian
Sea ; the distance in both cases is about 2,200 miles. I
have travelled along both these routes on more than one
occasion, and was struck by the lack of towns of any
importance and of commercial activity throughout. The
recently built town of Magnitogorodsk in the Ural
Mountains, with its rich iron mines, will, however, have
improved the Russian position to some extent. There
is also the recent but badly constructed Turk-Sib railway,
which runs from the Trans-Siberian railway at Novo-
sibirsk to a junction between Pishpok (Frunze) and the
Sir Daria, not far from Tashkent. But the whole province
of Russian Turkistan is now devoted to growing cotton,
and food supplies for a large force would be unobtainable.
It would, then, seem to be unwise for Russia to
attempt to invade India across Afghanistan, as she would
presumably be met on the Kabul-Kandahar line by
Afghan troops, firmly supported by British troops hold-
ing a strong position. Moreover, her lines of com-
munication would be repeatedly attacked by the tribes on
her flanks. On the other hand, Russia might be tempted
to occupy Afghan-Turkistan in the Oxus Valley or even
the Herat province. Yet to hold these conquests would
need large forces, which it would be difficult to keep in
the field.
To conclude this brief sketch, modern mechanized
warfare requires enormous supplies of ammunition, of
petrol and of innumerable other requisites. These
cannot be furnished without double railway tracks, large
ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR 337
commercial centres in close proximity and rich corn lands,
all of which are lacking in the vicinity of Northern
Afghanistan. Consequently a Russian attempt to invade
India across Afghanistan, more especially in view of the
proved weakness of her army, would, in my opinion, be
doomed to disastrous failure.
EPILOGUE
In concluding this work I would quote wise Doctor
Johnson, who remarked: " Courage is reckoned the
greatest of all virtues, because, unless a man has that
virtue, he has no security for preserving any other ". By
a happy coincidence Abdur Rahman Khan, that truly
great Amir who reunited all the provinces of Afghanistan
under his sway, once remarked to Sir Mortimer Durand
that all the virtues could be grafted on the stock of
courage, without which no nation could prosper. I
have been in touch with Afghans for many years and
I have especially admired their outstanding virility. I
can therefore, with full confidence in its realization,
wish Afghanistan a prosperous future.
VOL. II
APPENDIX A
THE SIMLA MANIFESTO
SIMLAH, October i, 1838.
Th<* Right Hon. the Governor-General of India having, with
the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage
of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems
it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which
have led to this important measure.
It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the
British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sindh,
the Newab of Bhawalpore, and Maharajah Runjeet Singh, had
for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate
the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in
Central Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of
benefits would naturally produce.
With a view to invite the aid of the de facto rulers of Afghan-
istan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties,
Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836,
on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Caubul. The
original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial
nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to
Caubul, information was received by the Governor-General that
the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and un-
provoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maharajah Runjeet
Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that his Highness the
Maharajah would not be slow to avenge the aggression; and it
was to be feared that, the flames of war being once kindled in the
very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our
commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British
Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a
result so calamitous, the Governor-General resolved on authorizing
Gfptain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan, that if he
should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms
with the Maharajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices
with his Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding
between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic
confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friend-
ship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the
339
340 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Governor-General, to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities
on his part should be suspended.
It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-
General that a Persian army was besieging Herat; that intrigues
were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose
of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and
even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not
only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of
her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded
evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the
principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.
After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotia-
tion at Caubul, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in
consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and
assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the
Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the
Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his
regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the
channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness; that
he avowed schemes of aggrandisement and ambition injurious to
the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he
openly threatened, "in furtherance of those schemes, to call in
every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave
his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of
the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the
British power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter
disregard of the views and interests of the British Government,
compelled Captain Burnes to leave Caubul without having effected
any of the objects of his mission.
It was now evident that no further interference could be
exercised by the British Government to bring about a good under-
standing between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and
the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that, so
long as Caubul remained under his government, we could never
hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured,
or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved
inviolate.
The Governor-General deems it in this place necessary to
revert to the siege of Herat and the conduct of the Persian nation.
The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian arAiy
for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable
and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding
the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at
the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of
accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have
behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of
APPENDIX A 341
their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the
hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful
defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In
the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests
of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events,
more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has
recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. M'Neill, Her
Majesty's Envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by a
refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect
adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the
Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessa-
tion of* all intercourse between the two Governments. The
necessity under which Great Britain is placed of regarding the
present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act
of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated
to the Shah, under the express order of her Majesty's Government.
The Chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan
of Caubul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy,
with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and
interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly
assisting in the operations against Herat.
In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our
Envoy from Caubul, the Governor-General felt the importance
of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of
foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.
His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the
position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who,
when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united
resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged
necessary by the British Government, and who, on his empire
being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable
asylum in the British dominions.
It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished
by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the
Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill
fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British
Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of
national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings
injurious to our interests ana security, the British Government
acknowledged and respected their authority; but a different policy
appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those
chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of
our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our
western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression,
and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging them-
selves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote
342 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
schemes of conquest and aggrandisement.
After serious and mature deliberation, the Governor-General
was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration
of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah
Soojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had
been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony
of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the
Governor-General was further of opinion that it was just and
proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh,
than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Govern-
ment, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party
to the contemplated operations. *
Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the
Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been
the conclusion of a triplicate treaty by the British Government,
the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby his High-
ness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself
to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his
ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting
parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all.
Various points have been adjusted, which had been the sub-
jects of discussion between the British Government and his High-
ness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of
the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the
surrounding States. A guaranteed independence will, upon favour-
able conditions, be tendered to the "Ameers of Sindh, and the
integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be
fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress,
it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security
of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence
of the British Government will gain their proper footing among
the nations of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established
upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting
barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.
His Majesty, Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan,
surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign
interference and factious opposition by a British army. The
Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily
replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and
when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence ahd
integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be with-
drawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures
by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the
security of the possessions of the British Crown; but, he rejoices
that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in
restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Through-
APPENDIX A 343
out the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously
employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile
differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the
distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness
of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose
hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British
Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treat-
ment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from
opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the
most suitable for the general advantage of their country.
By order of the Right Hon. Governor-General of India.
W. H. MACNAGHTEN
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General
APPENDIX B
THE TREATY OF CAPITULATION
[The following are translations of the different documents
referred to in the above-mentioned chapter, marking the cftfferent
stages of the treaty under which the English evacuated Caubul.
No. I is the draft of the original treaty which Macnaghten was
negotiating at the time of his death. The articles, as proposed by
the Afghan chiefs, are in inverted commas. The observations
which follow contain the assent of the English representative.
And the Remarks in brackets are those of the Afghan chiefs; the
original being in the handwriting of Akbar Khan.]
I
Rough Draft of the Treaty with the Assent of the
English Authorities
Article I . " There shall be no delay in the departure of the
English Army."
Agreed to. They will march twenty-four hours after having
received a thousand carriage-cattle, which shall be either camels
or yaboos.
[Remark. It rests with them (the English); let them pay the
hire as they may be able.]
Article 2. " Afghan Sirdars shall accompany the army, to
prevent any one offering opposition, and to assist in procuring
supplies."
It is very advisable.
[Remark. Sirdar Oosman Khan and Shah Dowlut Khan.]
Article 3. " The Jellalabad army shall march for Peshawiy
before the Caubul force starts."
It is agreed to. Do you name some person who shall accom-
pany them.
[Remark. Abdool Ghuffoor Khan.]
Article 4. " The Ghuznee force, having made their prepara-
tions, shall speedily march to Peshawur by Caubul."
344
APPENDIX B 345
It is agreed to. Do you name some proper person to accom-
pany them.
[Remark. A relation of the Naib or of Mehtur Moossa.j
Article 5. " The Candahar force, and all other British troops
in Afghanistan, shall quickly depart for Hindostan."
It is agreed. Let proper people accompany them.
[Remark. Newab Jubbur Khan.]
Article 6. " The whole of the property of the Ameer (Dost
Mahomed Khan) which is in the hands of the English Government,
or of individual officers, shall be left behind."
It^is agreed to. Whatever is with the public authorities is
known to you; whatever is with private officers point out and
take.
Article 7. " Whatever property belonging to the English can-
not be carried away, shall be taken care of, and sent by the first
opportunity."
It is agreed to: but we have given over all that remains to the
Newab.
[Remark. The guns, ordnance stores, and muskets, must be
given to me.]
Article 8. " In case Shah Soojah should wish to remain at
Caubul, we will give him yearly a subsistence of a lakh of
rupees."
It is agreed to. Do whatever you think advisable, wishing to
show your friendship for us.
Article 9. " In case the family of Shah Soojah should be left
behind, from want of carriage-cattle, we will fix the place now
occupied by them in the Balla Hissar for their dwelling-place, until
they can depart for Hindostan."
It is agreed to. The honour of the King is the honour of the
Douranees; and it is becoming in you. 1
Article 10. "When the English army arrives at Peshawur,
arrangements shall be made for the march or Dost Mahomed Khan,
and all other Afghans, with all their property, families, and
children."
It is agreed to. They shall all be sent to you with honour and
in safety.
4rttcle ii. "When Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the
others arrive safely at Peshawur, then the family of the Shah shall
be at liberty to depart; that departing they may arrive at the place
fixed upon."
It is agreed to.
1 The 8th and 9th articles are scored out in the original by Akbar Khan, as though,
on consideration) they were distasteful to him.
346 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Article 1 2. " Four English gentlemen shall remain as hostages
in Caubul until Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other
Afghans shall have arrived at Peshawur, when the English gentle-
men shall be allowed to depart."
It is agreed to.
[Remark. Let there be six hostages.]
Article 1 3. " Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan and Sirdar Oos-
man Khan shall accompany the English army to Peshawur, and
take them there in safety." l
It is agreed to.
[Remark. Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan.J
Article 14. "After the departure of the English, friendly
relations shall be continued, i.e., that the Afghan Government,
without the consent and advice of the English Government, shall
not form any treaty or connection with a foreign power; and should
they (the Afghans) ever ask assistance against foreign invasion, the
English Government will not delay in sending such assistance."
It is agreed to, as far as we are concerned; but in this matter
the Governor-General of India alone has authority. We will do
our best to bring about friendship between the two governments;
and by the blessing of the Almighty this wish will be obtained, and
friendship exist for the future.
Article 15. "Any one who may have assisted Shah Soojah
and the English, and may wish to accompany them, shall be
allowed to do so. We will not hinder them. And if they remain
here, no one will call them to account for what they have done,
and no one shall molest them under any pretence. They may
remain in this country like the other inhabitants." 2
We have interpolated a few words, and it will be friendship if
you comply with them.
Article 1 6. "Should any English gentleman unavoidably be
detained, he shall be treated honourably until such time as he can
depart." [MS. Records.]
II
[The following articles contain the further demands of the
Afghans advanced after Macnaghten's death. The observations
immediately following the articles are by the English negotiator^.
The remarks in brackets by the Afghans.]
Article I . " Whatever coin there may be in the public treasury
must be given up."
1 This article is scored out in the original.
2 The whole of this article also is scored out. Its provisions seem to have been
extended, suggestively, by Pottinger, but disapproved by Akbar Khan.
APPENDIX B 347
We have set apart two lakhs of rupees for our expenses to
Peshawur, which is twenty- four yahoos' loads. If there is more
than this in the public treasury, either in gold mohurs, ducats, or
rupees, it is yours. If you do not believe this, send some one to
note and inspect the loads on the day of our departure. If we
have said truly, give us a blessing; and if we have spoken falsely,
it is your property, take it away, and we shall be convicted of
falsehood.
[Remark. Let them pay the hire of the yaboos and camels.]
Article 2. " With reference to the remark that was made that
we should give up all our guns but six, we have with the force
one and a half companies of artillerymen. You have fixed six
guns. Half of a company would remain without equipments.
Be good enough to give three more small guns, such as are drawn
by mules, for the other half-company. It will be a great kindness."
[Remark. They cannot be given.]
Article 3. " The muskets in excess of those in use with the
regiments must be left behind."
This is agreed to. Whatever muskets are in addition to those
in use with the regiments, together with shot and powder and
other ordnance stores, all by way of friendship shall be the
property of the Newab.
Article 4. " General Sale, together with his wife and daughter,
and the other gentlemen of rank who are married and have children,
until the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other
Afghans and their families, and Douranees and Ghilzyes, from
Hindostan, shall remain as guests with us; that when the Ameer
Dost Mahomed Khan shall have arrived, they also shall be allowed
to depart with honour from Afghanistan."
General Sale is with the army in Jellalabad, the departure of
which is fixed to take place previous to our arrival; and as for the
other two or three gentlemen who are married and present here,
we have sent a man to them. They, having seen their families,
report that their families will not consent to this proposal; (adding)
that you men may do as you like no one can order us. This
proposal is contrary to all order. We now beg you to be good
enough to excuse the women from this suffering, and we agree to
give as many gentlemen as you may wish for. In friendship, kind-
ness and consideration are necessary, not overpowering the weak
with sufferings. Since, for a long time past, we have shown kind-
ness and respect to all Afghans of rank and consequence with whom
we have had dealings, you should consider what we have done for
them, and not forget Kindness. As Shah Soojah was father of a
family, and the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan was with his family,
and no one gave them annoyance, and we showed them respect,
348 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
you also now show similar kindness, that friendship may be
increased.
[Remark. Let them remain with their families. Let the
family of the General stop in Caubul, until he himself comes
from Jellalabad, Sturt with his family, Boyd with his family,
and Anderson with his family.]
ELDRED POTTINGER, Pol. Agent.
W. K. ELPHINSTONE, Major-Gen. 1
Ill
[The following is a draft of the new treaty submitted by the
Afghan chiefs, containing the additional articles, and embodying
the matter in Akbar Khan's " Remarks ".]
Agreement of Peace that has been determined on with the Frank
English gentlemen, to which engagement, if they consent and
act accordingly y on the part of the heads and leaders of Afghan-
istan henceforward no Infractions will occur to their friendly
engagements.
1st. That the going of the gentlemen shall be speedy. In
regard to the carriage-cattle, let them send money that they may
be purchased and sent.
2nd. As regards the going of the Sirdars with the English
army that no person may injure it on the way, Sirdar Mahomed
Akbar Khan or Sirdar Mahomed Oosman Khan, whichever may
be wished by the English, will be appointed and sent.
3rd. The army of Jellalabad shall march previous to the army
of Caubul, and proceed to Peshawur. Sirdar Abdool Suffoor Khan
having been appointed, will leave this and proceed, that he may
previously accompany them; secondly, the road of Bhungush has
been appointed.
4th. The Ghuznee force having got quickly ready will pro-
ceed by the road of Caubul to Peshawur. A relative of Naib
Ameen-oolah Khan, with Mehtur Moosa Khan, has been
appointed to accompany it.
5th. The army of Candahar and other parts of Afghanistan,
wherever an army may be, will quickly depart for India. Newat
Abdool Jubbar Khan nas been appointed to carry this into effect.
6th. Whatever property of the Ameer may be with the
English will be returned, ana nothing retained.
yth. Whatever property of the English may be left for want
of carriage will become the property of the Newab.
1 MS. Records.
APPENDIX B 349
8th, If the family of Shah Soojah, on account of want of
carriage, may remain here, they will be placed in the house of
Hadjee Khan.
9th. Whenever the English army may arrive at Peshawur,
they will make arrangements for the return of Ameer Dost
Mahomed Khan, the Afghans and their families, that are in
India.
I Oth. That the English gentlemen, with their families, will
be left at Caubul as hostages, until the Ameer Dost Mahomed
Khan, with the rest of the Afghans and their families, may arrive
at P^$hawur; or, secondly, that six hostages may be left.
nth. After the departure of the English there shall be
perfect friendship between the two states in so much so that the
Government of Afghanistan, without the advice and approval of
the British Government, shall enter into no connection or corre-
spondence with any other power; but if, in its defence, it may
require the assistance of the English, they will not delay to afford
it. Should the British Government not consent to this, the Afghans
are free to make friends with any one they like.
1 2th. If any gentleman would wish to remain in Caubul, on
account of his private affairs, he may do so, and will be treated with
justice and respect.
1 3th. Whatever cash, whether gold or silver, may be in the
treasury, shall be paid to Newab Zemaun Khan. A trustworthy
person will be appointed, who will issue supplies from stage to
stage as far as Peshawur.
1 4th. With regard to artillery, six guns have been determined
on. They are enough. More will not be given. Secondly, the
three mule guns will be given.
1 5th. The spare arms shall be given to Newab Mahomed
Zemaun Khan.
1 6th. The hostages to be left here, and these persons with
their families General Sale, Captains Sturt, Boyd, and Anderson.
iyth. Let General Sale go with the army to Jellalabad, and
his family remain here; after taking the army to Jellalabad, let
him return to Caubul.
1 8th. If any of the Frank l gentlemen have taken a Mussul-
man wife, she shall be given up.
If there may be questions about any article, send a note quickly
by the bearer. [MS. Records.]
1 Frank or Feringhi signifies a European.
350 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
IV
THE RATIFIED TREATY
Translation of a Treaty between the English Authorities at Caubul
and the Afghan Nobles. (Dated in the month of Ze-vol-Kadh)
The cause of writing this confidential paper, and the intention
of forming this unparalleled friendly treaty, is this: That at the
present happy moment, to put away strife and contention, and
avert discord and enmity, the representatives of the great English
nation that is, the high of rank and respected Eldred Pottyiger,
the ambassador and agent of the English Government, and General
Elphinstone, the commander of the English forces have con-
cluded a comprehensive treaty containing certain articles, which
they have confided to the hands of the Afghan nobility, that by
it the chain of friendship may be strengthened. And it has been
settled that the Afghan nobles shall give a similar writing.
An engagement is now made by his Majesty Newab Mahomed
Zemaun Khan, King of Afghanistan, and Naib Ameen-oollah
Khan, and the chief nobles of Afghanistan, whose seals are affixed
to and ornament this document. The articles of the treaty are as
follows:
Article i. That the British troops shall speedily quit the
territories of Afghanistan and march to India, and shall not return;
and twenty-four hours after receiving the carriage-cattle the army
shall start.
Article 2. That on our part the Sirdars, Oosman Khan and
Shoojah-ool-dowlah Khan, be appointed to accompany the before-
mentioned army to the boundaries of Afghanistan and convey it
to the boundary of the Sikh territory; so that no one shall offer
molestation on the road; and that carriage-cattle and provisions
may be procured for it.
Article 3. That the English force at Jellalabad shall march for
Peshawur before the Caubul army arrives, and shall not delay on
the road.
Article 4. Having brought the force at Ghuznee in safety to
Caubul, under the protection of one of the relations of Naib
Ameen-oollah Khan, we will send it to Peshawur unmolested
under the care of another trustworthy person.
Article 5. Since, according to agreement the troops at Candahar
and other parts of Afghanistan are to start quickly for India, and
make over those territories to our agents, we on our part appoint
trustworthy persons who may provide them with provisions and
protection, and preserve them from molestation.
Article 6. All goods and property, and stores and cattle,
APPENDIX B 351
belonging to Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan, which may be in the
hands of the English, shall be given up, and none retained.
Article 7. Six English gentlemen, who remain here as our
guests, shall be treated with courtesy. When the Ameer Dost
Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans shall arrive at Peshawur,
we will allow the above-mentioned English gentlemen to depart
with honour.
Article 8. After the departure of the English army according
to the treaty, should assistance against foreign invasion be at any
time demanded, they (the English Government) shall not delay.
Between (the Governments) friendship and good-will shall exist;
and we will not make a treaty with any but the above-mentioned
English Government. And in case the Governor-General of
India should not agree to this proposal, we are at liberty to form
an alliance with any other power.
Article 9. Should any English gentlemen be unavoidably
detained in Caubul, we will treat him with all respect and con-
sideration, and on his departure dismiss him with honour.
Article 10. The English can take six horse-artillery guns and
three mule guns, and the rest, by way of friendship, snail be left
for our use. And all muskets and ordnance stores in the magazine
shall, as a token of friendship, be made over to our agents.
Article 1 1 . Such English soldiers as may be left sick or wounded
at Caubul shall be at liberty to return to their own country on their
recovery.
This is the treaty, the articles of which have been entered into
between the nobles of the Mahomedan faith and the distinguished
gentlemen. From which articles we will not depart. Written in
the month of Ze-vol-Kadh, in the year of the Mahomedan faith
1257.
(Sealed)
MAHOMED ZEMAUN KHAN KHAN MAHOMED KHAN
MEER HAJEE KHAN ABDOOL KHALIK KHAN
SEKUNDUR KHAN AMEEN-OOLLAH KHAN
DARWEESH KHAN MEER ASLAN KHAN
ALLEE KHAN SUMUD KHAN
MAHOMED AKBAR KHAN MAHOMED NASIR KHAN
MAHOMED OOSMAN KHAN ABDOOLLAH KHAN
GHOLAM AHMED KHAN GHUFFOOR KHAN
GHOLAM MAHOMED KHAN MEER ALTEB KHAN
[MS. Records.]
APPENDIX C
AGREEMENT BETWEEN His HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR
RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, ON THE ONE PART, AND SIR
HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ON
THE OTHER PART
Whereas the British Government has represented to His
Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for the
literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 between Russia and
England by which it was decided that the river Oxus should form
the northern boundary of Afghanistan, from Lake Victoria
(Wood's Lake) or Sarikol on the east to the junction of the Kokcha
with the Oxus, and whereas the British Government considers
itself bound to abide by the terms of this Agreement, if the Russian
Government equally abides by them, His Highness Amir Abdur
Rahman Khan, G. C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Depend-
encies, wishing to show his friendship to the British Government
and his readiness to accept their advice ,in matters affecting his
relations with Foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will evacuate
all the districts held by him to the north of this portion of the
Oxus on the clear understanding that all the districts lying to the
south of this portion of the Oxus, and not now in his possession,
be handed over to him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer
Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government
of India, hereby declares on the part of the British Government
that the transfer to His Highness the Amir of the said districts
lying to the south of the Oxus is an essential part of this trans-
action, and undertakes that arrangements will be made with the
Russian Government to carry out the transfer of the said lands
to the north and south of the Oxus.
(Sd.) H. M. DURAND
Kabul, 1 2th November 1893.
(Sd.) AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN
1 2th November 1893 (2nd Jamadi-ul-awal 1311).
352
APPENDIX C 353
AGREEMENT BETWEEN His HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR
RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, ON THE ONE PART, AND SIR
HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON THE OTHER
PART
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier
of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His High-
ness tlxi Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling
these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit
of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there
may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied
Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:
(1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's
dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the
line shown in the map attached to this agreement.
(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise inter-
ference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of
Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise
interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of
India.
(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the
Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak.
His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time
exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral, including the
Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees
to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed
map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to
the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also
relinquishes his claim to Chageh.
(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and
demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by
Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to
arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere
with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map
?ttached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local
rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir
withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and con-
cedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in
the Sirkai Tibrai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will
be drawn as follows:
VOL. II 2 A
354 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Peha
Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such
a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to
Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the new Chaman Fort
and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand? The line
will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill
known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southwards, will rejoin
the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British
territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of
Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not
exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.
(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the
Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan
as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences
of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the
frontier, and both the Government of India and His Highness the
Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which
will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to
demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit,
so as to remove for the future, as far as possible, all causes of doubt
and misunderstanding between the two Governments.
(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good-will to the
British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent
and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the
purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they
will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in
order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His High-
ness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government
of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a
year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.
(Sd.) H. M. DURAND
Kabul; j
The 1 2th November 1893!
(Sd.) ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN
APPENDIX D
TRANSLATION OF THE TREATY
Praise be to Allahl
His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din 1 Amir Habibulla Khan,
Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its dependencies,
on the one part, and the Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane,
C.S.I.,. foreign Secretary of the Mighty Government of India
and Representative of the exalted British Government, on the
other part.
His said Majesty does hereby agree to this that, in matters of
principle and of subsidiary importance of the Treaty regarding
internal and external affairs and of the engagements which His
Highness, my late father, that is, Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, 2 who
has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and
acted upon with the exalted British Government, I also have
acted, am acting, and will act upon the same agreement and
compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any
promise.
The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does hereby
agree to this that as to the very agreement and engagement that
the exalted British Government concluded and acted upon with
the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, that
is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy,
regarding internal and external affairs and matters of principle or
of subsidiary importance, I confirm them and write that they (the
British Government) will not act contrary to those agreements
and engagements in any way or at any time.
Made on Tuesday, the I4th day of Muharram-ul-Haram of
the year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 2ist day of March of
the year 1905 A.D.
[Persian seal of Amir Habibulla Khan.]
This 3 is correct. I have sealed and
signed.
AMIR HABIBULLA
Louis W. Dane,
Foreign Secretary,
representing the Government of India
1 This signifies " Lamp of the Nation and of the Faith."
* This signifies " Lord of the Nation and of the Faith."
3 In the handwriting of the Amir.
355
APPENDIX E
ARTICLES OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT
AS AFFECTING AFGHANISTAN
The high contracting parties being animated with a sincere
desire to assure the perfect security of their respective frontiers
in Central Asia and to maintain there a solid and lasting peace,
have decided to conclude a Convention to that effect.
Article I. His Majesty's Government declare that they have
no intention of changing trie political status of Afghanistan; His
Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence
in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense and will not themselves
take in Afghanistan, and will not encourage Afghanistan to take
any measures threatening Russia. The Russia Government on
their part declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the
sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political
relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the inter-
mediary of His Majesty's Government. They further undertake
not to send any agents into Afghanistan.
Article II. His Majesty's Government having declared in
the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 2ist March 1905 that they
recognized the Agreement and the engagements concluded witn
the late Amir Abdur Rahman and that they have no intention
of interfering in the internal government of Afghanistan, His
Majesty's Government engage not to annex or to occupy in
contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to
interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided
that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted towards
His Majesty's Government under the abovementioned Treaty.
Article III. The Russian and Afghan authorities specially
designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier
provinces may establish direct reciprocal relations with each othter
for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.
Article IV. The British and Russian Governments declare
that they recognize as regards Afghanistan the principle of equality
of treatment in matters concerning commerce and agree that any
facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for
British and British Indian trade and traders shall be equally applied
356
APPENDIX E 357
to Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of commerce
establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments
will agree as to the measures to be taken, due regard being had to
the Amir's Sovereign rights.
Article V. The present arrangements will only enter into
force from the moment when the British Government has notified
to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms
above stipulated.
APPENDIX F
THE TREATY OF PEACE OF AUGUST 8, 1919
The following articles for the restoration of peace have been
agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Govern-
ment:
Article i
From the date of the signing of this Treaty there shall be peace
between the British Government, on the one part, and the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan on the other.
Article 2
In view of the circumstances which have brought about the
present war between the British Government and the Government
of Afghanistan, the British Government, to mark their displeasure,
withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing
arms, ammunition and warlike munitions through India to
Afghanistan.
Article 3
The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore con-
fiscated, and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir.
Article 4
At the same time, the British Government are desirous of the
re-establishment of the old friendship, that has so long existed
between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guar-
antees that the Afghan Government are, on their part, sincerely
anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The
British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan
Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive
another Afghan mission after six months, for the discussion and
settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments,
and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory
basis.
353
APPENDIX F 359
Article 5
The Afghan Government accept the I ndo- Afghan frontier
accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early
demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion
of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression
took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission
may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their
positions until such demarcation has been effected.
"*> THE LETTER OF SIR HAMILTON GRANT
You asked me for some further assurance that the Peace
Treaty which the British Government now offer, contains nothing
that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan either in
internal or external matters.
My friend, if you will read the Treaty carefully you will see
that there is no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan.
You have told me that the Afghan Government are unwilling to
renew the arrangement whereby the late Amir agreed to follow
unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to
his external relations. I have not therefore pressed this matter,
and no mention of it is made in the Treaty. Therefore, the said
Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and inde-
pendent in its internal and external affairs.
Moreover, this war has cancelled all previous Treaties.
(Sd.) SIR HAMILTON GRANT
APPENDIX G
NOTE ON PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH AND AFGHAN GOVERN-
MENTS DISCUSSED BY THE DELEGATES OF THE TwO STATES
AT THE CONFERENCE HELD AT MUSSOORIE, BETWEEN THE
MONTHS OF APRIL AND JULY 1920, AS A PRELIMINARY
TO DEFINITE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY OF FRIEND-
SHIP
(1) It was agreed that it is in the mutual interest of both
Governments that the Afghan State shall be strong and prosperous.
(2) The British Government will be prepared to reiterate the
undertaking, already given bv them, to respect absolutely the
integrity and independence or Afghanistan, both in internal and
external affairs, and to restrain to the best of their ability all persons
within the British boundaries from taking action obnoxious to the
Afghan Government.
(3) The British Government expect that the Afghan Govern-
ment will similarly undertake to prevent to the best of their ability
all action within the boundaries of Afghanistan, whether by their
own subjects or by British subjects who are or may in the future
be refugees from the British Dominions, or by subjects of other
nations, which may tend to stir up strife or produce enmity against
the British Government within the boundaries of India. The
British Government expect that the Afghan Government will
undertake in particular to restrain their subordinate officials and
others from inciting the frontier tribes within the British Boun-
daries against the British, to prevent to the best of their ability
the passage through Afghan territory to the British frontier of
arms and ammunition and of persons intending to raise an agitation
against the British Government, to prohibit preparations within
Afghan territory for making raids into British territory, to punish
persons found guilty of committing such raids, ana to abstain
themselves from all interference with tribes or persons on the
British side of the frontier, and from all kinds of political propa-
ganda within the British Empire.
(4) If the Afghan Government were willing to give formal
undertakings as set forth in the foregoing paragraph, then the
British Government, in the event of a Treaty of Friendship being
signed, and in order to show their sympathy with the desire of the
360
APPENDIX G 361
Afghan Government to develop their country, would be willing
to consider, as part of a Treaty of Friendship, the grant, for so
long as the Afghan Government performed its undertakings to the
satisfaction of the British Government, of assistance and con-
cessions to Afghanistan on the following lines:
(a) A yearly subvention of eighteen lakhs of rupees.
(b) Reasonable assistance towards the education in Europe,
at such places as might be agreed upon between the two
Governments, of a moderate number of Afghan youths,
to be selected by the Afghan Government with due regard
to their educational qualifications.
(c) Reasonable assistance, to be granted gradually, as financial
and other circumstances might permit, towards the con-
struction in Afghanistan of railways, telegraph lines, and
factories, and towards the development of mines.
(d) Technical advice regarding irrigation.
(e) The manufacture and supply of specially prepared paper
for the printing of Afghan currency notes and (if necessary)
provision of machines for note printing.
(/) Technical advice regarding the establishment of an
Afghan Government or Commercial Bank, and regarding
possibilities of improving the system of commercial credit
in Afghanistan.
(g) The restoration of the privilege of importing arms and
ammunition and military stores through India to Afghan-
istan, provided that the Government of Afghanistan shall
first have signed the Arms Traffic Convention, and pro-
vided that such importation shall only be made in accord-
ance with the provisions of that Convention.
(h) The grant in respect of all goods imported into India at
British ports fpr re-export to Afghanistan, and exported
to Afghanistan by routes to be agreed upon between the
two Governments, of a rebate at the time and place of
export of the full amount of customs duty levied upon
such goods, subject to a deduction of not more than one-
eighth of such duty as recompense for the work of customs
registration, and provided that such goods shall be trans-
ported through India in sealed packages which shall not
be broken before their export from India.
(/) An undertaking to levy no customs duty on such goods
of Afghan origin or manufacture as may be lawfully
imported into India, provided that such goods shall not
be exempted from the levy of the present Khyber tolls,
and from the levy of octroi in any Indian Municipality,
in which octroi is, or may be hereafter, levied.
362 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
(j) An undertaking to permit the export from Afghanistan
through India, in bond, and in sealed packages, by routes
to be agreed upon between the two Governments, of
opium and charas produced and manufactured in Afghan-
istan, provided that such opium and charas shall not be
despatched from Indian ports to any destination to which
the British Government are under an obligation to pro-
hibit or limit the despatch of opium or charas.
(k) The facilitating of the interchange of postal articles be-
tween India and Afghanistan, and arranging in accord-
ance with a separate postal agreement for the establishment
of offices of exchange on their frontiers, provid^f that
neither Government shall be permitted to establish a post
office in the territory of the other Government.
(/) Permission to establish at Peshawar and Quetta trading
agencies of the Afghan Government, provided that the
personnel and property of the agencies shall be subject to
the operations of all British laws and orders and to the
jurisdiction of British courts, and that they shall not be
recognised by the British authorities as having any official
or privileged position.
(m) Permission to establish Afghan Consulates at Culcutta,
Bombay and Karachi, provided the Afghan Government
permit the establishment of British Consulates at Jalalabad,
Ghazni, and Kandahar. The Consuls of both Govern-
ments, with their staffs, to enjoy all the privileges conceded
by international practice to such officials.
(5) In the event of the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship
the British Government would be prepared, on its signature, to
make the following gifts to the Afghan Government, as immediate
and tangible tokens of the sincerity of their intentions:
Either the following:
A
(a) 1 60 miles of steel telegraph posts, with a double wire, to
be handed over either at Chaman or at Peshawar.
(b) i o new large motor lorries with spares.
(c) 20 new touring cars with spares, American make, owing
to difficulty in obtaining prompt delivery of new English
cars.
(d) 300 soldiers' pals (bivouack tents).
Or the following:
B
460 miles of steel telegraph posts with a double wire.
(N.B. This would be sufficient for the construction of a
APPENDIX G 363
telegraph system from the British frontier to Kabul and from
Kabul to Kandahar; but it must be explained that immediate
delivery could be made only of 160 miles, which would suffice
for the line from the Britisn frontier to Kabul. The balance of
300 miles could not be made available in less than a year from
now, owing to shortage of material in India.)
(6) The following points are reserved for further consideration
at the time of negotiating a Treaty of Friendship:
(a) Permission to export from Afghanistan rouble notes through
India to countries outside India where their entry is
permitted.
Representation of the Afghan Government in London.
<*E
APPENDIX H
TREATY
Preamble
The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan,
with a view to the establishment of neighbourly relations between
them, have agreed to the Articles written hereunder, whereto the
undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have set their seals:
Article 1
The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan
mutually certify and respect, each with regard to the other, all
rights of internal and external independence.
Article II
The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the Indo-
Afghan Frontier, as accepted by the Afghan Government under
Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8th August
1919, corresponding to the I ith Ziqada, 1337 Hijra, and also the
boundary west of the Khyber laid down by the British Commission
in the months of August and September 1919, pursuant to the said
Article, and shown on the map attached to this treaty by a black
chain line; subject only to the realignment set forth in Schedule I
annexed, which has been agreed upon in order to include within
the boundaries of Afghanistan the place known as Tor Kham,
and the whole bed of the Kabul river between Shilman Khwala
Banda and Palosai, and which is shown on the said map by a red
chain line. The British Government agrees that the Afghaja
authorities shall be permitted to draw water in reasonable quantities
through a pipe, which shall be provided by the British Government,
from Landi Khana for the use of Afghan subjects at Tor Kham,
and the Government of Afghanistan agrees that British officers
and tribesmen living on the British side of the boundary shall be
permitted, without let or hindrance, to use the aforesaid portion
of the Kabul river for purposes of navigation, and that all existing
364
APPENDIX H 365
rights of irrigation from the aforesaid portion of the river shall be
continued to British subjects.
Article III
The British Government agrees that a Minister from His
Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the Royal
Court of London, like the Envoys of all other Powers, and to
permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in London, and
the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul
a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India,
and to permit the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul.
Path party shall have the right of appointing a Military
Attache to its Legation.
Article IV
The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establishment
of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and the British
Government agrees to the establishment of an Afghan Consul-
General at the headquarters of the Government of India, and three
Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay. In the
event of the Afghan Government desiring at any time to appoint
Consular officers in any British territories other than India, a
separate agreement shall be drawn up to provide for such appoint-
ments, if they are approved by the British Government.
Article V
The two High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the
personal safety and honourable treatment each of the representatives
of the other, whether Minister, Consul-General, or Consuls, within
their own boundaries, and they agree that the said representatives
shall be subject in the discharge of their duties to the provisions
set forth in the second Schedule annexed to this treaty. The
British Government further agrees that the Minister, Consul-
General, and Consuls of Afghanistan shall, within the territorial
limits within which they are permitted to reside or to exercise
their functions, notwithstanding the provisions of the said Schedule,
receive and enjoy any rights or privileges which are or may here-
after be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister, Consul-General,
<$r Consuls of any other Government in the countries in which the
places of residence of the said Minister, Consul-General and Consuls
of Afghanistan are fixed \ and the Government of Afghanistan
likewise agrees that the Minister and Consuls of Great Britain
shall, within the territorial limits within which they are permitted
to reside or to exercise their functions, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of the said Schedule, receive and enjoy any rights or
366 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed
by the Minister or Consuls of any other Government, in the
countries in which the places of residence of the said Minister and
Consuls of Great Britain are fixed.
Article VI
As it is for the benefit of the British Government and the
Government of Afghanistan that the Government of Afghanistan
shall be strong and prosperous, the British Government agrees
that, whatever quantity of material is required for the strength
and welfare of Afghanistan, such as all kinds of factory magjjinery,
engines and materials and instruments for telegraph, telephones,
etc., which Afghanistan may be able to buy from Britain or the
British dominions or from other countries of the world, shall
ordinarily be imported without let or hindrance by Afghanistan
into its own territories from the ports of the British Isles and
British India. Similarly the Government of Afghanistan agrees
that every kind of goods, the export of which is not against the
internal law of the Government of Afghanistan, and which may
in the judgment of the Government of Afghanistan be in excess
of the internal needs and requirements of Afghanistan, and is
required by the British Government, can be purchased and exported
to India with the permission of the Government of Afghanistan.
With regard to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees
that, as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government
of Afghanistan are friendly, and that there is no immediate danger
to India from such importation in Afghanistan, permission shall
be given without let or hindrance for such importation. If, how-
ever, the Arms Traffic Convention is hereafter ratified by the
Great Powers of the world and comes into force, the right of
importation of arms and munitions by the Afghan Government
shall be subject to the proviso that the Afghan Government shall
first have signed the Arms Traffic Convention, and that such
importation shall only be made in accordance with the provisions
of that Convention. Should the Arms Traffic Convention not
be ratified or lapse, the Government of Afghanistan, subject to
the foregoing assurance, can from time to time import into its
own territory the arms and munitions mentioned above through
the ports of the British Isles and British India.
Article Vll
No Customs duties shall be levied at British Indian ports on
goods imported under the provisions of Article VI on behalf
of the Government of Afghanistan, for immediate transport to
APPENDIX H 367
Afghanistan, provided that a certificate, signed by such Afghan
authority or representative as may from time to time be determined
by the two Governments, shall be presented at the time of importa-
tion to the Chief Customs Officer at the port of import, setting
forth that the goods in question are the property of the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan and are being sent under its orders to
Afghanistan, and showing the description, number and value of
the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed; provided,
secondly, that the goods are required for the public services of
Afghanistan and not for the purposes of any State monopoly or
State trade, and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a
clearj^jjistinguishable nature, transported through India in sealed
packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their
export from India.
And also the British Government agrees to the grant, in
respect of all trade goods imported into India at British ports for
re-export to Afghanistan and exported to Afghanistan by routes
to be agreed upon between the two Governments, of a rebate at
the time and place of export of the full amount of Customs duty
levied upon such goods, provided that such goods shall be trans-
ported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened
or sub-divided before their export from India.
And also the British Government declares that it has no
present intention of levying Customs duty on goods or livestock
of Afghan origin or manufacture, imported by land or by river
into India or exported from Afghanistan to other countries of the
world through India, and the import of which into India is not
prohibited by law. In the event, however, of the British Govern-
ment, deciding in the future to levy Customs duties on goods and
livestock imported into India by land or by river from neighbouring
States it will, if necessary, levy such duties on imports from
Afghanistan; but in that event it agrees that it will not levy
higher duties on imports from Afghanistan than those levied on
imports from such neighbouring States. Nothing in this Article
shall prevent the levy on imports from Afghanistan of the present
Khyber tolls and of octroi in any town of India in which octroi
is or may be hereafter levied, provided that there shall be no
enhancement over the present rate of the Khyber tolls.
Article HI!
The British Government agrees to the establishment of trade
agents by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, Quetta, and
Parachinar, provided that the personnel and the property of the
said agencies shall be subject to the operations of all British laws
and orders and to the jurisdiction of British Courts; and that they
3 68 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
shall not be recognized by the British authorities as having any
official or special privileged position.
Article IX
The trade goods coming to (imported to) Afghanistan under
the provisions of Article VII from Europe, etc., can be opened
at the railway terminuses at Jamrud, in the Kurram, and at
Chaman, for packing and arranging to suit the capacity of baggage
animals without this being the cause of re-imposition of Customs
duties; and the carrying out of this will be arranged by the trade
representatives mentioned in Article XII.
Article X
The two High Contracting Parties agree to afford facilities of
every description for the exchange of postal matter between their
two countries, provided that neither shall be authorised to establish
Post Offices within the territory of the other. In order to give
effect to this Article, a separate Postal Convention shall be con-
cluded, for the preparation of which such number of special officers
as the Afghan Government may appoint shall meet the officers of
the British Government and consult with them.
Article XI
The two High Contracting Parties having mutually satisfied
themselves each regarding the good will of the other, and especially
regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing
close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform
the other in future of any military operations of major importance,
which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among
the frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres, before
the commencement of such operations.
Article XII
The two High Contracting Parties agree that representatives
of the Government of Afghanistan and of the British Govern-
ment shall be appointed to discuss the conclusion of a Trade
Convention and the convention shall in the first place be regarding
the measures (necessary) for carrying out the purposes mentioned in
Article IX or this treaty. Secondly, (they) shall arrange regarding
commercial matters not now mentioned in this treaty, which may
appear desirable for the benefit of the two Governments. The
trade relations between the two Governments shall continue until
the Trade Convention mentioned above comes into force.
APPENDIX H 369
Article XIII
The two High Contracting Parties agree that the first and
second schedules attached to this treaty shall have the same binding
force as the Articles contained in this treaty.
Article XIV
The provisions of this treaty shall come into force from the
date of its signature, and shall remain in force for three years
from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties
shouljj^ave notified, twelve months before the expiration of the
said three years, the intention to terminate it, it shall remain
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which
either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it.
This treaty shall come into force after the signatures of the
Missions of the two Parties, and the two ratified copies of this
shall be exchanged in Kabul within 2| months after the signatures.
(Sd.) MAHMUD TARZI (Sd.) HENRY R. C. DOBBS
Chief of the Delegation of Envoy Extraordinary and
the Afghan Government Chief of the British
for the conclusion of the Mission to Kabul
Treaty
Tuesday, 3Oth Aqrab 1300 This twenty-second day of
HijraShamsi (correspond- November one thousand
ing to 22nd November nine hundred and twenty-
1921) one
VOL. II 2 B
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History of the Mongols, The, by Sir Henry Hoyle Howorth. 3 vols.
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History of Persia, by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes. 3rd ed. 2 vols.
History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, The, translated
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History of the Sikhs, A, by J. D. Cunningham.
History of the War in Afghanistan, by Sir John William Kaye. 2 vols.
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House of Seleucus, The, by Edwyn Robert Bevan. 1904.
Hudud-al-Alam, translated and explained by Professor V. Minorsky
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In the Footsteps of the Buddha, by Rend Grousset. 1932.
India as I Knew It, by Sir Michael O'Dwyer. 1925.
India, Morley and Minto, by Mary, Countess of Minto. 1934.
Indian Administration of Lord Lytton, The, by Lady Betty Balfour.
Indian Borderland, The, by Sir Thomas Holdich. 1901.
Indo-Iranian Borderlands, The: Their P } re-history in the Light of Geography
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" International Boundaries ", by Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Journal
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" Invasion of the Punjab by Ardeshir Papakan ", by Vincent Smith,
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" Iran as a Prehistoric Centre ", by Ernst Herzfeld and Sir Arthur Keith,
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Jami, Salaman and Absal, rendered into verse by Edward FitzGerald.
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John Russell Colvin, by Sir Auckland Colvin.
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Journal of Eldred Pottinger, by himself.
Journey of Friar William of Rubruck, The, edited by W. W. Rockhill
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Journey to the Source of the Oxus, by Lieut. John Wood. 1841.
Kabul Insurrection of 1841-42, The, by Major-General Sir Vincent
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Kingdom ofCaubool, The, by the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. 1839.
374 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
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Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, The, by Guy Le Strange. 1905.
VAngleterre et r Expedition Francaise, by Charles Roux, vol. ii.
" Les Allemands en Perse ", by Georges Ducrocq, Revue du Monde musul-
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VHistoire du monde, by La Valise Poussin, vol. vi.
Life and Memoirs of Gulbadan Begum, The, translated by Annette
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Life of Amir Abdur Rahman, by himself.
Life of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, by Mohan Lai. 1846.
Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, by Monypenny and
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Life of Field-Marshal Sir George White, by Sir Mortimer Durffic!.
Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Munro, The, by General Sir
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Life of Lord Carnock, The, by the Hon. Harold Nicolson.
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Life of Lord Granville, The, by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. 2 vols.
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LIST OF AUTHORITIES 375
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376 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
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Unter der Glutsonne Irans, by Captain Oskar Niedermayer. 1925.
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INDEX
Abaka Khan (son of Hulaku Khan), i, 235;
reign of, 236} battle of Hims, 237;
corresponds with Europe, 237, 243
Abbasa (sister of Harun-al-Rashid), i,
177 *
Abbasid Dynasty, the foundation of, i, 172,
185, 197
Abbas Mirza, i, 401
Abbas II, i, 325
Abbot, Captain James, ii, 8, 84
Abdalis: become subjects of Shah Abbas,
i, 313; they revolt and are forced to
migrate to Herat province, 313; Ghil-
zais and, 3255 rebellion of, 326; Nadir
defeats force of, 329; Nadir decides to
crush, 330; feuds among, 330; make
overtures for peace, 333, 351, 352,
353
Abd-al-Rahman, i, 1 59
Abdul Ghaffar, a leader of the Red Shirts,
ii, 3 2 3
Abdul Kuddus, ii, 270
Abdul Kuddus Khan, ii, 1 54
Abdullah Khan Sadozai, i, 330
Abdulla ibn Amir, Governor of Basra, i,
159
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar: Abdulla Jan (young-
est son of Shir Ali), ii, 81 ; nomination
as heir-apparent, 101; Shir Ali's favour-
ite son, 101, 105
Abdulla Khan Achakzai, ii, 27
Abdulla Khan (son of Shir Ali), ii, 76
Abdulla Khan II, i, 305, 306, 307, 308
Abdulla Mirza (grandson of Shah Rukh),
i, 270
Abdulla (son of Amir Kazghan), i, 252
Abdul Latif (son of Ulugh Beg), i, 269
Abdul Malik Mir (son of Amir Muzaffar
of Bukhara), ii, 79
Abdul Malik II, i, 185, 187
Ar^ul Qaiyum, Sir, ii, 323
Abdul Rahim of Lahore, Maulvi (the
Obaydulla of the Silk Letters Con-
spiracy), ii, 259, 261, 262
Abdul Wali, Kazi, Indian seditionist, ex-
pelled from Afghanistan, ii, 296
Abdur Rahman, Sirdar (son of Afzal
Khan), ii, 72; rebellion of, 73; occu-
pies Kabul, 73, 7$, 76; flight towards
Zurmat, 77, 80; 115 footnote, 119;
early years of, 120; imprisonment,
12 1 j Commander-in-chief, 122; flight
of, 123; return and defeat, 123; de-
cides to return to Afghanistan, 126;
encouragement of, by Russia, 1275
travels to Badakhshan, 127; arrival in
Afghan Turkistan reported to British,
129; chief opponents of, 1 30; battle of
Ahmad Khel, 131; question of Herat,
134; proclaimed Amir of Kabul, 137;
acknowledged Amir of Afghanistan and
its dependencies, 151 et seq.$ occupies
Kandahar, 153; defeats Ayub Khan,
154; capture of Herat, 154; the
Panjdeh Crisis, 163-165; his claim on
Jandol and Chitral, 170-171; Durand
Mission to Kabul, 174 et seq.\ Shinwari
expedition, 189; Ghilzai rebellion, 190;
rebellion of Ishak Khan, 191; the
Hazara rising, 192; gazetted a G.C.B.,
193; requests the appointment of Am-
bassador in London, 194; subjugation
of Kafiristan, 195; improvements
effected during his reign, 197-198;
death, 198; character, 198; likened
to William the Conqueror, 200; the
situation after his death, 215; agree-
ments signed with Sir Henry Mortimer
Durand, 352-354, Appendix C
Abdur Rashid (sixth son of Mahmud), i.
207
Abdur Razzak Mirza (son of Ulugh
Mirza), i, 268, 280, 285
Abgarus, Chief of Osroene, i, 108
Abgarus VII of Osrhoene, i, 1 14
Ab-i-Diz, River, i, 19
Ab-i-Panja, River, i, 6
Abivard, i, 328, 329, 347
Abraham, Patriarch, i, 23, 109
Abu Ali, Prince of Ghur, i, 189, 197
Abu Ali bin Sina, vide Avicenna
Abu Ali Simjur, i, 187
Abu Bakr (son of Miranshah), i, 261
Abu Ibrahim (brother of Abdul Malik II),
i, 188
Abu Jafar, Mansur, vide Mansur
Abu Kalinjar, i, 193
Abul Abbas (SaffaA), i, 172-173
Abul Faiz, Amir of Bukhara, i, 345
Abul Fath Daud, i, 188
377
378
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Abulistin, battle of, i, 237
Abul Muaskar (brother of Isa, Chief of
Makran), i, 193
Abu Muslim, i, 1725 raises the black
standard, 1725 173, 174$ assassinated,
174-
Abu Said (grandson of Miranshah), reign
of, i, 270
Abu Said (son and successor of Uljaitu), i,
242
Abydos, i, 59
Achaemenes (or Hakhamanish), Prince, i,
Achaemenians, i, 8, 39, 44; dynasty, i
footnote \ inscriptions, 95 foundation of
dynasty, 37
Achaeus, Viceroy of Asia Minor, i, 84
Acre, i, 239, 245, 246, 248
Adad-Nirari II, King of Assyria, i, 28
Adam, a Gakkar Chief, i, 302
Aden, Gulf of, i, 122
Adiabene, i, 99, 106, 114, 1 16
Adii Shah (Mubariz, Khan, brother-in-
law of Islam Shah), i, 302, 303, 304
Adina Beg, appointed Governor of the
Duab of Jullundur, i, 358
Adrianople, battle of, i, 133
Adriatic Sea, i, 228
Adul Aziz, i, 315, 316, 326
Adulis (Zeila), i, 81
Afghanistan, History of, vol. i: the land
and the people, i et seq., prehistory and
early history in Egypt and the Near
East, 17 et seq.'y Medes and Persians
conquer Iranian Plateau, 33; Cyrus the
Great, 43 et seq.\ at the dawn of
History, 465 Afghanistan satrapies, 47$
Alexander the Great, 58 et seq.\
Seleucid dynasty and rise of Parthia,
71 et seq.\ kingdom of Bactria, 88 et
seq.\ end of Greek rule in, 101; Rome,
Parthia and the Kushan dynasty, 103
et seq.\ Sasanian dynasty, Rome and the
White Huns, 124 et seq.\ reign of
Noshirwan followed by the decline of
the Persian Empire, 141 et seq.\ Arab
conquests in Central Asia and Afghanis-
tan, 157; invasion of, by the Moslems,
159; Golden Age of the Abbasid
dynasty and its decay, 171 et seq.\
dynasty of Ghazni, 186 et seq.$ the
Seljuk and the Ghurid dynasties, 203
et seq.$ Mongol cataclysm, 218 et seq.\
the Il-Khans, 234 et seq.^ Tamerlane,
252 et seq.\ renaissance of art under the
Timurid princes, 267 et seq.^ Baber
founds Moghul Empire of India, 276
et seq.\ influence of the Emperors
Humayun and Akbar, 296 et seq.\
journey of Benedict Goes, 308;
Afghanistan under the later Moghul
emperors, 311 et seq.\ Nadir Shah
recovers the lost provinces of Persia,
325 et seq.\ his conquests and death,
339 et seq.\ Ahmad Shah founds the
Kingdom of Afghanistan, 351 et seq.\
Timur Shah and Zaman Shah, 368 et
seq.) downfall of the Sadozai dynasty,
383 et seq.$ Fath Khan governs the
Afghans, 389; Dost Muhammad, 392
et seq.\ siege of Herat, 400-401;
Mission of Captain Burnes, 401 et seq.
Afghanistan, History of, vol. ii: the first
Afghan War, i et seq.\ Mission of
Macnaghten to Ranjit Singh, i-2j
Simla Manifesto, 3, 339~343> surrender
of Amir Dost Muhammad, 13 et seq.\
retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.^ second
reign of Dost Muhammad, 61 et seq.',
Shir AH establishes himself as Amir,
69 et seq.) advance of Russia across
Central Asia, 83 et seq.-^ first Seistan
Mission, 1872, 91 et seq.^ the genesis
of the Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.\
Second Afghan War, no et seq.\
Abdur Rahman, 120 et seq.\ battles of
Maiwand and Kandahar, 139 et seq.\
Abdur Rahman is acknowledged Amir of
Afghanistan and its dependencies, 151
et seq.; the Panjdeh Crisis, 158 et 3eq.\
Durand Mission to Kabul, 169 et seq.^
the Pamir and other Boundary Com-
missions, 178 et seq.\ Abdur Rahman
tames his rebellious subjects, 189; the
McMahon Missions, 20 ij Amir Habi-
bulla Khan negotiates a new treaty,
215 et seq.\ Habibulla Khan visits
India, 225 et seq.\ Turko-German
Mission to the Amir during the Great
War, 246 et seq.\ assassination of King
Habibulla and accession of Amanulla
Khan, 264 et seq.\ Third Afghan War,
270 et seq.\ 'acknowledged to be an
independent State, 283 et seq.$ King
Amanulla institutes reforms, 295 et
seq.\ visits Europe, Egypt, Turkey and
Persia, 302 et seq.\ tragedy of King
Amanulla, 310^ seq. ; rise of the brigand
Habibulla, 312 et seq.] Nadir Khan
overthrows the brigand Habibulla and
is elected king, 318^ seq.') assassination
of King Nadir Shah and accession of
King Zahir Shah, 327 et seq.\ becomes
a member of the League of Nations,
33 3 j Four- Power Treaty of Saadabad,
333
Afghan Turkistan, i, 2, 5, 10; ii, 119,
120, 123, 129
Afghan War, First: Lord Auckland settles
his policy, ii, i; mission of Mac-
naghten to Ranjit Singh, 15 instruc-
tions of the Board of Control, 25
INDEX
379
decision to despatch a British Force to
Kabul, 2; Simla Manifesto of October
i, 1838, 3} raising of the siege of
Herat, 4; army of the Indus, 4;
organization of transport and supplies,
4J contingent of Shah Shuja, 4;
appointments of Macnaghten and
Burnes, 5; line of march, 5; march to
Bukkur, 5; march of Bombay division,
6; march up the Bolan Pass, 6} mission
of Burnes to the Khan of Kalat, 7;
advance on Kandahar, 7; entry of Shah
Shuja into Kandahar, 7; position at
Kandahar, 8} mission to Herat, 8;
position of Dost Muhammad, 9;
advanft up the Khaibar Pass of the
Sikh Force, 9; advance on Ghazni,
June 27, 1839, 9$ flight of Dost
Muhammad, 11; occupation of Kabul,
n; withdrawal and distribution of
British troops, 14, 15; surrender of
Dost Muhammad, 20; rebellions of the
tribes, 22-24$ Sale's march to Jalalabad,
24-26; murder of Burnes, 27-28;
disasters at Charikar and Shekabad,
29; Nott despatches brigade to Kabul,
29-30; Macnaghten's negotiations with
Chiefs, 30; is murdered, 31; attitude
of Akbar Khan, 31-32$ retreat of
British from Kabul, 33 et seq.' y siege of
Jalalabad, 40; position of Nott at
Kandahar, 42; Pollock forces the
Khaibar Pass, 46; relief of Jalalabad,
47; Lord Ellenborough's instructions,
47; Pollock advances to Gandamak,
49-50; battle of Tezin, 50; battle of
Ghoaine, 51; Shams-ud-Din Khan
attacks the British, 51; Nott reaches
Kabul Valley, 52; the Captives Lady
Sale's Journal quoted, 53, 54; last
expedition, 57; victorious British
armies march back to India, $7-58;
Ellenborough's treatment of the host-
ages and prisoners, 58; summary, 36,
37; 105, no
Afghan War, Second: genesis of, ii, 97
et seq.\ General Kaufmann, 97; Shir
AH, 97; Sayyid Nur Muhammad, 98;
Lord Northbrook and Shir Ali, 99;
reply of Secretary of State for India,
100; Sirdar Abdulla Jan, 101; Yakub
Khan and Ayub Khan, 101; Lord
Salisbury, 101; Disraeli's policy, 102;
Lord Lytton and Amir, 102; Treaty
with Kalat, 105; Mission to Kabul,
106; British Mission to Kabul, 107;
despatch of ultimatum, 108; British
invade Afghanistan, no; battle of
Peiwar Kotal, in; Treaty of Ganda-
mak, 114; British envoy reaches Kabul,
114; advance on Kabul, 117; battle of
Charasia, 117; Roberts enters Kabul,
1 1 8; abdication of Yakub Khan, 1 18
Afghan War, Third: the first act of war,
ii, 273; phases of operations, 273;
British garrison at Landi Kotal, 274;
attempted rising in Peshawar city, 274;
capture of the Afghan position at Bagh,
275; Afghan attack on the camp at
Dakka, 275; Afridis display hostility,
276; Jalalabad and Kabul bombed,
276; Amanulla Khan requests an
armistice, 277; movements of Nadir
Khan, 277-278; evacuation of the
Tochi Valley and of Wana, 278; the
Chitral front, 280; Southern front,
281; summary, 282
Afridis, i, 307; ii, 114
Afshars, i, 328, 329, 333
Afzal Khan (father of Abdur Rahman), ii,
9, 13; governor of Afghan Turkistan,
71; rebellion of, 72-73; proclaimed
Amir, 74; British communication to,
74,75; death of, 75; 120, 121
Aga Khan, H.H., i, 232
Aga Muhammad Shah, founder of the
Kajar dynasty, i, 371, 373
Agathocleia (daughter of Demetrius
Invictus), i, 97, 101
Agathocles (son of Demetrius), i, 93
Agathocles (son of Lysimachus), i, 77, 78
Agbatana (Ecbatana), bit-Daiaukka, i, 36
Agesilaus, Spartan general, i, 56
Aghasi, Haji Mirza, i, 409
Agra, i, 292, 298, 303, 304, 305, 311,
318, 323
Ahmad, Mahmud's treasurer, Governor of
Punjab, i, 193, 194
Ahmad, successor of Ismail, i, 183
Ahmad, Sultan of Turkey, death, i, 312
Ahmad, Sultan, Jalayr Chief, i, 258, 261,
272
Ahmad, Sultan (son of Abu Said), i, 270,
271,277
Ahmad (brother of Ali bin Buwayhid), i,
191
Ahmad Khan, Chief of the Nurzai clan,
i, 382
Ahmad Khan, Sultan (nephew of Dost
Muhammad), ii, 67, 93
Ahmad Khel, battle of, ii, 131
Ahmad Pasha, i, 335
Ahmad Shah, founder of the Kingdom of
Afghanistan, i, i, 330, 338, 349, 350,
351; elected King, 352; system of gov-
ernment, 353; occupies Kabul, 353-354*
his first invasion of the Punjab, 354-
355; second invasion, 355; conspiracy
against, 355-356; captures Herat and
Meshed, 356; Nishapur captured, 356;
signs treaty with Shah Rukh, 357;
third invasion of the Punjab, 375;
380
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
campaigns against the Marathas, 358
et scq.j third battle of Panipat, 362;
defeats the Sikhs, 366; his last invasion,
366,367; death, 367; character, 367
Ahmad (son and successor of Muhammad
Shah), i, 355
Ahmad (son of Ibrahim), i, 195
Ahmad (Tagudar Oghlu, brother of
Abaka), reign of, i, 238
Ahura Mazda, i, 38
Ahwaz, i, 125
Aitchisons Treaties, i, 378 footnote, 380
footnote, 388 footnote ; ii, 65 footnote
Akaba, Gulf of, i, 119, 122
Akbar, Emperor, i, 299$ ascends the
throne, 3045 campaigns against the
North-West Frontier tribes, 307;
obtains possession of Kandahar, 307,
3085 death, 309-310
Akbar Khan, ii, 9, 13, 14
Akbar Khan (son of Dost Muhammad), i,
398; ii, 30, 31, 32, 34, 40; battle of
Tezin, 50; 54} 57; 61; his ambitions
and intrigues, 62, 63; death, 63, 64;
treaty of Capitulation, 344-35 1 Ap-
pendix B
Akchah, i, 3695 ii, 63, 80
Ak Darband, i, 335
Akhsi, i, 277, 278, 279, 280
Akkad, i, 20, 2 1
Ak Mas] id, fort of, i, 290, 319; ii, 14, 39,
46, 58, 85, 87, 108, 112
Aktur Khan (son of Dost Muhammad), ii,
2 3>44
Alafrank (cousin of Uljaitu), i, 241
Alamgir II, i, 358, 361
Alam Khan (uncle of Sultan Ibrahim), i,
288
Alamut, fortress of, i, 230, 231, 232
Ala-ud-din, Juwayni, i, 218 footnote
Ala-ud-Din, Muhammad, of Khwarizm:
early career of, i, 216; defeats Muizz-
ud-Din, 212-213, 220, 221; relations
with Chenghiz Khan, 221; pursuit of,
and death, 222
Ala-ud-Din, the " World-burner ", i, 209;
destruction of Ghazni, 210
Ala-ud-Din (younger brother of Fakhr-ud-
Din), i, 244
Ala-ud-dola (nephew of Ulugh Beg), i, 269
Albiruni, historian, i, 1 89
Aleppo, i, 234, 240,261
Alexander, Satrap of Persia, i, 84
Alexander (son of Roxana), i, 71, 73
Alexander the Great, i, 4, 7, 9; youth and
accession of, 585 recognized by Hellas,
58; destruction of Thebes, 59; battle
of the Granicus, 59; conquers Asia
Minor, 60; surrender of Sardes, 60;
battle of Issus, 60-6 1; siege of Tyre,
61; annexation of Egypt, 61; battle of
Arbela, 62; marches on Babylon and
Susa, 62; occupation of Persepolis and
Pasargadae, 62-63$ pursuit and death
of Darius Codomannus, 63; conquest
of Hyrcania and Parthia, 63; march
through Seistan and up the Helmand,
64; passage of Hindu Kush and annexa-
tion of Bactria, 64; advance to Jaxartes,
65; Macedonian reverse, 65; capture
of the Soghdian Rock, 65; descent to
the plains of India, 66; passage of the
Indus, 66; battle with Porus, 66-67;
march to the Indian Ocean, 68; march
from India to Susa, 68; death, 69;
character, 70; destruction of his family,
71 et seq., 75, 80; account fir, in the
Shahnama, 124-125, 197, 203, 246,
253,288,337
Alexandretta, Gulf of, i, 245
Alexandria, i, 147, 248
Alexandria Ariana, i, 9
Alexandria Eschate (modern Khojent), i,
65>74
Al-Hafar, i, 157
AH, Caliph (son-in-law of the Prophet
Muhammad), i, 285
AH (son-in-law of the Prophet Muham-
mad), i, 229
AH (son of Masud I), i, 207
AH Adil Shah II, i, 321
AH Ahmad Jan, ii, 318, 320
Ali bin Buwayhid, founder of Buwayid
dynasty, i, 191
AH Bin Isa, Governor, i, 177
Alikhanoff, Colonel, Governor of Merv,
ii, 162, 163
AH Khel, ii, 112, 116
AH Kuli Khan, Akbar's general, i, 304
Ali Kuli Khan (the eldest son of Ibrahim
Khan), i, 349
Ali Mardan Khan, i, 314
AH Riza, appointed heir-apparent, i, 179
and footnote
AH Tigin, i, 204
Al-Kadir Billah, puppet Caliph, i, 187,
191
Allahu Akbar range, i, 328
Allah Verdi Khan, i, 323
Allah Yar Khan (brother of Muhammad
Khan Afghan), i, 330, 333
Allis, battle of, i, 158
Al-Mustakfi, Caliph, i, 191 >
Alp Arslan, Seljuk, i, 206, 207, 208
Alptigin, Governor of Nishapur, i, 184-
186
Altai Mountains, i, 143
Altuntash, Turkish Chief, i, 190
Alumgir (Aurangzeb), i, 318
Alum Khan, Mir, ii, 95, 125
Alyattes, King of Lydia, i, 39
Amanulla Khan, ii, 57
INDEX
Amanulla, King, accession of,ii, 2675 Third
Afghan War, 270 et seq.; Peace Treaty
of Rawalpindi, 284; Anglo- Afghan rela-
tions after Peace Treaty, 287; Russo-
Afghan Relations, 287; treaties of
Afghanistan with Russia, Persia and
Turkey, 291; Afghan Mission to
Europe, 292; institutes reforms, 295
et seq. ; seven months' journey during
which he visited Bombay, 303; Egypt,
303$ Italy, 304; Paris, 304; Berlin,
305; England, 305; Russia, 307}
Turkey, 307; Persia, 308; his abdica-
tion, 313; hoists the royal standard at
Kandahar, 315; his last attempt to
regain* the throne, 3165 leaves India
and sails for Europe, 317; summary,
317
Amasis, King of Egypt, i, 45, 46
Ambala, ii, 77
Amida (modern Diarbekr), i, 131, 138
Amin (son of Zubayda), i, 178
Amir Abdur Rahman, i, 10
Amir Khan, Governor of Kabul, i, 320,
3 22
Ammon (modern Siwa oasis), visited by
Alexander the Great, i, 61
Ampe, i, 50
Amritsar, i, 364, 386
Amr-ul-Lais, Saffar, i, 182, 183
Amu Daria (the Oxus), River, i, 7, 10
Anahita, Persian Goddess of Fecundity, i,
85; temple of, 94
Anandpal (son of Jaipal), i, 189
Anatolia, i, 41, 265
Ancyra, i, 177
Anderab, i, 156, 259
Andijan, i, 271, 277, 278, 279
Andkhui, i, 7, 213, 341; ii, 63
Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1855, ii, 65
Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853, ii, 65
Anglo-Persian War of 1857, ii, 66
Anglo-Russian Agreement, Articles of,
affecting Afghanistan, ii, 356-357,
Appendix E
Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission of
1895, ii, 1 8 1 et seq.
Anglo-Russian Convention, 1907, ii, 231-
H5
Angora (now Ankara), battle of, i, 262,
263
^.ngna, i, 324
Anshan, vide Anzan
An-Sih, Chinese name for Parthia, i, 105
Antalcidas, King, i, 101
Antalcidas, the Peace of, i, 56
Antigonus, ruler of Phrygia, i, 72, 73, 74;
campaigns of, 76; death, 76; 78
Antigonus Gonatas (son of Demetrius), i,
79, 80
Antigonus (nephew of Hyrcanus), i, 1 1 1
Antimachus, Governor of Herat, i, 93
Antioch, i, 76, 81, 84, 87, 93, in, 114,
122, 126; sack of, by Noshirwan,
140-141, 146, 206, 248
Antiochus Hierax, Seleucid Prince, i, 81,
82, 126
Antiochus I (Soter), i, 75, 765 defeats the
Gauls, 78-90; death, 80
Antiochus II (Theos), i, 80, 81
Antiochus III (the Great), i, 84; cam-
paigns in the East, 84-85; march
through Bactria to the Kabul Valley,
85, 86; defeated at Thermopylae, 86;
battle of Magnesia, 86; Peace of
Apamea, 86; death, 86; 89, 90, 103
Antiochus IV (Epiphanes), i, 91; retreats
from Egypt, 92, 93; last years and
death, 93-94 and footnote
Antiochus VII, Sidetes, i, 96, 99
Antipater, King of Macedonia and Hellas,
*' ? 2 73
Antony, Mark: battle of Philippi, i, in;
expedition against Parthia, 112; cam-
paigns in Armenia, 112-113
Anushtigin (favourite cup-bearer of Malik
Shah), founder of dynasty of Khiva, i,
216
Anzan (or Anshan), district of, i, 30, 37, 38
Aornos, i, 66
Apama (daughter of Spitamenes), i, 72
Apamea, i, in, 142
Apamea, Peace of, i, 86
Apa-Sakae, the, i, 83
Apis, sacred bull, i, 57
Apollodorus, i, 100
Apollodotus, Satrap of Sind, i, 91, 94
Apollonia, i, 85
Arabia, i, 20, 48, 178
Arabs: firat invasion of Persian Empire, i,
158; campaign in Syria, 158; conquest
of Persia, 159; further campaigns in
Central Asia, 159; Civil war, 160;
campaigns of Kutayba, 161 et seq.\
embassy to China, 164; advance to the
Indus, 165; battle of the " Day of
Thirst", 1 66, 167; rebellion of Harith
ibnSuraj, 167; recovery of Transoxiana,
1 68; campaigns of Nasr ibn Sayyar, 168
Arachosia (modern Kandahar), i, 8, 44, 64,
7590
Aral, Sea of, i, 7, 1 84; Russian advance to,
11,85
Aramaeans, the invasion of, i, 28
Arang (Jaxartes), River, i, 34
Ararat, vide Urartu, Kingdom of
Aras, i, 333
Aras, River, i, 256
Arbela, battle of, i, 62
Arcadius, Emperor, i, 1 3 3
Ardawan (classical Artabanus), i, 125
Ardeshir, i, 117, 121; founder of Sasanian
382
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
dynasty, 125; overthrows Ardawan,
125; defeats Severus Alexander, 125-
126; invades Armenia, 126; death, 126
Ardeshir Dirazdast, vide Artaxerxes I
(Longimanus)
Ardeshir II, i, 133
Areia (or Aria), i, 90
Areobindus, the Goth, Roman champion,
i 134
Argaum, i, 375
Arghandab, River, i, 7, n, 316, 325
Arghun, Shah Husayn, the ruler of Sind, i,
299
Arghun, Zun-Nun Beg, i, 283
Arghun (eldest son of Abaka), reign of, i,
238, 247
Argos, i, 56
Argyll, Duke of, Secretary of State for
India, ii, 99, 100, 106 footnote, 108
Ariaramnes, King (son of Teispes), i, 38,
40,46
Ariaspae, the, i, 64
Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia, i, 104
Aristagoras, Governor of Miletus, i, 49
Aristotle, i, 58, 70, 199
Arius (Hari Rud), i, 89
Ariyaruk, Governor of the Punjab, i, 193
Armenia, i, 18, 19, 44, 55, 93 j relations
withParthia, 105; Antony's campaigns,
1 12; struggle for, by Rome and Parthia,
113; and Trajan, 114; evacuation of,
by Hadrian, 1155 conquest by Ardeshir,
126; seized by Tiridates, 129; treaty
with Rome, 1 30; partition of, i 3 3, 1 77;
invasion of, by Golden Horde, 236,
248; conquered by Tamerlane, 256
Armorium, fortress of, i, 1 80
Arnold, Matthew, i, 200
Arrian, i, 8, 58, 68
Arsaces of Armenia, 1,131
Arsaces I, founder of the Parthian Empire,
1*83
Arsaces II, vide Tiridates
Arsaces III, i, 85
Arsacid dynasty, foundation of, i, 83
Arsinoe (daughter of Ptolemy), i, 77, 78
Arslan (son of Masud III), i, 208, 246
Arslan (Israil: son of Seljuk), i, 204
Artabanus II, King of Parthia, i, 99
Artabanus V, King of Parthia, i, 116
Artacoana, i, 64
Artakhohayarsha, vide Artaxerxes I
Artavasdes, King of Armenia, i, 108, 112,
113
Artaxata, capital of Armenia, i, 106, 107,
115
Artaxerxes I (Longimanus), reign of, i, 52
Artaxerxes II, i, 54-56
Artaxerxes III, accession of, i, 5^'S7>
Egypt finally conquered, 56-57$ murder
of, 57
Artemisium, i, 5 1
Arukku (eldest son of Cyrus I), i, 38
Aryans, the, i, 13, 15, 28, 465 coming of
the, 33; original home of, 335 first
migration into India, 34$ effect of
immigration into Iran, 41; founded
Ecbatana, 41; architecture and culture
of, 41, 83
Aryenis (daughter of Alyattes), i, 40
Asad, Governor of Khurasan, i, 168
Asaf Jah, i, 323
Ashraf Khan, Abdali : released from prison,
i, 327; defeats Turks, 327$ faced with
grave crisis, 328, 3295 Nadir decides
to march against, 331
Asia, ii, 102 *
Asia Minor, i, 48, 49; Peace of Antal-
cidas, 56; 77, 86, 87, 104, 112, 146,
177, 203, 204, 234, 245, 249, 261
Asii, vide Yueh-chi
Askari, Mirza (brother of Humayun), i,
297, 298, 300
Asmar, ii, 170, 171, 175
Asoka, i, 75, 97
Assassins, the, i, 229 et *eq.\ extirpation
of, in Khurasan and Northern Persia,
231-232; 246
Assaye, battle of, i, 375
Assur, god, i, 32
Assur (modern Kala Shergat), i, 27, 28, 38,
39
Assurbanipal, King of Assyria, i, 22, 30-
32, 38
Assyria, i, 17, 29, 30; treaty with
Kassite monarch, 26; becomes inde-
pendent state, 28; conquest of Babylon,
26-27, 28; invasion by Aramaean tribes,
28; old Assyrian Empire, 28} Middle
Kingdom, 28; New Kingdom, 29}
first fought Elam, 295 Sargon II, 29;
battle of Durilu, 29; Esarhaddon, 30,
355 Assurbanipal, 30-325 raids and
conquers western portion of Iranian
plateau, 35; Scythian invasion, 36} fall
of Nineveh, 395 verdict of history, 39
Astauene, district of, i, 90
Astrabad, i, 63, 193, 201, 271, 277, 332,
348
Astrakhan, i, 258
As ty ages (or Ishtuvegu: son of Cyaxares),
i, 39, 40, 42
Ata Malik-i-Juwayni, historian, i, 232 %
Ata Muhammad, Governor of Kashmir, i,
icns, i, 49, 585 expedition against, 505
capture of, 515 ally of Persia, 56; 72,
105, 114
Atrek, River, i, 82, 90
Atropatene (modern Azerbaijan), province
of, i, 39
Atsiz, Khwarizm Shah, i, 215, 216
INDEX
383
Attalus of Pergamum, i, 82, 86
Atta Muhammad Khan, Naivab, mission
of, ii, 104.
Attica, i, 50
Attock, i, 7, 66, 288
Auckland, Lord, Governor- General of
India, i, 398, 4.01, 405; his reply to
Burnes, 406-4.07; ii, i, 2, 3; instruc-
tions on retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.\
38
Augustus, Emperor (Octavian), i, 101,
in, 112; restoration of Roman
standards, 113
Aurangzeb, i, 315, 316, 317; wins fight
for power, 318, 320$ death, 321, 322,
Aurelius, Marcus (Aurelian), 1,115, 128
Avaria, i, 348
Avars, the, i, 134, 147, 148
Avesta, the, i, 46, 48
Avicenna (Abu Ali bin Sina), i, 198
Avitabile, General, Italian governor of the
Peshawar district, ii, 38, 39, 46, 58
Ayaz, Mahmud's favourite slave, i, 193
Ayn Jalut, battle of, i, 234
Ayub Khan (son of Shir Ali), ii, 76, 81,
101, 138; battle of Maiwand, 142;
siege of Kandahar, 146, 1475 again
attacks Kandahar, 153; defeated by
Abdur Rahman, 154; the final settle-
ment of, in India, 155
Ayub Mirza (son of Timur Shah), i, 392
Azam, son of Bahadur Shah, i, 323
Azerbaijan, i, 159, 258, 260, 268, 269,
270, 333
Azes I, Saka Chief, i, 101
Azileses, Saka Chief, i, 101
Azim Khan, Governor of Kurram, ii, 715
rebellion of, 72-73, 74, 75; fall of, 76;
flight towards Zurmat, 77; 122, 124
Azud-ad-Daula, Buwayhid Prince, i, 191-
192
Baba Ali Beg of Abivard, i, 328
Baba Nanak, the founder of the Sikh sect,
i, 364
Baba Wali Pass, ii, 44
Baber, Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad, i, 268,
271, 274; ancestors of, 276; early
difficulties of, 277; defeated by the
Uzbegs, 278; fails to recover his king-
dom, 279; captures Kabul, 280; his
first raid to the Indus, 281; the plot
at Kabul, 282-283$ captures Kandahar,
284; second raid towards India, 284,
2855 and Shah Ismail, 286; defeat of
the Uzbegs at Pul-i-Sanghin, 286;
defeated by Uzbegs at Kul-i-Malik,
287; final defeat of, at Ghazdavan, 287;
First Indian Expedition, 288; campaign
against the Yusufzais, 290; Fourth
Indian Expedition, 290-291} Fifth
Indian Expedition, 291} battle of
Panipat, 291-292$ battle of Kanwa,
294; battle of the Gogra, 294, 295$
death, 295; 296, 314
Bab Salimeti, port of, i, 29
Babylon, i, 28, 40, 41; the first dynasty,
23 j the second dynasty, 2 3-24 j the
Kassite dynasty, 26; capture and sack
of, by Sennacherib, 305 fall of, 445
march on, by Cyrus the Younger, 54;
reoccupation by Seleucus, 74, 76, 93,
108, 115
Babylonia, i, 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 29, 30;
invasion by Aramaean tribes, 28}
Sennacherib's campaign against, 29-30;
new kingdom of, 38
Bacon, Roger, i, 229
Bactra, capital of Bactria, i, 64, 88, 90
Bactria (modern Afghan Turkistan), i, 6,
44, 47, 63; annexed by Alexander the
Great, 64-65; revolt of, 71-72; 74,
85, 88 et seq., 93, 94, 95, 98; conquest
of, by the Yueh-chi, 100
Badakhshan (classical Bactria), i, 2, 10,
12, 44, 152, 221, 225, 246, 259, 297,
300, 301, 305; Akbar agrees to reten-
tion of, by Abdulla Khan, 307; Akbar
thinks of recovering, 308; Goes
traverses, 309; ruled by Janid dynasty,
3 J 3 3 r 5 3 l6 3 l8 > 357> I2 7
Badghis, district of, i, 236, 244
Badia-az-Zaman (son of Sultan Husayn),
i, 282, 283
Badr Khan, lord of Samarkand, i, 214
Bagh, ii, 275
Baghavand, i, 336
Baghdad, i, 19; foundation of, 174, 178,
179, 180, 183, 191, 205, 206, 217, 227;
capture and sack of, by Mongols, 232;
249,259,261,285,334,335
Baghdad Khatun (daughter of Regent Amir
Chupan), i, 242
Bagoas, the eunuch, i, 57
Bahadur Shah: reign of, i, 323; death,
3^3i 3H
Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, i, 297, 298
Baha-ud-Din Sam, Governor of Ghur, i,
209
Bahawalpur, ii, 5
Bahman, known as Artaxerxes Longi-
manus, i, 124
Bahram, Chubin, Persian general, i, 144,
H5
Bahram Gur, i, 134; campaigns against
white Huns, 135; expedition into India,
135; character, 136
Bahram (son of Masud III), i, 208 et seq.
Bahram I, i, 128
Bahram II, early campaigns of, i, 128
Bahram IV, i, 133
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Baikal, Lake, i, 219
Bairam Khan, Humayun's general, i, 303,
3<H
Baisungur, Mirxa t i, 271, 273, 277, 278
Bajaur, i, 2885 ii, 170, 171
Bajgah, ii, 15, 19, 72
Baji Rao, i, 324
Baker, General Sir Thomas, ii, 117
Bakharz, i, 330
Bakhtiari Mountains, i, 19
Bakhtiaris, i, 337
Bakht-un-Nisa Begum , i, 305
Baki Muhammad, i, 313
Baku, i, 243, 285, 327
Bala Hissar, the, ii, 27, 28, 29, 30, 45, 56,
61, 63, 74, 114, 116, 118
Balaji Vishvanath, i, 324
Balas, Sasanian King, i, 137
B a If our, Lady Betty, ii, 98, 103 footnote,
1 10 footnote
Balkash, Lake, ii, 86
Balkatigin of Ghazni, i, 186
Balkh, i, 10, 122, 125, 127, 137, 143, 152,
!53 X 59 * *>o, *6i> 167, 169, 181, 183,
186, 188, 193, 194, 196, 203, 215,
222, 225, 246, 249, 250, 255, 264,
277, 278, 286, 287, 301, 305, 307, 308,
3'3 3H 3i5 3i g ' 34i 344 345>
35736 9 , 371,392; ii, n, 13
Baluchi 8, i, 4
Baluchistan, deserts of, i, i, 25, 26, 44,
22 7> 37i 3*6,3*7* 359>39 2
Bam, i, 337
Bamian or Bamiyan, i, 7, 15, 153, 168,
223,224, 314; ii, 55
Bampur, i, 68
Bandan, ii, 201, 208, 213
Bandar Abbas, i, 337; ii, 94
Bannu, i, 281, 295
Baonat, district of, i, 69
Barakzai brothers, ii, 7, 8
Barka Khan, Chief of the Golden Horde,
defeated by Hulaku, i, 235
Barka tulla, Indian seditionist, ii, 287
Barkiyaruk, brother of Sultan Sanjar, i,
214
Barlas, Haji, of Kesh (modern Shahr-i-
Sabz), i, 252, 253
Barmak, Zoroastrian priest, i, 169
Barmecides, the, i, 170, 176} fail of, 177
Barrow, General Sir George, ii, 272
Barsaentes, Satrap of Drangiana or
Zarangiana (later Seistan), i, 64
Bar-Soma, Mission to Europe, i, 238-239
Barygaza (Broach), port of, i, 91, 97, 122
Basra,!, 174
Batu (Mongol general), founder of the
Golden Horde, i, 228
Batum, i, 104
Bayan Kuii, the puppet Khan, i, 252
Bayan Selduz, i, 252
Bayazid (the " Thunderbolt "), Sultan of
Turkey, defeated by Tamerlane, i, 261-
262
Baybars Bandukdar of Egypt, i, 234 and
footnote\ battle of Abulistin, 237
Baydu (cousin of Gaykhatu), i, 239
Bazar Valley, i, 341
Bazh (modern Faz), village, i, 199
Beaconsfield, Lord (Disraeli), ii, iQifoot-
note\ policy in Asia, 102; 106, 108, 133
Beazley, Dr. Raymond, i, 218 footnote
Begjit, Amir, i, 253
Behistun inscription, i, 83
Beirut, i, 28
Belisarius, Roman general, i, 1395 cam-
paigns of, 141
Bellew, Dr., i, 1 3
Belshazzar, son of Nabonidus, i, 45
Benares, i, 118, 194, 288
Benckendorff, Count, ii, 232
Benderski, M., Russia's Chief Survey
Officer on Anglo-Russian Commission
of 1895, ii, 181
Benedict Goes, i, 308, 309
Bengal, i, 214, 296, 305
Beni Temim, a Yemen tribe, i, 162
Berenice (daughter of Ptolemy Phil-
adelphus), i, 80
Berenice (wife of Ptolemy), i, 78
Berowski, Russian general, i, 410
Bessus, Satrap of Bactria, i, 63-64; cap-
ture of, and death, 65
Bevan, Edwyn R., i, 71
Beveridge, Annette, i, 2j6footnotej 287,
296 footnote
Beyik Pass, ii, 182
Bezabde, i, 1 3 1
Bhagavand, i, 335
Bharatpur, i, 360
Bhatinda, i, 212
Bhim, Raja, i, 211
Bhira, i, 289, 290, 293, 297
Biddulph, Sir Michael, ii, 1 10
Bihzad, Kamal ad-din, Persian painter,
271,273
Bikni, Mount (Demavend), " the Lapis
Lazuli Mountain ", i, 35
Bindusura (son of Chandragupta), i, 75
Bismarck, Prince, ii, 162
Bistam, i, 250
Bisutun, i, 44
Bithynia, i, 105
Bizapur, 320, 321
Black Sea, i, 55, 104, 107, 143, 235
Boghaz-Koy, i, 3 3; tablets of " Kikkuli of
Mitannu " discovered at, 34
Bolan Pass, i, 34, 345, 372; ii, 5, 106, 1 10
Borak (son of Chagatay), invades Khur-
asan, i, 236, 237
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ii, 106
Bosphorus, Kingdom of the, i, 104
INDEX
385
Bosphorus, The, i, 146, 147, 176
Boundary Commissions, ii, 99; the Pamir
Commission, 178-183; Udny Com-
mission, 183-186; settlement of Moh-
mand boundary, 186; demarcation of
boundary in vicinity of Arandu, 186;
delimitation of the Kurram Valley,
187; boundary of Waziristan, 187
Bourquin, French general, i, 375
Bozai Gumbaz, ii, 179, 180
Brahuis, i, 4
Bravine, Bolshevist representative at
Kabul, ii, 287
Briggs, John, i, 186 footnote, 195 footnote,
209 footnote
Bright,^Gieral, i, 117
British Baluchistan, i, 3, 1 1
British Mission at Herat, ii, 103; Shir
Ali declines to receive, 104; despatch
of, to Kabul, 107
British Mission at Kabul, ii, 1 1 3; restores
Kandahar and Jalalabad to Amir, 114;
Amir agrees to receive, 1 14; retribution
for murderers of, 1 1 6
British Mission of Alexander Burnes
(1837), i, 401 etseq.
Broadfoot, Captain William, 11, 28
Broadfoot, Major George, at siege of
Jalalabad, ii, 40-41
Brooke, Brigadier-General, ii, 146
Browne, E. G., i, 171 footnote, 198 footnote,
199 footnote, 203, 204, 233, 243 foot-
note, 244, 252 footnote, 261 footnote,
266
Browne, Sir Sam, ii, no; advances up
Khaibar Pass, 112; advances to Jalala-
bad, 112; British force of, broken up,
"5
Brussa, i, 262
Brutus, i, 1 1 1
Brydon, Dr., ii, 36, 40
Buddha, i, 120, 153, 154
Buddhism, I, 75; transformation of, 120,
Buddhists, massacres of, by Mihirakula,
Budiabad, village of, ii, 54
Buhlul Khan, Sultan of Delhi, i, 288
Bukhara, i, 15, 160, 161, 162, 165, 173,
183, 185, 198, 203, 204, 221, 226, 237,
245,249,271,286,287,305,313,319;
JNadir Shah's campaign against, 345,
347; ii, 8, 80, 86, 97
Bukkur, ii, 5, 6
Bulughan (wife of Arghun), i, 247
Bundelkand, i, 288, 324
Buner, i, 155
Burak Hajib, i, 227 and footnote
Burj-i-Dada, i, 338
Burkhan-Khaldun, mountain of, i, 226
Burn, Sir Richard, i, 88 footnote
VOL, II
Burnes, Captain (brother of Sir Alexander
Burnes), ii, 28
Burnes, Captain (later Sir) Alexander:
Mission of, i, 401 et seq.; envoy to Dost
Muhammad, 401-402; Kohandil Khan
and, 402; Lord Auckland's reply to
recommendations of, 406; ii, 3, 7;
murdered at Kabul, 27
Burrard, Colonel S. G., i, 4, $ footnote
Burrows, Brigadier-General G. R. S., ii,
140
Burujird, i, 257
Bushire, i, 27, 87; ii, 66
Bust, i, 189, 196; destruction of, by Ala-
ud-Din, 210, 337
Buwayhid (or Daylamite) dynasty, i, 191,
205
Buyr-Nur Tartars, i, 219
Byron, Robert, i, ibj footnote, 275
Byzantium, i, 128, 142, 176
Cadusian cavalry, i, 55
Caesar, Julius: fight for power with
Pompey, i, no; assassinated, in
Caesarea Mazaca, i, 127
Cairo, i, 235, 240, 248, 261
Callias, Peace of, i, 53
Cambay, Gulf of, i, 91
Cambyses I, King, i, 40-41
Cambyses II, conquest of Egypt, i, 45-46
Cameron, G. G., i, 17 footnote, 23 foot-
note, 37 footnote
Campbell, general of Shah Shuja, i, 396;
Abdur Rahman's training under, ii, 121;
death, 122
Capisa, i, 44
Cappadocia, i, 39, 44, 73, 76, 104
Capperstam, i, 308
Caracalla, Emperor, i, 116
Carchemish, i, 40
Carduchi (Kurds), the, i, 55
Carmat, Ismaili leader, i, 230
Carmathian sect, i, 188
Carpini, John de Piano, mission to the
Mongols, i, 229
Carrhae, i, 62; battle of, 108, 129
Carthage, i, 103, 147
Carus, Emperor, campaign of, and death,
i, 129
Caspian Gates, i, 63, 84, 93
Caspians, i, 19, 33, 48
Caspian Sea, i, 6, 7, 83, 107, 119, 191,
222, 228
Cassander, i, 73, 74, 76, 77
Cassius, Longinus, Roman general, i,
in
Cassius Avidius, campaigns of, i, 115
Cathay, i, 308
Caucasus, the, i, 136, 141, 258, 336
Cavagnari, Major Sir Louis: letters of, ii,
113; disregards treacherous behaviour of
2C
386 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Yakub, 114} reaches Kabul as British
envoy, 114; Afghan troops ask him to
pay them, 115; murder of, 116
Cavendish-Bentinck, Lord William, i, 395
Cecil, Lady Gwendolen, ii, 69 footnote,
101 footnote
Chaeronea, battle of, i, 58, 105
Chagai, i, 4; ii, 172,207
Chagatay, 1,234, 276
Chagatay dynasty of Transoxiana, the, i,
252
Chaghanian, i, 165
Chakir Beg Daud, i, 194, 205, 207, 208
Chalcedon, i, 147, 148
Chaldeans, i, 29; Sennacherib's expedition
against, 29
Chaldiran, i, 312
Chaman, ii, 202
Chamberlain, General Sir Neville, ii, 107;
ordered to advance, 108; mission
stopped by Afghans, 108
Champaner, i, 298
Chanda, i, 320
Chandragupta (Sandracottus), i, 75
Chang-an, i, 156
Chang Kien, Chinese explorer, i, 98
Charasia, battle of, ii, 117, 3 21
Charikar, i, 64, 251, 301, 3165 ii, 29, 57
Charjui, i, 345, 347> 8o
Chaucer, i, 93, 95, 246
Chauth,\, 321, 324
ChehelZina, i, 316
Chenab, River, i, 289, 290, 311
Chenghiz Khan (Temuchin): rise of, i,
219; relations with Muhammad of
Khwarizm, 221; invades Transoxiana,
2215 devastation of Khurasan, 2225
campaigns against Jalal-ud-Din, 223-
225; return to Mongolia, 225; death
and character of, 226-227; 250, 251,
253,288
Chikishliar, ii, 86
Childe, V. Gordon, i, 17 footnote, 24
China, i, 97, 9 8 i despatch of Chinese
missions to the West, 99; early inter-
course with Parthia, 105$ Chinese
authority re-established in Central Asia,
1 19; authority of, established to Caspian
Sea, 119; relations with Persia, 140;
founding of the T'ang dynasty, 149,
229, 309; Marco Polo's journey to,
245; H, i79 l82
Chinese Empire, i, 2, 265
Chinese Turkistan, i, 184, 185, 217, 247
Chin-Shih Huang-Ti, i, 97
Chionites, vide Huns
Chishpish (or Teispes, son of Achaemenes),
'37
Chitor, 1,297 .
Chitral, i, 13; ii, 17* 17*5 8ie 8 e of l8 *
280,281
Chorasmia, i, 44
Chormaghun, Mongol general, i, 227
Chosroes, vide Noshirwan
Chosroes of Armenia, i, 126
Chosroes II, vide Khusru Parviz
Chotiali, i, 317
Christianity: persecution by Shapur the
Great, i, 133; favoured treatment by
Yezdigird, 133; persecution of Chris-
tians by Bahram Gur, 1 345 the " True
Cross " carried off by Khusru Parviz,
146
Chuki (daughter of Muhammad Husayn
Khan Kajar), i, 350
Chunar, fortress of, i, 298
Chupan, Amir, Regent of Abu ^idf i, 2425
rebellion and death, 2425 244
Chu Wentai, Governor of Turfan, i, 151
Cilicia, i, 77, 104, 107
Cilician Gates, i, 60, 78
Cimmerians, the, i, 38
Circesium, i, 132, 14$
Clavijo, Ruy Gonzalez di, on embassy to
the Court of Tamerlane, i, 263, 264
Clearchus, Spartan general, i, $4
Clement, Pope, i, 241
Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great,
' ? 2 r
Clerk, George, Lieutenant-Governor ot
the North- West Provinces, ii, 38
Cocachin, Princess, i, 247, 248
Coele-Syria, i, 74, 77, 81, 84, 92
Colvin, John, Private Secretary to Lord
Auckland, i, 405
Colvin, Sir Auckland, i, 406 footnote
Congress of Berlin, ii, 106
Connolly, Captain, ii, 54
Constantia, i, 144
Constantine, Emperor, i, 130
Constantinople, i, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148;
siege of, by Khusru Parviz, 147-148;
238, 249, 262; ii, 102
Constantius, Emperor, i, 130, 131
Corbulo, Roman general, i, 1 1 3
Corcyra, i, 85
Corduene, i, 106
Corinth, i, 56
Corus, plain of, i, 78
Cosmas Indicopleustes, Egyptian monk, i,
8l r 39
Cotton, Brigadier Sydney, ii, 71
Cotton, General Sir Willoughby, ii, 6, i^,
23,27
Co well, Prof., i, 200
Cox, Major (later Sir) Percy, ii, 249
Cracow, i, 228
Cranbrook, Lord, Secretary of State for
India, ii, 108
Crassus, Marcus Licinius, Proconsul of
Syria, i, 107; invasion of Parthia, 107-
108; battle of Carrhae, 109
INDEX
387
Craterus, Macedonian general, i, 67, 68,
69, 72, 8$
Crocker, Brigadier-General G. F., in the
Third Afghan War, ii, 274, 275
Croesus, King of Lydia, i, 43, 44
Ctesiphon, i, 1 1 5, 116, 127, 128, 129,132,
142, 148
Cunaxa, battle of, i, 54
Cunningham, J. D., i, 386 footnote, 387
footnote, 393 footnote, 394 footnote
Curzon, Honourable George, i, 7 footnote
Curzon, Lord, i, 2665 ii, 196, 216-224;
receives Afghan Mission in London,
292, 293
Cutch, province of, i, 101; n, 4
Cyaxarfcs (JJvakhshatra), King of Media, i,
37; subjugates Scythians, 37; forms
alliance with Nabopolassar, 38; first
assault on Nineveh, 39; final assault and
fall of Nineveh, 39; Battle of the
Eclipse, 39-40; death, 40; 83
Cynoscephalae, battle of, i, 86
Cyprus, i, 53, 56, 80
Cyra, i, 44
Cyriadis, Roman pretender, i, 127
Cyrus the Great, i, 32, 41, 48} defeats
Astyages, 43; rise of, 43; King of
Medes and Persians, 43; invasion of
Lydia, 43; Eastern campaigns, 44; con-
quest of Babylon, 44; cylinder of, 44;
death, 45; character, 45; 83
Cyrus, the Younger i, 54; march on
Babylon, 54; battle of Cunaxa, 54-55
Dacia, i, 114
Dadur, ii, 6
Daghestan, i, 333; Nadir Shah's cam-
paign, 347
Dahae, the, i, 83
Dakka, i, 7; ii, 275
Damascus, i, 158, 240, 249, 261
Dames, M. Longworth, i, i footnote, 16
Damghan, district of, i, 63, 331
Dane, Sir Louis, i, 351 footnote; ii, 120
footnote; his mission to Kabul, 218-224;
355, Appendix D
Daniel, Book of, 1,91
Daniyal, Prince, i, 309
Danube, River, i, 48, 49, 58
Daphne, i, 93
Dara, i, 139, 144, I45 H 6
Dara Shukoh, i, 317, 318
Dara the First, i, 124-125
Darband (now Derbent), i, 136, 141, 243,
327
Darius the Great, ii, 38; the reign of,
46; institutes satrapies, 46; Scythian
campaign, 48; Thrace annexed, 48;
Indian campaign, 48; 49, 88
Darius II (Darius Nothus), i, 53
Darius III (Codomannus), accession of, i,
57, 59; defeat of, at battle of Issus,
60-6 1 ; defeat of, at battle of Arbela,
62; pursuit of, and death, 63; 149
Darmesteter, James, i, 16
Darragaz, i, 328
Dasht-i-Margo, i, 10
Dastagird, the sack of, i, 148
Dattaji Sindia, Maratha Chief, i, 360
Daulat Khan, Governor of the Punjab, i,
288, 289, 290-291
Dayaukku (Deioces), King of Media, i,
36,41
Daylam, i, 176, 191
Debevoise, Neilson, i, 71, 105 footnote
Debul, port of, i, 165
Deccan, i, 75; importance of presence of
Akbar in, 308; Abbas intrigues with
rulers of, 312; Asaf Jah retires to his
province of, 323; Angria secures right
of collecting the chauth in, 324; 359
Deeg, battle of, i, 376
Definitive Treaty, i, 380
de Giers, M., ii, 127, 165, 168
Deioces, King of Media, i, 35
de Langele, Galfridus, mission to Mongol
Court, i, 239
Delhi, i, 287, 288, 292, 298, 302, 303,
304, 324, 341, 358, 361
Delhi, battle of, i, 260
Delos, League of, i, 53
Delphi, i, 91
Demavend, Mount, i, 35
Demetrius, Poliorcetes: battle of Gaza, i,
74; raid on Babylon, 74, 76; battle of
Ipsus, 76; overthrow of, 77; death, 78
Demetrius Soter (son of Seleucus IV), i,
94
Demetrius I (Invinctus), King of Bactria:
campaigns of, i, 90, 91; the empire of,
9 1
Demetrius II (son of Demetrius Invinctus),
i, 90, 93,94
Demetrius II, Nikator (son of Soter), i, 95,
96
de Morgan, i, 22, 27
Denison, Sir William, ii, 72
Dera Ghazi Khan, i, 317
Diarbekir, i, 206, 285
Dilavar Khan (Madad Khan), i, 368, 369
Dilshad A^a (daughter of Kamar-ud-Din),
'' 2 5?
Diocletian, Emperor, campaigns of, i, 129
Diodotus of Bactria, i, 85
Diodotus I, Satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana, i,
89
Diodotus II, i, 89
Diogenes Romanus, Emperor, i, 206
Dipalpur, i, 290, 303
Dir, i, 3
Dirgam (modern Gokchah) River, i, 215
and footnote
3 88
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Diu, port of, i, 298
Dizabul, Khakan of the Turks, i, 143
Dizful, i, 257
Dobbs, Henry (later Sir Henry), chief
British representative at Mussoorie
Conference, ii, 288; Mission to Kabul,
290 et ieq.\ Treaty with Afghanistan,
364-369, Appendix H
D'Ohsson, Mouradja, i, 218 footnote
Dokuz Khatun (wife of Hulaku Khan), i,
2 35
Domandi, ii, 201; arrival of the British
Commission at, 203
Dost Muhammad, Amir, i, 386, 390$
policy of, 395-396; battle of Kandahar,
396; attacks the Sikhs, 397; appeals to
Lord Auckland, 398; mission of Burnes
to, 401, 403 et seq.$ First Afghan War,
ii, i et seq.\ his defeat in September
1840, 19} reappears in the Kuhistan,
19; his surrender, 20; the second reign
of, 6 1 et seq.') quells the Ghilzai revolts,
63, 64; annexes Kandahar, 65; Second
British Treaty with, 66, 67; captures
Herat and dies, 67, 68; his sons, 71;
122, 123
Drangiana, i, 44
Dufferin, Lord, ii, 127, 164
Duhamel, General, i, 407
Dukak, Timuryaligh, Seljuk Chief, i, 204
Dukchi, ii, 167
Duki, i, 317
Dungi, King of Ur, i, 22
Dura-Europus, i, 1 1 5
Durand, Sir Henry, i, 395; ii, 3, 10;
'* Durand Medal ", n; 13,21,26,27,
38 footnote, 41
Durand, Mortimer (later Sir Mortimer),
Indian Foreign Secretary, ii, 160;
Mission to Kabul, 173 et seq,\ 239,
352-354, Appendix C
Durilu, the battle of, i, 29
Durrani Empire, i, 8
Durrani tribe, i, 8; rise of, to the throne,
35H 353> "',22,42,43
Dyer, Brigadier-General R. H. F., at
relief of Thai, ii, 279
Dyracchium, i, 85
Ea-gamil, King of Babylon, i, 24, 26
Eannatum, King of Lagash, i, 215 defeated
Elamite invasion, 21
Eastern Tartary, i, 185
East India Company, Board of Control of:
realizes Russia's aggressive spirit, ii, i;
instructions, 2; 65
Ecbatana, i, 39, 41, 62, 63, 65, 85, 96
Edessa, i, 114, 127, 142
Edinburgh, Duke of, ii, 98
Edward I of England, i, 231, 238, 239,
246
Edward II of England, i, 241
Edwardes, Herbert, Commissioner of
Peshawar, ii, 71
Egypt, i, 17, 19; conquest by Esarhaddon,
30; conquest by Cambyses II, 45;
revolt of, 53; reconquest by Artaxerxes
III, 56-57; annexed by Alexander the
Great, 61; 72, 76, 78, 80, 93; evacu-
ated by Antiochus IV, 92, no; sea
routes from, to India, 122; 206, 259,
262
Elam, state of, i, 19, 20, 27; founders
of, 19; geographical sketch of, 19;
conquered by Guti mountaineers, 22;
overthrows Kassite dynasty, 27; as
a great power, 27; allitfice" with
Babylonia, 29; Sennacherib's campaign
against, 29-30; first campaign of
Assurbanipal against, 30; second, 31;
third, 31; the fall of, 31; disappearance
of, 32; 50
Elburz Mountains, i, 230
Elgin, Lord, ii, 72
Elias, Ney, i, 252 footnote, 276 footnote
Elizabeth of England, i, 310
Ellenborough, Lord, Governor-General of
India, ii, 39, 44, 47, 48, 49; his treat-
ment of the hostages and prisoners, 58-
59; his proclamation of October i, 59;
61
Ellis, Sir Henry, i, 262 footnote
Elphinstone, General W. K., succeeds Sir
W. Cotton, ii, 27; the fatal indecision
of, 29 et seq.\ retreat from Kabul, 33
et seq.; detained as hostage by Akbar
Khan, 35; 42; death of, at Goudah, 54
Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 1,311 footnote,
324; mission to Shah Shuja, 387 and
footnote
England, General, ii, 42, 43, 44
Enlil, Sumerian god, i, 27
Ephesus, i, 50, 81, 177
Ephthalites, vide Huns
Epirus,i, 73, 85, 86
Eranvej, original home of Aryans, i, 34
Erech, the dynasty of, i, 22; sack of, by
Kudur-Nankhundi, 22
Eretria, i, 49; betrayed and sacked, 50
Erivan: recaptured by Shah Abbas, i, 312;
captured by Turkey, 327; held by
Turkey, 333; 336
Erzerum, i, 114, 261 %
Esarhaddon, King, i, 30, 35, 36, 82
Etymander, River (the Helmand), i, 7, 85
Eubcea, i, 50
Eucratides (son of Laodice), i, 92-93, 94;
death, 94; 95
Eulaeus (Karun), River, i, 19, 30, 68 foot-
note
Eumenes, Secretary of Alexander, i, 73
Eumenes of Pergamum, i, 92
INDEX
389
Euphrates, River, i, 5, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26,
29, 54, 55, 62, 69, 81, 95, 104, 107,
108, no, 113, 114, 115, 1 1 6, 117, 122,
127, 128, 130, 131, 140, 142, 146, 158
Euripides, i, 1 10, 226 footnote
Eurydice (wife of Philip Arrhidaeus), i, 73
Euthydemus, King of Bactria, i, 85, 89, 90
Exedares (son of Pacorus II), i, 114
Eyre, Major-General Sir Vincent, ii, 31,
32 footnote, 33, 34, 35
Ezekiel, Prophet, i, 122 footnote
Faiz Muhammad (son of Dost Muham-
mad), ii, 71, 75
Fakhr-ud-Din, Kurt, ruler of Herat, i,
240* 2^2, 243, 244
Farab (Otrar), i, 184
Farah, i, 243, 256, 330, 337, 372, 373;
ii, 63
Farah Rud, ii, 91
Farrukh-Siyar, i, 324, 366
Farrukhzad (son of Masud I), i, 207, 208
Fars, the province of (ancient Parsa or
Pars), i, 38, 39, 40, 117, 125, 169, 181,
191,217, 333
Fatehabad, ii, 36
Fath Mi Khan, Mir, Talpora Chief, i,
3 6 9
Fath Ali Shah, i, 378, 381, 401
Fath Jang, puppet King of Kabul, ii, 49,
56,57
Fath Khan (eldest son of Paianda Khan),
i, 381 e/ seg.$ defeats the Persian Army,
390; blinding of, 391
Fathullah Khan Talpora, i, 372
Fatimid dynasty, i, 206, 207, 230
Fatten Muhammad Khan (son of Akbar
Khan), appointed Governor of Afghan
Turkistan, ii, 73
Fazl (son of Yahya), the Barmecide, i, 176,
178
Ferghana, i, 90, 98, 122, 164, 166, 167,
173, 182, 270, 277, 279, 287, 313
Ferishta, Mahommed Kasim (Persian
historian), i, 189 footnote, 195, 209, 210
Ferozepur, ii, 4
Ferrier, J. P., i, 351 footnote, 389 and
footnote, account of the Herat siege
operations, 409; ii, 45
Finkenstein, Treaty of, i, 379
Firdausi ( Abul Kasim), poet, i, 48, 52, 1 1 7,
124, 135, 199-200, 216
riruz, Sasanian monarch, campaigns
against the White Huns, i, 136-137
Firuzkuh, i, 210, 214
Firuz-Shapur, i, 132
Firuz-ud-Din, Haji (brother of Mahmud
Shah), i, 384, 386, 390
Fitnak, the fortress of, i, 346
FitzGerald, Edward, i, 136, 200-201,
274
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, ii, 162 foot-
note
Fort Sandeman, ii, 278, 279
" Forty-fourth Hill ", ii, 36
Fowle, Lieutenant T. F. T., on battle of
Mai wand, ii, 143
Fukhur-ud-Din Altai, ii, 201, 213
Gabae, i, 94
Galerius, Emperor, i, 129
Gandamak, i, 3885 ii, 25, 26, 35, 36, 49,
113; treaty of, 114
Gandash, Kassite Chief, i, 26
Gandhara, i, 44, 47, 90, 94, 96, 97, IOO,
101, 118, 120, 138, 143, 152, 155
Ganges, River, i, 6, 67, 90, 91, 118, 260,
295
Ganja (modern Elizabetpol): Turkey to
hold > 3335 besieged, 336
Gardane, Le Chevalier de, i, 325
Gardanne, General, i, 379
Gardner, Prof. Percy, i, 103
Garmsir, i, 283
Gaud-i-Zireh or Zirra, i, 4; ii, 91, 207
Gaugamela, i, 62
Gauhar Shad (wife of Shah Rukh), i, 268,
2705 mosque of, 274-275
Gauls: invasion of Macedonia, i, 79;
defeated by Antiochus I, 79-80
Gaykhatu (brother of Arghun), i, 239, 248
Gaza, i, 615 battle of, 74
Gedrosia (now Makran), i, 68
Geok Teppe, ii, 89 and footnote
Georgia, conquered by Tamerlane, i, 256,
261
Georgians, the, i, 228
Gerard, Major- General, British representa-
tive on Anglo-Russian Commission of
1895, ii, 181
Ghalib Bey, Turkish Governor at Mecca,
ii, 259
Ghaus-ud-din, Chief of Ahmadzai Ghil-
zais, ii, 319, 320
Ghazan Khan, i, 234, 238, 239; Syrian
campaigns, 240; the reforms of, 240-
24 1 j death, 241; 248
Ghazdavan, i, 287
Ghaznavid, dynasty of, i, 15; the rise of,
1 8 6; troublesome period, 2075 revival
of, under Ibrahim, 2085 reign of Masud
III, 208; a disturbed period, 208;
destruction of Ghazni, 209-210; end
of, 210; 214
Ghazni, i, 14, 184, 185, 191, 194, 195,
196, 197, 200, 205, 207, 208; annexed
by Saif-ud-Din, 209; destruction of, by
Ala-ud-Din of Ghur, 209; 21 1, 213,
214, 217, 222, 224, 259, 280, 281, 283,
316,340,354; ii, 9, 11,43, 117
Ghilzais, the, i, 2835 become subjects of
Shah Abbas on capture of Kandahar,
39
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
312; most powerful tribe in province of
Kandahar, 325; success encourages
Abdalis to rebel, 326; victories won by,
329; Nadir determines to recover
Persia from, 3305 complete vengeance
exacted on, 331; Husayn Sultan
despatches force of 3000 to support of
Zufilkar, 3325 secretly steal away, 333;
repeatedly defeated by Nadir Shah,
3365 Upper Helmand held by, 3375
Nadir Shah enlists several thousands in
his bodyguard, 338; 350, 352, 383;
ii, 22, 1305 rise against Abdur Rahman,
190
Ghiyas-ud-Din, Kurt, i, 242, 243, 244,
256
Ghiyas-ud-Din (younger brother of Jalal-
ud-Din), i, 227
Ghiyas-ud-Din Muhammad, successor of
Saif-ud-Din, i, 211, 213
Ghiyas-ud-Din Pir Ali, Kurt Prince, i,
244
Ghoaine, battle of, i, 5 1
Gholam Haidar (son of Dost Muhammad),
ii, 61; becomes Dost Muhammad's
heir-apparent and Vizier, ii, 64;
negotiates for Anglo-Afghan Treaty of
1855,65
Gholam Nabi Khan (son of Ghulam
Haidar), Cherkhi, ii, 319, 325
Ghorband, River, i, 90
Ghorian, i, 390
Ghulam Haidar, Afghan Commander-in-
Chief and Chief Commissioner, ii, 183,
184, 185
Ghulam Sadik Khan, officiating Foreign
Minister during Amanulla's European
visit, ii, 3025 formation of a legislative
assembly, 311
Ghur, province of, i, 15, 159, 170, 189,
207, 209, 217, 223, 243, 283
Ghurak, Prince, i, 163
Ghurian. ii, 81
Ghurid dynasty: rise of, i, 210-211;
break-up of, 213-214
Ghuzz tribe, i, 204, 205, 210, 21 1; defeat
and capture of Sultan Sanjar, 215
Gibb, H. A. R., 157 footnote, 160, 168,
*74
Gibbon, Edward, i, 103. 257
Giers, M. de, assurance of, ii, 107, 108
Gilan, province of, i, 242, 334
Girishk, i, 7, 64, 337, 372, 386; ii, 8,
140
Gladstone, William Ewart, ii, 104, 133,
170
Goa, i, 320
Gobi Desert, i, 6, 99, 121, 150, 219, 247,
309
Gobryas, commander-in-chief of Cyrus, i,
45
Gogra, River, battle of the, i, 294, 295
Goldsmid, General Sir Frederic, ii, 94, 95
footnote, 96, 99; mission of, 208
Gondophares, i, 118
Gortchakoff, Prince, ii, 87, 88, 109
Goudah, ii, 54
Gough, Brigadier-General Hugh, ii, 133}
at battle of Kandahar, 148
Govind Singh, tenth and last Guru, i, 365
Grand Duchess Marie, daughter of the
Tsar, ii, 98
Granicus, battle of, i, 59-60
Grant, Sir Hamilton, ii, 284, 359,
Appendix F
Granville, Lord, ii, 162, 163, 165
Great Britain: Mission of Cajttaiti (later
Sir) John Malcolm, i, 378, 3795
Mission of Sir Harford Jones, 379-380;
Treaty of Lahore, 387; Elphinstone
Mission to Shah Shuja, 387; Captain
Burnes' Mission to Dost Muhammad,
401 et seq.\ First Afghan War, ii, i et
seq.\ retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.\
Anglo- Persian Treaty of 1853, 65;
Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1855, 65;
Anglo-Persian War of 1857, 66; Indian
Mutiny, 71; Anglo-Russian agreement
of 1873, 87; first Seistan Mission,
1872, 91 et seq.'y the genesis of the
Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.\ Second
Afghan War, no et seq.\ Abdur Rah-
man, 120 et seq.\ battles of Maiwand
and Kandahar, 139 et seq.; Abdur
Rahman is acknowledged Amir of
Afghanistan and its dependencies, 151
et seq.', Panjdeh Crisis, 158 et seq.\
Durand Mission to Kabul, 169 et seq.\
Pamir and other Boundary Commissions,
1 80 et seq.j the McMahon Missions,
20 1 et seq.\ Dane Mission to Amir
Habibulla Khan, 218-224; Anglo-
Russian Convention, 231 et seq.\ rela-
tions with Tibet, 238 et seq.\ Third
Afghan War, 270 et seq.\ acknowledges
Afghanistan to be an independent state,
283 et seq.\ King Amanulla visits
England, 305-307
Great Mihran (Sarasvati), i, 24
Great War, the, i, 8
Greeks, i, 49
Gregory X, Pope, i, 245
Griffin, Lepel (later Sir Lepel), Chi^f
Political Officer at Kabul, ii, 129, 130;
receives Abdur Rahman, 136
Griffiths, Major Charles, ii, 36
Grousset, Rend, i, 149 footnote, 154, 267
footnote
Grumbates, King of the Huns, i, 131
Gubazes, King, i, 142
Guchluk, Kerait Chief, i, 216, 220, 221
Gudea, King of Lagash, i, 22
INDEX
39 1
Gujarat, i, 303; becomes obedient to
orders of Akbar, 307; occupied by Baji
Rao, 324; battle of, ii, 64
Gulbadan Begum, i, 302
Gul Muhammad, meets McMahon for the
first time, ii, 204
Gulnabad, battle of, i, 326, 327
Gumal, River, i, 3
Gumal Pass, i, 3; ii, 171
Gumal Valley, i, 281
Gurgan, city of, i, 1375 Yezid's campaign,
164-165, 172, 188
Gurgan, River, i, 63, 82
Gurgan Valley, i, 332
Gurgin Khan (Georgian Prince), i, 3255
kil'cd^y Mir Wais, 326
Gur Khan, i, 220
Gurus, the, i, 364
Gushtasp, King, i, 124
Guti mountaineers, i, 22j conquest of
Babylonia, Sumer, Akkad and Elam, 22
Gutium, i, 20
Gwadur, i, 68
Habibulla, Amir, ii, 355, Appendix D
Habibulla, King, i, 16
Habibulla, " the Child of the Water-
Carrier ", ii, 312; attacks Kabul, 312-
313; proclaims himself Amir, 3145
318; his successes against Nadir Khan,
319, 3205 finally defeated, captured
and executed, 321
Habibulla Khan: proclaimed Amir of
Afghanistan, ii, 216; announces his
accession to the Viceroy, 216; invita-
tion by Lord Curzon, 216, and his non-
acceptance, 217; acceptance of Lord
Minto's invitation, 225; visits India,
226-2305 his attitude to the Turko-
German Mission, 2545 his demand for
representation at the Peace Congress,
265; his assassination, 265
Habibulla Khan Tarzi, Sirdar, Afghan
Commissioner, ii, 187
Hackin, J., i, 149 footnote, 168 footnote
Hadi, Caliph, i, 175, 176
Hadrian, Emperor, i, 115, 207
Haft Kotal, ii, 50
Haidar Mir<za, historian, i, 280, 282, 286,
287 and footnote, 295
Haiderabad, i, 374
Haider Khan, ii, 9
'*Haji Khanum, \, 309
Hajjaj bin Yusuf, i, 162, 164
Hakhamanish, vide Achaemenes
Hakim Mirxa, invasion of the Punjab by,
''3*
Halah (or Calah), early capital of Assyria,
35
Halicarnassus, i, 60
Halil Rud, i, 69, 85
Halley, Captain R., of the Royal Air Force,
in the Third Afghan War, ii, 276
Halule, i, 30, 37
Halys (now Kizil Irmak), River, i, 39, 40,
86
Hamadan, i, 119, 122, 178, 193, 217;
captured, by Turkey, 327; reoccupied
by Nadir Shah, 3315 army of Tahmasp
finally routed near, 333
Hami, i, 119, 151
Hamida Begum (wife of Humayun), i, 299
Hamilton, Lieutenant P. F. P., account of
battle of Ahmad Khel quoted, ii, 131
Hamilton, Lord George, Secretary of State
for India, ii, 194
Hammurabi, King of Babylon, i, 23; code
of laws, 235 28
Hamun, i, 4
Han dynasty, i, 98, 119
Hanna, Colonel H. B., ii, 139 footnote
Hannibal, i, 86
Hansi, fortress of, i, 194
Hanway, Jonas, i, 325, 347 footnote, 348
footnote, 349 footnote, 350
Haraeva, vide Herat
Haraiva (Herat), i, 34
Haraiwati (modern Kandahar), i, 8
Haran, i, 23, 109
Harappa, city of, i, 25
Harauwati (Arachosia), i, 47
Hardinge, Sir Charles (later Lord), ii, 233
Har Govind, i, 365
Hari Rud, River, i, 4, 7, 9, 211, 333; ii,
6 3
Hari Singh, Sikh general, i, 398
Harith ibn Suraj, rebellion of, i, 167
Harmozia (medieval Hormuz), i, 69
Harpagus, i, 44
Harran, i, 39
Harsha, King, i, 155
Harthama, General, i, 178
Harun al-Rashid, i, 163, 175 et seq.\
death, 178; 250
Harun (son of Mehdi), i, 175
Harut Rud, ii, 91
Hasan, a brigand, i, 258
Hasan, Uzun, " White Sheep " Chief, i,
270, 272
Hasan Abdal, i, 320
Hasan bin Zayd, i, 181
Hasan Sabbah, founder of the sect of
Mulahida, i, 230
Hashirn Khan, Sirdar (uncle of King
Zahir), ii, 320, 328, 329
Hashim Sultan, i, 305
Hassan, Shahxadeh (son of Mir Shah), ii,
128
Hatra, i, 115, 116
Haughton, Lieutenant, ii, 29
Havelock, Captain Henry, ii, 42
Hawkal, Ibn, i, 170
392
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Hay, Captain W. H., British Commissioner,
ii, 186
Hayatulla Khan, Moghul governor, i, 354
Hayden, H. H., i, 5 footnote
Hayton, Christian King of Armenia, i,
237-238
Hazarajat, i, 7
Hazara Mountains, i, 282
Hazaras, the, i, 15, 16, 281, 282, 283; ii,
63; rise against Abdur Rahman, 192
Hazarasp, fortress of, i, 163, 346
Hecatompylus (Damghan), i, 119
Heliocles, Governor of the eastern satrapies,
i, 92
Heliocles (son of Eucratides), i, 96, 97,
101
Heliodorus, Seleucid minister, i, 91
Hellas, 1,49; invasion by Xerxes, 51; 56;
position after Peace of Antalcidas, 565
recognition of Alexander, 58; 59, 60,
72, 74, 78, 85, 86, 87, 92
Hellespont, i, 51, 59, 79
Helmand, River, i, 4, 7, 10, 34; ii, 91,
208
Henck, Dr., ii, 249
Henry the Second, Duke of Silesia, i,
228
Henry III of Castile, embassy to Tamer-
lane, i, 263
Henry III of England, i, 231
Henry IV of England, i, 262
Henry IV of France, i, 310
Hephaestion, i, 66
Heracles (illegitimate son of Alexander), i,
Heraclius, Emperor: accession of, i, 147$
projected flight to Carthage, 1475
campaigns of, 1475 sacks Dastagird,
148; peace treaty with Kobad II, 1485
158
Heraclius (father of the Emperor Hera-
clius), i, 144
Herat, i, 5, 9, 12, 44, 475 valley of, 7, 15;
destroyed by Mongols, 9; made capital
by Timurids under Shah Rukh after
Tamerlane's death, 9; centre of art and
learning, 9; 91, 93, 159, 160, 170,
181, 182, 184, 194, 198,211; destruc-
tion of, by Tuli, 225; 236, 240, 242,
243, 244, 246, 249, 256, 259, 267,
268, 270, 2725 Renaissance of, 273;
277, 282, 283, 285, 286; held by
Persia, 306; Abdulla Khan anxious to
hold, 307; Shah Abbas wins great vic-
tory near, 308; Abdalis forced to
migrate to province of, 313, 325;
Nadir Shah attacked by force of Abdalis
from, 329; Nadir Shah decides to win
back, 330; seized by Abdalis, 332;
Nadir Shah moves Abdali tribesmen
from, 338; 345, 351. 356, 368, 372,*
373 3 86 39) the 8ie & e . of
second siege of, 408, 409; siege of, by
Muhammad Shah, ii, i; raising of the
siege of, 4; mission to, 8; captured by
Dost Muhammad, 65, 66; 76, 101,
102, 103, 105, 115, 122, 134; fortifica-
tion of, 1 66
Herbert, Colonel, in command at Attock,
ii, 64
Hermaeus, King, i, 101
Hermias, Seleucid minister, i, 84
Herodotus, i, 36, 37, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51,
83 J oof note, 98
Herzfeld, Dr. Ernst E., i, 17 footnote, 18
footnote, 19, 33, 34, 36 footnote
Himalayas, i, 4, 25, 303 t
Hims, battle of, i, 237, 240 *
Himu, the " Corn-Chandler", chief officer
of Adii Shah, i, 302, 304
Hindal, Mirxa (brother of Humayun), i,
297, 298, 301, 302
Hindu Kush, i, 3; origin of name, 4, 5;
7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15; passage of, by
Alexander the Great, 64; 64 footnote,
75, 85, 89, 94, 100, 101, 122, 153,
156, 170, 181, 186, 222, 225, 250,
259, 286, 300, 301; constituted
northern boundary by Akbar, 307;
crossed by Goes, 309; 357
Hindus, i, 322
Hindu Sahis, dynasty of, i, 189
Hindustan, i, 191
Hira, Arab state, i, 146
Hiram, King, i, 122
Hisar III, i, 25
Hissar, i, 280, 286, 287, 305
Histiaeus of Miletus, i, 49
Hittites, the, i, 20; invasion of Babylonia,
235 2 7 33
Hiung-Nu (or Huns), the, i, 98
Hoa (or Hoa-tun), section of the Great
Yueh-Chi, i, 134
Hobhouse, Sir Arthur, ii, 104
Hobhouse, Sir John (later Lord Broughton),
1,406
Hogg, Reynold, i, 347
Holdich, Major (later Sir) Thomas, i, 10,
13, 14 footnote, 66; ii, 166, 167, 181;
as Chief Survey Officer on Anglo-Russian
Commission of 1895, 181, 182; Chief
Surveyor on Udny Commission, 183,
i8 S
Holkar, Maratha chief, i, 375, 376, 387*
Horace, i, 109, 113
Hormisdas (younger son of Yezdigird II),
i, 136
Hormisdas I, i, 128
Hormisdas IV: continuation of war with
Rome, i, 144; invasion of the Turks,
144; assassination of, 145
Hormuz, battle of, i, 125, 245, 248
INDEX
393
Hotiki Ghilzais, i, 338
Hou-han-shu> Chinese History, i, 119
footnote
Howorth, Sir Henry, i, 218 footnote
Hsieh-li, Khan of the Northern Turks,
H9> 15
Hsuan-tsang, Buddhist monk and Chinese
explorer, i, 2, 8, 44, 64, 103, 120, 139}
commences his great journey, 15}
meets the Khakan of the Western
Turks, 151-1525 crosses Central Asia,
1525 arrives at Kapisi, 154.; reaches
Parushapur (Peshawar), 154; 155; his
return journey, 155-156; granted an
official reception at Changan, 156
Hubbefton, William, ii, 83 footnote
Hudud-al-Alam, the, i, 14
Hue-Chao, Korean monk, i, 168
Hulaku Khan (brother of Mangu), i, 191,
197; founded dynasty of the Il-Khans,
229; destroys Ismaili fortresses, 231-
232; defeated by Mamelukes at battle
of Ayn Jalut, 2345 defeats Barka, Chief
of the Golden Horde, 235; death, 236;
2 37 H3 H 6
Humayun, Emperor, i, 250, 284, 290, 291,
2975 Indian campaigns of, 2975 cap-
ture of Champaner, 297-298; final
defeat of, 298; the exile of, 299; retakes
Kabul, 300, 301; blinds his brother
Kamran, 301; invades India, 303;
death, 303; character, 303; 304, 319
Humayun Mirxa (eldest son of Timur
Shah), i, 370, 372
Humphrys, Major (later Sir) Francis, ii,
295; first British Minister at Kabul,
296, 303
Huns, i, 130, 131; origin of the White
Huns, 134; Bahram Gur's campaigns
against, 135; campaigns of Yezdigird,
136; campaign of Firuz, 136-137;
defeat of Firuz, 137; invasion of India,
138; campaign of Noshirwan, 143;
'53* 155
Huns, White, i, 121
Husayn, Amir (grandson of Amir Kaz-
ghan), i, 253; Tamerlane's struggle
with, 255
Husayn, Baikara, Sultan, last of the
Timurid Princes, i, 271-272, 273, 277,
281-282, 283
Husayn, the martyr of Kerbela, i, 285
IfUsayn Beg, i, 3 1 1
Husayn Jalayr, Amir, i, 258
Husayn Sultan: hostility of, to Ashraf,
i, 328; Ashraf killed by force sent to
intercept him by, 3 3 1 ; Abdalis, instigated
by, rebel against Nadir Shah, 332;
unable to meet Nadir Shah's army, shuts
himself up in the city, 337; 338
Huvishka, Kushan monarch, i, 121
Huzha, Aryan tribe, occupation of Elam,
1,41
Hydaspes, the (modern River Jhelum), i,
66
Hyderabad, i, 323
Hykulzai, ii, 43, 44
Hyphasis (Beas), River, i, 67
Hyrcania, conquered by Alexander the
Great, i, 63, 82, 85, 95
Hyrcanus (Jewish leader), i, 1 1 1
Hystaspes, Viceroy of Bactria, rebellion of,
i, 52
Hystaspes (father of Darius), i, 44, 46, 83
Ibn Battuta, Moslem traveller, i, 4; on
Hindu Kush, 4; starts off on pilgrimage
to Mecca, 248; meets Orkham Beg,
249; crosses the Oxus into Afghanistan,
249; visits Herat, Meshed and Nisha-
pur, 249; crosses the Hindu Kush,
250; visits Kabul and Ghazni and
marches down to the Indus, 250-251;
compared with Marco Polo, 251
Ibn Hawkal, Moslem geographer, i, 170
Ibn-ul-Athir, the historian, 218 footnote ',
219
Ibrahim, Governor, i, 177
Ibrahim Beg, the " Robin Hood " of Buk-
hara, ii, 324
Ibrahim (blind brother of Masud I), i, 195,
196
Ibrahim (brother of Farrukhzad), i, 208
Ibrahim (eldest son of Muhammad Ali), i,
172
Ibrahim Khan (brother of Nadir Shah), i,
347, 362, 263
Ibrahim Lodi, Sultan, i, 288, 289, 290;
battle of Panipat, 291-292; 296
Ibrahim of Turkey, i, 316
Ibrahim Shah (Ibrahim Khan Sur), i, 302,
303
Ibrahim (son of Tahir), i, 180
Idris (great-grandson of Ali), i, 175
Idrisi dynasty, i, 175
Ignatieff, political officer at Bukhara, ii,
231
Ilak Khans, the, i, 184, 188, 189
Il-Arslan (son and successor of Atsiz), i,
216
Ilbars, the Khan of Khiva, i, 346, 347
Ilek, River, i, 278
Hi Valley, i, 98, 99, 166
Il-Khans, dynasty of, i, 229
Iluma-ilu, Sumerian founder of Sea-Land
dynasty, i, 24
Ilyas, Kh'waja^ Governor of Samarkand,
i, 253; Tamerlane's campaigns against,
254
Imad-ul-Mulk, Vizier at Delhi, i, 358
Imam Kuli Beg, i, 328
Imams, the, i, 230
394
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Imeritia, province of, i, 104
Inayatulla Khan, Sirdar, ii, 226, 257, 258,
261,313
Indabugash, King, i, 31
India: migration of Aryans into, i, 34, 41,
48; Indian campaign, 48 ; invaded by
Alexander the Great, 67; 75, 94, 100,
10 1 ; sea routes from Egypt to, 122;
White Huns invade, 138-139; 152,
153, 154, 155, 181; expeditions of
Mahmud into, 188, 209; campaigns of
Muizz-ud-Din, 211-212; 213, 227,
230, 232, 234, 243; invaded and
plundered by Tamerlane, 258-260;
Baber's first expedition into, 288; 297,
302, 307, 315, 319, 364, 373, 374;
Napoleon's plan to attack, 377; ii, 104,
105, 108
Indian Mutiny, ii, 67
Indian Ocean, i, 12, 48; Alexander the
Great's march to, 69; 91, 119, 122
Indo-European tribes, i, 33
Indra, god, i, 34
Indus, River, i, i, 5, 24, 25, 26, 48, 49,
66, 69, 75, 91, 100, 101, 156, 213,
224, 243, 251, 259, 260, 288, 290, 303,
34i> 354" 35 8 359* 37 2 > 3735 4> 6 '>
1 10
Indus Valley, third centre of prehistoric
civilization, i, 5, 6, 7, 24, 138, 195, 281,
. 2 .9S.
Ionia, i, 41
Ionic revolt, i, 49
Ipsus, the battle of, i, 76
Iran, vide Persia
Iranian Plateau,!, i footnote, 5, ii, 18, 19,
20,29, 33>4i>99
Iraq, i, 175, 178, 192, 227, 249, 258
Irene, Queen, i, 176, 177
Irghiz, River, i, 278
Irkeshtam, i, 121, 122
Irtish, River, i, 265
Irwin, Lord, Viceroy of India, ii, 303
Isa, Chief of Makran, i, 193
Isaiah, Book of, i, 43, 45, 256
Isfahan, i, 159, 192; battle of, 227, 228;
256-257; Ali Mardan Khan ordered to,
314; 325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331;
Nadir Shah leaves, 337; disaster of,
avenged, 338; 349
Isfandiar, Prince, i, 124
Isfizar, i, 244
Ishak Khan (son of Azim Khan), ii, 79,
80; rebellion of , 1 9 1
Ishak Khan (son of Sirdar Azim), ii,
125
Ishak (son of Alptigin), i, 186
Ishakzai, the, i, 369
Ishkashim, i, 6
Ishtar, goddess, i, 32
Isin dynasty, i, 23
Iskandar Khan (son of Sulayman
i 370
Iskandar (son of Kara Yusuf), i, 269, 272;
proclaimed Khan, 305; 313
Islam: the rise of, i, 157, 160; the spread
of, 1 68 et seq.\ influence of the Seljuks,
203 et seq.\ 309
Islam Shah (Jalal Khan, younger son and
successor of Sher Shah), i, 301, 302
Ismail, Samanid Prince, i, 182, 183
Ismail, the disinherited Imam, i, 230
Ismailis, the, i, 230, 248
Ismail (younger son of Sabuktigin), i, 187
Issik-Kul, Lake, i, 99, 152
Issus, battle of, i, 60; 147
Istalif, ii, 57 c
Istami (brother of Chief Tumen), i, 143
lyas, Chief of Tayy tribe, i, 145, 146
Izz-ud-Din, Vizier, i, 243
Jabbar Khan, ii, ii, 15
Jacob, General John, warden of the Sind
frontier, ii, 70 and footnote
Jacobabad, ii, 106
Jafar-al-Sadik, i, 230
Jafar (son of Yahya, the Barmecide), i,
176; death, 177
Jagdalak Pass, i, 284, 320; ii, 35, 50, 53
Jahandar Shah, Mir, ii, 128
Jahangir: ascends throne, 31 1, 312; visits
Kabul, 313; death, 313-314
Jahangir Mirs&a (brother of Baber), i, 278,
282
Jahan Khan, adviser to Timur Mirxa, i,
.358
Jaipal, Raja of the Punjab, i, 187, 188
Jajau, battle of, i, 323
Jalalabad, i, 5, 8, 308, 309, 340, 341, 397;
ii, 24, 25, 32, 40, 44, 47, 58, 276, 318
Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad, Keiani Prince
of Seistan, i, 254
Jalal-ud-Din (son of Muhammad of
Khwarizm), i, 223; his ride to Ghazni,
223; defeated by Chenghiz on the
Indus, 224; dazzling career of, 227;
death, 228; 259
Jamal Khan, Haji, i, 352; appointed
Vizier, 353
Jami, Mulla Nur-ud-Din Abdur Rahman,
i, 274
Jamrud, battle of, i, 397, 398
Jan, Sultan, ii, 52
Jan, Uzbeg Chief, i, 3 1 3 *
Jand, i, 204
Jandol, ii, 170-171
Janid U/begs, 1,313
Janissaries, i, 334
Jankaji Sindia, i, 360
Jarring, Gunnar, i, 14 footnote
Jatah, conquered by Tamerlane, i, 255
Jats, the, i, 191, 364
INDEX
395
Jaunpur, i, 297
Jaxartes (Sir Daria), River, i, 6, 7, 44, 4.5;
Alexander's advance to, 65; 74, 78, 91,
14.3, 204.
Jaz Morian, Lake, i, 69
Jemal Pasha, Turkish general, ii, 289
Jenkins, Colonel, ii, 133
Jenkinson, Anthony, envoy of Queen Eliza-
beth, i, 299
Jeremiah, Book of, i, 37 footnote , 40 foot-
note
Jerusalem, i, 14.6, 248
Jesuits, i, 308
Jexaikhh, i, 335
Jhelum, River, i, 66, 68, 97, 100, 289,
3J
Johnson, Dr. N. K., i, n footnote
Johnston, E. H M i, 88 footnote
Jones, Sir Harford, mission of, i, 379-
380
Jovian, Emperor, i, 132
Juan-Juan, the, i, 142, 143
Juji (eldest son of Chenghii Khan), i, 221,
2 7 8
Julian, Emperor: expedition of, i, 1315
retreat of, and death, 132
Jullandur, i, 303, 304
Jumna, River, i, 361
Junayd ibn Abdur Rahman, i, 167
Justin II, i, 143, 144
Justinian, Emperor, i, 139; peace treaty
with Noshirwan, 141
Juwayni, historian, i, 225
Kabul, i, 5; captured by Babur, 75 9;
climate of, 115 64, 97, 159, 162, 163,
170, 1 8 1, 186,223, 225,243,250, 251,
259, 280, 281, 282, 284, 287, 288,
289, 291, 296, 297, 300, 301, 305, 306,
314, 316, 317, 319, 323; capture of,
by Nadir Shah, 340; 344, 353, 354,
368,373,383; ii,2, 3,4,9, 12; British
retreat from, in First Afghan War, 22
et seq.i reoccupation and punishment
of, 56, 57; 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105,
106, 107, 108, no, 112; British
Mission at, 113; 115, 116, 117, 120,
276, 290
Kabul, River, i, 7, 85, 121, 139, 154, 290
Kabus (grandfather of Kei Kaus), i, 201
Kabus Nama y the, i, 201
Kadphises I, founder of the Kushan
dynasty, i, 118
Kafiristan, i, 3; Bashgol Valley of, 35 5,
9; invaded by Tamerlane, 10; 155 ii,
185, 195, 308
Kafir Kala, i, 330, 390
Kahtaba, Abbasid general, i, 172
Kaim, Caliph, i, 205
Kain, i, 230
Kairawan, i, 176
Kaisar Mir%a (son of Zaman Shah), i, 373,
386, 391
Kajar dynasty, i, 371
Kakhaha, ii, 92, 93
Kala-i-Safid, i, 257
Kalaj Khan of Khaf, i, 373
Kalantar, 1,313
Kala Panja, i, 6
Kalat, i, ii, 336, 347, 349, 359; ii, 105,
no
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, i, 283, 284, 337, 3715
ii, 42, 43, 44, 74, 117, 147
Kalat-i-Nadiri, fortress of, i, 238, 256,
329
Kallar, Vizier of Laga-Turman, i, 189
Kaluskin, Russian Resident Tehran, i,
347
Kamaroff, General, Governor of the Akhal
Oasis, ii, 162, 163
Kamar-ud-Din, usurper, i, 255
Kamran Mirza (brother of Humayun), i,
297, 298, 300; blinded by Humayun,
301
Kamran Shah (son of Mahmud Shah), i,
384, 385, 386, 391, 400, 401; murder
and plunder of, ii, 62
Kanauj, i, 190
Kandahar, i, 5, 85 made capital of Durrani
Kingdom, 9; Shah Ahmad buried in,
9; 256, 259, 268, 277, 280, 283, 284;
capture of, by Baber, 290; 300, 303,
304, 306, 307; Shah Abbas captures,
312; 314, 315; three sieges of, 316,
317; 318, 325, 326, 328, 336, 338,
345> 35'> 35 2 > 355> 3 68 > 3 6 9 37^ 37*,
381, 385; ii, i, 2, 4, 5, 22, 42, 43, 65,
81, no, 115, 117, 121, 130, 139;
siege of, 146, 147; occupied by Abdur
Rahman, 1535 Ayub Khan again
attacks, 153
Kangra, fortress of, i, 189
Kanishka, Kushan monarch, i, 120, 154,
155
Kanjpura, fort of, i, 361
Kansu, Western, i, 98
Kan Ying, Chinese ambassador, i, 119
Kao-fu (name given by Chinese to Kabul),
i, 8
Kapisa, i, 64, 90, 94, 101, 118, 152, 154,
'? 6
Kapisi (the Chi-pin of the Chinese), i, 1 54,
156
Karabagh, i, 242, 261, 262, 340
Karachi, ii, 6, 302
Karakaitak tribesmen, i, 347
Kara Khitai dynasty, i, 214-215, 216,
2175 overthrow of, 220
Karakoram, i, 184, 229, 231, 237
Kara Kum desert, i, 8
Kara Kuyunlu (or " Black Sheep ")
dynasty, i, 256
396
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Kara Osman (grandfather of Uzun Hasan),
i, 272
Karapa Pass, i, 320
Karashahr, district of, i, 1 5 1
Kara Yusuf, Prince, i, 256, 261, 269
Kariz, village of, i, i, 7
Karkheh, River, i, 19, 33
Karkuyah, city of, i, 170
Karluks, the, i, 173, 184
Karnal, i, 212, 341; battle of, 342
Kara, i, 256, 312, 336
Karshi, i, 255
Karun, i, 19, 33
Karun, River, i, 69, 73
Kashaf Rud, i, 90
Kashgar, i, 120, 121, 156, 164, 184, 185,
188, 203, 207, 220, 247, 268, 308, 309,
319
Kashmir, i, 13, 75, 120, 193, 307, 313,
365, 366, 385, 392
Kashtiliash II, i, 26
Kassites, the, i, 20, 27 ; derivation of
name, 26; Kassite dynasty, 26, 27
Kataghan, province of, ii, 122
Kathiawar, i, 101, 190
Kaufmann, General, ii, 97, 98, 106, 107,
108, 113, 126
Kaydu (grandson of Ogotay), i, 236
Kaye, Sir J. W., i, i, 402 footnote, 403
footnote, 404 footnote'^ ii, 38 footnote , 42
footnote, 48 footnote, 49
Kazan Khan, the Western Chagatay ruler,
1,252
Kazghan, Amir, i, 252, 253
Kazvin, i, 222, 230, 257, 299, 327, 328
Kazvini, i, 170
Keane, Sir John, ii, 4, 6, 1 1
Keene, H. G., ii, 3 and footnote, 26 and
footnote
Keianian dynasty, i, 48
Kei Kaus, Ziyarid Prince, author of Kabus
Nama, i, 2OI
Keith, Sir Arthur, i, 18 footnote, 19
Kelly, Colonel, relieves British force at
Siege of Chitral, ii, 184
Keppel, Sir George, ii, 263
Keraits, the, i, 219
Kerkha, River, i, 29
Kerman, province of, i, 159, 169, 181,
191, 227, 244, 245, 269, 326, 337,
349
Kermanshah, i, 331-332
Kesh, i, 252,253, 255,264
Khadesiya, battle of, i, 158, 197
Khaf, i, 223
Khaibar Pass, i, i, 3, 281, 290, 307, 319,
341; ii, 2,9,40,46, 114, 156
Khairabad, fort of, i, 393
Khairpur, Amir of, ii, 5
Khaizuran, slave wife of Mehdi, i, 175
Khak-i-Jabar, ii, 34
Khalid (grandson of Amr-ul-Lais), i, 188
and footnote
Khalil Sultan (son of Miranshah), i, 268
Khaha, ii, 2
Khamiab, district of, i, 2
Khanate of Astrakhan, 1,313
Khan Dauran, Commander-in-Chief of
Nizam-ul-Mulk, i, 341, 342
Khanka, i, 346
Khan Mirza, i, 283 and footnote, 290
Khan of Kalat, ii, 6, 7
Khan Sahib, a leader of the Red Shirts, ii,
3*3
Khanua, battle of, i, 294, 297
Khanzada Begum (Baber's elder sister), i,
279,286 f '
Kharak, island of, i, 410; ii, 66
Kharan, district of, i, 1 1
Kharijites, the, i, 167 and footnote
Kharistan, i, 168
Khash Rud, ii, 9 1
Khaysar, fortress of, i, 243, 244
Khiva, i, 125, 215, 271, 315, 319, 3285
Nadir Shah's campaign against, 346;
374; first Russian expedition, ii, 83-84;
annexation of, 86-87; 98
Khivakabad, i, 347
Khizr Khan, Governor of Multan, i,
287
Khizr-Khels, the, i, 290
Khizr Khwaja Khan (son of Khwaja
Ilyas),i,255
Khoi, i, 263
Khojak Pass, ii, 5, 7
Khojand, i, 166, 167, 277, 278
Khokars, the, i, 189, 213
Khorasmia, i, 8 3
Khost, i, 283
Khotan, province of, i, 25, 119, 120, 121,
134, 156, 184,220, 247, 309
Khubilay, the great Khan, founder of the
Yuen dynasty, i, 229, 236, 247
Khudayar Khan, Kalhora Chief of Sind, i,
344-345
Khurasan,!, 3,9,41, 125, 159, 164, 165,
167, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 182,
183, 184, 187, 188, 191, 199, 205,
214; devastation of, by Chenghiz Khan,
222; 227, 230, 237, 248, 253, 259,
285, 306, 327, 329, 338, 351, 356, 369
Khurbatila, King of Elam, i, 27
Khushab, i, 289; ii, 66
Khusru Malik (Ghaznavid dynasty, son
and successor of Khusru Shah), i, 210
Khusru Parviz: early career, i, 145;
invasion of Syria and Asia Minor, 145-
146; battle of Zu-Kar, 146; conquests
of, 146; siege of Constantinople, 147-
148; flight from Dastagird, 148;
deposition and death, 148
Khusru Shah, ruler of Hissar, i, 280, 284
INDEX
397
Khusru Shah (Ghaznavid dynasty), suc-
cessor of Bahrain, i, 210
Khusru (son of Jahangir): loaded with
chains and subsequently blinded, i, 3115
rebellions of, 313$ 365
Khuzistan, i, 19; origin of name, 41
Khwaja Salar, ii, 88 and footnote
Khwandamir, historian, i, 24.0, 2%$ foot-
note, 287 footnote
Khwarizm dynasty, i, 215; founded by
Anushtigin, 216; at its zenith, 216;
2 37 347
Khwarizm (Khiva), i, 34, 163, 165;
Mahmud's expedition against, 190-191;
206, 213, 214, 216, 253; conquered
by r farerlane, 255; 256, 278
Kila Alladad, ii, 75
Kilif, town of, i, 2, 7
Kin dynasty, i, 219
King, L.W.,ii, 187
Kings, i at Book of, i, 122 footnote
Kipchak, i, 258
Kipchaks, the, i, 221
Kiriklu, i, 333
Kirki, ii, 80
Kirkuk, i, 334, 33$
Kitchener, Lord, ii, 226
Kizil, River, i, 121
Kizilbash, the, i, 383, 384
Kizil Kum (or " Red Sand ") desert, i, 152
Kizil Tapa, ii, 163
Knolles, Richard, i, 2 $2 footnote, 261,262
Kobad (son of Firuz): first reign, i, 137;
second reign, 137-138; first war with
Rome, 137-138; second war with
Rome, 139-140
Kobad II (Siroes), i, 148; peace treaty with
Heraclius, 148
Kohandil Khan (brother of Dost Muham-
mad), i, 394, 395; returns to Kandahar,
ii, 61; 62, 63; death, 64, 65
Kohat, i, 281, 295
Kolhapur, i, 324
Konkari, i, 320
Kophen, vide Kabul
Kophene, i, 8
Koran, i, 13, 172, 258
Kotal, ii, in
Krasnovodsk, ii, 86
Kubha, vide Kabul
Kucha, district of, 1,151
uchan, i, 329, 349
Kudur-Nankhundi, King of Elam, sack of
Erech by, i, 22
Kufa, i, 172, 174
Kuhak, i, 4
Kuh-i-Baba, i, 5, 7, 153, 170
Kuh-i- Khwaja, ii, 92
Kuh-i-Malik-i-Siah (the Mountain of the
Black Chief), i, 3, 4; ii, 202, 206; cairn
erected on, 207; 208
Kuhistan district, i, 230
Kuh-i-Taftan, ii, 206
Kuhlberg, Colonel, Russian Commissioner,
ii, 1 66
Kujbaz, battle of, ii, 73
Kujula Kadphises I, i, 118
Kul-i-Malik, i, 287
Kunar, River, i, 7, 288
Kunar Valley, i, 66
Kundar, River, i, 3
Kunduz, i, 156, 250, 254, 259
Kunduz Mountains, ii, 223
Kupkan, i, 328
Kur,i, 334
Kur, River, i, 107, 192, 236
Kurdistan, i, 19
Kurds, i, 329
Kurigalzu III, i, 27
Kurram, ii, 114, 115
Kurram Valley, ii, no, in, 114, 156,
3 2 3345> l l l
Kursul, the Baga Tarkhan, i, 168
Kurt dynasty, i, 15
Kurt Maliks, foundation of the dynasty of
the, i, 243; extinguished by Tamerlane,
244
Kushan, the, i, 100
Kushan dynasty, i, 1 18
Kushi, ii, 117
Kushk, River, ii, 163
Kushk, town of, i, 2, 9
Kushk-i-Nakhud, ii, 141
Kutayba ibn Muslim, i, 160; campaigns
of, 161 et seq.; death, 164
Kutb-ud-Din Aibak: appointed Viceroy
and captures Delhi, i, 212; assumes title
of Sultan, 213-214
Kutb-ud-Din Muhammad, a prince of
Ghur, i, 209, 216
Kutlagh Nigar Khanim (mother of Baber),
i*77
Kuwait, i, 157
Kuyuk (son of Ogotay), reign of, i, 229, 2 3 1
Kwei-shang (or Kushan), i, 118
Labienua, Roman general, i, 1 1 1
Lade, battle of, i, 50
Lagash, i, 22
Laga-Turman, last King of the Turkish
Sahi dynasty of Kabul, i, 189
Lahore, i, 194, 196, 197, 210, 211, 213,
289, 290, 291, 297, 298, 303, 305, 311,
3131 34 1 * 354 357 3S 8 3S9> 3 66 > 373>
389; ii, 1,9,64
Lahore, Treaty of, i, 387
Lajward, i, 246
Lake, General (Lord), victories of, i, 375,
376
Lampaka (now Lamghan), province of, i,
154
Lamsdorff, Count, ii, 232, 233
398
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Landi Kotal, i, 3; ii, 274.
Lane-Poole, Prof. Stanley, i, 205, 252
footnote, 2j 6 footnote, 295
Lansdowne, Lord, Viceroy of India, ii,
169, 232
Laodice (wife of Antiochus II), i, 80
Larkana, i, 345
Latham, Captain H. B., ii, 139 footnote
Lawrence, A. W., i, 36 \footnote, 71
Lawrence, Captain George, ii, i 3 footnote,
20, 27, 31, 52 footnote, 56, 58
Lawrence, Sir Henry, letter to Lord
Stanley, ii, 70 and footnote
Lawrence, Sir John (later Lord): negoti-
ates for Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1855,
ii, 65; the close border policy of, 70;
75>77
Layas or Ayaz, i, 245
Lazgis, the, i, 34.7
Lazica (ancient Colchis), campaigns of, i,
142, 145, 148
Leilan, i, 335
Leonidas, King, i, 51
Le Strange, Guy, i, 157 footnote, 26 3 foot-
note
Liegnitz, i, 228
Lockhart, Dr. Laurence, i, 325
Lockhart, Sir William, i, 10
Loftus, Lord, ii, 107
Logar Valley, ii, 112
Lohanis, the, i, 295
Lomakin, General: proclamation and
campaigns of, ii, 89; defeated at Geok
Teppe, 89
Longfellow, H. W., his poem ' ' Kambalu ' ',
i, 232
Lopnor, i, 121
Lora Hamun, i, 4
Lord, Dr., i, 402; ii, 15, 20
Louis IX, King, i, 229
Louis XIV, King, i, 322
Loveday, Lieutenant, ii, 19
Lovett, Major Beresford, ii, 94
Low, C. R., ii, 46 footnote, 47 footnotes, 48
footnote, 49 footnote
Low, Sir Robert, ii, 185
Lucian, i, 79
Lucullus, i, 105
Ludhiana, i, 387, 394
Lulubi, i, 22
Lumsden, General Sir Peter, ii, 161, 162,
163; his recommendations re the
Boundary Commission, 165
Luris (or Gypsies), i, 135
Luristan, i, 19, 42, 257
Lut, the great desert of Persia, i, 245
Lutf Ali Khan, i, 326
Lyall, Alfred (later Sir Alfred), Foreign
Secretary, ii, no, 152
Lydia, invasion of, by Cyrus the Great, i,
434S
Lynch, Major Hyacinth, ii, 1 39 footnote^
his account of the battle of Maiwand,
144
Lysimacma, i, 79
Lysimachus, i, 74; battle of Ipsus, 76, 77;
defeat of, and death, 78
Lytton, Lord, ii, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108,
113, 115, 116, 133
Macaulay, Colman, ii, 239
Macaulay, Lieutenant, ii, 187
McCaskill, General, ii, 50, 57
McCrindle, J. W., i, 139 footnote
Macedonia, i, 49, 51; rise of, under
Philip and Alexander, 58 et seg., 72, 74,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80; invadt 1 \>y the
Gauls, 79; first Macedonian War,
85-86; second Macedonian War, 86,
7
McGovern, Dr. W. M., i, 98, 134
MacGregor, Captain (Political Officer), ii,
25,29,40,41
Mackay, Dr., i, 17 footnote, 25
Mackenzie, Captain Colin, ii, 31 and/oo/-
note, 48
Mackeson, Captain, ii, 46
Maclaren, Brigadier, ii, 29, 30
MacLean, Major-General C. S., ii, 201
McMahon, A. H., i, 3 footnote
McMahon, Captain (later Sir) Henry, ii, 9 1
and footnote; Commissioner on boundary
between Afghanistan and Indian Em-
pire, 1894-1896,201-207; the benefits
to Afghanistan, 207; British Commis-
sioner and Arbitrator between Afghan
and Persian claims in the province of
Seistan, 208; presented with Order of
the Sardari, 229
Macmunn, Lieu tenant-General Sir George,
i, 3 51 footnote] ii, 4 and footnote
Macnaghten, William (later Sir William),
Chief Secretary to Indian Government,
i, 403, 405, 406; policy during First
Afghan War, ii, i et seq.^ his mission
to Ranjit Singh, i ; envoy to Shah Shuja,
5; sends mission to Herat under Major
Todd, 8; 9, n, 13; surrender of Dost
Muhammad, 20; decides that British
troops must remain in Afghanistan, 21;
22, 24, 27; negotiations with Afghan
Chiefs, 30; murdered by Akbar Khan,
31; 40; the Simla Manifesto, 339-34^
Appendix A
McNeill, John (later Sir John), i, 405;
visit to Herat, 409; sends Major Todd
on a mission, ii, i
Maconachie, Richard (later Sir Richard),
British Minister at Kabul, ii, 322
Macpherson, Brigadier-General, ii, 133
Macrianus, Prefect, i, 127
Macrinus, Roman Emperor, i, 116
INDEX
399
Madam, capital of the Sasanian monarchs,
i, 159, 174
Madaktu, city of, i, 19, 30
Maffey, John (later Sir John), defines
Khaibar demarcation, ii, 288
Magi, the, i, 117
Magnesia, battle of, i, 86, 89, 103
Mahabharata, the, i, 97
Mahendra, Indian seditionist, ii, 287
Mahmud of Ghazni, the " Idol-Breaker ",
i, 14, 187; ascends the throne and
secures recognition of the Caliph, 187;
first Indian expeditions of, i88j defeats
the Ilak Khan, 188-189; defeat of an
Indian confederacy, 189; annexed Ghur,
189,* overthrow of Sahi dynasties of
Kabul, 189; expedition against Khwar-
izm, 190; expedition against Muttra
and Kanauj, 1905 expedition against
Somnath, 190$ annexed Buwayhid pro-
vinces, 192$ death and character, 191-
192, 198; and the Seljuks, 204-205;
230
Mahmud, King (son of Muhammad), i,
2 5 8
Mahmud, successor of Sabuktigin, i, 184,
l8 5
Mahmudabad, village of, ii, 142, 144
Mahmud-al-Hasan, Maulana, religious
leader, ii, 259
Mahmud (brother of Sultan Ahmad), i,
271
Mahmud (eldest son of Mir Wais), i, 326;
appointed Governor of Kandahar, 326
Mahmud Khan, Sultan, ruler of Badakh-
shan, i, 271, 279
Mahmud Lodi, Sultan (brother of Sultan
Ibrahim), i, 295, 297
Mahmud Shah: Governor of Herat, 1,371,
372, 381; ascends the throne, 383;
Ghilzai rebellion, 383-384; dethrone-
ment of, 384-385; escape of, 386;
again becomes king, 388; 391, 400
Mahmud (son of Ghiyas-ud-Din), i, 213
Mahmud (son of Maudud), i, 197
Mahmud Tarzi, chief Afghan representa-
tive at Mussoorie Conference, ii, 288;
290; treaty signed after Mussoorie
Conference, 364-369, Appendix H
Maidan Pass, ii, 52
Maimana, ii, 63, 75
Maiwand, battle of, ii, 142-146
Majd-ad-Daula, Buwayhid Prince, i, 192
Majdud (brother of Maudud), i, 196
Majd-ud-Din, Vizier of Saif-ud-Din, i,
209
Maka, <vide Makran
Makran, i, 44, 49, 122, 125, 135, 165
and footnote, 307, 337
Malakand, i, 3
Malcolm, Captain (later Sir) John: first
mission to Persia, i, 378; second
mission, 379
Malik Kaward of Kerman, i, 206
Malik Mahmud: raises army and marches
to Gulnabad, i, 327; Tahmasp twice
defeated by, 329
Malik, Shah, Seljuk, reign of, i. 206
Malleson, Colonel G. B., i, 351 footnote
Mallet, Bernard, ii, 102 footnote
Malloi, the, i, 68
Mallu Khan (brother of Sarang Khan), i,
259, 260
Malta, ii, 108
Malwa, i, 138, 303, 324
Mamelukes: dynasty, i, 180; 234 and
footnote', battle of Ayn Jalut, 234;
battle of Abulistin, 237; battle of
Hims, 237
Mamun, i, 178-179; golden age of Mos-
lem culture, 179; 182,197
Mamun II, i, 190
Mandane, Princess (daughter of Astyages,
and mother of Cyrus the Great), i, 41
Mandu, i, 298, 312
Mangu (son of Tuli), i, 229, 237, 243
Manishtusu, i, 21
Man Singh, Raja* i, 306
Mansur, Abu Jafar, i, 174, 176, 230
Mansur (son of Maudud), i, 197
Mansur I of Bukhara, i, 186
Mansur II, i, 184
Manuel II Comneni, i, 263
Manupur, the battle of, i, 354
Maracanda (now Samarkand), i, 65
Maragha, i, 235
Maratha Empire, i, 320, 321, 324
Marathas, i, 320, 321, 324, 358 et seq.
Marathon, battle of, i, 43, 50
Marcellinua, Ammianus, i, 12$ footnote,
130
Marco Polo, i, 10, 230; journeys across
Asia to China, 245; across Asia Minor
and Persia to Hormuz, 245; across the
Lut to Badakhshan, 245; across the
Pamirs to China, 246-247; return to
Venice, 247; 309
Mardonius, i, 50
Marghilan, i, 271
Margiana (modern Merv), i, 90, no
Marmora, Sea of, i, 60
Marshall, Sir John, i, 17 footnote, 25
Masjid-i-Gauhar Shah, royal mosque, i,
268
Massagetae, the, i, 45, 83, 140
Masson, Charles, i, 16
Mastung, ii, 14
Masud I, i, 193; final defeat of, by the
Seljuks, 194-195; deposition and death,
1955 *>5
Masud II (infant son of Maudad), i, 207
Masud III, i, 208
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
400
Masudi, Abul Hasan AH, Arab historian,
' II7 - .
Masum Khan, Persian Commissioner, n,
94, 96
Mathura (Muttra), i, 96, 97, 100, 120
Maudad (son of Masud I), i, 195, 196;
campaign against the Seljuks, 196;
rebellion of the Rajas, 196; rebellion
of Toghril Beg, "the Ingrate", 1965
rebellion in Ghur, 196-197; death, 197
Maues, Sakae leader, i, 101
Maurice, Emperor, i, 144., 145, 14?
Maurya Empire, i, 75, 85, 90
Mayo, Lord, ii, 77, 100
Mazanderan, i, 222, 227, 256, 329, 338,
Mazar-i-Sharif, i, 105 ii, 113
Mazdak, i, 137
Mecca, i, 157, 175* 206, 230, 244, 248,
249, 301, 309
Medes, the, i, 28, 38; migration of, 3$;
the Empire of, 39; culture and art of,
41
Media, i, 35; Deioces, 36; Phraortes
conquest of the Persians, 36; Scythian
invasion, 36} Cyaxares subjugates
Scythians, 37; 71, 81, 83, 95, 96
Media Atropatene, i, 126
Medina, Muhammad's " flight " to, i, 157,
175, 206, 249
Mediterranean Sea, i, 28, 29, 74, 204, 234
Megasthenes, envoy to the Court of
Chandragupta, i, 75
Mehdi, Caliph, i, 175, 182
Mehdi Ali Khan, mission to the Court of
Persia, i, 377
Mehmandost, i, 331
Mehrab, Khan, ii, 7
Melon, pretender to Seleucid throne, i, 95
Memnon, Greek general, i, 60
Menander, Bactrian general, afterwards
king,i, 90, 93, 96, 97, 100
Merkits, the, i, 220
Merv, town, i, 2, 90, 122, 125, 159, 160,
161, 162, 167, 174, 177 X 7 8 194' 20 5'
206, 211, 215, 222, 243, 250, 286,
347; ii, 88
Merwan II, last Caliph of the Umayyad
dynasty, i, 172
Meshed, i, 199, 250, 263, 268, 308, 330,
33 2 347 35i> 356, 373' 4M ", 88
Mesopotamia, i, 19, 62, 81, 87, 96, 108,
128; evacuation of, by Hadrian, 115,
116, 119, 132
Metcalfe, C. T., mission to Ranjit Singh
i 387
Mian Kangi, district of, ii, 208
Michni Pass, ii, 1 14
Midleton, Lord, ii, 223
Mihirakula (son of Toramana), reign of, i
138; people's rising against, 139
Miletus, fall of, i, 50, 60, 80
Vliller, M., Russian Consul, ii, 209
Viiltiades, battle of Marathon, i, 51
Ming, Emperor, i, 119
Vlingrelia, province of, i, 104
Minorsky, Prof. V., 14 footnote
Minto, Lord, i, 380, 387
Mir Alam of Seistan, i, 356
Mir Ali Khel, ii, 278
Mir Ali Shir, Nawai, Vizier, i, 271
Mir Alum, Governor of Balkh, ii, 80, 126
Miranshah (son of Tamerlane), i, 260
Mir Atalik, ii, 122, 123
Mire, battle of the, i, 254 footnote
Mirkhwand, historian, i, 267 footnote ,
269, 271 * *"
Mir Wais, sent to Isfahan as prisoner, i,
325-326
Mitannu, i, 34
Mithra, god, i, 34
Mithradates I, King of Parthia, i, 95
Mithradates II, King of Parthia, i, 99,
101, 104
Mithridates, King of Pontus, i, 81
Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, i, 104;
and Mithridatic wars, 105-106
Mithridatic wars, i, 105-106
Moa, vide Maues
Modhar Arabs, i, 175
Moghul dynasty, i, 276 et seq.
Moghulistan, i, 254
Moghuls, i, 306, 307, 309, 315, 317, 319,
320, 323, 324, 325
Mogulkot, post of, ii, 278
Mohamera, ii, 66
Mohan Lai, i, 403 footnote^ ii, 28 footnote
Mohenjo-Daro, city of, i, 25, 26
Mohiuddin, Shaykh, surveyor, ii, 213
Mohmand, ii, 176
Mohmands, the, i, 283; ii, 176; settle-
ment of the boundaries, 186
Mokanna (" Veiled Prophet of Khura-
san "), rebellion of, i, 175
Molon, Satrap of Media, i, 84
Mongolia, i, 143, 149, 150
Mongolians, i, 1 3
Mongols, the: policy of, i, 218; origin
of, 218; first campaigns in Central
Asia, 220; capture of Urganj, 222;
devastation of Khurasan, 222$ Merv
and Nishapur destroyed, 223; cam-
paigns against Jalal-ud-Din, 223-225*;
invade Europe, 228; capture and sack
Baghdad, 232
Moore, Thomas (poet), i, 192
Mornington, Earl of (later the Marquess
Wellesley), i, 374
Morrison, J. L., ii, 69 footnote
Moscow, i, 257
Mosul, i, 28, 206, 285
Motamid, Caliph, i, 181, 182
INDEX
401
Motaaim, Caliph, i, 180
Muaffak (brother of Caliph Motamid), i,
181, 182
Muavia, Caliph, founder of U mayyad
dynasty, i, 159
Muazzam, Prince, i, 323
Mughan plain, i, 336
Mughlani Begum (mother of Muin-ul-
Muik),i, 358
Muhabbat Khan, Chief of Kalat, i, 313,
337
Muhammad, Prophet, i, 125, 146;
founds a mighty empire, 157; 203, 249
Muhammad Afzal (son of Dost Muham-
mad), ii, 6ij appointed governor of
AfgAar*Turkistan, 64
Muhammad Akram (son of Dost Muham-
mad), ii, 6 1
Muhammad Ali (head of the Abbas id
family), i, 172
Muhammad Ali (son of Shir Ali), ii, 72;
killed at battle of Kujbaz, 73
Muhammad Amin, Governor of Kandahar,
ii, 715 killed at battle of Kujbaz, 73
Muhammad Azim Khan (eldest of the
Barakzai brothers), i, 392, 393
Muhammad Azim (son of Dost Muham-
mad), ii, 6 1
Muhammad Bahiim, Governor of the
Punjab, i, 209
Muhammad bin Suri, i, 189
Muhammad bin Zaid, i, 183
Muhammad (brother of Sultan Sanjar), i,
214.
Muhammad Hakim Mir%a (half-brother
of Akbar), i, 304; invades the Punjab,
3 5
Muhammad Hasan Khan, ii, 133
Muhammad Hashim (brother of Nadir
Khan), ii, 319
Muhammad Husayn, Hazara, ii, 192
Muhammad Husayn (father of Mirza
Haidar), i, 283
Muhammad Ibrahim Khan (a younger son
of Shir Ali), ii, 72
Muhammad Khan, Sirdar, Bayat, i, 369
Muhammad Khan, Sultan, Governor of
Peshawar, i, 393, 394, 397, 406
Muhammad Khan Afghan, i, 330
Muhammad Khudabanda (better known
as Uljaitu), q.v.
Vuhammad Kuli Khan Kajar, i, 349
Muhammad Nabi Mirxa, ii, 107 footnote
Muhammad Rank, Afghan general, ii, 72
Muhammad Rahim Khan, Sayyid, ii, 125
Muhammad Saidal Khan, i, 332, 333
Muhammad Sam, i, 242
Muhammad Sarwar, ii, 129
Muhammad Shah, accession of, i, 323, 324
Muhammad Shah, Emperor of Delhi, i,
339* 34i 344
VOL. II
Muhammad Shah, successor of Path Ali
Shah, i, 401, 402, 403, 4075 second
siege of Herat, 408 et seq.
Muhammad Shah Khan, Ghilzai Chief,
ii, 63
Muhammad Sharif, Governor of Farah
and Girishk, ii, 71; defeated at battle
of Kujbaz, 73
Muhammad (son of Ismail), i, 230
Muhammad (son of Kasim), i, 165
Muhammad (son of Mahmud), i, 193
Muhammad Wali Khan, Sirdar, heads
Afghan Mission to Europe, ii, 292
Muhammad Yusuf Sadozai, ii, 66, 67
Muhammad Zaman Khan, i, 330
Muin-ul-Mulk (son of Kamr-ud-Din, the
Vizier), i, 355, 357
Muir, Sir William, i, i $j footnote; ii, 104
Muizz-ud-Din Muhammad, i, 210; Indian
campaigns of, 211-212$ defeat of, by
Ala-ud-Din of Khwarizm, 212; last
campaign of, in India, 213; death, 213
Muizz-ud-Din (third son of Ghiyas-ud-
Din), reign of, i, 244
Mukarrab Khan, regent, i, 259
Mukim (son of Zunnun Arghun), i, 280,
283, 284
Mulahida (or " Heretics "), sect of, i, 230,
232
Mulhar Rao Holkar, ruler of Indore, i,
360
Multan, i, 68, 165, 188, 190, 205, 209,
211,224, 230, 259, 333, 357
Mumtaz Mahal, Shahjahan's unfailing
love for, i, 319
Munro, General Sir Charles, ii, 272, 278
Murad Baksh, i, 318
Murchakhar, i, 331
Murghab River (or Aksu River), i, 6, 21 ij
ii, 162, 163
Murray, Dr. Gilbert, i, 226 footnote
Murshid, Mulla, Baber's ambassador to
Sultan Ibrahim and to Daulat Khan, i,
289
Musa (elder son of the Caliph Mehdi),
known as Hadi, q.v.
Musa Khan of Herat, Afghan Com-
missioner, ii, 209
Musa (son of Jafar-al-Sadik), i, 230
Musandam, Cape, i, 122
Mushk-i-Alam, religious leader of the
Ghilzais, ii, 190
Muslim bin Said al-Kilabi, i, 166
Muspratt, General Sir Sydney, adviser to
the Dobbs Mission, ii, 294
Mussoorie Conference, ii, 289-290, 360-
363, Appendix G
Mustasim BUlah, last Caliph of Baghdad, i,
232
Mutadid, Caliph, i, 182, 183
Mutawakkil, Caliph, i, 180
2 D
402
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Muttra, i, 190
Muzaffar dynasty, i, 257
Muzaffar Husayn Mtrza, Safavi Governor
of Kandahar, i, 307
Muzaffar Khan of Multan, i, 387
MuzafTar-ud-Din, Amir, of Bukhara, ii,
79, 80, 123
Muziris, port, i, 122
Mysore, i, 75, 321, 324, 374
Nab, i, 21 1
Nabonidus, King, i, 44
Nabopolassar, King, i, 385 forms alliance
with Cyaxares, 38-39
Nadirabad: Nadir Shah names town, i,
337> population of Kandahar moved to,
338
Nadir Khan, ii, 270; movements during
Third Afghan War, 277; besieges the
fort at Thai, 279; defeat of, 2805
returns to Afghanistan to fight against
Habibulla, 319; suffers reverses, 320;
but succeeds at third offensive, 320-3215
proclaimed king, 3215 summary of his
early career, 322; Soviet- Afghan Treaty,
3245 publishes declaration of policy,
324; assassination of, 327
Nadir Kuli Beg (later Nadir Shah), i,
328
Nadir Shah: recovers lost provinces of
Persia, i, 325-338; origin of, 328;
defeats a force of Abdalis, 329; decides
to crush Abdalis, 330; defeats Ashraf at
Mehmandost, 331; reoccupies Hamadan,
Kermanshah and Tabriz, 331; besieges
Herat, 3325 captures Herat, 333; defeat
of, 334; victory of Baghavand, 335;
coronation of, 336; prepares to attack
Kandahar, 3365 march on Kandahar,
337 siege of Kandahar, 337; campaign
in Baluchistan, 337; surrender of Kan-
dahar, 337; 338; despatches an envoy
to Delhi, 339; capture of Kabul and
Peshawar, 340; battle of Karnal, 342;
Delhi campaign, 342-344; Sind cam-
paign, 344-345; campaign against
Bukhara and Khiva, 345; Daghestan
campaign, 347; second battle of Bagh-
avand, 348-349; risings in Persia, 349;
assassination and character of, 349, 350
Nagarahara, province of, i, 1 54
Nagarahara (modern Jalalabad), city of, i,
'54
Nagor, i, 209
Nagrakot, i, 196
Nahr-ul-Kalb, Beirut, i, 28
Naimans, the, i, 220
Najib Khan, Rohilla Chief, i, 360
Najib-ud-Daula, i, 362, 363
Nakhichevan, i, 256
Namri (Kurdistan), i, 35
Nana, goddess, image of, carried off to
Susa, i, 22; restored to Erech, 22; 31
Nangrahar, i, 196
Nao Nehal Singh, ii, 19
Napoleon Buonaparte: expedition to
Egypt, i, 376; plans to attack India
across Persia, 377
Naram-Sin, Stele of, i, 22
Narbada, i, 320
Narmashir, i, 85
Narses, Sasanian monarch, campaigns of,
i, 129-130
Nasatya, god, i, 34
Nasir, Caliph, i, 217, 221, 227
Nasir Khan, Governor of Kabul, i, 354
Nasir Khan, Subadar of Kabul at d Vesha-
war, i, 340, 341
Nasir Khan of Kalat, i, 356, 359, 371
Nasir Mirxa (brother of Baber), i, 284
Nasir-ud-Din, Shah, ii, 75
Nasir-ud-Din of Tus, astronomer and
philosopher, i, 236
Nasir-ul-Mulk (eldest son of the Mehtar
of Chitral), ii, 187
Nasr, Samanid prince, i, 182
Nasratabad, ii, 95
Nasr ibn Sayyar, Governor of Khurasan, i,
167; the campaigns of, 168, 171
Nasr II, reign of, 183-184; 198
Nasrulla Khan, Shahxada (second son of
Abdur Rahman), his visit to England,
ii, 193
Nasrulla Khan, Sirdar ', ii, 226, 230, 246,
257, 258, 260, 261, 263
Nasrulla Khan of Bukhara, ii, 1 1
Nasrulla Adirxa (second son of Nadir Shah),
''.343
National Council, i, 336
Nawab Jabbar Khan (brother of Dost Mu-
hammad), ii, 1 1
Nawab Zaman Khan Muharnmadzai, ii,
45
Naxos, i, 50
Nazr Muhammad: raids of, 314; pursued
by Moghul army, 315; Abbas helps
with troops, 316
Nearchus, i, 68, 69
Near East, i, 17
Nebuchadnezzar, King (son of Nabo-
polassar), i, 39, 40, 41
Necho, King of Egypt, i, 40
Nehavend, battle of, i, 159, 170
Nek Muhammad, Sirdar, ii, 117
Nero, Emperor, i, 1 13
Nesselrode, Count, i, 405, 407
New Chaman, i, 2, 3, 5; ii, 202, 205, 207
Nicaea (modern Kabul), i, 8, 66
Nicanor, Satrap of Media, i, 74
Nicephorus, Emperor, i, 177
Nicholson, John, Deputy-Commissioner
of Peshawar, ii, 7 1
INDEX
403
Nicolls, Sir Jasper, Commander-in- Chief
in India, ii, 38, 47
Nicopolis, i, 261
Niedermayer, Captain Oskar, German
Agent, ii, 2515 leader of German
Mission to the Amir, 255; his scheme
for a coup d? Itat found to be impracti-
cable, 258$ failure of his Mission, 258
Nile, valley of, i, 17, 18, 25, 72
Nineveh, i, 28, 31, 32, 36, 385 Cyaxares'
first assault, 39; final assault and fall,
.39> 62
Ninhar (Ningrahar), King of, i, 14.
Nisa, i, 223
Nishapur, i, 159, 172, 174, 181, 182, 184.,
194^ 2*0, 205, 215, 222, 223, 225, 236,
250, 263, 308, 356
Nisibis, i, 116, 126, 127, 130, 139, 144
Nizak, Prince of Badghis, i, 1615 rebellion
of, 162
Nizam, dynasty of the, i, 323
Nizami, poet, i, 269-270
Nizam-ul-Mulk, i, 206, 207, 230; Vice-
roy of the Deccan, 340, 341, 342
Noman, Arab Chief, i, 146
Norman, Sir Henry, ii, 104
Northbrook, Lord, proposed guarantee, ii,
99; 100, 101, 102, 104, 106
Northern Afghanistan, i, 25
Northern Khurasan, i, 333
North-West Frontier: problem of, an
economic question, i, 319; Auranzeb
leaves, 320; main body of imperial
forces on, 321; negotiations during
Durand Mission, ii, 175; 196
North-West Frontier Province, i, 3, 13
Noruz, Mongol general, i, 240, 243
Noshirwan the Just, King: accession, i,
141; peace with Rome, 141; sack of
Antioch, 141} second peace with
Rome, 142; the Lazica campaigns,
142$ third war with Rome, 144; death,
144
Nott, General Sir William, ii, 15, 22;
expedition against the Ghilzais and the
Durranis, 22, 23; 27; despatches a
brigade to Kabul, 29; 37; at Kandahar,
42, 43; 49; battle of Ghoaine, 51;
enters Ghazni, 52$ reaches the Kabul
Valley, 52
Nowshera, i, 393
TJuchens, the, founders of the Kin
dynasty, i, 214
Nuh II, i, 184, 187, 199
Nurjahan, wife of Emperor Jahangir, i,
3 J 3> 3H
Nur Muhammad, Sayyid, Afghan Com-
missioner, ii, 95, 99, roo, 104
Nur Muhammad Alizai, i, 352; conspiracy
against Ahmad Shah, 352, 353
Nushki, i, 3, 4, 1 1
Nushtigin, Governor of the Punjab, i,
207, 208
Obaydulla, Indian seditionist, ii, 287; ex-
pelled from Afghanistan, 296
Ochus, Prince, afterwards Darius III, q.v.
Odenathus of Palmyra, i, 128
O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, ii, 271 footnote
Ogotay (third son of Chenghis), i, 226,
227, 2285 death, 228
Olympias (wife of Philip of Macedonia), i,
5 8 7 2 ^73
Omar Khayyam, i, 136, 199, 200-201
Omar Shaykh Mirxa (father of Baber), i,
270, 271$ death, 276
Omar II, i, 169
Onon, River, i, 226
Orakzais, i, 307
Orenburg, ii, 83, 84
Orissa, i, 307
Orkhan Beg (son of Othman Chuk), i, 249
Orobazus, Parthian ambassador, i, 104
Orodes II, King of Parthia, i, 107, 108,
no
Orta Bel Pass, ii, 182
Osh, i, 221, 279
Osman, Topal: Turkish army under, i,
334; defeat of, and death, 335
Osmanli Turks, i, 249, 261
Osroes, King of Parthia, i, 114-115
Ostrogoths, the, {,141
Othman Chuk, eponymous founder of
Ottoman dynasty, i, 249
Othman Khan of Samarkand, i, 213, 220
Otrar, i, 265
Ottoman Empire, i, 332
Oudh, i, 297, 323, 374, 375
Outram, Captain (later Sir James), in First
Afghan War, ii, 18; in Anglo- Persian
War, 66
Oways, Sultan, Barlas Chief, i, 269
Oxus, River: valley of, i, i; 2, 5; its
main source, 6; 7, 18, 13, 65, 99, 117,
122, 135, 143, 153, 156, 160, 161,
185, 187, 1 88, 203, 206, 21 5, 216, 222,
223, 243, 246, 249, 253, 255, 259, 264,
3H 34 1 * 344> 345' 3 6 9> 88
Oxyartes, Governor of Bactria, i, 66
Oxyartes, Satrap of the Paropamisus, i,
88-89
Pacorus (son of Orodes), i, no, nij defeat
of, and death, 111-112
Pacorus II, King of Parthia, i, 1 14
Paetus, Roman general, i, n 3
Paianda Khan, Chief of the Barakzais, i,
3 8i
PakAfunivali, Pathan code of honour, i, 16
Palaeologus, Emperor Michael, daughter
married to Abaka Khan, i, 236
Palestine, i, 23, in
404
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Palmer, Colonel, ii, 4.3, 55
Palmerston, Lord, i, 400, 405, 410
Palmyra, i, 128
Pamir, River, tributary of River Oxus, i,
2,6
Pamirs, i, 2, 5, 6, 119, 120, 121, 156,
232, 309; Anglo-Russian rivalry, ii,
178; boundary questions finally settled,
1 80
Pan-Chao, Chinese general, i, 119$ estab-
lishes authority of China to Caspian
Sea, 119; 1 20
Panipat: battle of, i, 291-292, 304} third
battle of, 362
Panjdeh Crisis: Russian advance on the
Panjdeh Oasis, ii, 162} defeat of the
Afghans, 164; settlement of, 165
Panjshir, i, 251
Panjshir, River, i, 7, 66, 90, 118, 121,
'54> "> S3
Papak (father of Ardeshir), i, 125
Paphlagonia, i, 104
Parachinar, ii, 277
Parapamisadae, the, i, 75
Paris, Matthew, i, 227, 231
Parker, E. H., i, 142 footnote
Parmenio, Macedonian general, i, 61
Parni, the, i, 83
Paropamisus, i, 4, 5, 90, 94, 96, 101, 118
Parsa (or Pars), province of, vide Fars
Parsii, the, i, 100, 101
Parsua, district of, i, 35, 37
Parsumash, district of, i, 30, 37, 38, 39,
4
Parthamasiris, Prince of Armenia, i, 1 14
Parthia, i, 39, 44, 635 rise of, 82$ earliest
mention of, 82-83; 85, 87, 90, 93, 95,
99, 100, 10 1 ; first intercourse with
Rome, 104; Armenian aggressions
against, 105; internal affairs, 107;
invasion of, by Craasus, 108; battle
of Carrhae, 1095 invasion of Syria,
in; Mark Antony's expedition, 112;
struggle for Armenia, 113; last invasion
of, by Rome, 116} summary, 117
Parushapur (Peshawar), i, 120, 154, 155
Parysatis (wife of Darius II), i, 53, 56
Pasargadae, i, 41, 45; occupation of, by
Alexander the Great, 625 69
Pashtu (language), i, 16
Pasiani, the, i, 100
Pasni, i, 68
Patala, i, 68,91
Pataliputra (Patna), i, 75, 90, 93, 96
Patan, capital of Gujarat, i, 21 1
Pathans, the, i, 1 3
Payanda Khan, Sirdar, Barakzai (Sarafraz
Khan), i, 368, 371
Paykand, i, 160, 161
Peel, Sir Robert, ii, 39
Peiwar Kotal* i, 3; ii, battle of, ill, 112
Pelly, Sir Lewis, Commissioner of Pesha-
war, ii, 104, 105
Pelusium, i, 46
Penkelaotis, i, 66
Perdiccas, Macedonian regent, i, 71, 72,
Pergamum, i, 103, 105
Perovski, Count, ii, 84
Peroz (son of Yezdigird III), i, 160
Persepolis, i, 18, 41; occupation of, by
Alexander the Great, 62; 94, 127, 192,
197
Perseus, King of Macedonia, i, 92, 103
Persia: Persians and Medes conquer
Iranian Plateau, i, 33 et seq.\ Cyrus the
Great, 43 et seq.\ Alexander tJ.e'Great,
58 et seq,\ decline of Persian Empire, 146
et seq.\ first invasion of, by Arabs, 157;
battle of Khadesiya, 158; Arab con-
quest of, 159; Abbasid dynasty and its
decay, 171 et seq.\ growth of Persian
language, 197; birth of Persian litera-
ture, 198; Tamerlane's early campaigns
in, 256; sieges of Kandahar, 316-317;
Nadir Shah, 328 et seq.', French negotia-
tions with, 377-379; siege of Herat,
400; mission of Captain Burnes, 401
et seq.\ Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853,
ii, 65; occupation of Herat, 65-66;
Anglo-Persian War of 1857, 66; cam-
paigns against the Turkoman, 88
Persian Baluchistan, i, n, 183
Persian Gulf, i, 19, 20, 21, 27, 29, 87,
93, 115, 119, 183, 245, 248, 285; ii,
IO2
Pertinax, Emperor, i, 1 16
Peshawar, i, 8, 118, 122, 187, 189, 197,
211, 213, 289, 295, 303, 309, 320;
capture of, by Nadir Shah, 341; 354,
37 373 3 8 3> 3 8 5 39 2 > 397 4 6 >
ii, 2, 9, 14, 39, 64, 104, 108, 323
Peshin, district of, ii, 156, 157
Peshiva^ i, 324
Pesth, i, 228
Peter the Great, annexations of, i, 327
Petre, F. Loraine, ii, 139 footnote
Phaleron, i, 52
Pharnaces (son of Mithridates VI), i, 1 1 1
Pharsalia, i, no
Phasis, River, i, 107
Phayre, Major-General, his march via
Quetta, to relieve Kandahar, ii, 150 *
Philip, King of Macedonia, i, 57, 58;
battle of Chaeronea, 58; assassinated,
? 8
Philip Arrhidaeus, i, 71, 73
Philip le Bel of France, i, 241
Philip (son of Cassander), i, 77
Philip V of Macedon, i, 86
Philippi, battle of, i, 1 1 1
Phoenicia, i, 107
INDEX
405
Phraates II (son of Mithradates), King of
Parthia, i, 96, 99
Phraates III, King of Parthia, i, 106
Phraates IV, i, 112, 113
Phraortes, the Mede, i, 36; reduced
Teispes to position of vassal ruler, 38
Phrygia, i, 72, 79
Piraeus, i, 105
Pirai (successor of Balkatigin), ruler of
Ghazni, i, 186
Pir Muhammad (son of Jahangir), i, 259,
267
Pir Paimal, village of, ii, 14.8
Pishin, ii, 114
Pithon, satrap of Media, i, 72
Plataea,<ibattle of, i, 52
Pliny, i, 44, 123
Plutarch, i, 52, 74, 77, 104, 107, 109,
no
Poles, the, i, 228
Pollock, General Sir George: at Peshawar,
ii, 39; 44; forces the Khaibar Pass, 46-
475 relief of Jalalabad, 47; his reply to
Ellenborough, 48; 49$ advances to
Gandamak, 49, 50; battle of Tezin,
50; reoccupation of Kabul, 56-57; 94,
96, 112
Pollock, General Sir Richard, Commis-
sioner of Peshawar, ii, 94; 102
Polybius, the historian, i, 82, 92, 95
Polyperchon, Regent of Macedonia, i, 73
Polytimetus (now Zerafshan) Valley, i,
65
Pompey: takes command of Roman
armies,!, 106, 107; results of campaign,
107$ fight for power with Caesar, no
Pontus, i, 107, in
Poona, i, 320, 374, 375
Porus, King, Alexander's battle with, i,
66-67
Pottinger, Lieutenant Eldred: second
siege of Herat, i, 408 and footnote^
saves Herat from falling, 410; at
Charikar, ii, 29; 42, 54, 55; verdict of
his court-martial, 58
Pottinger, Sir Henry, the Resident in
Cutch, i, 408; ii, 6, 8
Praaspa, capital of Media Atropatene, i,
112 (later Shiz, q.v.)
Pratap, Indian seditionist, ii, 287
Prester John, i, 220 and footnote
iPrimrose, General J. M., ii, 140
Prithvi Raja, the Chauhan Raja of Delhi,
i, 212
Procopius, the historian, i, 1 34
Prophthasia (now Farah), i, 64
Psammatichus III (son of King Amasis),
i,46
Psyttalea, Island of, i, 52
Ptolemy, King of Egypt, i, 72, 74, 76,
77,78
Ptolemy Keraunus, i, 78; assassination of
Seleucus, 79; defeat of, and death, 79
Ptolemy Philadelphus, reign of, i, 78
Ptolemy III (Euergetes), reign of, i, 81,
83, 84
Publius (son of Crassus), i, 109
Pul-i-Khisti, ii, 163
Pul-i-Sanghin, i, 286
Punic Wars: First, i, 85; Second, i, 86
Punjab, the, i, 48, 57, 67, 93, 94, 97, 125,
188,208, 211,259, 281,288, 289,290,
291, 303, 323; Ahmad Shah's first
invasion of, 3545 second invasion,
355; third invasion, 357; fourth
invasion, 358} seized by the Marathas,
358-359; dominated by the Sikhs,
366; 372, 373, 392
Pura, i, 68, 69
Purdil Khan (brother of Dost Muhammad
Khan), i, 394
Pushyamitra, Commander-in-Chief to
Asoka, i, 75
Pydna, battle of, i, 92
Pyne, Salter (later Sir Salter), ii, 173 and
footnote
Pyrrhus, Prince of Epirus, i, 77, 78
Pythia, the, i, 91
Quetta, ii, 6, 7, n, 106, no, 114, 156,
290
Rafi bin Lais, i, 178, 182
Rafi ibn Harthama, i, 182, 183
Raghunath Rao, i, 358
Rahman (son of the murdered Abdullah
Khan Sadozai), i, 330
Rahmdil Kahn, ii, 65
Rajputs, the, i, 212, 293, 294, 320
Ram Hormuz, i, 27
Ram Raja, i, 321, 324
Rana Sangraur Singh, generally called
Sanga, i, 293, 296
Ranjit Singh, Raja of Lahore, i, 380, 381;
British Mission to, 386-387; 389, 393,
397> < 39 8 > 399> 4-06,407} Macnagh ten's
mission to, ii, 1-2; 3, 9
Raphia, battle of, i, 84
Ras Malan, i, 68
Ravi, River, i, 25, 291
Rawalpindi, Peace Treaty of, ii, 284
Rawlinson, Captain (later Sir) Henry, ii,
22, 36, 37 footnote, 42, 43, 59, 65 foot-
note, 66 footnote, 83 footnote
Rawlinson, Prof., i, 36 footnote
Rawlinson, Sir Henry, i, 137, 379 footnote,
402 footnote
Ray, vide Rei
Raymond, Count of Tripoli, i, 231
Regiatan Desert, i, 4, 1 1
Rei, i, 174, 177, 178, 192, 206, 216, 273
Rennell, Major, " the Father of English
406
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Geography", i, 13; surveyed Ganges
Valley in 1764, 13; and Himalayas,
'3
Resht: occupied by Peter the Great, i,
327; the Treaty of, 334
Rhagae (near Tehran), the medieval Rei,
i,4i
Rhodes, i, 76
Ridgeway, Colonel (later Sir) West, British
Commissioner, ii, 161, 163; Russo-
Afghan Boundary Commission, 166;
the Khamiab and Khwaja Salar question
successfully settled with Russia, 167-
1685 178
Rig-Veda, the, i, 8
Rim-Sin, Ring of Elam, i, 23
Rimush, successor to Sargon I, i, 21
Ripon, Lord, Viceroy of India, ii, 133, 152
Riza, Imam, i, 250, 264
Riza Kuli (son of Nadir Shah), i, 332,
3415 blinding of, 348
Roberts (father of Lord Roberts), Brigadier-
General, ii, 27
Roberts, Lord, ii, 100, 107 footnote, no
footnote, in, 112, 1 1 6, 117; enters
Kabul, 1 18; proclamation of, 118, 1195
132, 133, 136; march from Kabul to
relief of Kandahar, 146, 147, 149
Robertson, Dr. (later Sir) George, Political
Agent at Gilgit, ii, 184 Z.K& footnote
Rockhill, W. W., i, i\% footnote
Rodwell, General, i, 20 1 footnote
Roe, Sir Thomas, i, 312
Rohtas, fort of, i, 305
Rome, i, 85, 86, 87; battle of Magnesia,
86; battle of Pydna, 92; eastward
expansion of, 103; first intercourse
with Parthia, 104; Mithridatic wars,
105; struggle for Armenia, 113; the
last invasion of Parthia, 1 16; last battle
with Parthia, 116; Ardeshir and, 125-
126; campaigns of Shapur I, 127; cam-
paigns of Narses, 129; campaigns of
Shapur the Great, 130-131; treaty
with Armenia, 131; Julian's expedi-
tion, 131; treaty with Shapur III, 132;
campaign of Bahram Gur, 134; rela-
tions with Yezdigird II, 136; Kobad's
first war, 137-138; Kobad's second
war, 139-140; peace treaty with
Noshirwan, 141; Noshirwan's third
war, 144
Roos-Keppel, Colonel (later Sir) George,
ii, 244
Roshan, i, 6; ii, 160, 174
Roshanais, a fanatical sect, i, 307
Ross, Major-General, ii, 132
Ross, Prof. E. D., i, 27 -6 footnote
Ross, Sir Denison, 157 footnote, 252 foot-
note
Rotas, fortress of, i, 397
Roux, Charles, i, 377 footnote
Roxana (wife of Alexander the Great), i,
66,71,73,88
Rubruquis, William of, Mission to the
Mongols, i, 229
Rudagi, Persian poet, i, 198
Rukn-ud-Din (son and successor of
Shams-ud-Din), i, 243
Rukn-ud-Din (son of Taj-ud-Din), i, 243
Russell, Lord Odo, ii, 109 footnote
Russell, Major, retreat of, in Third Afghan
War, ii, 278
Russia, i, 4, 6, 228, 257, 2$8, 327, 334;
declares war on Turkey, 336; 398, 400,
407; ii, 79, 80; first Khivan expedition,
83; advance of, across Centraf Asia,
83 et seq.y further conquests and
annexation of Khiva, 85-87; Anglo-
Russian agreement of 1873, 87; Russo-
Turkish campaign, 89; 98, 99, too,
102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108; en-
courages Abdur Rahman, 127; her
policy in Central Asia supported by
Germany, 162; Panjdeh Crisis, 162
et seq., 178; Anglo-Russian Boundary
Commission of 1895, 181; Russo-
Afghan relations during the reign of
Amanulla, 287; policy of Soviet
Government and its reaction on feeling
in Afghanistan, 290; British-Russian
trade agreement, 292; Soviet- Afghan
treaty, 324
Russian Turkistan, ii, 98
Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission, ii,
1 66; the question of Khamiab and
Khwaja Salar, 167; Ridgeway's success-
ful settlement with Russia, 167-168;
the signature of the final protocols,
168
Russo-Turkish War, ii, 106
Rustam, the champion, i, 124, 257; ii, 92
Rutbil, King of Kabul, i, 163
Saadabad, Treaty of, ii, 333
Saadat Khan, Subadar of Oudh, i, 323,
340, 341, 342
Sabaji Bhonsle, Maratha Chief, successor
to Adina Beg, i, 359
Sabuktigin (son-in-law of Alptigin), i, 14,
184, 1 8 6; annexed Kabul, 187; ap-
pointed Governor of Khurasan, 187
Sabzawar, i, 256 t
Sachiu (Tun-huang), i, 247
Sad, the Atabeg of Fars, i, 217, 227
Sadashir Bhao (or Rao), i, 360, 362
Sad bin Zangi, i, 235
Sadhus, i, 317
Sadi, poet, i, 235, 274
Sado, Chief of the Durrani tribe, i, 351
Sadozai dynasty, fall of, i, 391
Safavi dynasty, i, 267, 285
INDEX
407
Safdar Jang, Nawab of Oudh, i, 355
SafFar dynasty, rise of, i, 180, 183, 185,
198
Sand Kuh, i, 3, 5
Sagala (Sialkot), i, 90, 97
Said bin Amr al-Harashi, i, 166
Said bin Othman, Arab leader, i, 1 60
Said Muhammad (half-witted son of Yar
Muhammad), ii, 65
Saif-ud-Din, Prince of Ghur, i, 209
Saif-ud-Din Muhammad (son and successor
of Ala-ud-Din), i, 21 1
Saighan, ii, 15, 19
St. John, Colonel (later Sir Oliver), ii, 141,
153
Saka,*, /^j.
Sakae, the, i, 35, 51, 83, 90, 98, 99, 100,
1285 conquests of, ii, 101
Sakastcne (Seistan), i, 99
Salamis, battle of, i, 51-52
Sale, Brigadier-General Robert: his march
to Jalalabad, ii, 24-25; refuses to march
back to Kabul, 26; 36, 37; siege of
Jalalabad, 40
Sale, Lady: Journal quoted, ii, 52 footnote,
53> 54
Saleh Muhammad, Akbar's officer,
negotiates with British for release of
captives, ii, 55
Saleh Muhammad, Commander- in- Chief
of Amanulla Khan, ii, 270, 273
Salih ibn Nasr, ruler of Bust, i, 180, 181
Salih Khan, Superintendent of Nadir
Shah's household, i, 349
Salih (uncle of Abul Abbas), i, 172
Salim, Prince, i, 309, 311
Sali Noyan, i, 243
Salisbury, Lord: orders appointment of
British officer to Herat, ii, 101 and
footnote, 102, 108, 109, 134, 166, 167;
letter of, to Abdur Rahman, 194
Saman, founder of Samanid dynasty, i, 182
Samand Khan, Naivab, ii, 120
Samanid dynasty, i, 182; at its zenith,
183; 185
Samarkand, i, 7, 122, 152, 153, 160, 161,
162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 178,
182, 184, 217, 221, 222, 226, 244,
245, 249, 254, 258, 259, 260, 263,
264, 265, 268, 269, 270, 271, 277,
278, 279, 286, 287, 305, 313; ii, 86
Samarra, i, 180
Sambhaji Raja, i, 321
Sambhar, i, 190
Samsa-iluna, King of Babylon, i, 26
Sandeman, Captain (later Sir) Robert, ii,
105, 106, 155
Sandracottus, vide Chandragupta
Sanjar, Sultan, Seljuk, i, 208, 209, 210,
2115 early career of, 214; defeat of, by
the Kara Khitai, 214-215; defeat and
capture of, by the Ghuzz, 2155 escape
of, and death, 215; 231
San Stephano, Treaty of, ii, 89
Sara or Sarai, Barka's capital, i, 245, 249
Sarakhs, i, 34, 256
Sarasti, fortress of, i, 193
Sarasvati (later Arachosia), i, 34
Sardes, i, 43, 44, 52, 54; captured and
burned, 50; surrendered to Alexander,
60; 77, 84
Sargon I, i, 21
Sargon II, King of Assyria, i, 29
Sari, i, 329
Sarikol Valley, i, 6, 232
Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, i, 311, 322, 351
footnote
Sarmatians, the, i, 41
Sasanian dynasty, i, 117, 121; rise of, 124
Satibarzanes, Satrap of the Areians, i, 63-
6 4
Satok Boghra Khan, i, 184
Sattagydia, i, 44
Saxa, Decidus, Roman general, i, 1 1 1
Sayyid dynasty, i, 287, 288
Sazonoff, Serghei Dmitrievich, Russian
statesman, ii, 250
Schiemann, Doctor, ii, 84 footnote
Schouvaloff, ii, 109
Schveikovski, General Pavolo, Governor
of Ferghana and Russian representative
on Anglo-Russian Commission of 1895,
ii, 181
Scylax, a Greek, i, 48
Scythians, the: invasion of, i, 36-37; 38,
41, 65; campaign led by Darius, 48
Seistan, i, 7, 47; Alexander the Great
marches through, 64-65; 85, 90, 93,
124, 159, 162, 170, 180, 181, 182,
183, 187, 188, 191, 207, 243; Tamer-
lane's campaign, 254, 283, 337; ii, 8;
First Seistan Mission, 1872, 91 et seq.\
geographical outline, 91; a historical
note on, 92; invaded by Nadir Shah,
93; arbitration commission on, 94-96;
201, 208, 209
Seleucia, a Syrian city, i, 84, 115, 116,
122, 129
Seleucia, capital of Parthia, i, 108
Seleucus I (Nicator): rise of, i, 72, 73, 74;
reoccupies Babylon and creates an
Empire, 74-75, 76, 77, 78; assassination
of, 78
Seleucus II (Callinicus), i, 81; battle of
Ancyra, 81; 83
Seleucus III, i, 82, 84
Seleucus IV (Philopator), i, 91
Scljuks, the, i, 194, 195; importance of,
203; origin of, 204; foundation of
dynasty, 205; Toghril Beg, 205;
Seljuk dynasty at its zenith, 206
Semineau, General, i, 408
408
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Semites, supremacy of, i, 32
Seneca, i, 103
Sennacherib, naval expedition of, i, 29;
campaigns against Elam and Babylonia,
29-30
Seringapatam, i, 375
Seurk, Shaykh y i, 352
Severus, Emperor, i, 116
Severus Alexander, i, 125-126
Shabkadar, ii, 186
Shah Abbas the Great, i, 306; captures
Herat, 308; his contemporaries, 310;
makes peace with the Turks, 3115
captures Kandahar, 312; subjects of,
313; death, 314; 336
Shah Abbas II, i, 306, 307, 308, 3 10, 3 1 1 ,
312,313, 314, 319
Shah Ahmad (Durrani monarch), i, 9
Shah Alam (Ali Gauhur, son of Alamgir
II), i, 364, 366
Shah Alam (Prince Muazzam), i, 323
Shah Beg, i, 290
Shah Husayn: taken from harem to ascend
throne, i, 325; surrenders and abdicates,
3 26 > 3 2 733 8 . o
Shahin, Persian general, i, 148
Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavi dynasty,
i, 267, 285$ defeats the Uzbegs, 285-
286, 312
Shahjahan: marches with reinforcements
to Mandu, i, 3125 Muhabbat Khan
flies to join, 313; accession of, 314;
the Uzbegs and, 314; 316; summary
of the reign of, 318
Shah Kamran, ii, 8
Shah Mahmud Khan, Afghan Minister of
War, ii, 324, 325
Shah Mahmud Sultan (brother of Atsiz of
Khwarizm), i, 216
Shah Mansur, of the Muzaffar dynasty, i,
257
Shah Morad of Bukhara, i, 369
Shah Muhammad, an officer of Bairam
Khan, i, 304
Sha/mama, Persian epic, i, 48, 124, 125,
199; ii, 92
Shahr-Baraz, Persian general, i, 147, 148
Shahrud, i, 410
Shah Rukh (grandson of Nadir Shah), i,
356; treaty with Ahmad Shah, 357;
370
Shahrukh Mirxa, i, 305
Shah Rukh (son of Tamerlane), i, 259,
266, 267; reign of, 268
Shah Shuja, vide also Shuja-ul-Mulk, ii,
i 2> 3 5 7* 8 > I2 J 4 J 7 l8 20 >
21, 23, 28, 40, 41$ last days of, 44,
Shah Tahmasp, i, 299, 300, 304, 306
Shahu (eldest son of Raja Sambhaji),i,32i,
3*4
Shah Wali Khan, Afghan Prime Minister,
3 2 5
Shah Wali Khan, Ahmad Shah's Vizier, i,
362, 363, 368
Shahyar (youngest son of Jahangir), i, 314
Shakespear, Captain Sir Richmond, ii, 8,
56, 84 and footnote
Shal, ii, 6, 14
Shalmaneser III, King of Assyria, i, 35
Shamakha, i, 327
Shams-ud-Din, Muhammad I, founder of
the dynasty of the Kurt Malih, i, 243
Shams-ud-Din Khan, Governor of Ghazni:
battle of Ghoaine, ii, 51; flight to
Kabul, 52
Shansab, ancestor of the natives of Ghur,
i, 189
Shansabani house of Ghur, i, 243
Shapur Mirza (a younger son of Shah
Shuja), ii, 61
Shapur the Great: first campaigns against
Rome, i, 1 30; Eastern campaigns, 1 30;
second campaign against Rome, 1315
expedition of Julian, 131; retreat and
death of Julian, 132; restoration of the
five provinces and of Nisibis, 132; death,
133
Shapur I: invades Syria, i, 1265 second
campaign against Rome, 127$ capture
of Valerian, 127; the later years of,
1285 contest with Odenathus, 128
Shapur III, i, 133
Sharaf-ud-Din, historian, i, 259 footnote,
260, 262, 264, 273, 274
Shash (modern Tashkent), i, 152, 163,
182
Shawal range, i, 3
Shaybani, Muhammad, known as Shahi
Beg, i, 267, 271, 272, 278, 279, 282,
284, 285, 286
Shaybani tribe, i, 146, 305
Shekabad, ii, 29
Shelton, Brigadier, ii, 28, 29, 30; retreat
from Kabul, 33
Shen-Kwei (Kobad), i, 141
Shensi, i, 149, 150, 214
Sherpur, ii, 116, 118
Sher Shah Lodi, i, 297, 298, 299
Shias, the, i, 15, 179, 229, 230, 285, 353
Shibarghan, i, 246, 315; ii, 63
Shibar Pass, i, 1 54
Shignan, i, 6} ii, 160, 174, 180
Shikarpur, i, 395; ii, 5, 61
Shilhak-Inshushinak, King of Elam, i, 27
Shinwaris, the, Abdur Rahman's campaign
against, ii, 189
Shir Afzul, besieges British force at Chitral,
ii, 184
Shir Ali Khan, successor of Dost Muham-
mad: announces his accession to Vice-
roy, ii, 72; Afzal Khan and Azim Khan
INDEX
409
rebel against, 72-73; battle of Kujbaz,
73 j rebellion of Abdur Rahman, 73-
74; battle of Sheikhabad, 74; battle of
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 74; battle of Zurmat,
76, 77; visits India, 77, 78; internal
reforms, 78, 79; Persian Mission to,
795 receives Mir Abdul Malik of
Bukhara, 79-80; Yakub Khan rebels
against, surrenders, and is forgiven, 81,
82; flight and death of, 112, 113;
Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.\ 118,
123, 140
Shiraz, i, 27, 181, 227, 235, 257, 331
Shirin (wife of Khusru Parviz), i, 147
Shir Muhammad Khan, General, i, 384,
3851 t^e rebellion of, 386
Shir Singh, Maharaja of the Punjab, ii, 61
Shirwan, province of, i, 235, 312
Shirzad, son of Masud III, i, 208
Shiz (earlier name Praaspa, y.i/.), fortress
of, i, 145
Shuja-ud-Daula, Nawab of Oudh, i, 360
Shuja-ud-Dola (son of Zaman Khan), ii,
45
Shuja-ul-Mulk (brother of Zaman Shah),
i, 381, 383, 384; ascends the throne,
385, 386; expedition against Kanda-
har, 394-3955 defeat of the Amirs of
Sind, 395; advance on Kandahar, 395,
396; murder of, ii. 45; vide also under
Shah Shuja
Shustar, i, 257
Shutargardan Pass, ii, 112, 117
Shutruk-Nahhunte, King of Elam, i, 27;
stele of, 27
Siah-Push Kafirs (Wearers of Black
Clothes), i, 10, 15; converted to Islam,
10; Imra, the Creator, god of, 10; 259
Sialkot, vide also Sagala, i, 290
Sibi, i, 290; ii, 1 14, 156
Sidon, i, 76, 77
Sikandarabad, i, 360
Sikandar Gha<zi, Sultan, i, 288
Sikandar Shah (Ahmad Khan), i, 302
Sikaram, i, 5
Sikhs, the, i, 358; the origin and rise of,
364; dominate the Punjab, 366; 389
Silesia, i, 228
Silk Letters Conspiracy, ii, 258
Simla, ii, 99, 100
Simla Manifesto (Oct. i, 1838), ii, 3 and
^Appendix A
Simonich, Count, i, 404, 409
Sinai desert, i, 248
Sind, i, 9, 24, 48, 91, 97, 100, 135, 191,
37 345 358, 3$9 372, 385* 39 2 > >
i>5
Sind bad, a Zoroastrian, heads a rebellion, i,
*74
Singara (modern Sinjar), i, 130
Sin-Kiang (or Chinese Turkistan), i, 6
Sinope, i, 104
Sir Daria (Jaxartes), River: Kutayba raids
across, i, 164, 165, 167, 226, 265;
Russian advance up the, ii, 85
Sirhind, i, 125, 303, 341, 354, 361, 366
Sir-i-Kul (Lake Victoria), i, 2, 6
Sir-i-Pul, i, 278; ii, 63
Sirjan, district of, i, 69
Siroes, -vide Kobad II
Sivaji, i, 320, 321
Sivas, i, 261
Skandagupta, ruler of the Gupta Empire,
1,138
Skeen, General Sir Andrew, in Third
Afghan War, ii, 275
Skinner, Captain, ii, 35
Skobeloff, General, ii, 89-90
Skrine, F. H., i, 157 footnote
Slade, Captain, ii, 145
Smith, Bosworth, ii, 69 footnote
Smith, Dr. Vincent, i, 71, 121, 12$ foot-
note, 296 footnote , 311, 321
Smith, Sir Euan, ii, 94
Smith, Sidney, i, 17 footnote
Smyrna, i, 262
Snow Mountains, i, 153
Sobraon, battle of, ii, 64
Sogdiana, i, 44, 88, 94, 98
Soghdian Rock, capture by Alexander the
Great, i, 65
Solomon, King, i, 122
Somatash, ii, 179
Somnath, i, 190
Sophagasenos, King, i, 85
Sophocles, i, 77
Soteriadis, Prof., i, 50-51 And footnote
Sothic cycle, introduction of, i, 18
Souriya, Queen: on Afghan women, ii,
304; Mullas object to her appearing
unveiled in public, 310
Spain, i, 85, 87
Sparta, i, 49, 51, 56; Cyrus the Younger
and, 54
Spin-Baldak fort, ii, 281
Spingawi Pass, ii, 1 1 1
Spitamenes, Persian general, i, 65, 72
Statira (daughter of Darius), i, 69, 71
Statira (wife of Artaxerxes) II, i, 56
Stein, Sir Aurel, i, 17 footnote, 62foatnote 1
66, 88 footnote, \^foQtnote\ ii, 92, 184
footnote
Stewart, Sir Donald, ii, no, 115, 117,
129; his march from Kandahar to
Kabul, 130; battle of Ahmad Khcl,
I3M '33
Stoddart, Colonel, i, 409, 411; ii, 8
Stolietoff, Major-General, ii, 97; mission
of, io6j 107, 108
Strabo, i, 32 footnote, 82
Strato I (son of Menander), i, 97, 101
Stratonice (daughter of Demetrius), i, 76
4io
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Sturt, Lieutenant, ii, 27
Subutay, Mongol general, i, 236
Sughd (Sughdiana), i, 166, 167, 173, 174
Sughdians, the, i, 160, 161, 163
Sui, national dynasty of the, i, 149
Sukkur, ii, 4
Sulaiman or Sulayman Mountains, i, 14,
251
Sulayman, Caliph, i, 164
Sulayman Mirxa (cousin of Humayun), i,
300, 305
Sulayman Mir%a (eldest son of Ahmad
Shah), i, 368
Sulla, i, 104-105
Sultaniya, city of, i, 241, 242
Su-Lu, Khakan of the Turgesh, i, 1 66, 1 68
Sumer, i, 20, 22, 25, 33; conquered by
Guti mountaineers, 22
Sumerians, the, i, 20; influence on civiliza-
tion, 24
Sung-Yun, Chinese pilgrim, i, 138, 139
Sunni Sect, the, i, 14, 353
Suraj Mai, Jat Chief, i, 360, 361
Surastrene, province of, i, 101
Surat, i, 320
Suritz, Bolshevist representative, ii, 288
Susa, city of, i, 19, 22, 27, 30, 31, 37, 49,
5 2 > 53' 54) Alexander's march to, 685
7i7 2 >93
Susia (medieval Tus), i, 63, 90
Susiana, i, 81, 126
Sutlej, River, i, 212, 303, 354, 387
Swat Valley, i, 66, 155
Syria, i, 21, 74, 76, 77, 79; invasion of
(third Syrian War), 80; 85, 87, 96,
107, 109, no; Parthian invasion, in;
invaded by Vologases III, 115, 119;
invasion of Noshirwan, 14*$ 14^ I7^>
204,207,231,234; invaded by Ghazan
Khan, 240
Syrian Gates, i, 60
Tabari, Abu Jafar Mohamed, historian, i,
125 footnote, 137, 142, 162 and footnote
Tabaristan, province of, i, 159; Yezid's
campaign, i, 164-165; 181, 183, 193
Tabas (or Tabbas), i, 230, 245, 381
Tabriz, i, 227, 241, 245, 256, 263, 265,
285,312, 327, 331, 332, 333
Taghdumbash Valley, ii, 182
Tahirid dynasty, i, 179, 182, 185
Tahirids, the, i, 1 8 1
Tahir " the Ambidextrous ", i, 178, 179
TahirII,i, 181
Tahmasp Mirza: i, 327, 329, 331; appoints
Nadir commander-in-Chief, 329; defeat
of, by Turks, 333; deposition of, 334
Tai-tsung, Emperor (Li Shih-Min),
founder of T'ang dynasty, i, 149-150,
152; crushes the Western Turks, 152
Tajiks, the, i, 14, 16
Taj Mahal, i, 319
Taj-ud-Din (brother of Izz-ud-Din), i,
H3
Taj-ud-Din Harb, Malik of Seistan, i, 21 1
Taj-ud-Din Yildiz, Governor of Kerman,
i> 213
Takhtapul, ii, 121
Takht-i-Suliman (Throne of Solomon), i,
H
Takla Makan desert, i, 1 19
Takrit, captured by Tamerlane, i, 258
Tala, island of, i, 236
Talas, i, 143
Talha (son of Tahir), i, 180
Talikan, i, 161, 223, 309
Tambal, leader of the conspirators Against
Baber, i, 278
Tamerlane, i, 242, 244; appointed
Governor of Kesh, 253; early adven-
tures of, 253; Seistan campaign, 254;
campaigns against Khwaja Ilyas, 254;
struggle with Amir Husayn, 254; con-
quest of Jatah and of Khwarizm, 255;
early campaigns in Persia, 256; final
conquest of Persia, Armenia, and
Georgia, 256-257; campaigns against
Toktamish, 257; again invades South
Persia, 257; occupies Baghdad and
captures Takrit, 258; invades and
plunders India, 258-260; battle of
Delhi, 260; last campaigns of, 260-261;
defeats Bayazid, " the Thunderbolt ",
261-262; projected invasion of the
Chinese Empire, 265; death and char-
acter, 265-266; tomb, 266; 267, 276,
278, 288, 308
T'ang dynasty, i, 149
Tangier, i, 175
Tanner, Colonel, at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, ii,
H7
Tapuria, i, 90
Tara Bai, i, 324
Taraghai, Amir (father of Tamerlane), i,
253
Taraori, battle of, i, 212
Taraz, i, 173, 184
Tardu Shad, King of Tukhara (Tok-
haristan), i, 1 53
Tarikh-i-Rashidi, the, i, 270, 284
Tarim, River, i, 119, 214, 220
Tarn, W. W., i, 71, 72 footnote, 87, 88
footnote, 90, 92, 94, 97, 101, i\%footn<^e
Tarsus, i, 54
Tartars, European designation for Mon-
gols, (j.'V.
Tashkent, i, 270, 277, 287; ii, 86, 97,
106
Tashkurgan, ii, 121, 182
Tasians, the, i, 18
Ta-ta, Arab designation for Mongols, q.v.
Taurus Mountains, i, 54, 82, 86, in
INDEX
411
Taxila, the city of, i, 66, 90, 97, 100, 101,
118
Taxiles, King, i, 66
Ta-yuan, the, i, 98
Tegh Bahadur (youngest son of Har
Govind), i, 365 and footnote
Tehran, i, 329, 331, 347, 374, 401; ii,
101
Teispes (son of Achaemenes), i, 37, 45
Tejen (Kabul), River, i, 8
Tekish, Khwarizm Shah, i, 216
Ten Thousand, retreat of the, i, 55, 61
Terek, River, i, 257
Termez, i, 122, 153, 249, 259, 264, 315
Teuman, King, i, 30
TeutofiiKnights of Prussia, i, 228
Tezin, ii, 35, 36; battle of, 50; 53
Thai, fort of, ii, 279; relief of, 279
Thales of Miletus, i, 40
T /tanadar of the Persian frontier, i, 322
Tharshish, a port, i, 122
Thebes, i, 56, 58; destroyed by Alexander
the Great, 59
Theodora (wife of Uun Hasan), i, 272
Theodore (brother of Heraclius), i, 148
Thcodosiopolis (modern Erzerum), i, 134,
138
Theophilus, Emperor, i, 180
Thermopylae, i, 51, 78, 86
Thessaly, i, 59
Thrace, annexation of, by Darius, i, 48,
495 5' 59
Tian Shan Pass, i, 122
Tiberius, Count, i, 144
Tiberius, Emperor, i, 144
Tibet, i, 13, 160
Tien-Shan range, i, 151
Tinis, i, 148, 227, 256, 336
Tiglath-pileser I, King of Assyria, conquest
of, i, 28
Tiglath-pilcser IV, King, founder of New
Assyrian kingdom, i, 29, 35
Tigranes, King of Armenia, i, 104, 105,
106, 107
Tigri, village of, i, 53
Tigris, River, i, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 30,
39, 50, 55, 62, 108, 114, 115, ii6;
Tilak, Commander of Hindu troops, i,
194
Tilsit, Convention of, i, 379
'iimarchus, Satrap of Media, i, 95
Timurid dynasty, i, 9, 267; renaissance of
art, 272 et seq.\ 285
Timur Mirxa, i, 356, 358, 359
Timur Shah, i, 367; accession of, 368;
Sind campaign, 369; Bukhara cam-
paign, 369; conspiracy against, 370;
death, 370
Timur (son of Shah Shiya), ii, 2, 9, n
Tippu, Sultan of Mysore, i, 374
Tiridates (Arsaces II), i, 83; annexed Hyr-
cania, 83; 89
Tiridates (son of Chosroes), i, 129
Tiridates I of Parthia, i, 1 1 3
Tochari, vide Yueh-chi
Tochi Pass, ii, 171
Tochi Valley, ii, 278
Todd, Major, Envoy to Herat, ii, i, 8, 17,
62,84
Toghril Beg, Seljuk king, i, 194, 2055
death, 206
Toghril Beg, " the Ingrate ", rebellion of,
i, 196, 207
Toghril III, i, 216
Toktamish, defeat of, by Tamerlane, i,
257 .
Toramana, Ephthalite king, i, 138
Torno, fort of, i, 320
Toynbee, Arnold, ii, 29 1 footnote, 309
Trajan, Emperor, i, 113; first campaign
against Parthia, 114; second campaign
against Parthia, 114-115; retreat of,
11$; 207
Transoxiana, i, 83, 160, 167, 168, 182,
183, 184, 185, 204; invaded by
Chenghiz Khan, 221; 236, 237, 252,
256, 268, 269, 278
Trapezus (modern Trebizond), i, 55
Trasimene, i, 86
Traxiane, i, 90
Treaty of Berlin, ii, 107, 108
Treaty of Paris, ii, 66, 67
Treaty of Peace of August 8, 1919, iii
358-359, Appendix F
Trebizond, i, 263
Trevor, Captain, ii, 3 1
Trilochapula, last monarch of the Hindu
Sahis, i, 189
Tripartite Treaty, ii, 2
Tripolis, i, 95
Tsatsobi Pass, i, 341
Tughluk dynasty, i, 258
Tughluk Timur Khan, Governor of Jatah
or Moghulistan, i, 252, 253, 254
Tukharistan (Tukhara), i, 10, 135, 153,
160, 161, 165, 167, 174, 181, 204
Tuli (son of Chenghiz Khan), i, 222;
destroys Herat, 225
Tumen, Turkish Chief, i, 143
Tung, Khakan of the Western Turks, i,
152
Tun (modern Ferdaus), i, 245 and /con-
note, 246
Turan, i, 125
Turbat-i-Shaykh-Jam, i, 250, 274, 299,
356
Turfan, i, 119, 151, 152, 153
Turgesh tribe, i, 166, 167
Turkey, i, 261; Shah Abbas attempts to
regain western provinces annexed by,
3125 Russia unwilling to face war with,
412
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
327; treaty with Russia for dismember-
ment of Persia, 327; provinces held by,
3285 3315 Nadir makes truce with,
332; 3335 Nadir decides to start cam-
paign against, 334; Russia declares war
on, 336
Turkistan, Chinese (or Sin-Kiang), i, 6,
119,121,134
Turko- German Mission to the Amir
during the Great War: Amir's declara-
tion of neutrality, ii, 2465 entry of
Turkey into the War, 246; Amir's
statement to British Agent at Kabul,
247; German influence in Middle East,
2485 German Emperor visits Con-
stantinople, 248; German activities in
Persian Gulf, 249; gains influence in
Persia, 251; Turko-German Mission
to Afghanistan, 252; German agents in
Persia, 252; the Mission of Wassmuss,
25 3 j formation of the South Persia
Rifles, 253; failure of von der Goltz,
2545 differences between Germans and
Turks, 254; Turko-German Mission to
Afghanistan, 254; reception at Herat,
2555 arrival at Kabul, 256; attitude of
Amir, 256; Turko-German Mission at
Kabul, 2565 the Amir's diplomacy,
257; dismissal of the Mission, 258
Turkoman: Persian campaigns against, ii,
88 j Russian defeat of, 89, 90
Turko-Persian Treaty of 1639, i, 335
Turks, 13, 15; rise to power, 142-143;
relations with Noshirwan, 143; con-
quest of the Northern Turks, 150; 334,
336, 350
Turshiz, i, 256
Tus, i, 178, 184, 199, 200
Tyre, siege and capture by Alexander the
Great, i, 61, 76, 84
Ubaidulla Khan, i, 305
Ubaydulla (nephew and successor of Shay-
bani Khan), i, 287
Ubaydulla (son of Ziyad bin Abihi), i, 160
Uch, fortress of, i, 211 and footnote^ 259
Uddiyana, province of, i, 155
Udny, Richard (later Sir Richard), ii, 1785
Chief Commissioner on Boundary Com-
mission, 183
Udny Commission, ii, 183 et seq.; siege of
Chitral, 184; Umra Khan and, 184;
claims of Abdur Rahman, 185; the
expedition into Kafiristan, 185
Uighur tribe, i, 1 84
Ulam-Buriash, Kassite Monarch of Baby-
lonia, i, 26
Uljaitu (brother and successor of Ghazan
Khan), i, 241 and footnote^ intercourse
with Europe, 241} campaigns of, 242$
revolt of Fakhr-ud-Din, 243-244
Ulugh Beg (son of Shah Rukh), i, 2685
interest in astronomy, 269; death, 269
Ulugh Mir%a^ i, 280, 285
Umaira, Queen (wife of King Zahir), ii,
329
Umarkot, i, 345
Umayyad dynasty, i, 159, 168, 1695 over-
throw of, 171, 172, 173
Umra Khan of Jandol, besieges British
force at Chitral, ii, 184, 185
Und, i, 156
Uppis of Partakka, i, 83
Ural Mountains, i, 278
Urartu, Kingdom of, i, 28, 40, 41
Ur dynasty, i, 22-23; conquest of Elam
and Lulubium, 22; Elamite^iA'vasion,
22
Urganj, capital of Khwarizm, capture of,
i, 222, 223
Urghundeh, ii, 1 1
Urtaku, King, i, 30
Urtupa, battle of, i, 257
Urumia (Urumiea, or Urmia), Lake, i, 35,
37, 112, 236, 312
Uzbeg, Khan of the Golden Horde, i, 242
Uzbegs, i, 10, 13, 267, 269, 270, 283,
284; defeated by Shah Ismail, 285;
defeat of, at Pul-i-Sanghin, 286; defeat
of Baber at Kul-i-Malik, 287; 301;
annex Badakhshan, 305; dispute over
Herat between Persians and, 306; 307,
3'3> 3H 3i5 3 1 ?* 3' 8 > 345> 34-6,
384; ii, 63
Vahri-Datya (Oxus), River, i, 34
Valerian, Emperor, i, 127; capture by
Shapur, 127
Vambe*ry, Arminius, ii, 85
Van, sack of, by Tamerlane, i, 256
Vardan-Khudat, king of Bukhara, i, 162
Varuna, god, i, 34
Vasudeva I, Kushan monarch, i, 121
Vendidad, the, i, 9, 33
Venice, i, 248
Ventidius, Publius, Roman general, i,
112
Vernoe, Fort, ii, 86
Victoria, Lake, ii, 180, 182
Victoria, Queen, ii, 98, 102
Vikramaditya, Raja, vide Himu the
" Corn-Chandler "
Viswas Rao (son of the Pesh'wa)^ i, 3607
363.
Vitkavich, Captain, i, 398, 400, 401,
407
Volga, River, i, 245
Vologases (brother of Firuz), i, 1 37
Vologases I, King of Parthia, 1,113
Vologases II, i, 114
Vologases III, i, 1 1 5
Vologases IV of Parthia, i, 1 16
INDEX
Vologases V, i, 116
Vonones, Parthian Prince, i, 100
Wade, Captain C. W., i, 394, 405; ii, i, 9,
14
Wahab, Major, ii, 187
Wakhan, district of, i, 2, 246; ii, 175, 181
Wakhijir Pass, i, 6
Waksh-ab, River, i, 7
Waller, Frances Tezeena, ii, 36 footnote,
54 footnote
Waller, Major, ii, 36
Wana, ii, 278
Wapshare, Lieutenant-General, storming
of the Spin-Baldak fort, ii, 281
WassnfUsif (German agent), ii, 249
Wathik, Caliph, i, 180
Waziristan, i, 3
Wei dynasty, i, 149
Welid, Caliph, i, 164
Wellesley, Colonel Arthur, i, 375
Weasels, C., 308 footnote
White, Major (afterwards Field-Marshal
Sir) George, ii, 117, 149; on battle of
Kandahar, 149
Wild, Brigadier-General, ii, 38, 39
Wima Kadphises II, i, 118, 120
Winchester, Bishop of, i, 231
Wolseley, Sir Garnet, ii, 136
Wood, Lieutenant John, i, 401, 402 foot-
note
Woodburn, Captain, ii, 23
Woolley, Sir Leonard, i, 17 footnc(e, 21,
35 footnote
Wu-sun, the, i, 98
Wu-ti, Emperor, i, 98
Wymer, Colonel, ii, 22
Xenophon, i, 39, 45; retreat of the Ten
Thousand, 55
Xerxes, invasion of Hellas, i, 51, 52
Yadyar Mir*a (a great-grandson of Gauhar
Shah), i, 270
Yahya bin Abdulla, Prince, i, 176
Yahya Ghuri, Prince of Ghur, i, 197
Yahya (son of Khalid), i, 176
Yakub bia Lais, Saffar, i, 180, 181, 182,
189
Yakub Khan (son of Shir Ali): mission
to the Shah, ii, 75; reoccupies Kandahar,
076$ rebellion of, against Shir Ali, 81;
captures Herat, 81-82; surrenders to
Shir Ali, 82; reappointed Governor of
Herat, 825 100, 101, 104, 112;
succeeds Shir Ali as Amir, 113; signs
Treaty of Gandamak with Britain, 1 14;
massacre of British mission to Kabul,
114-116; defeated at battle of Charasia,
117; abdication of, 1 1 8; 130
Yakut, Persian geographer, i, 170, 222
Yamin-i-Nizam, Persian Commissioner,
ii, 209
Yarkand, i, 119, 120, 121, 156, 220,
247, 309
Yarkand, River, i, 6
Yar Muhammad Khan, Vizier of Kamran
Af/nsa, i, 400, 408, 410; ii, 8, 22, 62;
seizes and plunders Shah Kamran, 62;
conspires against Kohandil Khan, 62,
63; campaigns of, 63
Yasodarman, leader of the rising against
King Mihirakula, i, 1 39
Yasur, Prince, the Nikudari, i, 244 and
footnote
Yate, Sir Charles, ii, 163
Yathrib (now termed Medina), i, 157
Yavanas, the, i, 90, 96, 97, 101
Yelui Tashi, founder of Kara Khitai
dynasty, i, 214, 215
Yemen, the, i, 175
Yermuk, battle of, i, 158
Yezd, i, 169,245, 326, 349
Yezdigird I (the Wicked), i, 133
Yezdigird II, relations with Rome and the
White Huns, i, 136
Yezdigird III, last Sasanian monarch, i,
148-149
Yczid II, the campaign of, i, 164-165
Yissugay (father of Chenghiz Khan), i,
219
Yonoff, Colonel, Russian officer, illegally
arrests Captain Younghusband and Lieu-
tenant Davidson, ii, 179
Younghusband, Captain (later Sir) Francis,
illegally arrested by Colonel Yonoff, ii,
179; 240
Yueh-chi, the, i, 98; conquest of Bactria,
100; 118, 120, 134
Yuen dynasty, i, 229
Yulatan, ii, 163
Yule, Sir Henry, i, i^footnote^ 235 f oof-
note , 245 footnote
Yunus Khan, i, 270, 277
Yusufzais, the: Baber'a campaign against,
i, 290; 295; 307,319, 344
Zadracarta, capital of Hyrcania, i, 63
Zafar-Nama, i, 259
Zagros Mountains, i, 20, 22
Zahir Shah, King, ii, 328 et seq.\ accession
of, 328; summary of his career, 329
Zainab (sister of Husayn), i, 338
Zakariya Khan, Governor of Lahore, i,
34i
Zama, battle of, i, 86
Zaman Shah; accession of, i, 370, 371;
his policy of, 371; rebellion in the
Punjab, 372; invades Sind, 372; 377;
conspiracy of the Chiefs, 381; the
blinding of, 381-382; 383
Zamasp (brother of Kobad), i, 137
414
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
Zamindawar, i, 159, 189, 283
Zanakhan, ii, 77
Zanasana of Partakka, i, 83
Zanzibar, i, 232
Zarah, i, 256
Zarangia, i, 69
Zaranj (medieval Zahidan), i, 159, 256;
ii, 92
Zaranka (modern Seistan), i, 47, 48
Zargan, i, 331 ^
Zaydan, Jurji, i, 169 and footnote , 176 and
footnote
Zcla, i, i T I
Zelenoi, General, ii, 161
Zemarchus, the Cicilian, i, 143
Zenobia, i, 128
Zetland, Lord, Secretary of State for India,
" 334
Zeugma, i, 122
Zhob Valley, ii, 278
Ziyad, i, 173-174
Ziyad bin Abihi, i, 160
Ziyad bin Salih, Governor of Bukhara, i,
i?3
Zoroaster, the Prophet, i, 65
Zoroastrianism, i, 87, 117, 120, 134,
169
Zugmayer, Dr., German Agent, ii, 252
Zuhak, legendary monarch, i, 189
Zu-Kar, battle of, i, 146, 158
Zulfikar Khan (elder son of Muhammad
Zaman Khan), i, 330; heads Abdali
rebellion against Nadir Shah, 332-333;
338 . '
Zulfikar Pass, i, 2j ii, 166
Zuzan, i, 223
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